The challenge to Beijing is that it may be instigating an arms race where it does not seek one, especially with regard to India, which increasingly sees itself in a rivalry with China for great-power status in the Indo-Pacific.

For the past 20 years or so, China has been engaged in an ambitious effort to modernise and upgrade its armed forces. These modernisation activities have several objectives. For one thing, as China strives to become a global power, it is increasingly seeking “hard” power, i.e., military strength, commensurate with its growing economic, diplomatic, and cultural “soft” power. Additionally, Beijing is more and more prone to use military force (or the threat of military force) to defend and promote its regional interests, such as its territorial claims in the South China Sea or protecting local sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) vital to its energy supplies and trade; consequently, building up that military wherewithal is instrumental to this strategy. Moreover, China’s growing global footprint is, if anything, largely the result of its expanding international economic and commercial interests. This is evident in Beijing’s push for such China-centric initiatives as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, which depends heavily on a network of ports and other coastal infrastructure projects, and on Chinese access to the “strategic pathways of the Indian Ocean.” Finally, China overall seeks military power to mitigate the rising American military presence in the Indo-Pacific, and to establish itself as a credible rival to the US in this region.

As China strives to become a global power, it is increasingly seeking hard power, i.e., military strength, commensurate with its growing economic, diplomatic, and cultural soft power.

For whatever reason, these modernisation efforts have paid remarkable dividends, and since the late 1990s, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has made amazing progress in transforming itself into a modern fighting force. In many instances, it is practically unrecognisable compared to the PLA that existed 20 years ago. The impact of this transformation has been particularly noticeable in the past few years in the form of a much more assertive — even aggressive — China, increasingly willing to use its military to protect and advance its national interests. What the end result of this military modernisation process will be, or how China may further use its growing military power, is still an open question.

At the same time, given China’s emphasis not only on expanding international trade and commerce but on increasing its political clout globally, it is not surprising that Beijing is attempting to strengthen its ability to project sustainable power farther and farther beyond its territory. This is having a particular impact in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). While China might not possess a coherent constellation of “bases and places” stretching across the IOR, it is increasing its global reach more than ever before. This is apparent in Beijing’s recent establishment of its first overseas military base in Djibouti, a small country in the Horn of Africa. In conjunction with this event, an article in China Military, the official English-language news website for the PLA, explained, “The PLA’s responsibilities today have gone beyond the scale of guarding the Chinese territories,” requiring it to “protect China’s interests anywhere in the world. Overseas military bases will provide cutting-edge support for China to guard its growing overseas interests.”

As China becomes economically and militarily more present in the IOR, this will inevitably disturb an already brittle regional security calculus. In particular, India will have to deal with another aspiring great power operating in its strategic backyard, one that increasingly seeks to displace — or at least rival — it as the leading regional player.

As China becomes economically and militarily more present in the Indian Ocean Region, this will inevitably disturb an already brittle regional security calculus.

China’s Emerging New Military Doctrine: “Informationised Warfare”

The most recent stage of Chinese war fighting doctrine is “informationised warfare.” This comes out of the PLA’s most recent defence white paper, published in May 2015. It lays out an even greater emphasis on “informatisation” and makes it central to operational concepts:

“To implement the military strategic guideline of active defence in the new situation, China's armed forces will innovate basic operational doctrines. In response to security threats from different directions and in line with their current capabilities, the armed forces will adhere to the principles of flexibility, mobility and self-dependence…Integrated combat forces will be employed to prevail in system-vs-system operations featuring information dominance, precision strikes and joint operations.”

According to the 2015 white paper, the PLA will continue to de-emphasise land operations, all but abandoning People’s War (except in name and in terms of political propaganda), particularly in favour of giving new stress and importance to sea power and force projection: “The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.” As a result, the PLA Navy (PLAN) “will gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defence’ to the combination of ‘offshore waters defence’ with ‘open seas protection,’” an evolutionary development from what was announced in the 2006 white paper, which proclaimed that the “Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations.” This will require a “combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure. The PLAN will enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime manoeuvres, joint operations at sea, comprehensive defence and comprehensive support.”

As for air-power, the 2015 white paper stated that PLA Air Force (PLAAF) would “endeavour to shift its focus from territorial air defence to both defence and offence, and build an air-space defence force structure that can meet the requirements of informationised operations.” This included building up the PLAAF’s capacities for strategic early warning, air-carried precision-strike, air and missile defence, “information countermeasures,” and strategic force projection (i.e., airlift).

[O]uter space “has become a commanding height in international strategic competition,” and China plans to “secure its space assets to serve its national economic and social development, and maintain outer space security.”

Further differentiating current “informationised warfare” from its earlier manifestations is the much greater emphasis placed on both cyber operations and space war. As the 2015 white paper put it, “Cyberspace has become…a new domain of national security.…As cyberspace weighs more in military security, China will expedite the development of a cyber force, and enhance its capabilities of cyberspace situation awareness [and] cyber defence.” In addition, outer space “has become a commanding height in international strategic competition,” and China plans to “secure its space assets to serve its national economic and social development, and maintain outer space security.”