Congress general secretary Jairam Ramesh has accused the Narendra Modi government of “strangulating and emasculating” the Indian Space Research Organisation while pursuing an aggressive privatisation agenda in the space sector. The statement is politically forceful, but it is only partly accurate.
There is, in fact, a major structural change under way. ISRO is being encouraged to move away from the routine manufacture of mature launch vehicles and operational satellites, while private companies and public-sector undertakings are being asked to take over more of the production and commercialisation work.
However, this does not amount to the privatisation or sale of ISRO itself. ISRO remains India’s national space agency. Its principal responsibilities continue to include advanced research and development, scientific missions, human spaceflight, space exploration, new launch technologies, strategic space systems and the development of capabilities that are not yet commercially mature.
The Modi government’s policy is better described as the commercialisation and industrialisation of India’s space sector, rather than the privatisation of ISRO. The distinction is important.
Privatisation normally involves transferring ownership and control of a public institution or asset to a private entity. Commercialisation involves allowing public-sector technologies and services to be used or sold on commercial terms. Industrialisation involves shifting serial production from a research organisation to companies that can manufacture systems at scale.
The present reforms largely fall into the second and third categories.
The foundation for this change was laid by the space-sector reforms announced in 2020 and formalised through the Indian Space Policy 2023. The policy allows Non-Government Entities to participate across the space value chain.
This includes satellite manufacturing, launch-vehicle development, launch operations, ground stations, satellite data, remote sensing, navigation, space situational awareness and the establishment of launch infrastructure.
The policy also explicitly states that ISRO should transition away from its existing practice of manufacturing operational space systems once those systems have become mature.
That provision was not hidden. It was included in the official policy framework several years ago.
The intended division of responsibilities is relatively clear. ISRO is expected to concentrate on advanced technology and scientific missions. NewSpace India Limited, or NSIL, is responsible for commercialisation. IN-SPACe is responsible for promoting, authorising and facilitating private-sector space activities. The Department of Space remains responsible for overall policy supervision and national requirements.
Recent statements by IN-SPACe Chairman Pawan Goenka have made the implications of this policy more explicit.
He has said that ISRO will eventually stop manufacturing launch vehicles, with production being undertaken by private companies or public-sector undertakings. The Small Satellite Launch Vehicle has already entered this transition.
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited has acquired the technology for the end-to-end commercial production of the SSLV. The agreement covers activities such as manufacturing, integration, launch operations, quality control, training and post-flight support. The future transfer of PSLV and LVM-3 technology is also being considered.
This is a much more consequential step because the PSLV is India’s proven medium-lift workhorse, while LVM3 is the country’s most powerful operational launch vehicle. Transferring their production would represent a shift from occasional industrial contracting to a broader handover of mature launch-vehicle manufacturing capability.
Nevertheless, even this should not automatically be described as the dismantling of ISRO.
ISRO designed these vehicles, developed their technologies, established their reliability and created the industrial ecosystem that supports them. Transferring serial production to industry does not erase that institutional knowledge.
The crucial question is whether ISRO will retain sufficient design authority, systems-engineering competence, testing capability, mission-assurance expertise and the ability to intervene during a crisis. If the agency retains those capabilities, the change could strengthen India’s space program. If it loses them through an uncontrolled reduction in personnel, funding and manufacturing experience, the reform could gradually hollow out the organisation. This is the legitimate concern behind the Congress criticism.
The most serious part of Ramesh’s argument is not necessarily his use of the words “strangulated” and “emasculated”. It is his warning that ISRO may lose important capabilities faster than private industry can replace them.
Space technology depends heavily on tacit knowledge. This knowledge is not always captured in design documents or technology-transfer agreements. It is acquired through repeated testing, launch failures, quality-control decisions, supplier management, mission simulations and the accumulated experience of engineers and technicians.
A private company may receive a technology package, but it may still require several years to develop the judgement needed to manufacture and operate the system reliably. This is particularly important for cryogenic propulsion, flight computers, guidance systems, composite structures, solid-propellant motors, stage integration and launch-site operations.
The reported departure of between 100 and 120 ISRO professionals is therefore a matter that deserves serious examination. The figure has not been officially confirmed in full, and media reports have relied partly on internal sources.
Even so, departures from strategically important centres such as the UR Rao Satellite Centre and the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre would be concerning if they involve experienced personnel associated with major missions. Resignations alone do not prove that ISRO is being privatised.
Scientists and engineers may leave for several reasons, including better remuneration, more flexible work conditions, opportunities to lead projects and the attraction of the expanding private space sector. But if the exits are concentrated among senior specialists working on human spaceflight, advanced propulsion, satellite systems or mission assurance, the Department of Space must disclose enough information to reassure Parliament and the public.
A modern space agency cannot remain healthy if it becomes merely a purchaser of technology developed elsewhere. The Congress allegation that “much of its satellite-related assets” will be transferred “lock, stock and barrel” to private companies is more difficult to substantiate.
The policy does provide for mature technologies and operational systems to be transferred to industry. It also allows private companies to build and operate satellites and provide space-based services.
But that is not the same as transferring all publicly funded satellite assets to private ownership.
India will continue to require government-controlled satellites for navigation, secure communications, meteorology, disaster management, strategic surveillance, environmental monitoring and national development programs. The government also has a responsibility to ensure that essential space services remain available even when they are not commercially attractive.
The statement regarding the second spaceport in Tamil Nadu also requires careful qualification.
The government is developing the Small Satellite Launch Complex at Kulasekarapattinam. IN-SPACe has invited Indian private companies to operate and manage the facility and provide commercial launch services to launch-vehicle operators.
This appears to involve private operation and management of a publicly funded facility, rather than an outright sale of the spaceport. Such an arrangement is not unusual in infrastructure sectors. Airports, ports, telecommunications networks and power systems can be publicly owned while being operated by private entities under contracts and regulatory supervision.
The arrangement will be defensible only if the government retains ownership, national-security control, emergency access and the power to terminate the contract in the public interest.
The future of the Satish Dhawan Space Centre at Sriharikota is also not automatically in doubt.
There is no established evidence that the government intends to close Sriharikota or transfer the spaceport entirely to private ownership. In practice, India may need both government-controlled launch infrastructure for strategic and scientific missions and commercially operated facilities for higher-frequency private launches.
The growth of private participation has already produced tangible results.
India now has hundreds of registered space Start-Ups working in launch vehicles, satellite systems, propulsion, space electronics, Earth observation, space situational awareness and downstream applications.
Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Agnikul Cosmos, Pixxel, Dhruva Space, Bellatrix Aerospace and Digantara demonstrate that the private ecosystem is no longer merely theoretical. Private launch vehicles have progressed from laboratory prototypes to flight demonstrations and orbital missions. Private companies are also developing satellite constellations, electric propulsion, synthetic-aperture radar, space debris tracking and satellite-based data services.
The government has further supported the sector through the IN-SPACe Seed Fund, a Technology Adoption Fund, a government-backed venture-capital fund and subsidised access to testing facilities.
The official objective is to expand India’s space economy from roughly $8.4 billion to about $44 billion by 2033. That ambition cannot be achieved if ISRO remains responsible for designing, manufacturing, integrating, launching and commercially operating every mature system. ISRO has historically performed all of these functions because India’s private industrial base was once too weak to take them on. That situation has changed.
Indian firms now possess stronger capabilities in composites, precision machining, avionics, electronics, software, propulsion, systems integration and project management. HAL and Larsen & Toubro, in particular, already possess experience in complex aerospace and defence manufacturing. The transition can therefore help India increase launch frequency, shorten production cycles, reduce manufacturing bottlenecks and compete for a larger share of the global satellite-launch and space-services market.
There is also an important strategic argument in favour of the reform. A broader industrial base can make India more resilient. If several Indian companies can manufacture launch vehicles, satellite buses, propulsion systems and spacecraft components, the country will be less dependent on a single agency or a limited number of government facilities. It can also create surge capacity during a national emergency.
A private industrial base would help India maintain production when ISRO is occupied with Chandrayaan-type missions, Gaganyaan, solar observations, planetary exploration, advanced reusable launch vehicles or other high-risk programs.
However, private participation does not automatically guarantee lower costs or better performance. Companies will require predictable demand, access to test facilities, patient capital, insurance, export support and clear rules on liability. Launch vehicles are not ordinary commercial products. A failed launch can destroy customer satellites, disrupt insurance markets and damage India’s international reputation. Private companies may also be reluctant to invest in systems that require long development cycles and have uncertain launch demand.
The government must therefore remain an anchor customer.
It should provide multi-year procurement commitments, particularly for Earth-observation satellites, secure communications, navigation services, weather data and defence-related space assets. Without assured demand, companies may be forced to prioritise short-term funding rounds instead of long-term engineering capability.
The transfer of public technology also requires transparency.
The government has reported that dozens of ISRO-developed technologies have been transferred to industry, including important satellite, antenna, sensor, navigation and launch-vehicle technologies. Such transfers can be highly beneficial when they create domestic manufacturing capacity and reduce imports. They can become controversial when publicly funded technologies are licensed at prices that do not reflect their strategic or commercial value, or when the process appears to favour a small number of politically connected companies.
Every major transfer should therefore disclose the method of valuation, the duration of the licence, performance obligations, royalty arrangements, export conditions, security restrictions and provisions for termination. The state must not create private monopolies out of public monopolies. There is also a regulatory issue. IN-SPACe is expected to promote and authorise private space activities. Combining promotional and regulatory functions can help new companies navigate bureaucracy, but it may also create a conflict of interest. An institution that is encouraging a launch company may later be required to reject its launch application on safety, security or technical grounds.
India needs a strong, transparent and professionally staffed regulatory system with independent safety oversight. It also needs a comprehensive legal framework dealing with third-party liability, insurance, space debris, satellite interference, data security, environmental impact and the responsibilities of launch providers.
India’s space future depends not on dismantling ISRO but on harnessing the synergy between public and private sectors. The rise of start-ups is not a threat but an opportunity, provided safeguards are in place to protect national interests and sustain ISRO’s legacy.
IDN (With Agency Inputs)
