Winning The War Without Weapons Electronic And Cyber Warfare
by Air Marshal BN Gokhale PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)
In modern warfare EW has taken a preeminent place than just being a force multiplier. Over the years the Indian Armed Forces have been consciously making efforts to upscale this capability. It is now equally important to pay attention to the aspects of cyber war, as it could be a ‘game changer’ in the future conflicts. In order to ensure an integrated approach to this essential capability, the need for forming at the earliest a tri-Service cyber as well as Space commands cannot be over emphasised.
US President Barack Obama in his State
of the Union address on 20th January
referred to his government’s resolve
in ensuring cyber protection. In the
light of North Korean cyber-attack on
Sony Entertainment channel and subsequent US
reprisal, the very fact that such reference was made
in this important Presidential address to the nation,
indicates the importance cyber warfare is gaining in
this era of net-centricity.
Dominating EM Spectrum
Battle space today is increasingly dependent on
the use of electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. While
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) has become essential
form of operations, protecting such a capability is
becoming equally challenging. Apart from radar
emissions and various types of Information Technology
(IT) enabled communications, the increasing
dependence on cyberspace for the command and
control functions makes EM spectrum vulnerable to
the integrated domains of electronic and cyber warfare.
Defending newer disruptive technologies fielded to
disable or degrade both, the hardware as well as
the software, is therefore a daunting task. This was
amply demonstrated during ‘Operation Orchard’, the
successful attack by Israeli Air Force on a nuclear
reactor under construction in Northern Syria, on
06th September 2007.
A specially programmed UAV,
similar to US Suter airborne network attack system,
had apparently sent an embedded bug as part of the
reflected radar echo to one of the Syrian Air Defence
radars. This false echo had in turn disabled the entire AD
network for a considerable period of time, allowing the
Israeli F-15s and F-16s to destroy the site without any
resistance from the Syrian AD missiles or interceptors.
While downing of Malaysian Airline flight MH-17 by a
surface-to-air missile has made news, ‘YouTube’ also
demonstrates the fitment of deception capability on civil
airlines of Israeli Elta-ELM 2160 Flight Guard against
a shoulder fired missile.
While Marconi invented the wireless radio
communication in 1896, the first known use of interception and spoofing of a radio message has
been reported in the Russo-Japanese Naval Battle
of 1905. An initial form of Electronic Warfare had
taken birth. Later it was in the Second World War
that the techniques of jamming adversary’s radars
gathered momentum. Suppression of Enemy
Air Defence (SEAD) operations by F-4G Phantom
aircraft became a necessity in the Vietnam War, with
Wild Weasel aircraft of the US Air Force used
extensively to jam the Vietcong radar and missile
systems. It is reported that due to their contribution,
the USAF aircraft losses came down by nearly
70 per cent. In the 1967 War Israel had used
communication jamming extensively. But it was in
the midst of Yom Kippur War of 1973 that the need
for a robust yet agile EW capability came to the fore,
to minimise initial heavy Israeli aircraft losses to
different varieties of Egyptian AD missiles.
Only Kinetic Attack
The Indian Air Force started building Electronic
Warfare capability only after the Indo-Pak 1971 War.
Till then both India and Pakistan were yet to acquire
low-level radar coverage and surface-to-air missile
defences. As such, low-level attacks were reported
mainly by visual observers or MOPs. In both 1965
and 1971 Wars, IAF had resorted to few aerial attacks
against Pakistani radar located at Badin. However,
in these wars there was lack of any specific IAF
strategy for neutralising the command and control
capability of Pakistan.
With Pakistani deployment in the 70s of low-level
chain of MPDR sensors, terminal AD missiles like
the Crotale and an integrated
airborne interception capability,
the IAF had to embark on rapid
build-up of EW resources. In
1978 a dedicated EW squadron,
with a mix of Canberra and
MiG-21 aircraft was formed,
fi tted with standoff and escort
pods respectively; to provide a
suppressive shield to the embedded
strike force. Strike tactics were
evolved based on ‘burn through’
ranges for the terminal attacks.
Gathering of Electronic intelligence (ELINT) and
Communications Intelligence (COMINT) became
essential, but accuracy in locating and in particular
‘fingerprinting’ the Pakistani sensors needed much
better technology for the interception equipment.
In the Bekaa Valley War of 1982, the Israeli Air
Force had aptly demonstrated the need for accurate
ELINT and effective use of EW, which had neutralised
the Syrian Air Defence network, along with partial
incapacitation of their Command, Control and
Communication (C3) system. Since the Syrians were
using similar Soviet sensors and interceptors, the
lessons were somewhat worrisome for the Indian
Air Force. The inbuilt Soviet EW
equipment lacked versatility as
well as adequate power output.
As such, the IAF had to import
EW pods from countries such
as Italy and France. That is
when IAF mastered the art of
configuring Western equipment
on varied Soviet platforms. Due
to limited radii of MiG-21 EW
escort aircraft, emphasis was
also laid on acquiring Airborne
Self Protection Jamming
(ASPJ) pods.
The USAF doctrine of ‘aerial
dominance’ displayed in the
Gulf Wars highlighted the
need to attack and disable
enemy’s C3 system, in the
initial stages of war. By
destroying the radar network
along with communication
grid makes the enemy not only
‘deaf and dumb’ but also ‘blind’.
For the past few years the IAF
as well as Indian Army and Navy
have been on the path to acquire
similar capability. Acquisition of
better signal intelligence (SIGINT)
capability, both ground based
and airborne, provides the IAF
with a more accurate Electronic
Order of Battle ie EW ORBAT.
The IAF inventory also possesses
Anti-radiation Missiles (ARM)
on manned and unmanned
platforms, as well as improved
ASPJ for protection against the
terminal defences. However, most
of this capacity build-up has taken
place mainly against Pakistan,
with not much information on the
Chinese EW ORBAT.
Indigenous Systems
Since EW systems are highly
classified in nature, efforts for indigenous development
were given priority from the very beginning. A
specialist lab, DARE was set up by DRDO in 2001
by renaming ASIEO established in 1986, to develop
specific electronic as well as avionics projects.
DARE followed a collaborative approach with private
industry partners such as CMC and TATA Power, as
also with selected international companies. Over the
years DRDO has become a ‘single window’ supplier
of EW systems for the IAF and other two Services. It
has developed a static as well as mobile ESM system
Divya Drishti, capable of ‘fingerprinting’ sensors.
It is
also upgrading ESM capability of the ground based as well as airborne platforms of the IAF. The AEW&C
Embraer aircraft will also have such capability. In
order to cater to Service specific requirements, DRDO
has also developed a comprehensive EW system
known as Samyukta for the Army, which can also
give useful inputs to the IAF. Along with UAV and
Aerostat based ELINT and COMINT payloads, IAF
should shortly be in a much better position to glean
requisite information on adversary’s EW ORBAT.
DRDO has also developed EW suites for airborne
platforms with Tarang Radar Warning Receiver
and Tempest deception jamming pods. Su-30 is
configured to carry the Kh-31
anti-radiation missile and with
the fitment of Siva High Accuracy
Direction Finding (HADF) pods,
cuing this missile for SEAD
operations would bolster the
IAF capability.
Then there
are other indigenous projects
like missile approach warning
system (MAWS) and directional
infrared counter measures
(DIRCM) for evading enemy’s
anti-aircraft missiles, to be
fitted on all platforms including
fighters, transport and helicopters.
While Pakistan has already
established an EW test and
training range purchased from
Turkey near Sargodha, DRDO is
also building two test ranges in
Southern India. The test ranges
will not only be able to test
various ‘communication’ as well as
‘non-communication’ EW systems, but will also help in fielding varied electronic equipment
to check the aspects of electro-magnetic interference
(EMI) and electro-magnetic compatibility (EMC).
The IAF is in midst of inducting newer platforms
including the much anticipated 126 MMRCA and
the indigenous Tejas aircraft. But equally important
is its emphasis on induction of force multipliers
and support systems such as the AWACS, ground
and airborne data linking, better interrogation
friend or foe (IFF), airborne Active Electronically
Scanned Array (AESA) radar on interceptors etc
to name a few. Such enhanced capability would
enable the IAF in carrying out ‘silent interceptions’
and other operations, somewhat immune to
interference and ‘noise’.
Cyber War
While the emerging EW scenario seems quite
encouraging for the IAF, it would be equally
important to pay attention to the aspects of cyber
war. Apart from the Israeli ‘Operation Orchard’,
the Russo-Estonian stand-off of April 2007 and the
Russo-Georgian conflict of July 2008 have lessons for this new dimension of silent but unidentifiable
enemy action. In both these conflicts most of the
essential networks such as power distribution,
communication network and even banking were
bombarded by Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS)
attacks, thereby causing a crash or jamming of the
networks. Equally important was the aspect of not
being able to trace the origin of attacks, as proxy
servers had been used from remote out-of-country
locations. Similar crippling effect on Net-centric
Systems just prior to the start of a conflict can well
change the outcome; especially in a short duration war
envisaged in our region.
With almost entire hardware
being imported for the Indian
networks, there is a constant
need to sanitise the systems
from possible embedded bugs.
Such ‘trapdoor’ or ‘Trojan
Horse’ are known to lie dormant
for a considerable length of
time and are programmed
to be activated by a routine
system command, but in effect
disabling the system. One
such example of the disruptive
capability of cyber attacks is of
the Stuxnet malware injected
through Siemens hardware into
the Iranian uranium enrichment
plant at Natanz, which
experienced serious technical
malfunction in November 2010.
In order to avoid direct attacks
from the Web, Intranets within
the Service need to be totally
isolated. The computer ports need to be disabled
to avoid insertion of any inadvertent or intentional
viruses. There is also a need to establish standard
operating procedures for an effective back-up
and plans for disaster recovery. In this context a
number of countries like US, Russia, China have
created dedicated teams of cyber warriors and the
Chinese are known to have a strategy known as
Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW) along
with a doctrine to fight under such conditions. The
Indian Armed Forces have been demanding for
many years formation of Joint Cyber Command
for similar capability.
In modern warfare EW has taken a pre-eminent
place than just being a force multiplier. Over the
years the Indian Armed Forces have been consciously
making efforts to upscale this capability. It is now
equally important to pay attention to the aspects of
cyber war, as it could be a ‘game changer’ in the
future conflicts. In order to ensure an integrated
approach to this essential capability, the need for
forming at the earliest a tri-Service cyber as well as
space Commands cannot be over emphasised.
The writer has flown
over 3,500 hours on a
variety of combat and
trainer aircraft. He has
seen active operations
during the 1971 Indo-Pak
hostilities on both
Eastern and Western
fronts
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