by Lt Gen DS Hooda

The India-China standoff has entered its second month, and it appears that we are in for a period of protracted and tough negotiations before we see some real progress. While it is hoped that the crisis can be resolved peacefully, there have also been some discussions on the war fighting strategies and capabilities of the two militaries in the event of a conventional war.

These discussions range from a two-front threat in Ladakh, leading to a loss of areas in northern Ladakh and the Siachen Glacier to raising doubts on the ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to conduct successful operations owing to a lack of combat experience. This piece attempts a realistic assessment of the development of India’s military strategy and future prospects.

India’s strategy against China has been based on a realistic appraisal of China’s capability to conduct offensive operations along the forbidding terrain of the northern borders. After the 1962 war, India remained defensive against China, and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was thinly held to guard against any surprise attack. It was only after the Wangdung incident of 1986 that the Indian Army carried out a significant increase in the Indian deployment along the border with China.

One consequence of the Wangdung incident was that it triggered a period of diplomatic rapprochement with the visit of the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988 and the subsequent signing of various border agreements. However, this period of calm also had an unintended effect. While the Indian soldiers remained deployed along the LAC, infrastructure development was neglected.

In contrast, China carried out massive infrastructure improvements in Tibet, including the operationalisation of the Qinghai-Tibet railway in 2006. It was only in the mid-2000s that India took serious note of the growing mismatch between the two militaries, and a decision was taken to build 73 strategic roads along the LAC. In 2010, two new divisions were raised to strengthen the deployment in Arunachal Pradesh, followed by the raising of the Mountain Strike Corps.

Although shortfalls remain, there has been a change in strategic thinking. Two noted experts, Anit Mukherjee and Yogesh Joshi, have pointed out that the new Indian Army strategy has shifted from “deterrence by denial” to “deterrence by punishment”.

The India Air Force (IAF) has traditionally held an edge over PLA Air Force (PLAAF) as its airfields are located in the plains enabling air operations with full payloads.

PLAAF, operating from high altitude airfields with rudimentary facilities, is forced to operate with reduced payloads. In the last decade, the IAF has shifted its attention to the northern borders. Su-30 aircraft were deployed at the Tezpur airbase in 2009, and Hasimara, in West Bengal, is being readied for Rafale aircraft. There has also been a significant increase in strategic airlift capability with the induction of the C-130, the C-17, and the Chinook helicopters.

The Indian Navy (IN) currently enjoys a huge geographical advantage, and, in conflict, will seek to block the entry of PLA Navy through the narrow straits leading from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean, and engage in commerce warfare by interdicting Chinese trade. The IN has a good maritime domain awareness capability through its P-8I Poseidons that is now supplemented by Su-30 aircraft armed with the BrahMos missiles in the newly set up squadron based at Thanjavur in Tamil Nadu.

If a conventional conflict were to take place today, it would be a realistic assessment that India would hold its own and may even enjoy an edge in the air and maritime domain. However, as we look at the future, two sobering realities confront us. First, the balance of conventional forces is speedily shifting in China’s favour, and second, China’s military capability development is highly focused while India is yet to articulate a national defence strategy.

Backed up by an impressive indigenous industry, China continues to add to its growing inventory of modern aircraft and ships. The PLA Navy has already surpassed the US Navy in the number of battle force ships. It is estimated that a majority of fighter aircraft in the PLAAF will be fourth-generation within the next several years.

Apart from conventional weapons, the PLA created the Strategic Support Force (SSF) in 2016 to centralise cyber, space, electronic, and psychological warfare. The SSF would lead China’s information warfare operations that are considered essential for strategic dominance.

The Indian military is also engaged in a restructuring exercise, but this is driven primarily by the constraints of an inadequate defence budget. As the Air Force struggles with dwindling squadrons and the Navy downsizes its future plans, the Army seems obsessively focused on finding ways to reduce military pensions. Military restructuring decisions are often announced in the media before they have even been internally debated by the service headquarters.

The shape and size of military forces are driven by a realistic evaluation of the threats that nations face and the resolve to meet them. Unfortunately, the government has not undertaken a serious assessment of how future wars will be fought and the force structures required to win. The absence of such an assessment enables the ad hoc allocation of defence budgets without a long-term focus.

The PLA could disengage from the standoff at Ladakh, but that does not signal an end to the India-China strategic rivalry. And it is an unpleasant truth that in a crisis, it is ultimately the military capability of the two sides that drives policy choices. As John. J Mearsheimer, the architect of the ‘offensive realism’ theory, writes, “In international politics, a state’s power is ultimately a function of its military forces and how they compare with the military forces of rival states.”