Sunday, May 17, 2026

HAL‑IAF TEJAS MK-1A Review Deferred To June Amid Radar And Engine Delays


The program review meeting between Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and the Indian Air Force on the delayed TEJAS MK-1A light combat aircraft has been deferred to June, with no firm date yet finalised.

Senior defence officials have indicated that the postponement reflects the absence of tangible progress on the program, which has already slipped more than two years behind schedule.

The IAF, which had earlier shown flexibility on certain delivery‑linked operational requirements to facilitate induction, is now understood to be considering further relaxations to accelerate deliveries, though it insists that core operational benchmarks cannot be compromised.

Newly appointed HAL Chairman and Managing Director Ravi Kota visited New Delhi earlier this month for discussions with the IAF leadership, during which the revised timeline for the review meeting was agreed.

When convened, the review is expected to assess HAL’s progress on mandatory operational requirements and finalise revised delivery schedules. The delays continue to stem primarily from radar integration and engine supply shortfalls, both of which have held up formal induction of the fighter.

One of the most pressing challenges has been the integration and synchronisation of the active electronically scanned array radar with the aircraft’s electronic warfare suite and other mission systems.

Ensuring seamless communication across the mission computer network remains a complex task, with several integration parameters still undergoing refinement and validation.

Performance benchmarks linked to radar range and optimisation have required additional testing and software corrections before full operational clearance can be granted. Alongside radar certification, missile firing trials and full validation of the aircraft’s weapons package remain mandatory operational benchmarks.

The Astra beyond‑visual‑range air‑to‑air missile integration effort has also encountered difficulties during trials, necessitating further refinement and validation. These technical hurdles have compounded delays already caused by shortages of GE Aerospace’s F404 engines.

HAL currently has only six engines available, far fewer than originally scheduled, leaving several airframes awaiting powerplants. During its Q4 FY26 earnings call, HAL acknowledged that deliveries of the TEJAS MK-1A are now likely to begin only between August and September, marking yet another slippage in the program timeline.

For the IAF, the delays are operationally significant. The service is grappling with an acute shortage in fighter squadron strength, operating only 29 squadrons against a sanctioned strength of 42.5. Timely induction of the TEJAS MK-1A is therefore critical to stabilising numbers and reducing dependence on ageing platforms.

The Air Force has pressed HAL for a clearer induction roadmap, emphasising that while certain relaxations may be considered to expedite deliveries, the aircraft must still meet essential combat benchmarks before induction.

The coming months will be decisive in determining whether HAL can overcome integration and supply challenges to deliver the TEJAS MK-1A fleet on schedule and restore confidence in India’s most visible indigenous fighter program.

Agencies


HAL Expects TEJAS MK-1A Deliveries To Begin By September 2026


HAL has confirmed that TEJAS MK-1A deliveries to the Indian Air Force could finally commence by August or September 2026, following months of delays caused by engine supply bottlenecks and extended testing cycles.

The company has already received six GE F404 engines, with more expected during FY27, and insists that refinements and integration work are progressing positively.

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited stated during its post‑earnings conference call that deliveries of the TEJAS MK-1A fighter aircraft are now targeted for late summer 2026.

Chairman and Managing Director Ravi Kota emphasised that the program had faced repeated timeline revisions due to engine supply disruptions and ongoing certification requirements, but expressed confidence that the revised schedule would be met. He noted that aircraft fitted with newly received engines were already flying, and further refinements were being implemented to ensure mission reliability.

The company has so far received six engines from GE Aerospace, with additional consignments expected during the current financial year. HAL anticipates receiving between 15 and 20 more engines in FY27, though the final number has not yet been confirmed.

This stabilisation of the supply chain is seen as a turning point, enabling the backlog of airframes to be converted into deliverable fighters. Reports indicate that around 30 TEJAS MK-1A aircraft have already been manufactured, flown and tested using certification‑grade engines, and are awaiting combat‑ready powerplants for formal induction. This proactive manufacturing strategy has allowed HAL to sustain momentum despite logistical bottlenecks.

Investors have closely tracked the TEJAS MK-1A program, with analysts highlighting that delivery schedules have been stretched multiple times. Some questioned whether deliveries could slip beyond FY27, but HAL management reiterated that the program was moving in a positive direction.

Goldman Sachs maintained a neutral rating on HAL stock, trimming its target price slightly to ₹5,225, while noting that execution improvement remained a key trigger for valuation. The brokerage underscored that TEJAS MK-1A deliveries would be central to investor confidence in HAL’s execution capabilities.

Finance Director Barenya Senepati added that manufacturing revenues could become a larger contributor to HAL’s overall performance if deliveries of the TEJAS MK-1A and HTT‑40 trainer aircraft begin during FY27.

HAL guided for double‑digit revenue growth in FY27, with EBITDA margins expected to remain around 30% to 31%. In FY26, the company reported revenue from operations of ₹33,050 crore, a 7% increase from the previous year, while profit before tax rose 12% to ₹12,112 crore. Deliveries of ALH helicopters, AL‑31FP engines and RD‑33 engines helped offset delays in the TEJAS MK-1A and HTT‑40 programs during the year.

HAL’s order book expanded significantly, rising to ₹2.54 lakh crore at the end of FY26 from ₹1.89 lakh crore a year earlier. Fresh orders worth ₹97,028 crore were received during the year, including contracts for 97 TEJAS MK-1A aircraft.

Management expects additional orders worth around ₹90,000 crore over the next two years, covering helicopters, upgrades, and repair and overhaul activities.

Defence analysts point out that once engine supplies stabilise, HAL will be able to deliver a surge of aircraft to the Air Force, reinforcing India’s indigenous fighter fleet and easing squadron strength pressures.

The TEJAS MK-1A represents a significantly upgraded variant of the original TEJAS MK-1, incorporating advanced avionics, electronic warfare systems, and improved maintainability. HAL has confirmed that technical refinements and performance upgrades are still being executed, aimed at enhancing combat capability and mission readiness.

The Indian Air Force has made clear that only fully certified aircraft meeting Air Staff Qualitative Requirements will be inducted, meaning HAL must ensure that the first deliveries meet complete operational benchmarks.

Agencies


India’s Defence Exports To Surge Past ₹38,000 Crore, Set To Cross ₹50,000 Crore With Breakthrough Technologies Says G Satheesh Reddy


India’s defence exports have surged to nearly ₹38,000 crore in 2026 and are projected to cross ₹50,000 crore soon, marking a decisive transformation into a global defence technology powerhouse, reported The New Indian Express.

Former DRDO chief G Satheesh Reddy highlighted at the PanIIT Bangalore Summit that breakthroughs in missiles, radars, hypersonics, AI, and electronic warfare are driving this momentum.

India’s defence sector has entered a new phase of global competitiveness, with exports nearing ₹38,000 crore this year and expected to surpass ₹50,000 crore in the near future.

This milestone reflects the rapid evolution of the indigenous defence ecosystem, which has made significant advances in missile systems, radar technologies, electronic warfare, tanks, submarines, and AI-driven warfare capabilities. Reddy emphasised that modern warfare increasingly depends on technological innovation and surprise capabilities, areas where India has made notable progress.

Among the achievements, India has developed quick-reaction surface-to-air missile systems capable of launching within five seconds, alongside medium-range air defence systems.

The development of Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology represents a strategic leap, enabling a single missile to strike multiple targets simultaneously, thereby enhancing deterrence and operational flexibility.

On hypersonic technologies, India has successfully tested a scramjet engine for 1,200 seconds, a feat claimed to be a global first. This breakthrough paves the way for long-range hypersonic missiles, significantly extending strike capabilities. India has also developed long-range anti-ship hypersonic missiles capable of hitting targets up to 1,500 kilometres away, strengthening maritime dominance in the Indo-Pacific theatre.

Reddy noted that India’s armed forces now operate more than 2,000 indigenously developed radar systems, including the Uttam radar, which is central to modern fighter aircraft. Parallel progress is being made in artificial intelligence applications, autonomous underwater vehicles, anti-drone systems, and intelligent artillery shells, all of which are critical for future warfare scenarios.

The indigenous defence manufacturing sector crossed ₹1.54 lakh crore in 2024–25, underscoring the scale of domestic industrial capacity. Start-Ups, IITs, and private industries are playing a pivotal role in driving innovation across aerospace, drones, cyber security, and quantum communication technologies. This collaborative ecosystem is ensuring that India not only meets its own defence requirements but also becomes a reliable supplier to global partners.

The PanIIT Bangalore Summit 2026 provided a platform to showcase these achievements, reinforcing the role of India’s scientific and industrial community in nation-building. The IIT alumni network, with its global reach, is contributing to the acceleration of defence innovation, ensuring that India remains at the forefront of technological advancements in the coming decade.

India’s trajectory in defence exports and indigenous innovation signals a strategic shift from being a major importer to becoming a net exporter of advanced military systems.

The combination of battlefield-proven systems, cutting-edge research, and industrial capacity is positioning India as a key player in the global defence market, with targets of ₹50,000 crore in exports appearing increasingly attainable.

Agencies


Mindgrove Begins Commercial Production of India’s Secure IoT Chip, Targets Biometrics And Industrial IoT Markets


Mindgrove Technologies, incubated at IIT-Madras, is preparing to begin commercial production of India’s first indigenously designed Secure IoT chip, a RISC‑V based microcontroller SoC that promises to reduce device costs by nearly 30 percent compared to imported alternatives.

The company is targeting biometrics, industrial IoT, smart meters, wearables, and EV battery management systems, with early demand expected from secure biometric systems used in telecom onboarding and identity authentication.

Founded in 2021 by Shashwath T R and Sharan Srinivas J, Mindgrove has positioned its Secure IoT chip as India’s first commercial‑grade high‑performance microcontroller built on the open‑source RISC‑V architecture.

The chip has already been taped out at the 28nm node and operates at 700 MHz, offering a blend of power efficiency and robust security features. Several customers are currently testing prototype versions, and the company is confident that production‑grade shipments will be adopted swiftly across sectors requiring secure and cost‑effective solutions.

The Secure IoT chip is designed to serve millions of connected devices where low deployment costs, energy efficiency, and hardware‑level security are critical. It integrates advanced cryptographic capabilities such as AES‑256, RSA‑2048, SHA‑256, and a true random number generator, alongside physical memory protection and one‑time programmable memory.

These features make it particularly suitable for applications in biometric authentication, smart locks, access‑control systems, and industrial IoT devices, where resilience against cyber threats is paramount.

Mindgrove has entered into a two‑year commercial partnership with Pune‑based Pinetics to integrate its chips into biometric access‑control systems, smart locks, and camera applications. This collaboration bridges the gap between chip design and end‑product manufacturing in India, marking a significant step in the country’s semiconductor ecosystem.

Pinetics will design and develop modules around Mindgrove’s chips, enabling their deployment in real‑world devices and strengthening vertical integration in India’s electronics value chain.

The company’s first wave of demand is expected to come from secure biometric systems used in telecom onboarding and identity authentication infrastructure, where government standards dictate security requirements and private players procure and deploy devices.

Beyond biometrics, the chip is also positioned to support industrial IoT applications, smart meters, wearables, and EV battery management systems, reflecting its versatility across multiple domains.

Mindgrove is also working on a Vision SoC, supported under the government’s Design Linked Incentive scheme, which will target high‑performance edge and vision‑based use cases such as CCTV systems, dashcams, and smart TVs. This pipeline of products underscores the company’s ambition to build a comprehensive portfolio of indigenous semiconductor solutions for diverse applications.

The commercialisation of the Secure IoT chip represents a defining moment in India’s semiconductor journey. It reduces reliance on foreign technology, enhances supply chain resilience, and provides Indian manufacturers with a cost‑effective, secure, and locally designed alternative.

By embedding domestic chips into everyday products, Mindgrove is accelerating India’s progress towards technological self‑reliance under the Make in India and Aatmanirbhar Bharat initiatives.

Agencies


Dassault Rafale-F5 Breaking All Rules: The Multirole Fighter Reinvents Air Combat With Loyal Wingman And Hypersonic Strike


The Dassault Rafale has long been regarded as the crown jewel of French military aviation, and the latest F5 standard is set to push the aircraft into a new era of relevance. Unlike the American F‑22 Raptor and F‑35 Lightning-II, which are built around stealth as their defining feature, the Rafale continues to thrive without full stealth capability. Instead, it relies on adaptability, advanced systems integration, and a philosophy of multirole versatility that has kept it competitive in the age of fifth‑generation fighters.

The Rafale F5 standard will introduce a revolutionary concept: a UCAV “loyal wingman” based on the nEUROn stealth demonstrator. This unmanned adjunct will act as an advanced sensor and combat partner, capable of reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and penetrating heavily defended areas ahead of the manned aircraft.

Alongside this, the F5 will integrate the ASN4G hypersonic nuclear missile, scheduled for deployment post‑2033, ensuring France maintains a credible nuclear deterrent well into the future.

The Rafale’s journey began in the 1970s when both the French Navy and Air Force sought a new multirole fighter capable of carrier operations and diverse mission sets. Dassault, already proven with the Mirage series, was the natural choice.

Initially part of the multinational Future European Fighter Aircraft (FEFA) program, France eventually withdrew in 1985 to pursue its own path. The Rafale A prototype flew in 1986, but it was not until 2004 and 2006 that the aircraft entered service with the Navy and Air Force respectively, after extensive testing.

The aircraft’s current relevance is anchored in the F4 standard, which achieved full operational status in 2024. This upgrade enhanced connectivity, targeting precision, and situational awareness. Key additions included the Thales RBE2 XG AESA radar, improved helmet‑mounted displays, and advanced data fusion for seamless interoperability with NATO allies.

The integration of the 1000 kg AASM guided bomb, known as the “Hammer,” further expanded its precision strike capabilities. The F4.1 subvariant, scheduled for delivery from 2027, will add improved fire control for the Meteor missile, expanded passive threat detection, and enhanced datalink exchange.

The F5 standard, due post‑2033, represents a leap into network‑centric warfare. Its loyal wingman UCAV will allow the Rafale to operate in high‑threat environments without direct exposure, while its compatibility with the ASN4G hypersonic missile underscores France’s determination to sustain a flexible nuclear deterrent. This approach aligns with the French Military Programming Law and serves as a precursor to the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), which will define Europe’s next generation of air combat.

Despite the looming arrival of sixth‑generation fighters such as the American NGAD program, Dassault remains confident in the Rafale’s enduring relevance. The aircraft’s adaptability and continuous upgrades have already translated into export success.

In 2024, Dassault delivered 21 Rafales compared to 13 in 2023, with exports rising from just two aircraft in 2023 to seven in 2024 — a 350 percent increase in foreign military sales.

Nations such as Croatia, Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Qatar, and the UAE have all become customers, reflecting the aircraft’s global appeal.

The Rafale’s enduring success lies in its ability to evolve. From its origins in Cold War requirements to its modern role as a multirole platform capable of integrating drones and hypersonic weapons, it has consistently adapted to the demands of contemporary warfare. While it may not possess the stealth of its American counterparts, its blend of versatility, advanced systems, and forward‑looking upgrades ensures that it remains a formidable force in the skies.

Agencies


Iran Seizes Chinese Vessel And Indian Ship Sinks As BRICS Divisions Deepen


Iran’s maritime actions on 14 May marked a sharp escalation in the ongoing confrontation in West Asia, coinciding with a fractious BRICS meeting in New Delhi.

Within hours, Iranian forces seized a Chinese-operated floating armoury anchored off Fujairah and attacked the Indian‑flagged cargo vessel Haji Ali, which subsequently sank in the Gulf of Oman.

The UK Maritime Trade Operations centre confirmed the boarding and diversion of the Chinese‑linked vessel toward Iranian waters, while Oman’s coast guard rescued all 14 Indian crew from the stricken Indian ship.

These dual strikes underscored Tehran’s willingness to expand its maritime reach and link military escalation directly to diplomatic confrontation.

The incidents unfolded as Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi used the BRICS platform to accuse the UAE of direct involvement in attacks against Iran, intensifying divisions within the bloc. Iran pressed BRICS members to condemn the United States and Israel, but consensus proved elusive, with the UAE’s presence complicating alignment.

Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar stressed the importance of stability and unimpeded maritime flows, while also voicing concern over unilateral sanctions. The UAE labelled the attack on the Indian vessel a “terrorist attack,” and India termed it “unacceptable,” highlighting divergent emphases in public messaging that exposed fractures in the group’s unity.

The strategic significance of these maritime incidents lies in their impact on global trade. The Strait of Hormuz handles roughly one‑fifth of global oil shipments, making any disruption a direct threat to energy markets.

The seizure of a Chinese‑linked vessel risks straining Tehran‑Beijing ties at a time when China has sought to balance its energy dependence on the Gulf with its strategic partnership with Iran. The sinking of an Indian ship places pressure on New Delhi, the world’s third‑largest oil importer, to respond decisively, especially as its energy security is tied to uninterrupted shipping lanes.

These developments also cast doubt on the practical impact of the reported Trump‑Xi understanding to keep Hormuz open, revealing the limits of diplomatic signalling when challenged by events at sea.

The broader context is the war between the US‑Israel coalition and Iran, ongoing since 28 February, which has already led to a near‑total halt of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Crude prices have surged toward $110 per barrel, while the Indian rupee has fallen to record lows under the pressure of rising import costs.

Iran’s history of detaining foreign vessels during periods of heightened tension continues, but the seizure of a Chinese‑operated ship at a UAE anchorage marks an assertive expansion of its operational reach. With regional production cuts and declining global oil inventories, continued maritime incidents risk deepening supply shocks and worsening economic pressures worldwide.

The dual maritime strikes therefore represent more than isolated incidents; they are part of a deliberate strategy by Tehran to leverage maritime disruption as a tool of political messaging and coercion.

By targeting both Chinese and Indian interests on the same day, Iran has simultaneously tested Beijing’s tolerance, pressured New Delhi’s maritime resilience, and complicated BRICS’ ability to present a unified front.

The collision of military escalation and diplomatic confrontation underscores the fragility of global energy security and the difficulty of maintaining consensus among diverse powers when confronted with aggressive unilateral actions.

Curated By IDN


India’s Astra Program Joins US And China In Ultra‑Long‑Range Air Combat Race


The unveiling of the AIM‑260 JATM by the United States marks a decisive step in ultra‑long‑range air‑to‑air missile warfare, closing the gap with China’s PL‑15 and PL‑17. India, meanwhile, is advancing its ASTRA Mk‑2 and ASTRA MK‑3 Gandiva programs, ensuring it remains competitive in this evolving domain with ranges of 200 km and 350 km respectively.

The AIM‑260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM), developed by Lockheed Martin, represents America’s most ambitious air‑to‑air missile project since the AIM‑9 Sidewinder.

First revealed in 2019, though development began around 2017, the missile has now been photographed undergoing live testing on a Navy F/A‑18F at Eglin Air Force Base in May 2026.

The missile is designed to counter the long‑range threat posed by China’s PL‑15 and PL‑17, both of which have extended reach and advanced guidance systems. The JATM features a clean, finless body optimised for stealth fighter bays, a multi‑pulse solid rocket motor, and speeds exceeding Mach 5.

Its expected range surpasses 200 kilometres, with a minimum threshold of 190 kilometres, significantly outmatching the AIM‑120D AMRAAM’s 160 kilometre range. Importantly, the missile retains AMRAAM’s dimensions, ensuring compatibility with platforms such as the F‑22, F/A‑18, F‑35, and future unmanned Collaborative Combat Aircraft.

The United States Air Force and Navy plan to spend $15.6 billion on development and production, with funding rising sharply through 2027. This investment underscores the missile’s priority status as America’s number one air‑delivered weapon program.

The JATM signals America’s entry into ultra‑long‑range beyond‑visual‑range warfare, echoing the pioneering role of the AIM‑9 Sidewinder seventy years earlier. Australia is expected to be the first foreign customer, with deliveries projected for 2033, highlighting the missile’s strategic export potential.

India is simultaneously pursuing its indigenous ASTRA program. The ASTRA MK‑2, with a range of 200 kilometres, is expected to enter service either this year or in 2027. The Indian Air Force plans to induct as many as 700 of these missiles for the Sukhoi‑30 and Tejas fleets, marking a significant step towards self‑reliance.

The ASTRA MK‑2 employs a dual‑pulse solid rocket motor, indigenous RF seeker, and advanced guidance systems, ensuring high manoeuvrability and resilience against electronic countermeasures. This missile places India firmly in the same category as the AIM‑260 and the European Meteor, which already arms India’s Rafale fighters.

Beyond ASTRA MK‑2, India is developing the ASTRA MK‑3, also known as Gandiva. This missile will have a range of 350 kilometres and will be based on Solid Fuel Ducted Ramjet (SFDR) technology, similar to that used in the Meteor.

The Gandiva is expected to provide India with ultra‑long‑range capability, enabling engagement of high‑value targets such as AWACS and aerial refuelling aircraft deep inside contested airspace. The ASTRA family of missiles is intended to replace Russian, French, and European air‑to‑air missiles currently in Indian service, thereby reducing dependence on foreign suppliers and strengthening indigenous capability.

China, meanwhile, has already fielded ultra‑long‑range air‑to‑air missiles. The PL‑15, with a range of 180 kilometres, has been operational for several years, while the PL‑17 and PL‑21 are reported to have ranges of up to 400 kilometres.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, these missiles represent a formidable challenge to regional air forces. India recovered PL‑15s fired by the Pakistani Air Force during Operation Sindoor, which failed to hit their targets and were found nearly intact on the ground. This recovery provided valuable insights into Chinese missile technology and its limitations.

The quiet unveiling of the AIM‑260 JATM demonstrates that the United States is closing the range gap with China’s PL‑15 and PL‑17, while India is simultaneously pursuing its own indigenous solutions. The ASTRA MK‑2, with a 200 kilometre reach, and the upcoming ASTRA MK‑3 Gandiva, projected at 350 kilometres using SFDR technology, place India firmly in the same league of ultra‑long‑range air‑to‑air missiles.

This trajectory reduces dependence on foreign suppliers, ensures parity with both American and Chinese advancements, and strengthens India’s strategic position in the Indo‑Pacific.

Agencies


Indo-Pak Dialogue: Dreams And Reality


by Nilesh Kunwar

Unexpected Development

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is an Indian right-wing volunteer organisation that's often accused of being a paramilitary group advocating militant Hinduism and spreading communal hatred. This organisation is so despised in Pakistan that Prime Minister IMran Khan in his 2019 UNGA address described it as an organisation "inspired by Hitler and Mussolini."

The next year, he once again used the UNGA podium to accuse India of being a country where the "state sponsors Islamophobia" and alleged that this was happening due to the overbearing prevalence of "RSS ideology." But that’s not all. Just four months later, Islamabad formally approached UNSC seeking inclusion of RSS in the list of “violent nationalist groups” and demanded its proscription as it purportedly posed “a clear danger to regional and international peace and security.”

So, RSS General Secretary Dattatreya Hosabale’s recent recommendation that New Delhi “should not close the door” and that “we should always be ready to engage in dialogue” with Pakistan is both surprising and intriguing.

Expectedly, it has caused a stir of sorts in political circles- while J&K’s main political parties- National Conference and Peoples Democratic Party, endorsed the RSS general secretary’s viewpoint, the Indian National Congress views it as downright capitulation under foreign (US) pressure.

As is their wont, political parties are more interested in extracting political mileage from this incident rather than engaging in serious discussion and debate on the issue of Indo-Pak dialogue. It’s therefore imperative that the suggestion of negotiating peace with Pakistan through talks that keeps surfacing intermittently be addressed dispassionately to evaluate the viability (and probability) of ending Indo-Pak stand-off through dialogue.

Peace Dividends

There’s no gainsaying the fact that peaceful coexistence between neighbouring countries is a win-win situation for all. Once amity replaces animosity, borders cease to be impassable barriers and this facilitates free trade, transit and people to people contact.

Once relations normalise, the fear of war automatically diminishes obviating the need for regularly incurring colossal expenditure on defence, and the money thus saved can be gainfully utilised for developmental activities as well as welfare of the people.

The annual expenditure on defence by India and Pakistan is mind boggling. In 2025, India spent $11.9 bn (Approx 2.3 percent of its GDP) while Pakistan’s defence expenditure stood at $11.9 bn (approximately 2.9 percent of its GDP). Due to increased tension between the two countries, these figures will definitely escalate significantly during the current year leaving less money with both New Delhi and Islamabad for undertaking other essential programmes like healthcare and poverty alleviation.

While any reduction in defence expenditure will greatly help both countries, it’s obvious that cash-strapped Pakistan needs this money much more desperately than India. So, it would be logical to expect that in the overall interests of Pakistan, it would be keen on normalising relations with India, and this adds weight to the RRS general secretary’s call for keeping doors for negotiations open.

However, Pakistan has surprisingly made no serious efforts to create an environment conducive for talks. However, the Government of Pakistan cannot be entirely blamed for this as it’s a well known fact that in Pakistan, it’s the military and not the government that calls the shots.

Rawalpindi’s Dilemma

By successfully portraying India as an existential threat and projecting the Pakistan army as a bulwark against New Delhi’s hegemonistic designs, Rawalpindi has acquired a host of extra-constitutional powers. Though its primary role is defending Pakistan, it simultaneously runs a sprawling business empire valued at over $20 bn, which includes banking, insurance, manufacturing, real estate, fertilizer, cement, food, power generation and LPG supply and even renting out marriage halls.

The Pakistan army is law unto itself. It has orchestrated dismissals of democratically elected governments, brazenly used the judiciary to imprison (and in one case even execute) the prime minister and get laws passed to save its senior officers.

Gen Pervez Musharraf’s disclosure that the then army chief Gen Raheel Sharif had facilitated his foreign travel by getting the judiciary to remove his name from Exit Control List and Islamabad High Court Judge Justice Shaukat Siddiqui’s shocking revelation that “In different cases, the ISI (Pakistan army’s spy agency Inter Services Intelligence) forms benches of its choice to get desired results" indicates the military’s complete hold over the judiciary.

Similarly, recently promulgated 27th constitutional amendment that provides self-appointed Field Marshal Asim Munir lifelong immunity from criminal persecution reveals the complete control of the army over the legislature.

So, while normalisation of relations with India would definitely prove beneficial for Pakistan, it would also reduce the Pakistan army’s relevance and this would pose a serious threat to its undisputed power base. It's thus obvious that what's good for Pakistan is paradoxically detrimental to the army’s interests.

This is the reason why Rawalpindi doesn't approve of Indo-Pak dialogue or normalisation of relations with India, and the people of Pakistan know this. “Yeh jo dehshatgardi hai, uske peeche wardi hai" (the uniform is behind terrorism) is an oft used slogan used by protesters in Pakistan that aptly highlights the level to which the Pakistan army can stoop to further its self-serving agenda of protecting its supremacy at all costs.

Creating Impediments

Rawalpindi has the dubious record of not only scuttling Indo-Pak negotiations but also fuelling anti-India sentiments to ensure that there’s no scope of achieving normalcy.

In 1999, the mutual trust built between India and Pakistan by the Delhi-Lahore Bus service initiative was effectively sabotaged by the Kargil intrusions masterminded by the Pakistan army, and later its architect Gen Musharraf pretended to be a peacenik by attending the Agra Summit but skilfully ensured that the talks to broker peace fail.

Readers would also recall that in 2014, the Pakistan army chief had reservations about allowing Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to attend his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi’s oath taking ceremony possibly because the two prime ministers getting close could bring about a thaw in relations. However, since the media published news of the army chief-prime minister disagreement, the former relented just to save face.

Just three days before Sharif was scheduled to reach India for this event, the Indian Consulate in Herat, Afghanistan, was attacked by terrorists. Luckily all the attackers were killed by alert Indian security guards before they could cause any damage. At that time no one linked this terrorist attack to Sharif's India visit.

However, the US Government subsequently identified the assailants as members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which is a Pakistan army sponsored terrorist group. It later emerged that the aim of this attack was to inflict casualties on India’s diplomatic staff to trigger Indo-Pak tensions that would prevent the Pakistani Prime Minister from going to India- a wily manipulation contrived by ISI to foreclose any possibility of cordiality in Indo-Pak relations.

Promoting Hatred

Talking of the present, one finds that rather than trying to promote amity, Field Marshal Munir has instead been working assiduously to so vitiate the environment that even the illusion of “Aman Ki Asha” (hope of peace) that anyone in India and Pakistan has is done away with for good through a two pronged approach.

One, he’s brazenly promoting Hinduphobia by telling his people that Muslims can’t coexist with Hindus and instigating them by using provocative claims, like Indo-Pak faceoff is due to a “clash of ideologies.” Two, he’s simultaneously using terrorists to specifically target members of the Hindu community in J&K in order to provoke a backlash against Muslims so he can cite such retaliatory violence as proof of the inherent incompatibility of these two religions.

On June 9, 2024, Pakistan sponsored terrorists ambushed a bus in the Reasi district of J&K killing nine and injuring more than 30 passengers. This wasn’t a random attack- it was a well planned act meant to kill two birds with one stone and had the patent signature of Pakistan’s spy agency Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) all over.

The target selection was meticulously done- it was a bus carrying Hindu pilgrims returning from their visit to a holy shrine. ISI expected that specifically targeting Hindus would arouse anti-Muslim sentiments and lead to violence against local Muslims. Two, this attack was extremely well timed. Coming just an hour before Modi was scheduled to take oath as prime minister for his third consecutive term, it was meant to embarrass Modi and give ammunition to the opposition to use against him.

A year later, Field Marshal Munir resurrected the Two-Nation Theory and within days after his gross diatribe on this issue, Pahalgam witnessed the mass killing of tourists. Here again, terrorists followed the Reasi terror attack pattern – they singled out and killed Hindus and also tried to embarrass Modi by telling the wife of a victim that her life was being spared so that she could go and tell him what happened.

Prognosis

Modi’s message to Nawaz Sharif that “The sound of talks gets lost in the sound of bomb blasts” holds good- both literally as well as metaphorically. And his view that “bomb blasts should stop so that we can talk and our voices can be heard” is a logical statement that can’t be contested. So, since talks are the only way forward, the RSS general secretary’s suggestion of keeping doors open for dialogue makes sense.

However, when it’s amply clear that Pakistan (or to be more specific Rawalpindi) has no intention whatsoever of stopping “bomb blasts,” harping on the issue of ushering normalcy through Indo-Pak talks makes little sense.

Let’s not forget that the Pakistan army has worked very hard to achieve its present status of indisputable supremacy and no army chief will ever relinquish the extra-constitutional powers, perks and privileges the men in khakis enjoy. Former army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa admitted that the Pakistan army “is often made the subject of criticism (and) a major reason for this is the army’s interference in politics for the last 70 years, which is unconstitutional,” but did nothing to remedy this serious malady.

And since Field Marshal Munir (who was always considered apolitical till he became army chief) has turned a deaf ear to his predecessor's advice to keep the army away from politics, it's amply clear that Rawalpindi will continue to rule Pakistan-come what may.

Lastly, it doesn’t require rocket science to deduce that despite glibly expressing views to the contrary, the heart and soul of Pakistan army Generals lies not in ensuring the wellbeing of their country or its people but in preserving Rawalpindi’s own turf. As such, looking forward to normalisation of Indo-Pak relations through dialogue is delusional and a case of harbouring great expectations!

Nilesh Kunwar is a retired Indian Army Officer who has served in Jammu & Kashmir, Assam, Nagaland and Manipur. He is a keen ‘Kashmir-Watcher,’ and after retirement is pursuing his favourite hobby of writing for newspapers, journals and think-tanks. Views expressed above are the author's own


India And Netherlands Elevate Ties To Strategic Partnership With Landmark Deals In Semiconductors And Green Hydrogen

PM Narendra Modi held a bilateral meeting with his Dutch PM Rob Jetten

India and the Netherlands have formally elevated their bilateral relationship to a strategic partnership, unveiling a comprehensive roadmap that spans semiconductors, green hydrogen, defence, and water management.

A landmark Tata Electronics–ASML agreement, the adoption of a Green Hydrogen Roadmap, and technical cooperation on Gujarat’s Kalpasar project were among the most significant outcomes of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to The Hague.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten agreed to deepen cooperation across trade, investment, semiconductors, green energy, defence, and water management. The Ministry of External Affairs confirmed that the two leaders acknowledged the strong momentum in bilateral relations and formally elevated ties to a strategic partnership.

This upgrade was accompanied by the adoption of an ambitious roadmap guiding cooperation across multiple sectors, including agriculture, health, education, and culture.

One of the most notable developments was the signing of a game‑changing agreement between Tata Electronics and ASML, the Dutch semiconductor equipment giant. This partnership will support India’s first commercial 300mm chip fabrication facility in Dholera, Gujarat, with an estimated investment of USD 11 billion.

ASML’s advanced lithography technology will be deployed to manufacture semiconductors for automotive, mobile devices, and artificial intelligence applications. This agreement builds on earlier collaborations in semiconductors, emerging technologies, and critical minerals, and is expected to generate high‑skilled jobs while strengthening India’s semiconductor ecosystem.

On green energy, both sides adopted an ambitious Green Hydrogen Roadmap to support India’s production, usage, and export of green hydrogen. The roadmap is designed to accelerate India’s transition to clean energy and enhance its role in global hydrogen supply chains.

The two countries also expressed satisfaction with progress on developing a green and digital sea corridor connecting Indian and Dutch ports, which will facilitate sustainable maritime trade and digital integration.

Water management emerged as another critical area of cooperation. The leaders welcomed the establishment of a Centre of Excellence on Water at IIT Delhi, created in collaboration with the Netherlands’ Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management.

A major outcome was the signing of a Letter of Intent for technical cooperation on the Kalpasar project in Gujarat, a multipurpose mega‑water project aimed at creating a freshwater reservoir to enhance water security in the Saurashtra region. Dutch expertise in dyke systems will play a pivotal role, given the similarities between the Kalpasar project and the Netherlands’ northern dyke system.

The talks also covered broader strategic issues, including support for the early signing and implementation of the India‑EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Both leaders highlighted the importance of resilient supply chains, trade facilitation, and mobility, while also emphasising collaboration in agriculture, healthcare, education, and cultural exchanges.

The roadmap of the strategic partnership for 2026–2030 institutionalises cooperation through regular political dialogue, economic collaboration, and joint ventures in priority sectors such as renewable energy, maritime infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, and high‑tech innovation.

The visit also included symbolic and cultural elements, with agreements signed across multiple sectors and discussions on restitution of historic artefacts. Prime Minister Modi is scheduled to visit a Dutch dyke, underscoring the shared emphasis on water security and sustainable infrastructure.

This strategic partnership marks one of the most comprehensive upgrades in India’s relations with a European nation, reflecting New Delhi’s broader push to intensify engagement with Europe in advanced technologies, clean energy, and defence manufacturing. It positions India and the Netherlands as key partners in shaping resilient supply chains and sustainable innovation in the Indo‑Pacific and beyond.

ANI


Iranian Foreign Minister Says India Can Play A Greater Role In West Asia Peace Efforts


Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, during his three‑day visit to New Delhi for the BRICS foreign ministers’ conclave, stated that India could play a greater role in bringing peace to West Asia. 

He emphasised that India’s strong relations with nearly all countries in the region and its good reputation made it well placed to contribute constructively to easing tensions.

Araghchi welcomed any positive Indian role in promoting peace and security, noting that Tehran would appreciate such involvement. His remarks coincided with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement in Abu Dhabi that India was ready to extend all possible support to restore peace in the region.

Araghchi was sharply critical of Washington, describing mistrust as the main obstacle preventing diplomatic progress between Tehran and the United States. He explained that contradictory signals from Washington had deepened Iranian scepticism and doubts about American seriousness in negotiations. 

He stressed that Iran would only move forward if convinced that the US genuinely sought a fair and balanced agreement. He reiterated that Iran had no trust in the Americans, calling this the central hurdle in any diplomatic effort.

The Iranian minister accused the United States and Israel of launching unprovoked aggression against Iran while negotiations were underway. He said Iran had been the victim of such acts but maintained that while he was optimistic about diplomacy, the possibility of returning to full‑scale war could not be ignored. He underlined that Iran was prepared both for renewed fighting and for diplomatic engagement, signalling readiness on both fronts.

Araghchi revealed that he had held discussions with Prime Minister Modi and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar on issues including the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. He described the positions of India and Iran as close, with shared concerns and interests in the region. He characterised the situation around the Strait of Hormuz as very complicated, noting Tehran’s efforts to ensure safe passage for ships. The waterway remains critical as nearly 20 per cent of global petroleum supplies transit through it, and Iran’s blockade has disrupted energy markets worldwide.

On the economic front, Araghchi offered to resume oil exports to India, recalling that India had been a major customer of Iranian oil before US sanctions halted imports. He said Tehran was ready to sell energy to India again, highlighting that bilateral trade had exceeded USD 20 billion annually before sanctions intensified.

He also expressed hope that India would continue developing the strategically important Chabahar Port project despite uncertainty over US sanctions exemptions. The port is seen as a vital connectivity initiative linking India with Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan.

Araghchi suggested that trade volumes between the two countries could quickly recover if sanctions were lifted, underscoring Iran’s determination to keep diplomatic and economic channels with India open even as conflict in West Asia continues to reshape alliances and global energy markets.




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Dutch CEOs Laud Modi’s Vision, Highlight India–Netherlands Opportunities In Semiconductors, Infrastructure And Trade


Dutch business leaders have expressed strong admiration for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision for India’s economic growth, highlighting expanding opportunities in semiconductors, infrastructure and trade after engaging with him at the CEO Round Table on Economic Ties in The Hague.

The interaction underscored the growing depth of India–Netherlands economic relations and the wider potential for collaboration across Europe.

Boudewijn Siemons, CEO of the Port of Rotterdam Authority, remarked that he was deeply impressed by Modi’s energy and determination. He emphasised that India and the Netherlands hold significant opportunities to strengthen their economic partnership. Siemons noted that what resonated most was Modi’s assertion that “the best is yet to come,” reflecting optimism about India’s trajectory.

Christophe Fouquet, President and CEO of ASML, drew attention to the strategic partnership signed between ASML and TATA Electronics, which he described as a testament to India’s strong ambitions in the semiconductor sector under Modi’s leadership. Fouquet recalled being impressed by India’s plans during the Semicon India event last year, observing that the agreement reflects India’s determination to build a robust semiconductor ecosystem.

Keith Svendsen, CEO of APM Terminals, welcomed India’s economic growth ambitions and stressed the importance of concluding an India–European Union trade agreement. He explained that his company is making progress on commitments discussed with PM Modi last year, including shipbuilding, container manufacturing and the establishment of training centres in India. He added that APM Terminals is also investing in new infrastructure projects within the country, signalling confidence in India’s long-term growth.

Dick Richelle, Chairman and CEO of Vopak, praised India’s transformation over the past twelve years, describing it as “fantastic” under Modi’s leadership. He highlighted opportunities for trilateral cooperation between India, the Netherlands and the European Union, particularly in infrastructure and investment. Richelle’s remarks reflected a broader European recognition of India’s economic rise and its role in global supply chains.

Addressing the CEOs Round Table, Prime Minister Modi underlined that more than 300 Dutch companies are now part of India’s growth story. He noted that the Netherlands has emerged as India’s largest investor from Europe and its second-largest trading partner. Modi emphasised that “today’s India is a symbol of scale and stability,” pointing out that India is the world’s fastest-growing major economy and continues to improve ease of doing business through reforms and reduced compliance requirements.

The discussions in The Hague reinforced the strategic importance of India–Netherlands economic ties, particularly in sectors such as semiconductors, shipping, infrastructure and energy. They also reflected Europe’s growing interest in India as a reliable partner in global trade and technology, with Dutch companies positioning themselves at the forefront of this expanding relationship.

ANI


Canada And India Advance Defence Cooperation Following Prime Minister Carney’s Visit


The High Commissioner of Canada to India, Christopher Cooter, held discussions with Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh in New Delhi on Saturday, focusing on advancing defence cooperation between the two nations.

This meeting was positioned as a follow-up to Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s state visit to India in February 2026, which had set the stage for a renewed and expanded partnership across multiple sectors.

The Ministry of Defence confirmed the talks in a post on X, noting that the courtesy call centred on identifying next steps to strengthen India‑Canada defence cooperation.

Prime Minister Carney’s earlier visit to India included a meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, after which both leaders released a joint statement. They welcomed five Memorandums of Understanding and announced a wide range of ambitious initiatives designed to broaden collaboration in energy, critical minerals, technology, artificial intelligence, talent, culture, and defence.

The Canadian delegation highlighted Canada’s competitive strengths in energy, defence, agriculture, critical minerals, AI, quantum computing, and health technology, while also emphasising Canada’s role as a premier destination for global capital and investment.

These areas were identified as key drivers for new investments and exports, particularly in infrastructure, manufacturing, mining, and defence.

Canada’s positioning as a Pacific nation was underscored during these engagements, with both sides recognising that stronger ties in the Indo‑Pacific are crucial for security and sovereignty. Defence cooperation is expected to expand significantly, with a particular emphasis on maritime security.

Plans are being developed to identify opportunities for bilateral and multilateral naval activities, aimed at deepening interoperability and promoting knowledge exchange. This reflects a shared commitment to enhancing resilience and ensuring regional stability in the Indo‑Pacific.

Beyond defence, the leaders also agreed to advance cooperation in security and law enforcement. This includes tackling issues of mutual concern such as the illegal flow of drugs, particularly fentanyl precursors, and addressing transnational organised criminal networks.

Prime Minister Carney stressed that Canada will continue to take measures against transnational repression, signalling a strong alignment with India on combating global security challenges. These discussions highlight the growing convergence between India and Canada in addressing both traditional and non‑traditional security threats.

The latest meeting between Christopher Cooter and Rajesh Kumar Singh builds upon this momentum, ensuring continuity in the dialogue and reinforcing the strategic intent expressed during Prime Minister Carney’s visit.

It reflects the determination of both nations to translate high‑level commitments into practical cooperation across defence, security, and broader strategic domains. The emphasis on maritime collaboration, law enforcement cooperation, and industrial engagement points towards a comprehensive framework for India‑Canada relations in the coming years.

ANI


Su-57 Stealth Jet’s RCS On Par With — Or Greater Than — Rafale, Sukhoi Claims


Sukhoi’s own technical documentation places the Su‑57’s frontal radar cross section between 0.1 and 1 m², which means its stealth signature is equal to or greater than that of the Rafale, estimated at 0.05–0.1 m², reported a French based defence portal.

This undermines Moscow’s claims of fifth‑generation stealth and highlights the detection advantage of Western fighters such as the F‑35, whose radar footprint is about a thousand times smaller.

The Su‑57 has long been presented by Russia as a highly stealthy fifth‑generation fighter, yet its stealth credentials are questioned by its own patents. The frontal radar cross section is set between 0.1 and 1 square metre, a figure that places it on par with or above the Rafale’s minimal frontal signature, which Dassault engineers estimate at 0.06 square metre.

This comparison is based on clean airframes without external stores, but it highlights the Su‑57’s vulnerability to modern radars and explains why the F‑35 can detect the Su‑57 at a distance six times greater than the reverse.

The Rafale benefits from a smaller frontal signature, translating into earlier detection of the Su‑57 when radars of identical performance are applied. The F‑35’s radar cross section, about one thousandth of a square metre, explains the vast detection range gaps and supports its dominance in beyond‑visual‑range engagements. These figures remain tied to frontal aspect and surface condition, but they are critical in shaping operational outcomes.

In terms of airframe design, the Su‑57 does retain advantages. It carries R‑77 medium‑range and R‑72 short‑range missiles internally, preserving geometric stealth, and boasts an internal fuel capacity of around 10 tonnes compared with the Rafale’s 4.7 tonnes. This allows the Russian aircraft to extend endurance without external tanks, whereas the Rafale’s radar cross section increases once drop tanks or underwing weapons are fitted.

The balance shifts when sensors and protection systems are considered. The Rafale fields the RBE2 active electronically scanned radar, a frontal optronic system and the SPECTRA electronic warfare suite, widely regarded as more capable than the Su‑57’s onboard systems. Its weapons portfolio, including MICA, MICA NG, METEOR, AASM Hammer, and future Stratus and Smarcruiser munitions, offers superior engagement options compared with Russia’s current offerings.

Operationally, Russia’s Aerospace Forces operate between 32 and 42 Su‑57s, while the United States fields more than 1,300 F‑35s. This disparity in fleet size, combined with the radar footprint differences, directly influences interception distances and firing windows in beyond‑visual‑range combat. 

Industrialisation challenges further complicate Russia’s ambitions. At the Shanghai International Aerospace Exhibition in 2024, observers noted visible rivets, screws and misaligned panels on a Su‑57 prototype, raising questions about production quality. Moscow still aims for 76 aircraft by 2027, but logistical strains and dependencies on precision equipment remain obstacles.

Propulsion is another limiting factor. Current Su‑57s fly with AL‑41F1 engines derived from the Su‑35, while the next‑generation Izdeliye 177 turbofan has yet to be serially integrated. Interim engines restrict prolonged supercruise, increase fuel consumption and raise infrared signatures, making detection by optronic sensors easier. These shortcomings weigh heavily on mission profiles in contested airspaces.

By contrast, the Rafale continues to evolve. The F4.1 standard began qualification in 2023, with operational persistence from 2024. Its modular computing architecture and data fusion support denser sensors and weapons, enhancing survivability in air‑to‑ground raids.

The F5 standard, reconfigured in the 2024–2030 Military Programming Law, promises conformal tanks, low‑signature drop tanks, advanced sensors and a collaborative combat drone derived from the nEUROn demonstrator. This drone, announced as more stealthy than the Su‑57, will allow the Rafale F5 to broaden operational offerings and strengthen export appeal.

Ultimately, while the Su‑57 retains advantages in internal carriage and fuel capacity, its radar cross section figures, propulsion limitations and industrial challenges undermine its stealth narrative. The Rafale, with superior sensors, electronic warfare systems and evolving standards, positions itself as a more balanced and survivable platform in the coming decade.

Agencies


Trump’s China Summit Falls Flat, Exposes Divergent Narratives And Limited Progress


The summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People on 14 May 2026 was marked by sharply divergent narratives from Washington and Beijing. 

Both sides brought senior officials responsible for foreign affairs, defence and economic policy, with China represented by thirteen officials and the US by eleven. Xi repeated familiar language about cooperation benefiting both countries and conflict harming both, while Trump declared that ties were “going to be better than ever before.”

Yet behind the ceremonial statements, the meeting revealed the absence of major agreements, persistent strategic distrust and Beijing’s reluctance to elevate Trump’s visit politically or symbolically.

Chinese state media placed Taiwan at the centre of the summit. Xinhua reported that Xi described Taiwan as “the most important issue” in US–China relations, warning that mishandling it could lead to confrontation or conflict.

He reiterated Beijing’s position that “Taiwan independence” is incompatible with peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The White House account, however, did not foreground Taiwan, instead highlighting discussions on Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, global energy security and economic cooperation.

The contrasting readouts reflected parallel messaging strategies: Beijing emphasising sovereignty and red lines, Washington attempting to frame the summit around broader geopolitical cooperation and stability in West Asia.

Taiwan’s prominence in Beijing’s narrative coincided with developments in Washington. Just a day before the summit, a bipartisan group in the US House of Representatives introduced a resolution reaffirming longstanding American commitments to Taiwan. The measure underscored the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Communiques and the Six Assurances as the foundation of US policy, rejecting any notion that they could be treated as bargaining tools.

The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 has shaped unofficial US–Taiwan ties while supporting Taiwan’s democratic and economic development. The Six Assurances of 1982 reiterated that Washington would not set a date for ending arms sales, would not consult Beijing in advance, would not mediate between Taiwan and the Chinese Communist Party, would not revise the Act, would not take a position on sovereignty and would not pressure Taiwan into negotiations.

The Three Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979 and 1982 continue to define the framework of the US “One China” policy. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs later stated that China remains “the sole risk to regional peace and stability” and pledged continued cooperation with the US and other partners. Despite the rhetoric, the summit produced no breakthrough on Taiwan, with Xi reiterating familiar positions and Washington offering no concessions.

On trade, Chinese state media attempted to portray the summit as economically constructive, but tangible results were limited. Xi told Trump that recent economic discussions had produced “generally balanced and positive results,” referencing separate talks between US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in South Korea earlier in the week. China’s Ministry of Commerce said Beijing was willing to expand cooperation while narrowing differences.

Yet outcomes fell short of expectations. One concrete development involved licensing US slaughterhouses for beef exports to China, but this quickly appeared uncertain amid reports of reversals and pressure from Chinese agricultural interests. Anticipated agreements involving Chinese purchases of Boeing aircraft also failed to materialise.

Reports had suggested China could commit to buying 200 Boeing jets, but no confirmation emerged, disappointing investors. There was likewise no visible progress on geopolitical disputes involving Iran, Taiwan or Japan. Trump claimed Xi had “strongly” promised not to supply Iran with weapons, but no formal agreement was reached.

The White House highlighted discussions on the Strait of Hormuz and global energy security, but Chinese readouts barely mentioned them. Ultimately, the summit produced neither a significant trade breakthrough nor a strategic reset.

Beijing’s treatment of Trump’s visit was notably subdued. Unlike previous visits by American presidents, Chinese state media coverage remained restrained and at times indifferent. On the day Trump arrived, China Daily’s front page featured Xi with Tajikistan’s president, relegating Trump’s arrival to secondary coverage.

People’s Daily placed commentary on Trump’s visit on Page 3. CCTV’s flagship news program devoted only 12 seconds to announcing Trump’s arrival, followed by a six‑minute segment on Yangtze River Delta development. Even on the day of the summit, coverage of the Trump‑Xi meeting lasted just two and a half minutes and appeared 13th in the program line-up.

This contrasted sharply with earlier visits by Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump’s own 2017 trip, all of which received extensive promotion. Beijing’s caution reflected uncertainty over Trump’s unpredictability, with officials wary of sudden controversies turning favourable coverage into liabilities. 

Social media activity was heavily restricted, with public discussion limited to sardonic commentary about US difficulties in Iran and occasional praise for Trump’s deferential posture toward Xi. One of the few figures to generate excitement was Jensen Huang, the Taiwanese American technology executive accompanying Trump’s delegation.

Xi largely repeated long‑standing positions rather than offering new initiatives. He reiterated Beijing’s red lines on Taiwan, democracy, human rights and China’s political system, returning to themes of stability over confrontation, rejection of great‑power conflict and warnings against the “Thucydides Trap.”

No major joint initiatives or strategic frameworks emerged. Much of the political theatre appeared centred on Trump seeking validation from Xi. In media appearances, Trump praised Xi in unusually personal terms, even remarking to Fox News that Hollywood could not find someone like him to play China’s leader.

The contrast with earlier US presidential visits was striking. Previous leaders arrived representing a globally dominant United States managing relations with China. This time, Beijing projected confidence while Washington appeared focused on optics and personal diplomacy.

By the end of the visit, the summit had produced divergent narratives, modest trade gestures and extensive symbolism, but little evidence of strategic progress.

Agencies


India Warns Against Targeting Shipping In Strait of Hormuz Amid West Asia Crisis


India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Parvathaneni Harish, has outlined New Delhi’s approach to tackling the ongoing energy and fertiliser crisis triggered by the conflict in West Asia. 

Speaking at the Special Meeting of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNECOSOC) on safeguarding energy and supply flows, Harish stressed that a combination of short‑term and long‑term measures, supported by international cooperation, was essential to effectively respond to the crisis.

He emphasised that India’s strategy was designed to balance immediate relief with structural reforms, ensuring resilience in the face of prolonged disruptions.

Harish reiterated India’s deep concerns over maritime security and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery for global energy and trade. He declared that targeting commercial shipping, endangering civilian crew members, or impeding navigation in the Strait was unacceptable and must be prevented.

He underlined that international law governing maritime conduct must be fully respected, and that violations of these principles posed grave risks to global supply chains and economic stability.

His remarks came against the backdrop of Iran’s announcement of a new “professional mechanism” to regulate maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian Parliament’s National Security Committee chief, Ebrahim Azizi, stated that the mechanism had been developed within the framework of Iran’s national sovereignty and aimed at ensuring the security of international trade.

According to Azizi, only commercial vessels and parties cooperating with Iran would be permitted to benefit from the designated route, while operators associated with the so‑called “freedom project” would be barred. He added that specialised services would be provided under this mechanism, with fees collected accordingly.

The Iranian proposal has raised concerns among international stakeholders, as it effectively introduces a selective regime for maritime passage through one of the world’s most vital chokepoints. The Strait of Hormuz handles a significant proportion of global oil and gas shipments, and any restrictions or selective access could exacerbate the already fragile energy and fertiliser supply chains.

India, heavily reliant on imports transiting through the Strait, has consistently called for unimpeded freedom of navigation and warned against unilateral measures that undermine international norms.

Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump issued a stark warning, cautioning that the world would face a “very bad time” if a peace deal to end the West Asia crisis was not reached. His remarks, reported by Al Jazeera and French broadcaster BFMTV, underscored Washington’s growing anxiety over the protracted conflict and its global repercussions.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, however, dismissed American overtures, asserting that the United States remained the primary barrier to peace in West Asia. Addressing a press conference in New Delhi after a meeting of BRICS Foreign Ministers, Araghchi claimed that after more than a month of failed military objectives, Washington had attempted to pivot towards dialogue.

He argued that Tehran harboured deep‑seated scepticism about US intentions, citing a long history of mistrust. “Now, after 40 days of war, when the US became hopeless of achieving any goal in their aggression against Iran, they offered negotiation... We have no trust in Americans... This is the main obstacle in the way of any diplomatic effort. We have every reason not to trust Americans, while they have no reason not to trust us,” he declared.

The unfolding situation highlights the widening trust deficit between Iran and the United States, complicating efforts to broker peace in West Asia. India’s intervention at the UN underscores its dual priorities: safeguarding its energy and fertiliser supply chains while defending the principles of maritime freedom and international law.

With Iran seeking to impose new maritime regulations and the United States warning of dire consequences without a peace settlement, the Strait of Hormuz remains at the centre of a volatile geopolitical contest.

ANI