by Adithya M Nair
China has a long history of using disputed borders to expand influence and alter the status quo with its neighbours. Very few of them have been able to call its bluff and stand strong against Chinese aggression and expansion.
I present two cases where India not only recognised Chinese grey-zone tactics but effectively countered them through pre-emptive action, strategic infrastructure development and resolute on-ground posture.
Doklam Standoff
Chumbi Valley (located in the Yadong county of Chinese controlled Tibet) acts as a key strategic area, which can be used by China to cut off India's vulnerable 22km wide Siliguri Corridor (Chicken's neck). The thin corridor acts as a bridge between Central India and its seven sisters in the east.
This valley sits as a narrow wedge of Tibetan territory shaped like a dagger pointing directly down between Sikkim (India) to the west and Bhutan to the east.
Chumbi Valley in itself is strategically at a disadvantage because the Indian Army has a presence both to the east and the west of this valley. Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT), established in 1961–1962, IMTRAT is India's oldest overseas military mission. It is headquartered permanently at the historic Haa Dzong in the Haa Valley of Western Bhutan.
This allows for a permanent and a continuous Indian presence to the east of the Valley. Alongside combat personnel, the Indian Army’s Border Roads Organisation (BRO) operates a permanent task force inside Bhutan known as Project DANTAK. Established in 1961, DANTAK constructs and maintains all critical military-grade roads, airfields, helipads, and bridges across Bhutan.
Along with these the 17th Mountain division, also called the Black Cat division, is stationed on East Sikkim .The Black Cat Division holds all the critical mountain passes overlooking the Chumbi Valley, including Nathu La and Cho La. They control the highest ridge lines (ranging between 14,000 and 18,000 feet), giving them an absolute vertical and visual advantage over the lower-lying Chinese bases in Yatung(which is the main Chinese military town located right at the base of Chumbi Valley).
If the Chinese march in through the valley to cut off Siliguri corridor, both the Indian military can manoeuvre a pincer motion, from both East and the West, to cut off the invading army from its base.
Also the Indian Army has the advantage of being at a height, which allows them to overlook the Valley.
This is why Doklam becomes a strategic point for China. The Doklam Plateau sits right at the top-right lip of this valley. If China controls Doklam, it broadens its narrow wedge, gives its troops room to manoeuvre, and pushes its military deployment out of the vulnerable base of the valley onto high ground.
Up until June 16, Chinese vehicles could only drive to a certain point before troops had to patrol the southern plateau on foot. Building a heavy, motorable road to the Zompelri Ridge (Jhampheri Ridge) would allow the PLA to bring up heavy armour, logistics trucks, and artillery. From the heights of the Zompelri Ridge, China would look straight down onto India’s Siliguri Corridor. It would shift the military advantage entirely to Beijing, turning India's strongest defensive line into an indefensible liability.
In a conflict, China could theoretically sever the Chicken's Neck within hours, completely isolating Far east India from the rest of the country.
On 17th June 2017, A heavily armed engineering and construction contingent of the PLA entered the Doklam Plateau, an area internationally recognised as Bhutanese territory but claimed by Beijing as "Donglang". The Chinese forces brought heavy earthmovers, bulldozers, and tactical road-building machinery. Their goal, simply said, was to build a heavy motorable road through the Doklam Plateau to reach a high mountain ridge. If they reached this ridge, they could park heavy tanks and missiles on top, looking directly down at India’s narrowest land bottleneck.
India cannot afford that to happen. Which is why, despite this being an issue between China and Bhutan (as the region is a disputed area between China and Bhutan (one can read more about the Bhutan China border dispute here: https://www.orfonline.org/research/doklam-start-very-beginning)), India stood firm with its Bhutan counterpart and resisted Chinese incursion into Bhutanese territory.
On 18 June 2017, as part of Operation Juniper, about 270 armed Indian troops with two bulldozers crossed the Sikkim border into Doklam, to stop the Chinese troops from constructing the road.
The PLA aggressively retaliated by bulldozing an old, non-operational Indian bunker in the vicinity to intimidate the troops. However, the Indian soldiers stood their ground, sparking a 73-day high-altitude standoff.
On 28th August, both sides decided to pull back. India was successful in preventing the Chinese from constructing the road to the ridge. Because India put up a physical human wall and deployed bulldozers to match China's machinery, the PLA could not reach the Zompelri Ridge via the shorter, direct path. India's line of sight over the Siliguri Corridor remained safe from that angle.
India was able to call China's bluff out and successfully divert China from creeping into bordering nations.
While the standoff was a success, China continues to do the same "salami slicing" strategy, but on other fronts. Instead of trying to build on top of the disputed, flat plateau where Indian troops could easily see them, China shifted its heavy machinery a few kilometres eastward into the deep, low-lying Amo Chu (Torrsa) River Valley.
This valley cuts deep into western Bhutanese territory. Over the last few years, satellite imagery confirmed that China built a massive network of roads, tunnels, and 22 permanent "Xiaokang" (moderately prosperous) villages (including Pangda Village) right inside the valley.
By building this alternative, hidden route through the river valley, China bypassed the 2017 standoff site entirely. This network has placed Chinese military infrastructure just 7 to 8 kilometres away from the exact same Zompelri Ridge line they were blocked from reaching in 2017.
Galwan Clash
In the 2020 Galwan clash between India and China, the roles were reversed. It was China who tried to prevent India from constructing a strategically valuable road and miserably failed.
The primary reason for the confrontation was India's nearing completion of the Darbuk–Shyok–Daulat Beg Oldi (DSDBO) Road. This 255-km strategic lifeline runs parallel to the LAC at altitudes above 14,000 feet. It directly connects the main city of Leh to Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), India's northernmost military outpost sitting right beneath the Karakoram Pass, home to the world's highest advanced landing airstrip.
Before this road was completed, it took Indian soldiers days of gruelling foot-marches and high-altitude trekking to reach the northern border. The DSDBO road reduced travel times from days to just 12 hours. China realised that India could now mobilise thousands of heavy mechanised troops to the border instantly during a crisis.
In May 2020, the PLA diverted thousands of troops from an exercise in Tibet and marched them westward along the Galwan River basin toward Indian territory, to disrupt the road construction. They crossed the mutually understood LAC and established a temporary camp consisting of observation tents, tarps, and fortifications right at Patrolling Point 14 (PP-14).
PP-14 is a sharp bend where the narrow Galwan River valley opens up to meet the Shyok River. By placing an outpost at PP-14, the Chinese military sat on high ridges looking directly down onto the newly built DSDBO highway. From this vantage point, Chinese artillery could easily monitor and blow up the Indian road, severing India's connection to the north. (https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/satellite-images-show-positions-surrounding-deadly-china-india-clash/)
On June 6, 2020, Indian and Chinese military commanders held a flag meeting and agreed to a phased disengagement. The PLA promised to dismantle its observation post at PP-14 and withdraw its personnel.
On June 15, an Indian patrol led by Colonel B. Santosh Babu (Commanding Officer of the 16 Bihar Regiment) marched up to PP-14 to verify the Chinese withdrawal. They found that the PLA had refused to leave and had reinforced the post.
A fierce physical confrontation erupted. Because a long-standing 1996 bilateral agreement strictly bans firearms and explosives within 2km of the LAC, no shots were fired. Both sides use melees and iron rods wrapped in barbed wire to fight. The Indian side faced 20 casualties while the Chinese side faced around 35-40 (Officially China only acknowledged 4, but western and even Russian state owned news outlets said that China faced more than 30 casualties)
While multiple lives were lost on both sides India successfully defended its territorial integrity and prevented Chinese incursion. Despite the intense violence, massive Chinese mobilisation, and threat of an all-out war, India refused to halt operations. India flew in 12,000 additional construction workers to the region and successfully completed the final bridges and black-topping of the DSDBO highway.
Following multiple rounds of military talks, both sides pulled back from the immediate river junction. A temporary "Buffer Zone" was established around PP-14. While this means neither side can currently patrol up to the exact point on foot, it forced the PLA to pull its observation tents back into Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin.
To make defence airtight, India began construction on a second, completely hidden alternate road to DBO via Sasoma and Saser La. This backup highway runs through deep valleys entirely shielded from any Chinese high-ground observation posts, ensuring India's northern defence line can never be cut off.
Ultimately, these events shattered the long-standing myth of Chinese invincibility along the Line of Actual Control. By combining rapid alpine manoeuvre with uncompromising infrastructure development, India demonstrated that the only effective antidote to China's 'salami-slicing' is clear-eyed, symmetric deterrence.
As Beijing continues its expansionist push across Asia, India's actions in the Himalayas stand as definitive proof that China's grey-zone aggression can not only be recognized, but effectively defeated.
Adithya M Nair is a seasoned analyst and commentator on foreign policy and defence affairs, with a reputation for incisive insights into the shifting dynamics of global security
