Sunday, August 9, 2026

Kaveri 2.0: India’s Indigenous Fighter Engine Enters a New Phase


India’s Kaveri 2.0 fighter jet engine program has entered a decisive phase, with the Gas Turbine Research Establishment achieving major breakthroughs in weight reduction, thrust performance, and advanced materials.

The engine is now targeting integration with TEJAS variants by 2030 and could eventually power the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft and the Ghatak UCAV, marking a critical step toward India’s aerospace self-reliance.

This initiative builds on decades of experience from the original Kaveri program, which struggled to meet thrust and weight requirements for the TEJAS fighter. 

he new effort is focused on creating an advanced engine core with improved compressor, combustion, turbine, and digital engine-control technologies. The long-term goal is to reduce India’s dependence on foreign powerplants and establish a stronger indigenous aerospace propulsion ecosystem.

Historically, TEJAS MK-1 and MK-1A fighters relied on American GE-F404 and F414 engines, but delays in deliveries underscored the strategic vulnerability of relying on imported turbofans. Kaveri 2.0 is designed to overcome these limitations by delivering thrust levels comparable to foreign engines while maintaining a lighter weight and improved reliability.

Recent breakthroughs include a dramatic reduction in engine weight from the original 1,235 kilograms to around 1,100 kilograms, with future prototypes aiming for below 1,000 kilograms.

Engineers have achieved this through modular redesign, additive manufacturing, and the use of composite structures. Advanced materials such as single-crystal turbine blades and polymer matrix composites are being incorporated to withstand higher turbine inlet temperatures and reduce structural mass.

Performance targets for Kaveri 2.0 are ambitious. The engine is expected to deliver 55–59 kilonewtons of dry thrust and 90–100 kilonewtons of wet thrust with afterburner, making it suitable for upgraded TEJAS variants and potentially TEJAS MK-2. This represents a significant improvement over the original Kaveri, which produced only 41 kilonewtons dry and 70–72 kilonewtons wet thrust.

Technological upgrades include integrated BLISK compressors, boltless turbine blade arrangements, improved aerodynamics, and modern Full Authority Digital Engine Control systems.

These innovations enhance efficiency, reliability, and thrust-to-weight ratios. Digital twin modelling and predictive fatigue analysis are also being used to accelerate development cycles and reduce costly physical testing.

The program is following a phased approach: certifying the dry derivative for unmanned roles, demonstrating afterburner operation, integrating with a TEJAS flying test-bed, and eventually scaling to full production for manned fighters. If successful, Kaveri 2.0 could also power India’s fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft and the stealth Ghatak UCAV.

Beyond propulsion, the significance of Kaveri 2.0 lies in its strategic impact. A successful indigenous engine would insulate India from export controls, geopolitical disruptions, and foreign supply shortages. 

It would also strengthen India’s defence autonomy, support long-term force planning, and seed wider aerospace industrial capabilities such as turbine manufacturing, high-temperature metallurgy, and precision machining.

Kaveri 2.0 is not just about building an engine. It represents India’s determination to achieve technological independence in one of the most complex areas of aerospace engineering.

If the program succeeds, it will mark a milestone in India’s journey toward mastering advanced fighter aircraft engines and joining the select group of nations capable of designing and producing them.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)


Parliamentary Panel Directs DRDO To Set KPIs And Strengthen Defence R&D Roadmap


India’s Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence has directed DRDO to set clear Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) covering costs, timelines, technology maturity, and operational effectiveness, while closely monitoring the ₹33,000 crore defence R&D roadmap.

The panel also emphasised stronger workplace grievance mechanisms, enhanced welfare measures for defence families, and a time-bound roadmap for ECHS migration.

The committee has asked DRDO to establish measurable performance targets for all projects. These KPIs must include cost efficiency, technological maturity, project completion dates, and operational effectiveness.

The panel stressed that these indicators should be formally notified and integrated into a transparent benchmarking framework to ensure accountability.

The report highlighted the need for a structured and periodic assessment system that benchmarks DRDO projects against these KPIs. This approach is intended to prevent delays, cost overruns, and inefficiencies, ensuring that defence R&D delivers tangible technological and operational outcomes.

The committee also urged the Defence Ministry to provide details of steps taken to improve fund utilisation and prevent cost overruns.

It reiterated its earlier recommendation for a transparent benchmarking framework that places emphasis on technology readiness, project timelines, cost efficiency, and operational utility.

On funding, the panel backed a sustained increase in defence R&D investment over the next five years, noting that the proposed ₹33,000 crore roadmap must lead to greater indigenisation and reduced dependence on imports.

The Defence Production Department has been tasked with closely monitoring implementation to ensure the roadmap delivers intended results.

The committee acknowledged the increase in the defence capital budget following Operation Sindoor, recognising the government’s focus on strengthening defence R&D as part of broader capability enhancement.

Workplace grievance mechanisms at DRDO were also reviewed. The panel noted that women employees have equal opportunities and that systems such as Internal Complaints Committees, She-Box, and nodal officers are in place. However, it called for stricter compliance with the POSH Act and further strengthening of complaint mechanisms.

The committee also addressed welfare measures for defence families. It asked the Defence Ministry to conduct a comprehensive study on educational opportunities for children, wards, and widows of defence personnel.

This study should involve the Ministry of Education, state governments, and professional bodies, exploring options such as increased reservation and support measures in professional colleges.

On healthcare, the panel welcomed the migration of Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS) applications to the National Government Cloud. It recommended a time-bound roadmap for completing migration, integrating stakeholders, and rolling out a unified platform.

Separately, the committee noted that the government has approved three lakh additional vacancies for National Cadet Corps (NCC) cadets, with enrolment to be completed in phases between 2025 and 2028.

Agencies


Could An Indo-Israeli Stealth Fighter Partnership Strengthen Both Nations?


Israel is once again considering the possibility of building its own fighter jet after nearly four decades. Reports from Bloomberg and The Jerusalem Post in late July 2026 revealed that a senior Israeli official outlined a ten-year plan to develop a domestic stealth fighter and an unmanned combat aerial vehicle that would draw upon F-35 technology.

This marks Israel’s first major attempt at a new fighter design since the IAI Lavi program was cancelled in 1987 due to prohibitive costs and American political pressure. The new vision aligns with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s broader strategy to reduce reliance on the $3.8 billion in annual military aid from the United States, which is set to expire in 2028, by shifting towards domestic funding, local manufacturing, and international joint ventures.

Since the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel has depended entirely on American aircraft for its frontline fighter fleet. The announcement of a homegrown stealth jet signals a dramatic shift towards strategic independence.

Defence analysts have noted that Israel’s ambitions could align closely with India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) program, which is itself a fifth-generation stealth fighter initiative.

However, Israel’s project remains at a very early stage. The official clarified that the ten-year timeline is only for producing a flight demonstrator, with no contractors selected, no schedules finalised, and no formal program launched by the Ministry of Defence.

Israel’s defence industry leaders have admitted that building a complete aircraft from scratch is beyond their current capabilities, given the absence of manufacturing infrastructure, dedicated engineering teams, and a funded aerospace program.

Israel does, however, possess advanced expertise in Active Electronically Scanned Array radars, electronic warfare systems, and avionics, honed through decades of modifying American aircraft, particularly the customised F-35I Adir.

Yet it lacks facilities to mass-produce stealth airframes, test radar-evading designs, or develop high-thrust turbofan engines. Establishing these capabilities will take immense time and resources, explaining why Israel’s demonstrator phase is projected to take at least a decade. This reality is crucial for India to consider when evaluating potential collaboration.

India and Israel already share a strong defence relationship. Bharat Electronics Limited and Rafael Advanced Defence Systems jointly manufacture precision-guided munitions, while the Barak-8 missile system stands as a successful co-development project.

This history of cooperation has fostered mutual trust and smooth technology transfer. Israel’s aerospace limitations align with India’s strengths. Israel needs a partner with large-scale manufacturing capacity, while India offers Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s infrastructure and the Indian Air Force’s demand for future aircraft.

In return, Israel’s advanced radar, electronic warfare, and sensor fusion technologies could help India overcome technical challenges in the AMCA’s internal systems. Such collaboration would also diversify India’s technological dependencies, reducing reliance on France, particularly as India awaits final approval for the Safran-GTRE joint venture to build a 120-kilonewton engine for the AMCA.

Despite these complementarities, making Israel a structural partner in the AMCA airframe design is highly impractical. India has deliberately ensured complete domestic ownership of the stealth airframe and intellectual property to avoid export restrictions and bureaucratic hurdles, such as those experienced with the TEJAS fighter’s reliance on American engines.

Current workshare agreements are centred on the Safran-GTRE engine partnership, and introducing Israel as a new structural partner would require renegotiations that could derail the project.

Moreover, much of Israel’s cutting-edge electronic warfare and sensor technology is tied to American intellectual property, meaning Washington retains veto power over its export. Integrating such systems into the AMCA could undermine India’s goal of building a sovereign fighter free from US restrictions.

Development timelines also pose a challenge. India’s Aeronautical Development Agency aims for the AMCA MK-1 prototype’s first flight by 2028 or 2029, with mass production by 2035. Israel, however, is at least a decade away from producing a basic demonstrator. Israel lacks mature airframe technology that India could incorporate without risking delays to its established schedule.

Therefore, the most practical path forward is a focused collaboration at the subsystem level. India could invite Israeli firms to supply electronic warfare suites, radar components, and sensor fusion software, areas where Israel excels. This would strengthen the AMCA without disturbing its structural design or engine partnership.

Such a component-level partnership would also avoid geopolitical complications. Making Israel a primary co-creator of India’s flagship stealth fighter could strain New Delhi’s delicate diplomatic balance in West Asia, where it maintains ties with Gulf nations and Iran.

By limiting collaboration to subsystems, India gains technological benefits while avoiding diplomatic risks. This approach would allow both nations to leverage their strengths—India’s manufacturing scale and Israel’s advanced electronics—without jeopardising timelines, sovereignty, or strategic independence.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)


India Risks Falling Behind As Turkey’s KAAN Fighter Advances Rapidly


Turkey’s KAAN fighter has surged ahead with multiple prototypes already undergoing taxi trials and preparing for flight testing, while India’s AMCA remains stuck at the design stage with its first prototype unlikely before the early 2030s, Times of India reported.

This widening gap underscores Turkey’s aggressive prototyping and indigenous sensor integration compared to India’s slower, partnership-dependent approach.

Turkey’s fifth-generation fighter program has entered an advanced phase. The KAAN platform, developed under the National Combat Aircraft initiative, has already completed powered taxi trials with its P1 prototype at Turkish Aerospace Industries facilities in Ankara.

The maiden flight of the P0 demonstrator took place in early 2024, marking a rapid transition from conceptualisation to flight testing. The P1 prototype incorporates refined aerodynamics, redesigned air intakes, advanced flight control software and an indigenous Turkish radar. This reflects Turkey’s determination to integrate homegrown systems early in the development cycle.

Although the KAAN is currently powered by imported General Electric F110 engines, the same used on Turkish F-16s, Ankara is developing its own TF35000 engine to ensure long-term self-reliance. Turkey’s approach is notable for its multi-prototype testing strategy.

Several airframes are expected to fly soon, allowing different systems to be validated simultaneously and compressing development timelines. Initial deliveries are targeted for 2028, with full-scale production planned for the early 2030s. This aggressive schedule is supported by sustained political prioritisation and a clear roadmap to replace Turkey’s ageing F-16 fleet.

India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft program, in contrast, has yet to produce a single prototype. The Aeronautical Development Agency and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited have completed the design phase and secured funding, but the first flight is unlikely before the early 2030s.

Persistent challenges include delays in engine selection, slow progress in stealth material development, and the absence of a parallel prototyping strategy. The prototypes and the initial production variant will be powered by the GE F414 engine, which will also power the TEJAS MK-2.

However, little progress has been made on the engine deal despite India and the United States agreeing to an 80% transfer of technology. Cost escalations and other issues have delayed the signing of the final agreement.

The AMCA is envisioned as a twin-engine stealth fighter with internal weapons bays and advanced sensors, but tangible progress has remained slow. The deadline for opening bids to select one of the three entities competing for the program has already been extended to the end of this month, further pushing timelines. India’s reliance on prolonged design cycles and foreign partnerships risks widening the gap with Turkey, which has demonstrated how aggressive prototyping and indigenous sensor integration can accelerate development.

Turkey’s progress with the KAAN demonstrates the benefits of a multi-prototype, parallel testing strategy. By validating systems across several airframes simultaneously, Turkey has compressed development timelines and positioned itself to deliver operational aircraft by the late 2020s.

India’s slower pace, compounded by delays in engine technology transfer and stealth material development, threatens to leave the country behind at a time when China already operates fifth-generation fighters in significant numbers and Pakistan is expected to acquire such aircraft from Beijing.

Agencies


India’s ASTRA Missile Vs America’s AMRAAM: Speed, Range And The Battle For Air Superiority


India’s ASTRA missile represents a major leap in indigenous defence technology, but it still lacks the extensive combat record of the American AIM-120C AMRAAM, which has been battle-tested across decades and multiple theatres.

While ASTRA MK-1 offers impressive speed and range, its true test will come with operational deployment and the upcoming ASTRA MK-2 variant.

Modern air combat is increasingly determined before opposing aircraft come into visual range. The ability to detect, track and launch a beyond-visual-range missile first often decides the outcome. For decades, the AIM-120C AMRAAM has been the global benchmark, proving itself in conflicts worldwide. India, however, is building its own answer with the ASTRA missile, a domestically developed system designed to give the Indian Air Force strategic independence in aerial warfare.

The ASTRA MK-1 is India’s first indigenous beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile, developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation. It is currently integrated with the Su-30MKI and is being prepared for platforms such as the TEJAS MK-1A and other frontline fighters.

The missile has a reported engagement range of 80–110 km, can reach speeds of up to Mach 4.5, and uses inertial navigation with mid-course guidance before switching to an active radar seeker in the terminal phase. This allows pilots to fire and manoeuvre freely while the missile continues tracking its target.

The AIM-120C follows a similar operational philosophy, combining inertial navigation, data-link updates and active radar homing. It has become the standard BVR missile for many Western air forces. The key difference lies in combat experience.

The AIM-120 has been in active service for over three decades, integrated across aircraft such as the F-15, F-16, F/A-18, F-22 and F-35, and has accumulated numerous confirmed kills. ASTRA, by contrast, is still new, with successful trials but no combat record yet.

ASTRA’s importance extends beyond specifications. It is a cornerstone of India’s defence self-reliance program, developed domestically with contributions from dozens of Indian companies and manufactured by Bharat Dynamics Limited.

The successful development of an indigenous radio-frequency seeker has reduced reliance on foreign technologies for one of the missile’s most critical components. This strengthens India’s control over production, upgrades and future improvements.

Comparisons based solely on range can be misleading. Effectiveness depends on launch altitude, aircraft speed, radar performance, electronic warfare, target manoeuvres, data-link quality and pilot tactics. Both ASTRA and AIM-120C are designed around a fire-and-forget concept, allowing aircraft to disengage or pursue additional targets after launch. ASTRA’s smokeless propulsion also enhances stealth by reducing visibility during flight.

India is already working on ASTRA MK-2, a longer-range variant expected to deliver improved propulsion, enhanced guidance and greater engagement distances. If successfully inducted, it could significantly strengthen India’s long-range air combat capability and narrow the gap with Western and Chinese BVR missiles. Meanwhile, the AIM-120C remains the global benchmark, backed by decades of operational experience and widespread adoption.

The future of ASTRA will depend on accelerated induction, integration across multiple platforms, and continued investment in supporting radar and sensor infrastructure. With sustained development, ASTRA could evolve into a formidable rival to the world’s most battle-tested BVR weapons.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)


Pakistan’s Western Build-Up: Guns, Submarines And Drones In One Theatre


Pakistan has advanced three separate military programs in the past week, all concentrated in the same geography stretching from Sindh through the Arabian Sea. Nearly 250 Chinese SH-15 howitzers have been positioned facing India, a Chinese-built Hangor-class submarine has sailed out of Karachi, and Sir Creek has become the site of Project Ababeel, as reported by Firstpost.

Ababeel is described as an air defence system for Sir Creek and the Arabian Sea, coordinated with the Army’s newly formed Rocket Force to counter threats along that coastline. The Hangor submarine now based in Karachi operates in the same waters.

The SH-15 deployment includes batteries in the south, near the Sindh and Rajasthan sectors bordering Sir Creek. A rocket force, a coastal air defence system, a submarine and an artillery fleet, all active in the same theatre within the same stretch of months, represent a layered build-up that demands scrutiny.

China’s role is visible across each of these developments. The SH-15 is Chinese-built and now produced under licence at Heavy Industries Taxila. The Hangor submarine runs on Chinese air-independent propulsion technology and operates alongside newly inducted Chinese Tughril-class frigates.

Project Ababeel draws on Chinese hovercraft and Turkish drones. Beijing sits at the centre of every one of these programs, at a time when Pakistan’s National Strategic Command has been modelled on the structure of China’s PLA Rocket Force.

The timing of these deployments coincides with a significant diplomatic event in Jeddah. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Army Chief Asim Munir and Turkish President Erdogan met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to sign a trilateral defence pact between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. 

This comes after last September’s Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, which already declared that an attack on either country would be treated as an attack on both.

The new framework covers joint exercises, technology transfer and intelligence sharing, according to Firstpost. Pakistan’s concentrated military build-up along its coastline therefore appears less like coincidence and more like a posture being assembled under the cover of new political and technological partnerships.

For India, this development has direct implications. India’s theatre command reform, already nearing Cabinet approval, has been designed precisely to counter scenarios of layered pressure across a single front. Turkey’s presence in the Jeddah pact sharpens the challenge further.

Ankara has become Pakistan’s most reliable arms supplier after China, and its drones featured heavily in Pakistan’s arsenal during Operation Sindoor, where Indian air defences neutralised them effectively.

A trilateral pact with technology-transfer clauses could deepen that pipeline. The concentrated build-up along Pakistan’s western seaboard is a reminder of why theatre command reform matters, and India’s forces along Sir Creek and the Arabian Sea have already demonstrated, most recently during Operation Sindoor, that they can identify and respond to coordinated pressure when required.

Agencies


Milestones Reached In Gaganyaan Human Spaceflight Program


India’s Gaganyaan mission has successfully crossed critical human‑rating milestones, confirming the readiness of HLVM-3 propulsion, crew safety systems, and ground infrastructure.

The first uncrewed flight carrying Vyommitra is scheduled for late 2026, with crewed missions targeted by 2027 and the Bharatiya Antariksh Station planned for 2035.

India’s first human spaceflight mission, Gaganyaan, has advanced significantly with the completion of propulsion, structural, life‑support, and safety testing. On 6 August 2026, the Union Minister of State for Science and Technology informed the Rajya Sabha that the Indian Space Research Organisation had validated key systems essential for human‑rating.

The mission is built around the Human Rated Launch Vehicle HLVM-3, a modified version of the LVM-3 designed with enhanced safety margins and redundancy.

This vehicle will carry the Crew Module and Service Module, both of which have undergone rigorous development and qualification. Propulsion systems for these modules have been tested and cleared for flight.

The Environmental Control and Life Support System has been realised in engineering model form, ensuring astronauts can survive and operate in orbit.

The Thermal Protection System and Crew Module Up‑righting System have also been validated, guaranteeing safe re‑entry and recovery. The Crew Escape System, a vital safeguard during launch emergencies, has five types of motors, all of which have been developed, static tested, and structurally qualified.

Precursor validation flights have already been conducted. The TV‑D1 Test Vehicle Mission successfully demonstrated in‑flight operation of the Crew Escape System. Two Integrated Air Drop Tests, IADT‑01 and IADT‑02, validated the spacecraft’s deceleration system using simulated crew modules. Preparations for the next test vehicle mission, TV‑D2, are underway.

Ground infrastructure has been established to support the mission. Facilities include the Gaganyaan Control Centre, the Crew Training Facility, the Orbital Module Preparation Facility, and modifications to the Second Launch Pad at Bangalore.

A robust communication network has been finalised, with IDRSS‑1 feeder stations and terrestrial links in place. Recovery assets have been identified, and a detailed crew recovery plan has been worked out.

Vyommitra, a half‑humanoid robot, will fly on the first uncrewed experimental mission in the fourth quarter of 2026. This mission will validate several technologies being deployed for the first time.

Two further uncrewed missions, configured identically to the first crewed flight, are targeted by 2027, paving the way for India’s maiden human orbital mission.

Looking ahead, the Bharatiya Antariksh Station is planned for operationalisation by 2035. ISRO has worked out the configuration of the station, comprising five modules, with the first module BAS‑01 already approved for development and launch. Technology development activities for subsystems are progressing across ISRO centres.

The Gaganyaan mission represents India’s entry into human spaceflight, combining indigenous technology with international collaboration. It is a landmark in India’s space program, ensuring astronaut safety while laying the foundation for long‑term human presence in space.

Agencies


PM Modi And JD Vance Discuss Strategic Partnership Amid Energy And Trade Challenges


Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s phone call with US Vice President JD Vance on 8 August 2026 reaffirmed the momentum in the India-US Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership, covering defence, trade, technology, energy security and critical minerals.

The conversation came amid heightened tensions in West Asia and fresh US legislation targeting nations importing Russian oil, directly impacting India’s energy calculus.

Prime Minister Modi received the call from Vice President Vance and discussed ways to deepen cooperation across strategic sectors.

PM Modi congratulated Vance and Second Lady Usha Vance on the birth of their son, extending warm wishes to the family. The gesture added a personal dimension to the otherwise strategic dialogue, underscoring the importance of high-level exchanges in sustaining bilateral ties.

The leaders reviewed progress in the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership, which spans defence collaboration, advanced technologies, energy security, critical minerals and trade. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to expanding cooperation in these areas, reflecting the sustained momentum in high-level engagements between New Delhi and Washington.

The timing of the call was significant. Vice President Vance had earlier stated that Washington was working to establish a safe maritime route through the Strait of Hormuz, amid escalating tensions with Iran.

He noted Tehran’s assurances to allow maximum oil flow but emphasised that the US did not trust Iran’s commitments. This issue carries direct implications for India, which relies heavily on energy imports transiting through the strait.

The conversation also coincided with the US Senate’s passage of the Lindsey O Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. The bipartisan legislation, approved by an overwhelming 86-11 vote, authorises President Donald Trump to impose tariffs of up to 100% on goods from countries—including India and China—that continue importing Russian oil and gas.

The measure aims to escalate economic pressure on Moscow and Tehran while compelling energy-importing nations to choose between discounted Russian crude and access to the US market.

India has expanded its procurement of discounted Russian crude since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, citing national interest and energy security. The availability of cheaper oil allowed Indian refiners to optimise costs and ensure uninterrupted supplies during global market turmoil.

However, the new US legislation presents a challenge, as India must balance its energy requirements with the risk of punitive tariffs on its exports to the United States.

New Delhi has consistently maintained that its energy procurement strategy is guided by national interest and the imperative of affordable, reliable supplies for its citizens. The government has argued that energy security cannot be compromised, particularly amid disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and volatility in global markets.

The latest developments highlight the complex interplay between India’s strategic autonomy and its deepening partnership with Washington.

The call between Modi and Vance also came against the backdrop of ongoing negotiations for a bilateral trade agreement. Talks have focused on market access, tariffs and supply chain resilience, with both sides seeking a commercially meaningful outcome. The new tariff threats could complicate these negotiations, adding urgency to efforts to conclude an interim deal.

The broader context of the conversation reflects the evolving dynamics of India-US relations. While challenges remain over energy trade and tariffs, both nations continue to expand cooperation in defence, technology and strategic sectors.

The dialogue between Modi and Vance underscores the importance of sustained engagement in navigating these complexities and advancing shared interests.

ANI


US Senate Approves Russia Sanctions Bill Granting Trump Tariff Authority On India And China


The United States Senate has passed a sweeping bipartisan sanctions bill that could authorise President Donald Trump to impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on imports from countries that continue to purchase Russian oil and gas.

India and China are among the nations identified as major buyers, with Washington maintaining that such trade sustains Moscow’s economy and funds its military operations in Ukraine.

The legislation, formally titled the Lindsey O Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, was approved by an overwhelming 86–11 vote. It is named after the late Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, who played a central role in shaping its provisions.

The measure is designed to escalate economic pressure on Russia and Iran while signalling consequences for nations that maintain significant energy trade ties with Moscow.

Under the bill, the US president is granted discretionary authority to impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on imports from the world’s top five buyers of Russian crude oil or natural gas. India, alongside China, is highlighted as one of the largest purchasers of Russian crude globally.

The legislation seeks to force energy-importing nations to choose between continuing to buy discounted Russian energy or retaining access to the lucrative US market.

Beyond targeting foreign energy buyers, the bill introduces fresh sanctions against Russian President Vladimir Putin, senior political and military officials, financial institutions, energy projects and entities linked to Russia’s war effort.

It also extends restrictions to older and reflagged oil tankers allegedly used by Russia to circumvent global sanctions, aiming to cut off revenue streams sustaining Moscow’s economy and military campaign.

India’s procurement of discounted Russian crude expanded significantly after the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict in 2022. While Russia was not historically a primary supplier, Indian refiners capitalised on discounted rates to optimise costs and ensure uninterrupted domestic supplies amid global market volatility and transit disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. New Delhi has consistently defended its energy strategy as being guided by national interest, energy security and affordability for its citizens.

Washington has repeatedly raised concerns about global purchases of Russian oil, but Indian refiners have maintained a pragmatic stance focused on domestic stability. If broadly applied, a 100 per cent tariff could raise import costs for US buyers across sectors such as engineering goods, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, textiles and auto components. In response, Indian exporters may explore market diversification or adjust operational strategies to maintain competitiveness.

Although the bill secured strong Senate support, some lawmakers expressed reservations about expanding presidential tariff authority. An amendment proposed by Senators Rand Paul and Ron Wyden to remove the new tariff powers was defeated.

Senator Raphael Warnock, who had raised concerns about the framework, confirmed receiving written assurances from the Trump administration outlining operational safeguards.

The legislation also incorporates measures targeting Iran by extending the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 through 2031, sustaining pressure on Tehran’s energy sector. The package thus combines sanctions against two countries viewed by Washington as major geopolitical adversaries.

Under the draft terms, countries may qualify for exemptions if they account for less than 15 per cent of Russia’s total natural gas exports and are actively reducing reliance on Russian energy. The bill also grants the president full authority to waive sanctions or tariff restrictions if deemed in the US national interest.

The measure now moves to the House of Representatives for consideration when lawmakers return later this month. House approval is required before the legislation can be sent to President Trump for signature, leaving significant legislative and diplomatic processes ahead before any tariff measures could take effect.

ANI


Rubio And Helberg Highlight Pax Silica As Cornerstone of US $3 Billion Mining And Security Drive, Praises India's Early Leadership Role

Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri US Under Secretary Jacob Helberg

Marco Rubio has positioned Jacob Helberg’s Pax Silica initiative as the strategic backbone of America’s $3 billion mining investment, linking supply chain security, national sovereignty, and AI-driven innovation. President Donald Trump reinforced this by announcing unprecedented funding for mining schools to counter looming workforce retirements, while Helberg highlighted India’s pivotal role in the pact.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio underscored the Pax Silica initiative as the centrepiece of Washington’s strategy to secure critical supply chains and protect national sovereignty.

He praised Under Secretary Jacob Helberg for designing the program, which integrates mining, refining, processing, and end-use applications. Rubio stressed that the United States must never depend on other nations for essential resources, and the State Department would leverage diplomacy to diversify supply chains so no country could threaten America’s future.

Helberg echoed Rubio’s remarks, affirming that Pax Silica is strengthening supply chains, driving investment, and building trusted AI partnerships.

He emphasised that under President Trump and Rubio’s leadership, America is being kept at the forefront of innovation. His comments highlighted the dual economic and technological dimensions of the initiative.

President Trump used the roundtable to announce $3 billion in domestic mining projects and workforce development. He declared that miners were being put back to work and America was reclaiming its rightful place as the minerals superpower of the world. He noted that half of the current mining workforce is set to retire within three years, creating a critical labour challenge.

To address this, Trump pledged $100 million annually to mining schools, far exceeding the $10 million they had requested. This tenfold increase was presented as a decisive step to train the next generation of miners and secure the industry’s future.

The White House stressed that critical materials underpin modern technology and infrastructure, powering automobiles, industrial machinery, smartphones, computers, and defence systems.

Targeted investments are designed to eliminate vulnerabilities, strengthen resilience against geopolitical shocks, and guarantee secure American-sourced materials for national defence and emerging technologies.

The Pax Silica initiative has also been framed in an international context. In June, Helberg lauded India as a pivotal partner in securing the global technological future, describing US-India ties as one of the most vital partnerships of this century.

India was among the first ten countries to join Pax Silica, formally entering the pact in February during the AI Impact Summit in New Delhi. Helberg praised India’s early leadership role and the stewardship of the US Ambassador in India, noting that the relationship is one of the most consequential bilateral ties in the 21st century.

The inaugural Pax Silica Summit took place last December, marking the beginning of a framework that is not a standard trade agreement but a pact for economic and military security.

The initiative is anchored on the understanding that future security will depend heavily on which nations manage and control the artificial intelligence value chain.

This positions Pax Silica as both an industrial and geopolitical instrument, shaping resilience and balance in the decades ahead.

ANI


ISI’s Shifting Playbook: From Kashmir's Kulgam To A Foiled Delhi Plot


Punjab Police have dismantled two ISI-run terror modules and arrested nine individuals, including four minors, over a plot to attack Jantar Mantar during recent protests. One of the accused, Sukhman Singh, admitted to being in direct contact with a Pakistan-based handler.

The network traces back to Shahzad Bhatti, a Pakistani gangster-terrorist whose operatives had already been intercepted by Kolkata STF while running an almost identical plot against the same target. The repeat targeting points to a standing directive rather than a one-off cell, highlighting a deliberate strategy by handlers across the border.

The same weeks saw Kashmir absorb two attacks built on identical logic. On 22 July, Head Constable Ashiq Hussain was shot dead in Anantnag, marking the first attack on a policeman anywhere in the Valley this year.

Nine days later, terrorists killed two labourers from Chhattisgarh at a brick kiln in Kulgam. Neither incident required a trained infiltrator crossing the Line of Control. Both leaned on local operatives against targets chosen for their vulnerability rather than strategic value, underscoring a shift in tactics.

This shift aligns with developments on Pakistan’s own side of the border. Rawalpindi is grappling with an insurgency in Balochistan that it cannot contain, a protest movement in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir that it cannot suppress, and an economy that leaves little room for the kind of trained infiltration campaigns it once ran.

Moving an armed operative across a hardened LoC costs money and risks exposure that the Pakistan Army cannot easily absorb at present. By contrast, recruiting a minor over WhatsApp and using a jailed handler’s digital wallet costs almost nothing and leaves no direct state fingerprint. It is terrorism scaled down to match a shrinking budget and a leadership with fewer places left to hide its hand.

What connects Amritsar, Kolkata, Anantnag and Kulgam is the reliance on over-ground workers, local sympathisers and small-time recruits performing the legwork that infiltrators once did, all run remotely by handlers.

It is cheaper and more deniable, but it depends on OGW networks that Indian agencies have spent years mapping and infiltrating. Two modules with near-identical targets being rolled up before they could act, in two different cities, demonstrates the tactic’s own weakness.

A campaign built on cheap, disposable recruits is also a campaign built on recruits who talk, panic, or get flagged early. Pakistan may have found a cheaper way to keep trying, but it has not found a way to succeed.

Additional intelligence assessments suggest that ISI’s reliance on digital communication platforms such as WhatsApp and encrypted wallets is increasing, with handlers exploiting anonymity and low-cost recruitment methods.

However, Indian counter-terror agencies have strengthened surveillance of these channels, leading to early detection and disruption. Analysts note that the repeat targeting of Jantar Mantar, a symbolic protest site in Delhi, reflects an attempt to exploit domestic unrest for international propaganda, but the failure of both modules underscores the resilience of Indian security measures.

Agencies


Strait of Hormuz Reopening Hinges On US Acceptance of Iran’s Conditions


The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps declared on Saturday that the Strait of Hormuz will only reopen once the United States fully accepts Iran’s conditions.

IRGC spokesperson Sardar Mohebi emphasised that reopening the waterway would depend on specific mechanisms and conditions distinct from the ongoing negotiations with Oman. He stated that the US must end interference in regional negotiations before any reopening could take place.

Iranian officials confirmed that discussions with Oman are progressing towards a new shipping protocol for the strait. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the two sides were very close to reaching an agreement, but additional conditions would need to be met. He highlighted that US compensation to Iran was among the requirements before the strait could be reopened.

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr outlined a detailed list of conditions.

These included an end to US threats against Iran, cessation of military action against the country and its regional allies, withdrawal of naval and air forces enforcing the blockade, compensation for damages caused during the conflict, and the lifting of sanctions with the unfreezing of Iranian assets.

President Masoud Pezeshkian described the current situation as the best time to reach an agreement. He stressed that Tehran would not compromise on the rights of the Iranian people. In a post on X, he reiterated that the government’s reliance is on domestic capacities and the people, while underlining the necessity of a compassionate approach towards citizens. He quoted a principle that people are either religious brothers or equal in creation.

Pezeshkian also accused Israel and the United States of attempting to turn Persian Gulf states against Tehran. He alleged that both nations were exploiting Iran’s internal challenges amid the ongoing West Asia conflict. His remarks came as the military confrontation continues, with the restoration of commercial maritime transit through the Strait of Hormuz remaining a central issue.

The IRGC’s position underscores Tehran’s determination to link the reopening of the strait to broader strategic concessions from Washington. The conditions laid out by Iranian officials highlight the depth of mistrust and the scale of demands that must be addressed before any resolution can be achieved.

The situation remains fluid, with negotiations involving Oman offering a potential pathway, but the decisive factor lies in whether the United States will accept Iran’s terms in full.

ANI


Asim Munir’s Disaster Management Gig Highlights Civil-Military Imbalance


Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir’s recent involvement in disaster management has ignited widespread debate over the military’s growing role in civilian affairs.

His visit to the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) headquarters in Islamabad on 4 August 2026 was presented by the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) as a routine inspection of monsoon preparedness, but the optics of the event have fuelled public anger.

Munir was briefed on “Disaster Lens 2026,” a real-time monitoring platform tracking flood risks across the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, and Sutlej rivers, as well as flash flood warnings in Dera Ghazi Khan, Rajanpur, and northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

He praised the NDMA’s technological capabilities and pledged full military support for rescue and rehabilitation operations. Yet, conspicuously absent were the prime minister, provincial chief ministers, and civilian climate officials who constitutionally hold responsibility for disaster risk reduction.

The backlash stems from concerns that the military is encroaching upon civilian domains. Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution, reinforced by the 18th Amendment, places disaster response and urban planning under civilian jurisdiction.

Citizens expressed frustration on social media, questioning why the army chief was presiding over matters reserved for elected representatives. Many saw this as further evidence that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government is overshadowed by General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.

The controversy is compounded by Pakistan’s deteriorating security environment. Data from the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) shows that in the first seven months of 2026, 2,786 people were killed in terror-related incidents, including 434 security personnel. July alone saw 112 security officials killed, marking the deadliest month in years. Critics argue that the army’s focus should remain on counter-terrorism rather than weather forecasting and urban flood management.

Munir’s involvement in disaster management follows his participation in a July 2026 national conference on population control, co-chaired with Prime Minister Sharif. This has reinforced perceptions of the military’s expanding footprint in civilian governance.

Through the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), the military already wields influence over foreign investment, mining projects, corporate farming, and energy restructuring. Now, with roles in demography and disaster management, the military’s reach appears to be extending into nearly every civilian sphere.

The NDMA itself has long been criticised for its structural flaws. Established after the devastating 2010 floods, it was intended as a civilian-led institution. However, it has consistently been headed by serving or retired generals, undermining its technical capacity in climate science and urban engineering.

The 18th Amendment devolved disaster management powers to provinces, but coordination between military-led federal authorities and civilian provincial governments remains weak, perpetuating reliance on military deployments during crises.

This civil-military imbalance is unfolding against a backdrop of political instability and economic hardship. The disputed 2024 elections left opposition parties, led by Imran Khan’s PTI, questioning the legitimacy of the current government.

Meanwhile, Pakistanis are enduring painful IMF-mandated reforms, including higher electricity tariffs, new taxes, and reduced fuel subsidies. For citizens struggling with daily survival, the sight of the army chief managing civilian portfolios—from corporate farming to flood drainage—has deepened resentment and eroded trust in governance.

The episode underscores Pakistan’s enduring challenge: the military’s dominance in spheres constitutionally reserved for civilian leadership. As Munir’s disaster management role demonstrates, the boundaries between military and civilian authority continue to blur, raising questions about accountability, priorities, and the future of democratic governance in the country.

Agencies


UAE’s Participation In BRICS Trade Ministers’ Meeting In Jaipur Highlights Expanding Global Trade Cooperation


Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi, Minister of Foreign Trade of the United Arab Emirates, participated in the 2026 BRICS Trade Ministers’ Meeting in Jaipur. The meeting was hosted by India under its BRICS Chairmanship and convened at Maharani Mahal, Hotel Sawai Man Mahal.

It brought together trade ministers and senior officials from across the BRICS community to deliberate on safeguarding the multilateral trading system, fostering inclusive trade, empowering MSMEs, and reshaping global value chains amid accelerating digital transformation.

Al Zeyoudi was accompanied by Abdulla Al Nuaimi, UAE Ambassador to India. During his visit, he held a series of bilateral discussions with key counterparts. These included Piyush Goyal, Union Minister of Commerce and Industry of India; Li Chenggang, China International Trade Representative and Vice Minister of Commerce; Mohamed Farid Saleh, Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade of Egypt; Budi Santoso, Minister of Trade of Indonesia; Parks Franklyn Mpho Tau, Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition of South Africa; and Ilichev Vladimir Evgenievich, Deputy Minister of Economic Development of Russia. The talks focused on strengthening bilateral trade and investment ties, expanding cooperation in priority sectors, and deepening private‑sector engagement.

At the Trade Ministers’ Meeting, Al Zeyoudi raised the UAE’s grave concerns over Iran’s attacks on commercial shipping and the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz. He reiterated the UAE’s call for its immediate and unconditional reopening and stressed the importance of protecting freedom of navigation and international shipping in accordance with international law. His intervention highlighted the UAE’s emphasis on maritime security as a cornerstone of global trade stability.

The broader discussions at the meeting covered priorities for BRICS economic cooperation, including trade resilience, market connectivity, and emerging challenges affecting global commerce.

However, trade ministers were unable to reach consensus on a joint declaration at the conclusion of the meeting, reflecting the complexity of aligning diverse national interests within the expanded BRICS framework.

Al Zeyoudi stated that at a time of heightened uncertainty in global trade, cooperation between emerging markets and developing economies is more important than ever. He emphasised that the UAE views BRICS as a vital platform for strengthening economic cooperation and supporting an open and predictable trading environment.

He noted that the UAE’s engagement in Jaipur reinforced the strength of its economic relationships with fellow BRICS members, and expressed commitment to translating these discussions into tangible outcomes for businesses and communities.

Trade between the UAE and BRICS nations continues to record strong growth. In 2025, bilateral non‑oil foreign trade between the UAE and BRICS member nations surpassed $312 billion, representing a 28.5% increase compared to $243 billion in 2024. BRICS nations accounted for approximately 31% of the UAE’s total non‑oil foreign trade in 2025. They were also the source of 34% of the UAE’s imports, the destination for 23% of its non‑oil exports, and accounted for 28% of its re‑exports during the same period.

The bilateral meeting with Piyush Goyal provided an opportunity to review progress under the India‑UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, which entered into force in May 2022. Discussions explored avenues for expanding cooperation in services trade, digital commerce, logistics, and food security.

India remains one of the UAE’s largest trading partners globally, with bilateral non‑oil trade reaching US$76.2 billion in 2025, a 17.3% increase on the previous year. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to advancing trade facilitation and strengthening private‑sector collaboration in high‑growth sectors.

The BRICS community has expanded significantly in recent years. From its original five members, it grew to nine in 2024, with Indonesia joining as its tenth member in 2025. The grouping now comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, and the UAE.

Collectively, these nations represent approximately 40% of the world’s population and around 25% of global GDP. The UAE’s membership reflects its commitment to expanding economic ties with partners across the developing world and advancing open, mutually beneficial trade.

The UAE’s participation in the BRICS Trade Ministers’ Meeting complements its broader trade agenda, anchored by the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement program. This initiative aims to increase non‑oil foreign trade to $$1.1 trillion by 2031.

Since its launch in September 2021, 38 agreements have been concluded with economies across Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas, with 18 already in force. These include agreements with fellow BRICS members India and Indonesia, underscoring the UAE’s determination to strengthen its role in global commerce.

ANI


Rosoboronexport Expands Su‑57E Export Package With New RVV‑SDM Air‑To‑Air Missile


Rosoboronexport has initiated a global marketing campaign for the RVV‑SDM medium‑range air‑to‑air missile, which has been developed and manufactured by Tactical Missiles Corporation.

The missile is being offered primarily for the export‑version Su‑57E fighter, but it can also be adapted for other Russian‑made aircraft following appropriate modifications.

The company has further stated that the weapon could be integrated into the armament systems of foreign‑made aircraft, broadening its potential customer base.

The RVV‑SDM is designed to engage a wide range of targets including aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles. It is intended to operate effectively around the clock, even in environments where electronic countermeasures are present.

The missile employs an active/passive radar seeker, an inertial control system and a radio update link. It is capable of engaging targets at altitudes between 15 metres and 25 kilometres, including those travelling at speeds of up to Mach 3.

Rosoboronexport Director General Alexander Mikheev highlighted growing international interest in the Su‑57E fifth‑generation fighter, emphasising that the aircraft has demonstrated superiority in actual combat conditions.

The company stated that the Su‑57E has successfully engaged air, ground and surface targets using Russian air‑launched weapons, including the RVV‑SDM. According to Rosoboronexport, the missile offers a longer launch range, an improved power‑to‑weight ratio, higher effectiveness and enhanced aerodynamic performance.

Mikheev further noted that the RVV‑SDM incorporates a passive radar homing channel, which provides stealth, high guidance accuracy, fire‑and‑forget capability and resistance to jamming.

However, Rosoboronexport did not disclose the maximum launch range of the missile in its statement. The RVV‑SDM is being marketed as part of a broader air‑to‑air weapons package for the Su‑57E, which also includes the RVV‑MD2 short‑range missile and the RVV‑BD long‑range missile.

The Su‑57E export weapons package extends beyond air‑to‑air missiles. It features Kh‑38MLE air‑to‑surface missiles and Kh‑69 air‑launched cruise missiles. Other listed weapons include Kh‑58UShKE anti‑radar missiles, Kh‑35UE anti‑ship missiles, KAB‑250LG‑E guided bombs and UPAB‑1500B‑E guided glide bombs. Rosoboronexport explained that these weapons can be carried either in the Su‑57E’s internal bays or on external hardpoints, with internal carriage intended to reduce the fighter’s radar signature.

Mikheev confirmed that Rosoboronexport is prepared to negotiate contracts with countries friendly to Russia for the supply of both the Su‑57E fighter and its associated air‑launched weapons. He stressed that the company prioritises the requirements of the Russian Armed Forces in its export activities. 

Rosoboronexport also asserted that Russia’s defence industry possesses sufficient production capacity to support export deliveries while meeting domestic military needs. The company claimed it could offer production and delivery schedules comparable with, and in some cases shorter than, those of international competitors.

The RVV‑SDM represents a significant addition to Russia’s export portfolio, particularly as Moscow seeks to expand the appeal of the Su‑57E in global markets. By offering a comprehensive weapons package that includes short‑, medium‑ and long‑range air‑to‑air missiles alongside precision strike and anti‑ship capabilities, Rosoboronexport aims to position the Su‑57E as a versatile fifth‑generation fighter for nations unable to access Western aircraft such as the F‑35.

This sales push underscores Russia’s strategy of leveraging advanced missile technology to enhance the attractiveness of its flagship stealth fighter in the international arena.

India is currently not planning to procure the RVV‑SDM missile. India has instead focused on acquiring other Russian air‑to‑air systems such as the R‑37M (RVV‑BD) and the R‑77‑1 (RVV‑SD), while continuing to modernise its Su‑30MKI fleet and develop indigenous ASTRA missiles.