
France and India have sealed a historic alliance in aeronautical defence, one that stirs deep geopolitical unease over the cross-leakage of key technologies toward Russia, a concession that infuriates Europe and is quietly tolerated by the United States in order to curb China's expansionism.
In the words of Charles de Gaulle, "Les États n'ont pas de sentiments, ils n'ont que des intérêts" — states have no feelings, only interests.
To grasp this complex strategic manoeuvre, thick with economic interests, espionage and the deceiving of allies, and where "the enemy of my enemy is also my enemy," one must hold fast to its three fundamental factors: the transfer of the French "secret," the technological "bridge" to Russia, and the common enemy in China.
Paris and New Delhi have closed unprecedented agreements. The most striking is the transfer by the French company Safran of 100% of the intellectual property and technological know-how for the engines of India's future fifth-generation fighter, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, or AMCA.
India has also formally begun the process of joining the French sixth-generation fighter program following the breakup of the European FCAS project.
This generosity stands in stark contrast to the red lines the Élysée imposed on its own NATO partners, to whom it denied access to source codes that will now rest in Indian hands.
Under the Safran partnership, India's Defence Research and Development Organisation, through its Gas Turbine Research Establishment in Bangalore, is to hold the entire intellectual property of the engine, including the advanced single-crystal blade technology that withstands extreme temperatures.
The great paradox of the agreement lies in the arsenal of the Indian Air Force. Its fleet and national production infrastructure are structurally dominated by Russian platforms, most notably the Sukhoi Su-30MKI air superiority fighters, of which the IAF fields more than 260. Indian engineers and assembly plants, such as the state-owned HAL, will therefore handle Russian systems and new Western developments side by side.
It is an open secret in the defence sector that Moscow enjoys indirect access to reverse engineering or performance data of critical components assembled on Indian soil. Yet despite the obvious risk that Russia may reach the military secrets of a NATO country like France, both Western governments and Washington have chosen to look the other way out of sheer pragmatism.
For the West, and especially the Pentagon, Beijing's military growth and its deployment of stealth fighters such as the J-20 on the Himalayan borders represent the greatest long-term global threat. A strong India, equipped with cutting-edge aeronautical technology and a credible deterrent, is the one piece capable of tipping the balance in Asia and disrupting China's expansion plans.
On this chessboard, the risk of leaks to Moscow is accepted as collateral damage. Looking ahead to 2050, the gamble is on a thriving and young India against an organised but aging China.
At the air force level, the heart of the deal is the 120 kilonewton Safran engine and its intellectual property. Safran will co-develop the powerplant alongside DRDO, in a joint venture valued at roughly $7 billion and spread over a decade and more. India has insisted that full intellectual property rights reside exclusively with it, leaving Safran no authority to reuse or repurpose the jointly developed architecture in its global product line.
Unlike usual commercial contracts, France has accepted the total transfer of intellectual property and critical technology, something it refused to share with Germany for the FCAS. This includes access to the engine's source codes, the advanced metallurgy for single-crystal blades, and the ability to manufacture, modify and export the engine sovereignly from India without a French veto.
The AMCA is the crown jewel of Indian military aviation, designed to counter the Chinese fleet, and its schedule is managed under a strict date strategy. Once the agreement is signed, the first prototype is expected to make its maiden flight in 2029, following a rollout toward the end of 2028.
The program requires 1,800 test flights within 84 months, or seven years, and to achieve this five prototypes will be built, all of which must be operational by 2032.
Delivery of the fighter to the Indian Air Force is projected for the mid-2030s, with full-scale production beginning around 2035. Initially it will fly with American General Electric F414 engines in the Mark 1 phase — American engines operating in bases where Russian technicians are present — before transitioning to the 120 kN engine co-developed with Safran in the Mark 2 phase.
In a notable twist, the British firm Rolls-Royce has since entered the race, offering India a full transfer of technology and complete intellectual property rights for a rival 120 kN-plus engine with thrust potential up to 145 kN.
Washington maintains a pragmatic position that many analysts label a technological double standard, motivated by the need to consolidate the Quad strategic forum of the United States, Japan, Australia and India to curb China.
While the United States harshly sanctioned Turkey, a NATO member, and expelled it from the F-35 program for purchasing Russian S-400 defence systems, it has made an exception for India.
New Delhi also operates the S-400 and maintains a significant military dependency on Moscow, yet Washington has avoided applying sanctions under the CAATSA law.
The United States prefers India to equip itself with French technology — even competing by offering its own General Electric F414 engines — rather than see New Delhi stagnate or turn to solutions that would strengthen the direct industrial alliance between Russia and China.
The Pentagon assumes the risk of Russia "peeking" into Indian hangars, provided India remains firmly aligned with the containment block against Beijing.
China has not stood still. To neutralise India's future stealth fleet, the People's Liberation Army is betting heavily on a new technological leap. Beijing leads the development of artificial intelligence algorithms applied to conventional radars, systems that process millions of residual data points from electromagnetic and thermal disturbances in the air to "guess" the position of stealth fighters such as the AMCA or the Rafale, nullifying their invisibility properties.
Chinese defence institutions are also advancing networks of satellites and quantum ground-based radars designed specifically to track the extremely low radar signatures that characterise new Western designs.
While Indian technology materialises, China has accelerated the permanent deployment of its fifth-generation Chengdu J-20 fighters at airbases in the Tibet and Xinjiang military regions. Commercial satellite imagery from Vantor in July 2026 revealed at least twelve J-20 "Mighty Dragon" stealth fighters stationed at Hotan in Xinjiang and Damxung in Tibet, one of the largest concentrations of fifth-generation aircraft ever recorded along the Line of Actual Control.
There is also a naval alliance with France. If the AMCA dominates the airspace, the Scorpène-class submarines designed by the French Naval Group ensure control of the depths of the Indian Ocean, a critical scenario in the face of harassment by China's Navy.
With the end of the first phase of Project 75, the Indian Navy successfully completed its first batch of six domestically built Scorpène submarines under French licence at the Mazagon Docks shipyards, and the sixth and final submarine of the series has entered active service.
Faced with the increase in Beijing's submarine activity in the region, India and France have accelerated bilateral negotiations. The plan includes ordering three additional Scorpène submarines from the Bombay shipyards, the goal being to keep the Indian production line active and avoid an "operational void" while more complex projects are approved.
Beyond conventional submarines, Paris is playing a master card by advising New Delhi on its natively designed nuclear-powered attack submarine, or SSN, program, a transfer of technical advice that positions France as India's most intimate and versatile military partner in the maritime domain.
The European Union observes France's stance with deep frustration, strategic alarm and growing indignation, a wound that bleeds openly after the recent definitive collapse of the FCAS program.
The EU sees Paris's behaviour as a flagrant contradiction: while President Emmanuel Macron preaches European strategic sovereignty, the French military industry has preferred to liquidate the largest defence consortium in EU history rather than share its industrial and technological leadership with its community partners.
If this fusion of strategies is finalised before the deadline set by the consortium, France will be completely isolated in Europe. Without heavyweight industrial partners on the continent, since the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany plus Spain would all be in the GCAP, the Élysée will have no choice but to rely on external powers like India to co-finance and economically sustain its own combat aircraft, paying the price for its inflexible stance on intellectual property.
Agencies













