In reality whatever policy we have pursued since independence has not succeeded in changing Pakistan's calculus against India

by Kanwal Sibbal 

Pakistan continues firing across the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K and the government has permitted the Indian Army to respond liberally. Our open system publicises our casualties, both Army and civilian, whereas Pakistan suppresses such information, presumably as part of a domestic narrative that it remains on top of the situation. 

Till today, for instance, they have not acknowledged our cross-LOC strikes in September 2016. Our disadvantage is that the effectiveness of our robust retaliation is not apparent to the public whereas the losses on our side are felt as a reality. This then encourages our soft-on-Pakistan lobby to question the rationale and effectiveness of our current policy of responding punitively to Pakistan's ceasefire violations because Pakistan's behaviour remains unchanged, with no significant reduction of cross-border terrorism. A review of the policy is therefore advocated, including the restoration of the November 2003 ceasefire agreement to end the current futility. It is also being suggested that our current policy is being guided and distorted by domestic political considerations, that it lacks careful calculation and desirable ends are not being achieved.

In reality whatever policy we have pursued since independence has not succeeded in changing Pakistan's calculus against India. Pakistan remains unpersuaded that it is in its own interest to live in peace with a much bigger and stronger neighbour, that it is an unequal battle that Pakistan cannot win given the huge disparities between the two countries which no external support can balance out. Despite wars it has lost, and the break-up of the country in 1971, it has not moderated its attitude towards India. Its fixation on Kashmir remains unchanged, as does its obsession with parity with India. It continues to seek "strategic stability" through an expansion of its nuclear arsenal and an NSG deal. It persists in using terrorism as state policy despite the internal blowback from the proliferation of jihadi groups in the country which has radicalised Pakistani society, swelled domestic terrorism and earned odium for Pakistan internationally.

To therefore suggest that some viable policy option to change Pakistan's calculus exists but has not been explored so far, or that the present government wants to be seen to be tough with Pakistan because of domestic political considerations, is not being objective and overlooks the fact that because of Pakistan's activities in Kashmir and spewing of communal poison against India, our Pakistan policy has always had an internal dimension.

Modi, in fact, has made several overtures to Pakistan since he took over but they have come to nought. The NSA-level dialogue established between the NSAs of the two countries remains operative and reflects our pragmatic approach. It gives Pakistan an opportunity to address India's concerns constructively and not manipulate the past weakness of our approach on the issue of terrorism. Even now that effort continues, with the Pakistani NSA lauding the merits of politically mainstreaming Hafiz Saeed and his JuD as a way of moderating their posture towards India.

Purveying this absurd line to us shows how ingrained are Pakistan's "lies and deceit" on the terrorism issue, to use Trump's words. Our security forces are being killed by Pakistani-abetted attacks inside Kashmir but that is not used as an argument to cease operations against terrorists there. Why therefore our losses in cross-LoC firing should be an argument not to inflict a price on Pakistan is not clear. An important reason to continue robust action on the LoC is also to create uncertainty in Chinese thinking about the security of its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passing through PoK.

The author is a former foreign secretary