China increasingly treats space as a pivotal domain for military competition, ranking it equally alongside land, sea, and air. Under the leadership of Chairman Xi Jinping, Beijing’s ambition is clear: to challenge and eventually overtake the United States as the dominant space power.

This strategic push manifests in massive scientific, civil, and military investment, aimed at building out a space infrastructure that serves both national pride and hard security interests.

China’s progression in space is both rapid and unequivocal. In the past year alone, China executed 68 launches, deploying 260 payloads into orbit. Of these, 67 were satellites with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, marking a significant military leap. Over the past decade, China’s on-orbit presence has soared by approximately 620%, rising from 185 satellites in 2015 to more than 1,060 by 2025. More than 510 of these serve ISR functions using advanced sensors, providing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with robust global surveillance and targeting abilities.

A case in point is the TJS-12 satellite, launched into geosynchronous orbit in December 2024. According to U.S. Space Force assessments, this asset enables the persistent monitoring of U.S. and allied forces throughout the Pacific—a capability that underscores the reach of China’s space-based architecture.

To rival global mega-constellations like SpaceX’s Starlink, China is constructing its own G60 low Earth orbit (LEO) communications network. By early 2025, 72 G60 satellites were already in place, with plans for 648 by year-end and 14,000 by 2030.

The China Satellite Network Group is also developing a separate network, aiming for 13,000 satellites. This exponential expansion is partly motivated by a desire to counter perceived U.S. military technological advantages, especially after observing how Starlink was used in conflict zones.

China’s commitment to space as a domain of war is institutionalised in its military reforms. Originally, all space operations fell under the PLA Strategic Support Force, but this entity was replaced in April 2024 by the Aerospace Force, which now reports directly to the powerful Central Military Commission. 

This service manages military space assets centrally—streamlining ISR, targeting, communications, and space denial operations across seven specialised bases, each with unique operational focuses ranging from maritime tracking to missile early warning and R&D.

The Aerospace Force reflects the PLA’s understanding that control of space is vital for modern warfare. Its structure ensures rapid, centralised deployment of space assets, aligning with other digital warfare arms such as the Cyberspace Force and Information Support Force. This unity enables expedited targeting cycles, comprehensive intelligence gathering, and cohesive attack planning, strengthening China’s readiness for varied conflict scenarios (including any prospective Taiwan crisis).

Chinese doctrine now views space as the “commanding heights” of future warfare. Space intelligence, attack capabilities, and counter-space operations—including the shadowing of foreign satellites and the deployment of dual-use inspector satellites—are all integrated under a unified command, eradicating service rivalries and maximising operational effectiveness.

Counter-Space—Going Beyond Surveillance

China’s space pursuits extend beyond ISR and communications. It actively seeks the ability to degrade or deny adversaries access to space. These ambitions are supported by a broad range of counter-space systems:

Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons: Since its 2007 demonstration of a kinetic-kill ASAT weapon, China has operationalised ground-launched ASAT missiles. Reports indicate current and future capabilities to target not just LEO, but also the distant geosynchronous orbits (GEO) where many strategic satellites reside.

Co-orbital Systems And Spaceplanes: Recent tests showcased highly manoeuvrable satellites and reusable spaceplanes. These assets can “dogfight” in space—approaching, inspecting, nudging, or disabling adversary satellites. The Shijian-21 satellite's relocation of a defunct BeiDou navigation satellite is a public demonstration of these capabilities.

Directed-Energy And Electronic Warfare: China has established ground-based laser systems able to dazzle or damage satellite sensors and is working towards more powerful variants capable of structural damage. The PLA regularly trains with jammers targeting space-based navigation, communications, and radar assets.

Responsive Launch: Vertical take-off and reusable rocket tests suggest that China is developing rapid-launch capabilities to quickly replace lost satellites or bolster its constellation in times of conflict.

Despite these strengths, China still faces challenges. Its space situational awareness network is less globally distributed than that of the United States, limiting its real-time tracking of worldwide space activity. Nevertheless, China compensates with around ten space-based sensors and continues to innovate in satellite maneuverability and anti-satellite techniques.

Chinese official statements often obscure the dual-use or military purposes of many satellites, but the increasing sophistication and scale of activities leave little doubt about strategic intent. In Chinese military thought, space dominance equates to military initiative; “whoever controls space controls the initiative in war.”

China’s expansive militarisation of space marks a transformative shift in military power, doctrine, and international competition. Its rapidly growing constellation of satellites, cutting-edge counter-space weaponry, and centralised military command reflect a coordinated effort to both use and deny space in any future conflict. This development escalates the risks of space confrontation, making the domain a central theatre of major power rivalry in the years ahead.

Based On ANI Report