by G H Kumar

India's message regarding the F-35 stealth fighter represents a profound assertion of strategic autonomy and defence self-reliance, signalling to Washington that New Delhi has fundamentally different priorities than those offered by  the Americans.

The implicit statement conveyed by Indian officials is unambiguous: India has options, and those options align far more closely with the nation's vision of building indigenous defence capabilities under the "Atmanirbhar Bharat" (Self-Reliant India) initiative.​

When the United States offered the F-35 through President Donald Trump during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's White House visit in February 2025, the proposal appeared strategically significant on the surface. However, Indian defence officials swiftly communicated their disinterest through official channels by July 2025, rejecting what many in Washington viewed as a cornerstone for future Indo-U.S. military cooperation.

The rejection was particularly noteworthy because it occurred even as the Trump administration imposed punitive 25 percent tariffs on Indian imports, a move that might have been anticipated to push New Delhi towards reassessing defence partnerships with Western nations.​

American F-35 single-engine stealth fighter

The crux of India's objection centres on the fundamental asymmetry inherent in the F-35 acquisition model. Indian defence officials have explicitly stated that procurement decisions must prioritise technology transfer, joint production capabilities, and the opportunity to integrate domestically developed weapons systems. The F-35 offers none of these elements. American officials have consistently insisted of withholding source code access and thus restricting India's ability to adapt the aircraft to operational requirements specific to the subcontinent's threat environment.

This represents a departure from France's approach with the Rafale, where restrictions on critical subsystems—such as the Thales RBE2 AESA radar and Modular Mission Computer—have already generated friction within Indian defence circles regarding long-term strategic autonomy.​

The Indian Air Force currently operates only 31 combat squadrons against a sanctioned strength of 42, creating an urgent capability gap that demands attention. This shortfall has intensified as Pakistan moves toward acquiring Chinese J-35 fifth-generation stealth fighters whilst China continues expanding its fleet of Chengdu J-20 aircraft equipped with advanced avionics and thrust-vectoring engines. Against this backdrop, India's indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) program, though promising, remains a decade away from operational availability, necessitating an interim solution to prevent dangerous capability gaps.​

Russia's offer has positioned itself as categorically superior to the American proposal in respects that matter profoundly to Indian strategic planners. Moscow has tendered full technology transfer, complete source code access, and a proposal for domestic assembly at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited's Nashik facility—the same facility that has successfully produced over 220 Su-30MKI fighters under licence. 

The localisation rate could reach up to 60 percent, enabling seamless integration of Indian-developed systems including the Astra air-to-air missile, Rudram anti-radiation missile, and Virupaksha AESA radar. This represents precisely the framework India seeks: a partnership centred on joint manufacturing rather than procurement of finished equipment.​

The Su-57E's operational characteristics align with India's doctrine requirements far more coherently than the F-35. The Russian aircraft features a Gallium Nitride-based AESA radar system providing 360-degree situational awareness through forward and side-mounted arrays, advanced electronic countermeasures and counter-countermeasures functions, twin AL-41F1 engines with thrust-vectoring nozzles enabling extreme post-stall manoeuvres, and internal weapons bays supporting stealth characteristics.

Critically, the Su-57E can accommodate indigenous Indian weapons systems without requiring American authorisation or reconfiguration, a capability fundamentally absent from the F-35 ecosystem.​

Indian defence officials have articulated concerns about the F-35 that extend beyond mere capability considerations. The aircraft has been persistently plagued by fleet availability issues, with utilisation rates significantly below those of comparable platforms. Hidden costs continue accumulating as software patches and system upgrades proliferate, transforming what appeared as an 80-million-dollar per-unit acquisition into a substantially more expensive proposition when lifecycle costs are factored in. 

Furthermore, Indian analysts have noted that modern battlespace environments are increasingly populated with advanced radar systems capable of detecting stealth aircraft, a concern that becomes particularly acute given India's acquisition of the S-400 air defence system and the restrictions American officials would inevitably impose on India's operational employment of such systems alongside the F-35.​

The strategic messaging embedded within India's rejection transcends the narrow question of fighter aircraft procurement. By explicitly spurning the F-35 whilst maintaining diplomatic courtesy toward Washington, India has communicated that it will not permit defence procurement decisions to become mechanisms for relinquishing technological sovereignty or strategic autonomy.

This posture reflects matured statecraft, balancing immediate security imperatives against long-term institutional independence. India's government has simultaneously deepened defence relationships with France through planned domestic production of Rafale aircraft fuselages at a rate of up to two units monthly by 2028, demonstrating that partnerships based on genuine technology transfer and mutual respect remain attractive.​

Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh has confirmed that India prioritises short-term technology transfer in fifth-generation fighters to accelerate capabilities whilst simultaneously treating indigenous engine development as a "national mission" to reduce import dependence. This dual-track strategy—acquiring interim fifth-generation platforms with embedded technology transfer provisions whilst advancing the AMCA program and pursuing engine development collaborations—represents India's calculated response to immediate threats without surrendering the long-term objective of comprehensive defence self-reliance.​

The Modi government's handling of this complex situation demonstrates recognition that India possesses leverage within global defence markets that previous administrations lacked. As a nation of 1.4 billion people facing genuine two-front threats, with demonstrated procurement capacity and strategic location within the Indo-Pacific, India can negotiate from a position of considerable strength. 

By publicly communicating that options exist and that India will not subordinate strategic autonomy to procurement convenience, New Delhi sends a message applicable far beyond fighter aircraft selection: India will construct its defence posture according to Indian interests, not according to templates devised by external powers.​

The rejection of the F-35 simultaneously represents an implicit acceptance of the Su-57E offer or at minimum a serious evaluation of Russian proposals, though India's Defence Secretary has indicated that no formal decisions have been concluded. Whether India ultimately proceeds with Su-57E acquisition, accelerates AMCA development through private-sector partnerships, or negotiates additional platforms from other nations remains uncertain.

What is unambiguous, however, is that India's message resonates with unmistakable clarity: India possesses options, intends to exercise strategic autonomy in defence procurement, and will not accept arrangements that compromise long-term technological sovereignty or restrict indigenous weapon system integration. This represents a fundamental realignment in India's defence posture, one that acknowledges American strategic importance whilst firmly declining to become dependent upon Washington-centric security frameworks.​

G H Kumar writes on national security, military technology, strategic affairs & policies. This essay reflects author's opinions alone