New Delhi: China, probably for the first time in the last five months, told Indian interlocutors in Moscow on Thursday that it’s willing to discuss reduction of forces and military assets it has brought up to Ladakh frontier. However, it’s believed the Chinese took the line that this process should be undertaken simultaneously by both sides, which is where lies the catch.

The last paragraph in the joint statement is a code for larger de-escalation: "The ministers agreed that as the situation eases, the two sides should expedite work to conclude new confidence building measures to maintain and enhance peace and tranquillity."

So, the principle that disengagement should be followed by de-escalation through new CBMs has been officially recognised. But the problem really is carrying out troop reduction in a mutually agreed manner. Infrastructure on the Chinese side allows for faster mobilisation of troops compared to India, so any such effort will require the PLA to move further back than the Indian forces.

It’s important to keep in mind that India too has moved up forces in large numbers as a response to Chinese mobilisation. India is unlikely to agree to thinning out unless fully satisfied that China has demonstrated sufficient intent to de-escalate. Which means Beijing will have to necessarily take the first step and probably more, given that logistics of mobilisation don’t permit much back and forth from an Indian perspective.

Therefore, any de-escalation conversation has got way more complicated than what it was when the Galwan incident happened on June 15. It will now be a tough exercise between two armies shorn of any mutual trust at this point in time.

Having said so, the Moscow meeting has provided a window conditioned, of course, on what India is calling "comprehensive disengagement". The background to this is an assessment that China has been selective in executing the disengagement process post-Galwan. While it was prompt in some sectors, in others it tried to hold on to vantage points.

The fact is that much of the disengagement process, thus far, has been informed by how tactically well-positioned each side is in various sectors. For instance, in Galwan, while the Chinese forces moved on to the river bed and camped there, Indian forces captured surrounding heights, thus, rendering Chinese forces vulnerable and their ingress rather pointless.

Even now, what we are witnessing in the Pangong Tso is a shadow fight where India is trying to keep tactical advantage against heavy Chinese troop accretion and infrastructure build-up. Thus, the question before the foreign ministers really was whether disengagement negotiations are to be held according to military preferences or through political guidance. On that score, the release of a five-point joint statement itself is an indication towards adopting a political approach.

How? The express mention of abiding by 1993 and 1996 peace and tranquillity agreements as well as upholding border protocols is meant to address both troop concentration issues and incidents like shots being fired in air for the first time in 45 years on the LAC.

Then, the fog of words around progress in other aspects of the relationship. India said peace and tranquillity is essential to the health of the overall relationship. China chose to spin it differently, saying India did not make border settlement a condition to progress in the rest of the relationship. Which, if followed in the right spirit, would mean moving back to the status quo ante.

However, the real test for this diplomatic recalibration would be the mandate with which China comes to the table at the military commanders-level talks. Beijing could steer the process in the direction of de-escalation as the two foreign ministers seem to have discussed or be tactical and risk miscalculated escalation in a charged military environment. The choice the Chinese leadership makes may well determine how warm this winter would be on the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh.