by Gurmeet Kanwal

On September 28-30, 2018 India observed “Parakaram Parv” to commemorate the valour and spectacular success of the Special Forces personnel who had launched multiple surgical strikes across the Line of Control (LoC) two years ago to destroy terrorist training camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). However, while the Pakistan army was initially shell shocked at the Indian army’s audacity, one or two sets of surgical strikes were bound to prove insufficient to impose prohibitive costs on Pakistan to compel it to end its quest to wrest Jammu and Kashmir from India. A comprehensive, multi-disciplinary strategy needs to be drawn up and implemented resolutely over a sustained period of time.

India’s Policy of Strategic Restraint

For three decades now, the Pakistan army and the ISI — known as the ‘deep state’ — have been waging a proxy war against India as part of their strategy of ‘bleeding India through a thousand cuts’. Neither after the attack on Parliament in December 2001 nor after the multiple terrorist strikes at Mumbai in November 2008 did India choose to inflict punishment on the perpetrators of terrorism operating from bases in Pakistan and PoK.

Till recently, India had conducted its counter-proxy war campaign within its borders and on its own side of the LoC through sustained counter-infiltration and counter-insurgency operations. These operations helped to stabilise the situation and create a reasonably secure environment for political negotiations. The strategic restraint shown by India despite grave provocation enabled the country to keep the level of conflict low and sustain a high rate of economic growth. However, it failed to create any disincentives for Pakistan’s deep state.

The terrorist attack on the air force base at Pathankot on New Year’s Day 2016 once again crossed India’s red lines. Despite that, the Indian government gave Pakistan yet another opportunity to make amends by inviting an investigation team to come to Pathankot to evaluate the evidence of Pakistani involvement that India had provided. The attack at Uri on September 18, 2016 was the last straw and, since then the rules of the game have changed.

Surgical Strikes Across The LoC 

On the night of September 28, 2016, several teams of the Special Forces of the Indian army crossed the Line of Control (LoC) through gaps in the forward defences of the Pakistan army. The highly-trained commandos walked quietly over several kilometres across some of the most difficult terrain in the Himalayas under the very nose of the Pakistan army. Their targets were terrorist training camps in POK. They struck with deadly effect and, as quietly as they had come in, they exfiltrated back across the LoC.

In his briefing after the attack at Uri, the DGMO had said that the army “reserves the right to respond” to the terrorist strike at Uri at a time and place of its choosing. It took ten days to plan the operation, which was based on accurate intelligence. In carefully measured words the DGMO said during a press briefing on September 29 that India’s Special Forces had “inflicted significant casualties” on the terrorists and their infrastructure in surgical strikes the previous night.

The operations were meticulously planned and brilliantly executed. According to media reports, surgical strikes were launched at six to eight terrorist camps across the LoC and about forty Pakistan army personnel and terrorists were killed. In an operation that was conducted with utmost professionalism, the personnel of the Special Forces did not suffer any casualties.

While the credit for the success of these complex operations goes to the officers and jawans of the Special Forces of the Indian army, the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet Committee on Security and the NSA deserve to be complimented for giving the go ahead to the army to launch trans-LoC raids on terrorist training camps. For the first time since the 1971 war with Pakistan the political leadership of the country exhibited firm national resolve.

Pakistan’s Reaction: Nuclear Sabre-Rattling 

The surgical strikes came as a huge surprise to the Pakistan army and the ISI. In keeping with the national psyche, the Pakistan army opted to deny that the surgical strikes took place. However, the blame game soon began in Pakistan. In a television interview, Imran Khan was severely critical of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's leadership. He said he 'will show Sharif how to respond to Modi.'

Pakistan's leaders soon found their country diplomatically isolated both in the region and beyond. True to form, they once again began to indulge in their favourite pastime of nuclear sabre-rattling. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif held out a nuclear threat to India. 'Islamabad,' he said, 'is open to using tactical (nuclear) devices against India if it feels its safety is threatened.' It is a patently flawed approach as, in response to a nuclear attack on its forces, India will execute its doctrine of massive retaliation and Pakistan will cease to exist as a functional nation state. Surely, that is not the end state that the Pakistan army is prepared to accept.

As had probably been anticipated, the Pakistan army did not react after the trans-LoC raids except to launch isolated terrorist attacks on civilian and military targets, all of which were successfully foiled. Over the last two years this has changed. The summer of 2018 has seen a major escalation in attempts at infiltration as well the number of incidents of violence. The Pakistan army can be expected to wait for a suitable opportunity to avenge the losses that it had suffered. In all probability, it will launch its SSG to destroy what it considers a soft and vulnerable target. It could possibly be a Border Outpost (BOP) on the Jammu-Pathankot sector of the international boundary (IB), which Pakistan calls a ‘working boundary’ where the BSF is deployed.

Despite its internal instability, failing economy, international isolation and vitiated civil-military relations, Pakistan will continue to profess that Kashmir is the ‘unfinished agenda of the Partition’. Its advocacy of the need to wrest Kashmir from India at all costs will become shriller though the strategy to achieve that aim may be fine-tuned to avoid culpability. Also, Pakistan will not give up its quest to control the destiny of Afghanistan and dictate its strategic choices.

Pakistan’s deep state is unlikely to back down from its strategy of bleeding India through a thousand cuts. It will continue to wage a proxy war through terrorist organisations like the LeT, the JeM and the HuM. The army will continue to raise the bogey of an existentialist threat from India as hostility with India is necessary to justify its disproportionately large strength and the funds necessary to equip and maintain the war machine.

New Rules of The Game 

Till surgical strikes were launched, India’s response to individual incidents of terrorism had been predictable: blame Pakistan, but avoid reacting overtly. By launching surgical strikes and taking other pro-active actions, India introduced an element of unpredictability. Pakistan can no longer be sure about India’s likely response. India signalled that the rules of the game have changed.

India must be pro-active in framing its responses to terrorist incidents with their origin on Pakistani soil. India’s counter-proxy war strategy should be based on a realistic assessment of the threat and carefully formulated to achieve carefully formulated national security objectives. It should be a national priority to reach out to the people of Kashmir and stabilise the situation. If instability in Kashmir continues, Pakistan will exploit it to the hilt. The army should be prepared to confront an Operation Gibraltar-like influx of Mujahideen a la 1965, but on a reduced scale.

By launching trans-LoC strikes on terrorist training camps with its Special Forces India had sent several messages to Pakistan. Firstly, the present Indian government will not tolerate the wanton killing of innocent Indian civilians or soldiers by state sponsored terrorists from Pakistan. Secondly, the surgical strikes were a warning to the Pakistan army that if it does not put an end to cross-border terrorism, it may expect an even more vigorous Indian response.

Counter-Proxy War Strategy 

The remaining roots of the proxy war are now in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir. The only way India can ensure that Pakistan’s proxy war is brought to a quick end is by dismembering Pakistan. This is neither desirable, as India will have to suffer the consequences and deal with the fallout; nor is it militarily achievable as a large-scale war simultaneously on two fronts is not winnable.

Hence, India’s objective should be to gradually raise Pakistan’s cost for waging a proxy war against India with a view to eventually making it prohibitive. It should also be a national security and foreign policy objective to work towards reducing the salience of the Pakistan army in the country’s polity. With these limited aims in view, it should be possible to synergise the political, diplomatic and military approaches and formulate appropriate strategies.

India had exercised a range of political, diplomatic, economic, military options in response to the terrorist attack on Uri. The aim of Indian diplomacy should be to isolate Pakistan in the international community and work towards having the country branded as a terrorist state by the UN Security Council. Economic measures should be designed to hurt Pakistan’s economy.

By boycotting the SAARC Summit that was to be held in Islamabad and through deft diplomatic manoeuvres, India has succeeded in isolating Pakistan in South Asia as well as internationally. The shift in emphasis from SAARC to BIMSTECH will also provide handsome dividends in the long term.

In this age of realpolitik, on the politico-diplomatic front, India has many other cards that it can play. The expression of overt support for the long-oppressed people of Baluchistan and Gilgit-Baltistan has galvanised their movements and caused acute embarrassment to Pakistan.

Before approaching the United Nations Security Council to declare Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, India should do so unilaterally after the next major incident of terrorism. India should also call upon its neighbours in South Asia to do so.

One more arrow in the quiver is for India to express its support for the Afghan position that the Durand Line is no longer relevant and the boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan needs to be demarcated afresh. This move will give a major boost to the nascent movement for Pakhtoonkhwa and completely unsettle a sensitive province of Pakistan. It will also further boost India’s image with the Afghan people.

Before holding out a threat to opt out of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, India must first make arrangements to fully utilise India’s quota of water, part of which is flowing unharnessed into Pakistan. This action will have a major impact on the availability of water in Pakistan.

Afghanistan is also not able to fully utilise its share of the water of Kabul River and its tributary Kunar River. Now that India has successfully completed and handed over the Salma Dam, India should offer to build dams on both these rivers the water of which flows into Indus River.

Imposing Economic And Military Costs 

The aim of imposing economic costs should be to choke Pakistan’s economy. India should withdraw the most favoured nation (MFN) status accorded to Pakistan in 1996, which Pakistan has failed to reciprocate. Later, if necessary, India could consider banning over flights for Pakistani aircraft, but this is an option that hurts both.

Military measures should be designed to inflict punishment on the Pakistan army and its organs to systematically degrade their war waging potential. The aim should be to inflict punishment on the Pakistan army deployed on the LoC for every act of terrorism on Indian soil for which there is credible evidence of its involvement or the involvement of its organs such as the ISI. For each subsequent act of terrorism the scale and the intensity of the dose should be increased by an order of magnitude. However, military operations should be carefully calibrated to reduce the risk of escalation.

The surgical strikes conducted across the LoC were the lowest rung on the escalatory ladder. It will take much harsher military measures to make it prohibitive for the deep state to wage a proxy war. Military operations designed to inflict punishment should include artillery strikes with guns firing in the ‘pistol gun’ mode to destroy bunkers on forward posts with minimum collateral damage; stand-off PGM strikes on brigade and battalion HQ, communications centres, logistics infrastructure, ammunition dumps and key bridges; and, raids by Special Forces and border action teams (BATs). Every Pakistan post through which infiltration takes place should be reduced to rubble by artillery fire.

Counter-proxy war operations should be supplemented by covert operations. Since Pakistan is not inclined to bring to justice the leaders of terrorist organisations like the LeT and the JeM, terrorists whom they call ‘strategic assets’, they must be neutralised through covert operations.

When the Pakistan army begins to hurt and bleed, gradually the deep state will realise the futility of its nefarious designs on India. While Pakistan may not give up its claims on Jammu and Kashmir, it will be forced to come to the negotiating table to discuss a long-term solution to the dispute through peaceful means.