PM Narendra Modi and Kyrgyzstan President Sooronbay Jeenbekov

by Lindsay Hughes

Background

Kyrgyzstani President Sooronbay Jeenbekov was a special guest at Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s swearing-in to office for his second term. The invitation given to Mr Jeenbekov is just one sign of the growing ties between the two countries. Where previously the relationship was limited to cultural exchanges and the like, Mr Modi signed an agreement with then-President Almazbek Atambayev on defence co-operation and the holding of annual joint military exercises. This was finalised when he visited Bishkek during his tour of the Central Asian republics in 2015. Although the two countries started the “Khanjar” high-altitude exercises in 2011, scheduled exercises became more frequent and regular after Mr Modi’s visit. Kyrgyzstan has since then sought India’s assistance in several construction projects.

Comment

Chingiz Aidarbekov, the Foreign Minister of Kyrgyzstan, met India’s then-Minister for External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj, on his first official visit to India at the end of January this year. He briefed Ms Swaraj on Kyrgyzstan’s efforts to liberalise its economy and create business-friendly conditions to attract foreign investment, including from India. He then invited Indian firms to take part in developing Kyrgyzstan’s infrastructure, including its railways and hydro-electric projects. Noting that Kyrgyzstan hosts around nine thousand Indian students, the two sides also sought better ties between their universities. They also discussed collaboration in capacity building, cultural exchanges, healthcare and pharmaceuticals, IT and e-governance, movie production, culture, tourism and training. The two countries are jointly constructing the Kyrgyz-Indian Mountain Training Centre and a military hospital.

It was President Jeenbekov, however, who moved to deepen the relationship by requesting India to provide it with military equipment. That request makes sense, since both the countries have common Russian equipment. India, however, has developed a military-industrial base that develops systems to enhance the equipment and platforms that it purchases from Russia. As Kyrgyzstan’s own defence systems age, purchasing upgrades from India is a much cheaper option than having to purchase new systems, whether from Russia, China or elsewhere. Kyrgyzstan, accordingly, wants to purchase the same simulators that India has purchased to train its own forces, as well as equipment to enhance driving and the functionality of BMP Infantry Combat Vehicles, T-72 and T-90 tank crews, and protective equipment. India is said to be prepared to extend a line of credit to Kyrgyzstan to enable it to make those purchases.

It is quite conceivable, however, that Kyrgyzstan’s approach to India is predicated on wider reasoning. During the Soviet era, Kyrgyzstan’s road and rail network remained sub-standard, due to the harsh terrain and the fact that if the Soviet leaders wished to transport personnel or goods to far-flung regions, such as the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, it was quicker and easier to do so by air. Thus, while Kyrgyzstan was able to move goods within its territory with a degree of difficulty, its development was not very high on the Soviet Union’s list of priorities. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Kyrgyzstan constructed its first major road, the Bishkek-Osh highway.

The railway network, however, languished. There is a reason for that: Kyrgyzstan does not have the funds available to construct a modern railway network. China, which would like to bring Kyrgyzstan under its influence, is reluctant to construct that network, which is expected to cost around US$6 billion ($8.6 billion), because Kyrgyzstan can offer it no collateral. China is wary of undertaking such large projects in foreign countries without state guarantees. Some other reasons for China’s reluctance to construct a Kyrgyz rail network include unstable governments, a restless population and the reluctance of that population to give up their houses and land if required. Bishkek, furthermore, is reluctant to become overly-beholden to Beijing and, in light of the experiences of Sri Lanka and Malaysia in dealing with China, remains wary of Chinese loans.

It turned to India, therefore, hoping that New Delhi would be more open to its plans and its requirements. Given its downplayed tensions with China, India probably sees an opportunity to insert itself into Central Asia and to counter China’s rapidly-increasing influence in that region. Coupled with its influence in Afghanistan, which is decidedly antagonistic towards Pakistan, New Delhi could reason that it would have a greater ability to counter China’s influence and, simultaneously, access the region’s natural resources. It would make sense, therefore, to cultivate its relationship with Bishkek, albeit at some financial risk given Kyrgyzstan’s parlous financial state.

To what degree it could, indeed, increase its regional influence and whether it could sustain that effort in light of China’s much greater economic, political and military advantages, however, is moot.