Russian S-400 missile air defence systems drive during Zapad 2017 military exercises

by Seema Sirohi

A lot is riding on the high-level dialogue between India and the US scheduled for early July. Can the ‘2+2’ meeting between the defence and foreign ministers smoothen the wrinkles currently fogging the relationship? From trade disputes to threats of US sanctions, the background noise has got louder in recent months. So, what’s up?

India filed a case last week in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) against the US decision to impose tariffs on imported steel and aluminium. New Delhi plans to slap addition duties of $165 million on American cashews, chickpeas, walnuts and wheat by June 21 unless the US moves.

New Delhi feels stung when Mexico and Canada got a waiver, while India didn’t. A WTO wrangle between friends is not unusual. But when it comes with an unproductive trade dialogue, things can get sticky.

The atmospherics have taken a hit lately. And atmospherics matter, because much of the ‘feel good’ factor in the India-US equation is sustained by words. Soaring rhetoric of “shared democratic values” and being “natural partners” helps obscure serious trade disputes and the slow pace of progress on defence projects and acquisitions.

And now the sword of US sanctions hangs over the relationship. Indian officials are nervously watching developments on Capitol Hill around the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), a law that defeats the purpose for which it was written: punishing Russia. The second and third order consequences of CAATSA seemed to have escaped its ambitious writers.

Last week, the Trump administration got no assurance from Senate Democrats that countries such as India would get a waiver when they do business with Russia, Iran and North Korea, the primary targets of CAATSA. The Democrats are itching to punish Republicans, and the politics is out of control. 

The attempts, so far, to amend CAATSA still leave a heavy burden of proof on the administration and affected countries. The latest effort asks for “specified steps, including terminating defence relationships with Russia or reducing reliance upon the Russian defence or intelligence sectors” before relief can be given.

India’s recent informal summits with China and Russia haven’t helped the atmospherics. Neither did the unannounced visit of deputy external affairs minister V K Singh to North Korea. The optics of Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in New Delhi last week talking of expanding ties “in all fields” are all too obvious.

But it’s India’s purchase of Russian S-400 Triumf anti-aircraft and anti-missile system that has unnerved Washington. Apart from triggering sanctions, US officials are worried about the security implications of the S-400s for their own systems. Some have suggested that India-US joint military exercises may be affected if the S-400 is inducted into the Indian Air Force. William Thornberry, chairman of the US House Armed Services Committee, hinted that India’s access to the best US technology, such as armed drones, could become more difficult.

While India can buy drones elsewhere, it can’t get the S-400 anywhere else. A comparable one doesn’t exist. China, first in line for the S-400, has already received the first delivery from Russia and it’s buying six battalions of this relatively low-cost system.

After you cut the hype, defence analysts agree that the S-400 is a game-changer with its multiple intercept missiles that can aim high and low. It can hit targets just 5 m off the ground and as far as 400 km and faster than any existing aircraft. Its radars are supposed to defeat stealth fighters.

No wonder so many countries — Turkey and Saudi Arabia included —are eager to buy the S-400, and Washington is worried. Turkey, a NATO member, was told that the S-400 was incompatible with the alliance’s systems. The US Congress is considering a Bill to block the sale of F-35s to Ankara in retaliation.

The US is understandably concerned about the proliferation of S-400s because they can dramatically upset the military balance, especially vis-à-vis China. It will strongly raise the issue in the upcoming ‘2+2’ meeting of external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj and defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defence Secretary James Mattis. India will equally strongly defend its decision to ‘secure its borders’.

While there is an overall understanding that New Delhi is doing what any country must — secure its national security interests — especially given the difficulties of dealing with an unpredictable US president, there will still be noise from the sidelines to pick a side. It could be a tough political and diplomatic walk.