China's Rising Influence in the Pacific through Sale of Arms

by Rear Admiral Dr S Kulshrestha (Retd)
‘There is one aspect of the recent revolution in Hawaii which seems to have been kept out of sight, and that is the relation of the islands, not merely to our own and to European countries, but to China. How vitally important that may become in the future is evident from the great number of Chinese, relatively to the whole population, now settled in the islands…….China, however, may burst her barriers eastward as well as westward, toward the Pacific as well as toward the European continent.’
- Alfred Thayer Mahan, Captain, United States Navy. New York, Jan. 30, 1893

Arms sales are always for enhancement of self-interest of the seller country, they are primarily for the furtherance of own strategic and commercial interests. The strategic reasons include widening of areas of influence vis-a-vis a perceived adversary, a projection of power in the desired region, quid pro quo proposition in times of hostilities through utilization of recipient’s military facilities and resources or for gaining political upper hand in international bodies. Arms sales are invariably never without a hidden agenda on the part of the seller. The sales are justified under the garb of strengthening self-defense capabilities of the recipient or providing support against an adversary. The commercial interests include furtherance of own defense manufacturing capabilities, enhancement of the profits accrued to its own defense industries or as a quid pro quo for other products of interest from the recipient.

This article takes in to account only the certified arms sales as recorded by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and does not detail political, social, educational or other soft-influence approaches in the Pacific region by China. The article considers a towering influence of the United States in the Pacific region since the second world war as a given and hence the arms sales by the United States (U.S.) are not discussed vis-à-vis China. Further, an attempt has been made to indicate to the rising Chinese influence in view of its sales of arms in the region so as to spur some timely corrective measures to ensure cooperative and collective freedom of the Pacific Commons. The countries considered in the article comprise South East Asia and South America.

American Approach to the Pacific Ocean

The American approach to the Pacific is largely an implementation of the thoughts of Mahan detailed in his book ‘The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present, and Future’. He had held forth on the importance of the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii) for the Pacific, stating that they should be under the American control. He foresaw that the commercial shipping from Japan and China would pass near to the Hawaii island group and thus provide America a strong position in the Pacific to safeguard its maritime interests. He had said that Hawaii forms the center of a circle of about 2100 nm radius in the Pacific, the periphery of which touches the archipelago system of Australia- New Zealand as well as the American west coast. The power which will hold Hawaii island group, in his opinion, would oversee the Pacific. It is for the simple reason that in case of hostilities the supply lines would stretch back to over 3000-4000 nm each way making such an assault against America unstainable.
Chinese Perception of the Pacific

Chinese view their seaboard frontier as seas of denied opportunities, seas where their access is perpetually under watch by inimical powers. The Chinese threat perception encompasses Japan in the north and Malacca in the south. The access to the SLOCS from the Gulf is overlooked by India right up to Malacca straits, thereafter by nations which have been under the western influence. Indian island Chain of Laccadives sits astride the important 9-degree channel SLOC and the Indian island chain of Andamans looks over the entry to Malacca Straits. It may be interesting to note that Singapore and Malaysian port of Penang lies just ~1176 nm and ~807 nm from Port Blair in Andamans.

The construct of the island chains is viewed as an attempt by the Western Powers to inhibit its naval expansion to within the First Island Chain. Once China has started looking seaward it finds layers of obstruction lined up in the Pacific to dissuade it from becoming a modern Naval power. The Chinese aim in the Pacific appears to be; to overcome or pierce the island chains at their weak points by strengthening its onshore long-range missile capabilities and its naval might. Japan and Guam are considered the strongest components of the first and second Island Chains. Taiwan and Philippines are relegated to a weak component status. However, it is held that Taiwan needs to be in the Chinese fold for a strong grip on the seas.

The US-Japan-Australia-India ‘quad’ (with France in support), if and when it takes concrete shape, would definitely be taken as an attempt to thwart Chinese ambitions of attaining global power status in its envisaged multipolar world. The positioning of road/rail mobile Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) DF-21 D and DF-26 C in the recent past is to put a serious deterrent in place to thwart any intimidating attempt by the U.S. Navy. It is claimed that the DF 21 D (CSS-5 Mod 5) has a range of ~1,500 km and is armed with a Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicle (MaRV). DF-21D has the ability to attack large ships like the aircraft carriers. DF-26 has a claimed range of 3,000-4,000 km enough to strike Guam.It is estimated that China has command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities required for targeting ships at sea. However, ASBMs also require over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting support that can integrate target information from multiple sources. Once fully deployed the Chinese ASBM system-of-systems would be the world's first system capable of targeting a moving carrier group with long-range ballistic missiles fired from land-based mobile launchers and would pose a grave threat to the US forces and bases in the region.

China appears to be forging along a strategic trajectory in the Pacific in that it is developing its Navy to blue water capabilities, upgrading its land-based ballistic missiles to target mobile assets of the adversary with conventional and nuclear warheads at great ranges, and courting countries in and across the Pacific through Arms sales to build up sympathetic logistic linkages to counter US influence. It is opined that China would keep building up its military might and its cross-Pacific network through the sale of arms and/or dole of economic benefits to nations till such time that Taiwan comes firmly in its fold thereafter it could plan for making a bold move in the Pacific to challenge the US power.

Arms Sales by China

Chinese arms and weapons are in demand as China has started supplying modern equipment which can meet the economic requirements of middle and lower tier countries. The arms are cheap, reasonably reliable and are supplied with access to easy term loans from Chinese banks. Chinese unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles are considered nearly as good as those offered for export by western countries. This has made China a leading arms supplier across the globe. It is understood that the guiding tenets of China’s arms export include, non-interference in internal matters of the country like its political or human rights record; perceived strengthening of the recipient’s self-defense capabilities; and bringing about regional arms balance. China also offers transfer of technology which makes countries gain a degree of self-reliance and allows development of their own defense industry. Whether the loans offered to push the recipients into a debt trap or force it to part with its resources or make it pliable to extract military gains for China is yet to be seen. The fact that the importing country becomes politically indebted to China cannot be denied, even when a country is hedging or diversifying its sources of arms import, as it would definitely adopt a more benign stance where China is concerned. 

The major countries where China seeks influence in the Pacific are those in SE Asia, Oceania, and countries in South America.

Arms Transfer to SE Asian Countries by China

China has arms trade with seven of Southeast Asia’s countries namely Indonesia, Myanmar Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, and Timor-Leste.

Some of the major Arms transfers to SE Asian countries by China during the period 2010-2017 as per SIPRI Arms trade register are:

Indonesia - Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), Anti-Ship Missiles (ASM), Naval Guns, Close-in weapon system (CIWS), Anti-Aircraft Guns (AA Guns), Multi-Rocket Launchers (MRL), various Radars, Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV).
Myanmar - Frigates, various Radars, ASM, Trainer/combat aircraft, Naval Guns, Main Battle Tanks (MBT), MRL, UAV, UCAV, SAM, Transport aircraft, Fifth generation aircraft J-17, Armoured Fire Support Vehicle (AFSV), Armoured Personnel Carrier(APC).
Malaysia - Littoral Mission Ship (LMS)
Thailand - Self-propelled MRL, ASM, Artillery Locating Radar/Weapons Locating Radar, SAM, Tank, Submarines, Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), Anti-ship and Anti-Submarine Warfare(ASW) torpedoes.
Cambodia - Helicopters and Transport aircrafts
Laos - Helicopters and Transport aircraft
Timor-Leste - Patrol boats

As far as the Philippines is concerned, China has recently donated 3000 Type CQ- A5b 5.56mm assault rifles (an unlicensed Chinese variant of the M16 rifle manufactured by Chinese state-owned arms manufacturer - Norinco) for tackling the drug mafia.

Arms Transfers to South American Countries by China

It is noteworthy that China has not only made arms sales to SE Asian countries and is making friendly overtures in Oceania but that it has also made deep inroads through arms sales in South America. Significantly, it has sold arms to Venezuela, Peru, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Trinidad & Tobago. 

Some of the major Arms transfers to South American countries by China during the period 2010-2017 as per SIPRI Arms trade register are:

Venezuela - Radars, Trainer/combat aircraft, Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles (SRAAM), Transport aircraft, self-propelled MRL/Mortar, infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), Armoured Protected Vehicles (APV), Armoured personnel carriers (APC), light tanks, ASM.
Peru - SAM, 122 mm MRL
Argentina - APCs
Ecuador - Air Search Radars, but the deal fell through in 2017. The plan to buy four radars from China for $60 million was canceled last year after Ecuador found they were incompatible with its military aircraft.
Bolivia - Trainer/ combat aircraft, helicopters, APV
Trinidad and Tobago - Light Utility Vehicles

Strategically China has thus ‘cupped’ the Pacific by securing not only its southeastern shores and Oceania but also the western shores of South America.

Conclusion

China has been working on the strategy of casting a strategic net across the seas with its arms sales which raises security concerns for nations directly or indirectly dependent upon sea trade. It has almost put in place a multi-polar power structure which would be difficult to dislodge. The string of pearls in the IOR has grown into a studded ‘Jade Necklace Across the Oceans’ with its pendant as the cupped Pacific.

The Chinese arms sales should not be wished away as insignificant since the market share of the US remains undented, it should instead be assessed in terms of collapsing-strategic and geopolitical space of the US and its future ramifications.

The option available today in the Pacific is striving for freedom of the Ocean commons and loosening the trade & economic web spun by China through strengthening the spokes in the San Francisco System. It may be worthwhile to look for additional spokes in the nearly 70-year-old system, especially in the third island chain. Island nations with a rich maritime heritage like Tonga offer a good strategic foothold and geostrategic advantage in the Pacific. For example, Tonga is ~3182 nm from US base at Guam, ~2752 nm from Hawaii, and ~1959 nm from Sydney. It has a large swath of uninhabited islands which can be utilized for security infrastructure. With the available sensor technologies innovative and cost-effective ISR, stations can be created which in turn would help in the development of the South Pacific Nations and wean them away from the influence of China.

A new node in these islands nations offers the US the flexibility of using the existing seaports and airstrips as well as an alternate maneuvering and Staging Area. In turn, it could accrue scarce strategic space and strengthen the third island chain.

Time to act is slipping away!