South Korea Test-Flies First Home-Grown Hypersonic Weapon In Major Military Milestone

South Korea has successfully flight-tested its first domestically developed hypersonic weapon, marking a significant advance in the country's efforts to strengthen its conventional military capabilities.

The weapon is designed to travel at least five times the speed of sound while evading existing missile defence systems, potentially providing Seoul with a powerful new strategic asset.

President Lee Jae Myung attended the test and described it as a major step forward for South Korea's national security. The government stated that the trial met its primary objectives, although it did not disclose the location of the launch.

According to officials, the weapon separated from its booster rocket at the planned altitude before descending towards its target. During flight, it successfully carried out both vertical and horizontal manoeuvres and ultimately struck the designated test target.

Authorities said that, once fully operational, the hypersonic weapon would be capable of conducting surprise strikes against critical targets within the Korean Peninsula theatre of operations.

Lee emphasised that South Korea must secure its safety through its own capabilities. He also inspected the Hyunmoo-5 ballistic missile, the country's most powerful ballistic missile system currently in service.

The test comes amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Last month, three South Korean soldiers were injured in landmine explosions near the heavily fortified inter-Korean border.

South Korea's military and the United Nations Command concluded that the explosions were caused by mines planted by North Korea. Pyongyang has denied responsibility and mocked Seoul's demands for an apology.

Relations have further deteriorated as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un continues to expand his nuclear weapons and missile development efforts while adopting an increasingly confrontational stance towards South Korea.

Pyongyang has also intensified weapons testing activities. On 3 October, North Korea launched what it described as a hypersonic intermediate-range missile. North Korean authorities claimed the missile travelled more than 1,000 kilometres before landing in waters near Japan.

Japan reported that the missile landed outside its Exclusive Economic Zone. South Korea assessed the flight distance at more than 700 kilometres, while Japan's Defence Ministry estimated approximately 680 kilometres.

Kim Yo Jong, the influential sister of Kim Jong Un, argued that the differing flight assessments by South Korea and Japan demonstrated the limitations of their tracking capabilities and suggested they would struggle to intercept such missiles.

The latest developments also present a political challenge for Lee, who has traditionally supported engagement and dialogue with North Korea. His conciliatory approach has come under pressure amid growing public anger following the border mine incidents.

At the same time, Lee has advocated bolstering South Korea's independent conventional military strength while reducing reliance on the United States. His position gained attention after Washington scaled back a major joint military exercise with South Korea in August, with US President Donald Trump citing his positive relationship with Kim Jong Un.

The successful hypersonic weapons test places South Korea among a limited group of nations pursuing advanced manoeuvrable missile technologies, reflecting an increasingly competitive regional arms environment shaped by North Korea's expanding missile capabilities and broader security concerns across East Asia.

Agencies

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Trump Confirms Plan To Meet North Korea's Kim Jong Un Later This Year

US President Donald Trump has confirmed that he expects to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un later this year. Speaking to reporters on the South Lawn, Trump said, “Yeah, I will be. I’ll be doing this too,” when asked about the potential meeting.

He emphasised his personal relationship with Kim, describing their rapport as beneficial for international relations. Trump stated, “I get along with him right. And you know what, the fact that I get along with him, that’s a good thing, not a bad thing.”

During the exchange, Trump highlighted North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, claiming that Kim possesses fifty-seven powerful nuclear weapons. He remarked that such a stockpile should never have been allowed to develop. Trump added, “If I were president, I wouldn’t have allowed it. But he’s got ’em. I get along with him very well. You can’t let Iran have a nuclear weapon.”

He defended his approach to North Korea, expressing confidence in the outlook for the region under US leadership. He said, “I know Kim Jong Un very well. And he’s gonna be fine. As long as we have a smart president, he’s gonna be fine. If we have a dumb president, then he’s probably not gonna be so fine.”

Earlier, Trump noted that Kim Jong Un had always treated him with “great respect.” He explained that they had met on multiple occasions and understood each other well. Trump contrasted his relationship with Kim against the North Korean leader’s reported dislike of previous US presidents, stating, “He didn’t like Biden, he didn’t like Obama, he didn’t like anybody, but I get along with him very well. Now, what I’m doing is making things safer, just the opposite.”

This confirmation comes after Trump instructed Secretary of War Pete Hegseth to substantially reduce joint military exercises with South Korea. He cited his relationship with Kim Jong Un and described the drills as costly and inappropriate.

On Truth Social, Trump expressed dissatisfaction with the United States’ long-standing agreement to participate in such exercises, saying, “Based on my very good relationship with Kim Jong Un, of North Korea, I am not happy with the fact that the United States has, long ago, agreed to participate in Joint Military Exercises with South Korea.”

If the meeting takes place, it would mark Trump’s first encounter with Kim Jong Un during his second term as US President. Between 2018 and 2019, Trump and Kim met face-to-face three times in unprecedented direct diplomacy.

Their first historic meeting occurred at the Singapore Summit in June 2018, where both leaders signed a joint declaration to establish new bilateral relations, build a lasting peace regime, pursue complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, and recover American war remains. Following that summit, Trump announced the suspension of major US-South Korea military exercises, calling them “provocative war games.”

The second meeting took place at the Hanoi Summit in Vietnam in February 2019. Negotiations collapsed over disagreements on sanctions relief and nuclear dismantlement. North Korea offered to decommission the Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for major sanctions relief, but the US insisted on broader denuclearisation across undisclosed sites, leading to an early end without agreement.

Their third meeting occurred in June 2019 at the Korean Demilitarized Zone in Panmunjom. Trump crossed into North Korean territory, becoming the first sitting US president to do so.

Joined briefly by South Korean President Moon Jae-in, Trump and Kim held a fifty-minute private talk inside the Freedom House and agreed to restart working-level nuclear negotiations.

The upcoming meeting, if realised, would continue Trump’s unique approach to North Korea, combining personal rapport with strategic decisions such as scaling back military exercises with South Korea. It underscores his belief that direct engagement with Kim Jong Un can contribute to stability on the Korean Peninsula.

ANI

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Trump Orders Pentagon To Cut South Korea Military Exercises After Refusal On Iran Denuclearisation

US President Donald Trump has ordered the Pentagon to substantially reduce ongoing joint military exercises with South Korea. This decision followed South Korea’s refusal to join the United States in its push for the denuclearisation of Iran.

Trump described South Korea’s stance as “totally inappropriate and hostile” to North Korea. He contrasted this with his portrayal of North Korea, which he claimed had been “unthreatening and respectful.”

The reduction in joint military drills marks a significant shift in Washington’s defence posture in East Asia. These exercises have long been a cornerstone of US-South Korea military cooperation, designed to deter aggression from Pyongyang and strengthen regional security.

Trump’s remarks suggest a recalibration of alliances, with the US President openly criticising Seoul while expressing a more conciliatory tone towards Pyongyang. This rhetoric underscores his broader strategy of pressuring allies to align with Washington’s foreign policy objectives, particularly on Iran.

The Pentagon’s move to scale back exercises could have implications for deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Analysts note that such drills are vital for maintaining readiness and interoperability between US and South Korean forces. A reduction may embolden North Korea, which has historically opposed these exercises, viewing them as provocative.

Trump’s framing of North Korea as “respectful” contrasts sharply with decades of US policy that has treated Pyongyang as a primary security threat. His comments may signal an attempt to reconfigure diplomatic dynamics in the region, potentially using North Korea’s perceived restraint as leverage against South Korea’s refusal to cooperate on Iran.

South Korea’s rejection of participation in the Iran denuclearisation effort highlights the complexities of balancing regional priorities. Seoul has traditionally focused on stability on the Korean Peninsula, while Washington has sought broader global commitments from its allies.

The development also reflects Trump’s transactional approach to alliances, where military cooperation is tied to political alignment on issues beyond the immediate region. This could strain relations between Washington and Seoul, particularly at a time when North Korea’s nuclear ambitions remain unresolved.

Observers warn that weakening military coordination with South Korea may undermine US influence in East Asia. It could also complicate efforts to reassure other regional allies such as Japan, who rely on American military presence as a stabilising factor.

Trump’s decision comes amid heightened tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, with Washington pressing for international support to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. South Korea’s refusal to join this initiative has now triggered repercussions in its defence relationship with the United States.

The Pentagon is expected to implement the reduction in exercises in the coming weeks. While details remain unclear, the move is likely to be closely monitored by regional actors, including North Korea, China, and Japan, all of whom have vested interests in the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula.

This episode illustrates the interconnected nature of global security issues, where decisions on Iran reverberate in East Asia, reshaping alliances and military strategies.

Agencies

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Russian Su-35 Production Set To Surpass 400 Fighters Amid Wartime Demand And Expanding Exports

Russia’s Su-35 fighter program is now on track to surpass 400 aircraft produced, driven by wartime demand, Iranian contracts, and new export opportunities. Deliveries to Iran are progressing despite delays linked to airbase upgrades, while Algeria and Ethiopia have confirmed smaller orders.

North Korea’s potential involvement could further expand production, though uncertainty remains over its preference for the Su-57.

The Su-35 program has entered a new phase where export orders dominate production. The Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Plant has already completed around 20 aircraft for Iran, with another 28 scheduled over the next two years.

Deliveries are temporarily delayed until Hamadan Airbase reconstruction is complete, but production continues steadily, with nearly 30 aircraft expected by early 2027. Iran’s order of 48 Su-35s, alongside 12 Su-30SM2s, represents one of its largest air force modernisation efforts in decades, though this will replace only a fraction of its fleet of nearly 300 fighters.

Preparations include pilot training, simulators, and weapons packages, with over 300 guided munitions included in the deal.

The Su-35 was originally conceived as an export-oriented program with a planned run of 200 aircraft. Rising tensions with NATO and delays in the Su-57 program led Russia to expand domestic procurement. By 2020, the Defence Ministry had ordered 128 Su-35s, later shifting to rolling contracts. 

Conservative estimates suggest over 70 additional aircraft have been ordered since, bringing Aerospace Forces totals close to 200. Deliveries by mid-2026 are estimated at over 150–170 aircraft, with projections that more than 200 will be in service by year’s end.

Export orders quadrupled in 2025, rising from 24 to 96 fighters. Algeria received refurbished aircraft originally intended for Egypt, while Ethiopia confirmed an order for six Su-35s to replace ageing Su-27s. Ethiopia’s small fleet is insufficient to replace its 18 Su-27s, making follow-up orders likely. 

Algeria, meanwhile, is expected to focus future procurement on the Su-57 and possibly the Chinese J-35, but its Su-35 fleet remains operational. Iran’s potential for a second batch of 48 Su-35s could alone push production totals to 350 fighters.

The Su-35’s export prospects are complicated by Western sanctions, which previously deterred Egypt and Indonesia. However, the fighter’s modernisation with AESA radar, advanced avionics, and integration of the R-77M missile enhances its appeal. Its combat record in Syria and Ukraine, with minimal losses and extensive air-to-air testing, further strengthens its reputation.

North Korea has shown interest in Russian fighters, with officials inspecting Su-35 and Su-57 production facilities in 2023. Analysts suggest Russia may tie Su-57 sales to Su-35 commitments, particularly if production bottlenecks limit Su-57 availability.

North Korea could absorb over 100 fighters, but given the presence of U.S., Japanese, and South Korean F-35s near its borders, the Su-57 remains the more attractive option for parity.

The future of the Su-35 program depends on balancing domestic and export demand. With ongoing upgrades, including a new radar and electronic warfare systems, production could exceed 400 aircraft. 

This would double the program’s initial goal and mark a significant milestone for post-Soviet Russia, though still modest compared to China’s J-20 fleet, which has already surpassed 500 fighters.

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Global Nuclear Spending Soars As China Accelerates Arsenal Expansion

Global nuclear weapons spending surged to a record $119 billion in 2025, with the United States accounting for more than half of the total, while China led the pace of arsenal expansion, according to a report by AFP.

SIPRI and ICAN warn that the dismantling of retired warheads is slowing, meaning stockpiles are likely to grow again, intensifying risks amid geopolitical competition.

Worldwide expenditure on nuclear weapons reached unprecedented levels last year, with the nine nuclear-armed states jointly spending nearly $119 billion, marking a 19 per cent increase compared to 2024.

This dramatic rise reflects a rush to modernise arsenals and deploy more warheads onto delivery systems. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) described the situation as the onset of a new nuclear arms race, while the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) voiced alarm at the growing risks.

ICAN’s director of programs, Susi Snyder, expressed deep concern, noting that the combination of accelerated spending and the potential role of artificial intelligence in nuclear command and control could heighten the risk of use.

She admitted to being “terrified” by the trajectory of developments. SIPRI’s findings reinforced this anxiety, highlighting that although the overall number of nuclear warheads has declined to 12,187 at the start of 2026, the number available for potential use has risen to 9,745. Of these, 4,012 are deployed with operational forces, with between 2,100 and 2,200 kept on high alert.

The United States and Russia together hold around 83 per cent of the world’s nuclear arms, each maintaining more than 5,000 warheads. Both countries are pursuing extensive modernisation programmes, including new delivery systems and upgraded warheads.

China, however, is expanding its arsenal faster than any other nation, now estimated at around 620 warheads, with projections suggesting it could rival US and Russian intercontinental ballistic missile numbers by 2030. SIPRI director Karim Haggag emphasised that intensifying geopolitical competition is driving China to increase its reliance on nuclear weapons.

ICAN’s report revealed that Washington spent $69.2 billion on nuclear weapons in 2025, an increase of $12.4 billion from the previous year, more than all other nuclear powers combined. China followed with $13.5 billion, Britain with $12.6 billion, and Russia with $9.5 billion. Over the past five years, the nine nuclear-armed states have collectively spent more than $470 billion on their arsenals.

Britain, France and the United States have already outlined plans to maintain and develop nuclear systems well into the next century, with the US Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missiles expected to remain operational past 2100 and plutonium pit production ensuring warhead viability through 2120. US nuclear arms spending between 2025 and 2034 alone is projected to approach $1 trillion.

The humanitarian implications of such vast expenditure are stark. Researchers noted that a single day of nuclear weapons spending in 2025 could have provided food security to more than two million people. Instead, nuclear-armed states continue to invest in arsenals that cannot be used without committing war crimes, underscoring what Snyder described as a “total disconnect from reality.”

The SIPRI Yearbook 2026 also highlighted India’s nuclear expansion, with its arsenal rising to 190 warheads by early 2026, widening its lead over Pakistan. India remains the world’s fifth-largest military spender and second-largest arms importer, with expenditure reaching $92.1 billion in 2025.

Operation Sindoor in May 2025 marked an unusually severe crisis with Pakistan, involving strikes on nuclear-related bases and the integration of cyber operations into active conflict for the first time. Pakistan’s arsenal remains stable at 170 warheads but continues to accumulate fissile material, suggesting future growth.

Globally, the nine nuclear powers are increasingly relying on nuclear weapons as instruments of national power, reversing decades of disarmament efforts. With the pace of dismantlement slowing and new deployments accelerating, experts warn that nuclear stockpiles are likely to grow again, raising the risks of miscalculation and escalation in an already volatile strategic environment.

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Xi And Putin Cement Pragmatic Partnership Amid Global Fragmentation

Xi Jinping’s meeting with Vladimir Putin in Beijing from 19–20 May came just days after his farewell to US President Donald Trump.

The timing underscored the deliberate choreography of China’s diplomacy, as Xi and Putin appeared to align their positions against their common adversary, the United States. Reports suggest Xi may soon visit North Korea, hinting at a potential China-Russia-North Korea axis. Putin’s 25 visits to China and over 40 meetings with Xi since 2013 highlight the depth of their engagement.

Analysts such as Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute warned that the summit echoed the prelude to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. He suggested that Putin and Xi may be coordinating actions in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, emboldened by Trump’s retreat from NATO and Taiwan.

Davis cautioned that the world is entering a perilous pre-war period reminiscent of the late 1930s. Yet Dr Yu Jie of Chatham House emphasised that the relationship is driven not by personal warmth but by strategic interests, with both leaders seeking to reshape the international order.

The joint declaration issued on 20 May called for a multipolar world and criticised unilateralism, hegemonism and bloc confrontation. It advocated openness, indivisible security, democratisation of international relations and respect for civilizational diversity.

However, the statement’s claim that “the security of one state cannot be achieved at the expense of another” rang hollow given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. The declaration also opposed the use of human rights as a pretext for interference, raising concerns about legitimising authoritarian practices.

Putin hailed Xi as a “long-time good friend” and spoke of a new stage in bilateral ties. Xi echoed this sentiment, noting that relations had reached unprecedented levels. The summit coincided with anniversaries of the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and the strategic partnership, while bilateral trade reached USD 228 billion in 2025.

Putin claimed the partnership played a stabilising global role, though Yu stressed it was pragmatic alignment rather than a formal alliance. Shared opposition to Western dominance binds them, but differences remain, such as China’s unease over dependence on Russian energy.

China’s vulnerability to global disruptions, particularly in energy supplies, explains Xi’s call for an immediate ceasefire in the Middle East. While Moscow seeks to inflame anti-US sentiment, Beijing prioritises stability to safeguard its economic interests.

Analysts like Ryan Hass of the Brookings Institute argued that China does not aspire to global leadership in the Gulf but rather seeks to clear a path for its rise. Trump’s conciliatory stance towards China, including pausing arms sales to Taiwan, further bolstered Beijing’s confidence.

Yu highlighted that Russia views multipolarity as a way out of isolation, while China sees it as a transition away from US dominance. Their convergence has produced a durable partnership, with China providing Russia economic lifelines and Russia offering discounted energy and military cooperation. 

Reports even suggest China secretly trained Russian soldiers in drone and electronic warfare under a 2025 agreement. Despite denials, such exchanges reveal deeper military collaboration.

Chinese experts celebrated Trump’s visit, noting that he elevated Xi as a peer and adopted some of Beijing’s framing on Taiwan. Hass observed that the uneasy calm between Trump and Xi depends heavily on their personal rapport, though he doubted the durability of “constructive strategic stability.” Trump’s concessions without reciprocal gains from China reinforced perceptions of US accommodation.

Ultimately, the Xi-Putin summit showcased a relationship defined by calibrated utility rather than ideology. Russia gains the appearance of a powerful partner, while China secures a counterweight to the US.

The partnership is resilient but bounded, rooted in pragmatism rather than limitless friendship. As Yu concluded, its durability lies in carefully managed limits, making it one of the most consequential strategic relationships in the world today.

Agencies

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Pakistan Navy Claims To Have Test Fired Its Taimoor Anti-Ship Cruise Missile

Pakistan has announced the successful test-firing of its indigenously developed anti-ship weapon system, marking a significant milestone in its naval modernisation efforts.

The demonstration involved the Taimoor air-launched cruise missile, which was deployed by the Pakistan Navy to showcase its precision strike capability.

According to the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the missile executed its mission with exceptional accuracy, underscoring the operational readiness of the force.

The Taimoor missile, designed to neutralise sea-based threats at extended ranges, represents a powerful addition to Pakistan’s maritime arsenal. The ISPR described the test as a “powerful demonstration of precision strike capability and operational readiness,” highlighting its role in strengthening the Navy’s ability to detect, target, and decisively neutralise enemy threats across the maritime domain.

The demonstration is seen as part of Pakistan’s broader effort to reinforce its deterrence and combat capabilities in the face of evolving regional security challenges.

Notably, most Pakistani missile systems are sourced from abroad, either as CKD kits or ready-to-use platforms. In the past, China shared designs of its obsolete Soviet-era SCUD-based missiles, while North Korea has also been a key source of missile proliferation.

Pakistan's Ra'ad air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), publicly unveiled in 2007, traces its origins to South Africa's troubled Torgos project. In 1993, Kentron (now Denel Dynamics) began developing the Torgos, completing its design phase by 1997 with prototypes ready for testing. Financial woes struck in 1999, prompting Kentron to showcase the 300 km-range missile at Dubai 2000, seeking co-development partners.

Turkey and Pakistan expressed interest in technology transfer. Turkey leveraged the design to evolve its SOM missile, including the SOM-J variant. Pakistan, however, took eight years to adapt the technology, deploying the Ra'ad amid its history of sensitive arms acquisitions.

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Pak Claims India Pursuing 12,000km Range Intercontinental Missile; US Report Puts Islamabad With Iran & North Korea

Pakistan has sharply rebutted a recent US intelligence assessment that groups it with adversarial states like Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran over its missile ambitions.

The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, authored by US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, warns that Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile program "potentially could include ICBMs with the range capable of striking the homeland." This places Islamabad under heightened scrutiny from Washington.

In response, Pakistan's Foreign Office dismissed the characterisation as baseless and swiftly pivoted to India's defence developments. It accused New Delhi of pursuing a missile exceeding 12,000 kilometres in range, claiming this "raises broader security concerns beyond the region." The statement frames India's program as a global threat, far outweighing Pakistan's own capabilities.

Pakistan spotlighted three Indian systems in its retort. The Agni-V, already inducted into service, boasts a range surpassing 8,000 kilometres, placing most of Asia within reach. This road-mobile, canister-launched missile represents a cornerstone of India's nuclear triad.

Development of the Agni-VI, a three-stage intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), has been publicly acknowledged since May 2018. Defence analysts estimate its range at up to 12,000 kilometres, enabling strikes across Eurasia and into the Pacific. The system remains under testing, with indigenous solid-fuel technology at its core.

The K-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) forms the third pillar of Pakistan's critique. Designed for India's Arihant-class nuclear-powered submarines, it offers a range of 5,000 to 8,000 kilometres. Pakistan argues that deployment during extended ocean patrols would allow India to threaten Europe, Russia, Israel, and US Pacific territories from stealthy sea-based platforms.

This deflection aligns with Pakistan's strategic narrative. Its longest operational missile, the Shaheen-III, tops out at 2,750 kilometres—adequate to cover India but well short of the 5,500-kilometre ICBM threshold defined by arms control standards. No Pakistani system yet approaches intercontinental reach.

Tensions trace back to December 2024, when the US State Department imposed sanctions on Pakistan's National Development Complex (NDC) and three private firms. These penalties targeted procurement of missile-applicable equipment, including maraging steel and carbon fibre, amid concerns over proliferation risks. Pakistan views such measures as discriminatory.

Islamabad's invocation of India's Agni-VI draws on verifiable facts. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has confirmed the program's advancement, with prototypes undergoing ground tests. Flight trials could commence soon, potentially mirroring the Agni-V's rapid maturation from concept to deployment.

Pakistan contends that sea-launched K-5 missiles disrupt India's "credible minimum deterrence" doctrine. By enabling second-strike survivability from the Indian Ocean, they extend India's nuclear reach asymmetrically. This, Islamabad argues, invites a regional arms race while drawing in extra-regional powers.

The US assessment reflects broader anxieties. It notes Pakistan's pursuit of multi-stage solid-propellant engines and re-entry vehicle technologies, potentially enabling ranges beyond 3,000 kilometres. Coupling this with MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) capabilities could overwhelm missile defences.

India's silence on Pakistan's claims is telling. New Delhi typically avoids direct rebuttals to such provocations, focusing instead on strategic autonomy. The Agni series underscores its no-first-use policy, emphasising deterrence against existential threats rather than offensive posturing.

Pakistan's manoeuvre seeks to recast Washington as selectively blind. By highlighting India's longer-range assets, it implies US threat assessments favour an Indo-Pacific ally over a counterbalance in South Asia. This echoes longstanding grievances over F-16 sustainment and nuclear sanctions.

The exchange underscores escalating missile competitions. India's indigenous push, via initiatives like the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program, contrasts with Pakistan's reliance on imported components despite sanctions. Both nations prioritise cannisterised, road- and sea-mobile systems for rapid response.

An operational Agni-VI would position India among a select club of ICBM powers, enhancing its strategic depth amid tensions with China. For Pakistan, US scrutiny risks constraining its deterrence posture against a conventionally superior rival.

As of March 2026, no official Indian response has emerged. The episode highlights how intelligence reports can ignite diplomatic salvos, with missile ranges serving as proxies for deeper power balances in South Asia.

Agencies

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US Intel Chief Tulsi Gabbard Warns of Pakistan's ICBM Threat to American Mainland

Tulsi Gabbard, the US Director of National Intelligence, has issued a stark warning regarding Pakistan's advancing missile capabilities during a Senate Intelligence hearing on worldwide threats.

Speaking in Washington, DC, she highlighted that Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile developments could potentially encompass intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with sufficient range to strike targets within the US homeland.

Gabbard emphasised the broader risks posed by state actors pursuing enhanced kinetic and cyber warfare capabilities. She noted that while the United States maintains a secure nuclear deterrent against strategic threats, nations including Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan are actively researching and developing diverse missile delivery systems.

These systems, capable of carrying nuclear or conventional payloads, increasingly place the US homeland within their operational range.

According to the intelligence community's assessment, the number of missiles posing threats to the US is projected to surge dramatically. By 2035, this figure could exceed 16,000 missiles, up from the current estimate of more than 3,000. This escalation underscores the growing proliferation of advanced missile technologies among adversarial states.

Gabbard singled out China and Russia as the most persistent and active threats in this domain. Both nations are aggressively pursuing research and development efforts aimed at creating advanced delivery systems designed to penetrate or bypass US missile defences. Their programs represent a direct challenge to American strategic superiority.

North Korea has already achieved a troubling milestone, with its ICBMs demonstrating the ability to reach US soil. The intelligence community assesses that Pyongyang remains committed to expanding its nuclear arsenal, further heightening risks to continental America.

Iran's potential looms large as well. Gabbard revealed that Tehran has previously demonstrated space launch vehicles and related technologies that could be adapted to develop a militarily viable ICBM before 2035. Should Iran decide to pursue this path, it could significantly alter the regional and global threat landscape.

Returning to Pakistan, Gabbard explicitly stated that its long-range ballistic missile program 'potentially could include ICBMs with a range capable of striking the homeland.' This assessment marks a notable escalation in US intelligence evaluations of Islamabad's strategic ambitions, traditionally focused on regional deterrence against India.

The context of Pakistan's missile advancements is rooted in its longstanding nuclear program, which has evolved since the 1980s. Systems like the Shaheen series and the more recent Ababeel multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV)-capable missile already provide medium- to intermediate-range strike options. However, indications of solid-fuel technology and larger boosters suggest a push towards greater reach.

US intelligence tracks these developments closely, particularly given Pakistan's receipt of technical assistance from China and North Korea in the past. The integration of MIRV technology and improved guidance systems could enable Pakistan to overcome ballistic missile defence architectures, amplifying the strategic implications.

From an Indian perspective, this revelation intensifies longstanding concerns over Pakistan's arsenal. New Delhi has invested heavily in its own missile defence systems, including the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) and Advanced Air Defence (AAD) interceptors under the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program. Pakistan's potential ICBM pursuit could necessitate further enhancements to India's two-tiered shield.

Geopolitically, Gabbard's testimony arrives amid strained India-Pakistan relations, exacerbated by recent border skirmishes and cross-border terrorism. Pakistan's military, under the stewardship of its Strategic Plans Division, oversees nuclear and missile assets, often justifying expansions as countermeasures to India's Agni-V and BrahMos capabilities.

The US has historically imposed sanctions on entities linked to Pakistan's missile program, such as the National Development Complex, under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Gabbard's comments may signal renewed scrutiny, potentially affecting bilateral defence ties, including Pakistan's F-16 sustainment packages.

Broader implications extend to global non-proliferation efforts. The intelligence community's projection of over 16,000 threatening missiles by 2035 highlights the erosion of arms control frameworks, reminiscent of Cold War dynamics but complicated by multiple actors.

North Korea's cyber prowess adds another layer, with its 2025 cryptocurrency heists reportedly netting $2 billion. These funds, per US assessments, bolster the regime's strategic weapons development, including missile programmes.

China's hypersonic glide vehicles and fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) exemplify the technological frontier, while Russia's Avangard hypersonic weapon challenges existing defences. These innovations could inspire similar pursuits by secondary powers like Pakistan.

For India, monitoring Pakistan's trajectory aligns with its 'no first use' nuclear doctrine and credible minimum deterrence posture. The Agni-VI, under development with a projected 10,000-12,000 km range, positions New Delhi to counter extended threats, including potential Chinese collaborations with Islamabad.

Gabbard's hearing underscores the interconnected nature of global missile threats. As Director of National Intelligence, her role in shaping US policy could influence alliances, with India benefiting from strengthened Quad and iCET frameworks to counter shared risks from China and its proxies.

Critically, this disclosure serves as a clarion call for enhanced intelligence sharing, missile defence investments, and diplomatic pressure on proliferators. The spectre of Pakistani ICBMs reaching the US mainland reframes South Asian security dynamics on a truly global scale.

ANI

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DSA Holding Signs $2 Billion LoI For Innogress Ventures–Led Quantum, Deep-Tech Ecosystem

DSA Holding AS, a European deep-tech investor based in Norway, has signed a landmark letter of intent (LoI) to commit up to $2 billion towards India's burgeoning quantum and deep-tech ecosystem. This initiative is spearheaded by Innogress Ventures, marking one of the largest private investments in the country's quantum technology sector.

The LoI, accompanied by a memorandum of understanding (MoU), was formally executed on 22 December at JSS University in Noida. This event underscores the growing collaboration between European capital and Indian innovation hubs.

Alongside DSA Holding, its sister company Norwegian Green Solutions (NGS) AS has pledged support for Innogress-led projects spanning quantum computing, artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and advanced data infrastructure. Key developments include the Greater Karnavati Quantum Computing Technology Park, the Greater Noida Robotics Technology Park, and the Indraprastha Quantum Data Center.

The investment will extend to partner institutions and start-ups, such as IIT Gandhinagar, JSS University Noida, and various early-stage deep-tech ventures. This multifaceted approach aims to foster a comprehensive ecosystem for cutting-edge technologies.

In a parallel move, NGS AS signed a separate MoU with Innogress Ventures focused on green technology initiatives. These encompass renewable energy solutions designed to power data centres and technology parks across India, blending deep-tech advancement with sustainable infrastructure.

Event speakers highlighted India's surging demand for quantum, AI, and clean-tech solutions. They emphasised the nation's capacity to scale these technologies for both domestic needs and global markets, positioning India as a pivotal player in the international deep-tech arena.

Innogress Ventures founder Sumant Parimal addressed the critical role of overseas capital in the sector. He noted the disparity between India's robust innovation output and the constraints of limited domestic funding, advocating for such international partnerships to bridge the gap.

The signing ceremony drew senior leaders from academia, industry, and a European delegation. Innogress Partner and Advisor Kalyan Upadhyay was present, alongside strategic and institutional stakeholders, reinforcing the firm's pivotal role in orchestrating this investment framework.

This development reflects escalating international interest in India's quantum and deep-tech aspirations. It particularly spotlights synergies at the nexus of advanced computing and sustainable technology, potentially accelerating India's position in global tech leadership.

The $2 billion commitment could catalyse infrastructure growth in quantum computing parks, where specialised facilities will enable research into quantum algorithms, error-corrected qubits, and hybrid quantum-classical systems. Such parks are vital for overcoming current computational limits in fields like drug discovery and materials science.

Robotics technology parks under the initiative promise advancements in automation, swarms, and human-machine interfaces. These align with India's push towards Industry 4.0, enhancing manufacturing precision and efficiency in sectors like defence and aerospace.

The Indraprastha Quantum Data Center represents a cornerstone, integrating quantum processors with high-performance classical computing. It will support secure data handling through quantum key distribution, addressing rising cybersecurity challenges in an AI-driven world.

Support for institutions like IIT Gandhinagar will bolster academic-industry linkages. The institute's expertise in quantum information science could yield breakthroughs in scalable quantum networks, benefiting national projects such as secure communications and satellite-based quantum relays.

JSS University Noida's involvement ensures talent pipeline development through specialised curricula in deep-tech. Early-stage startups will gain mentorship, funding, and infrastructure, nurturing ventures in AI-driven quantum simulations and edge robotics.

NGS's green tech MoU introduces sustainability at the core. Renewable solutions, including solar-integrated data centres and energy-efficient cooling for quantum systems—which demand ultra-low temperatures—will mitigate the high power needs of these technologies.

This comes amid global quantum races, with nations like the US, China, and EU investing billions. India's National Quantum Mission, allocated ₹6,000 crore, finds timely reinforcement through private foreign capital, amplifying indigenous R&D.

Geopolitically, the Norway-India tie-up diversifies supply chains away from traditional powers. It supports India's Atmanirbhar Bharat vision by localising deep-tech production, potentially exporting quantum-secured systems to ASEAN and African markets.

Challenges remain, including talent retention and IP protection. Yet, with DSA's track record in European deep-tech and Innogress's local acumen, this partnership could set benchmarks for scalable quantum adoption.

Ultimately, the LoI signals a transformative era for India's deep-tech landscape, merging European investment with homegrown innovation to drive economic growth, technological sovereignty, and sustainable progress.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)

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Trump Stunned: Kim Reveals Nuclear Sub Matching US Navy Might

North Korea has recently unveiled significant progress on its first nuclear-powered submarine, a development that has heightened tensions in the Indo-Pacific region. State media released images showing leader Kim Jong Un inspecting the vessel at a shipyard, describing it as an 8,700-ton-class nuclear-propelled submarine capable of carrying ballistic missiles.

This marks a potential advancement in Pyongyang's naval capabilities, with the hull appearing largely complete and coated in anti-corrosive paint.

The submarine, referred to as a "strategic guided missile submarine" or "strategic nuclear attack submarine," aims to bolster North Korea's nuclear deterrent. Analysts note that its size exceeds earlier diesel-electric models like the Sinpo-C class, which displace around 3,000 tons and carry fewer missiles.

Experts suggest the vessel could launch up to ten nuclear-capable missiles from underwater, complicating detection and interception efforts.

Construction appears advanced, with photographs indicating internal systems may already be installed, as submarines are typically built from the inside out. Moon Keun-sik, a submarine specialist at Hanyang University in Seoul, stated that the full hull display implies the submarine could undergo sea trials within months. North Korea first announced the project in 2021 as part of a broader weapons development plan, including hypersonic missiles and ICBMs.

Kim Jong Un linked the submarine's development to regional rivalries, condemning South Korea's push for its own nuclear-powered submarines, backed by U.S. President Donald Trump. He described Seoul's efforts as an "offensive act" that undermines North Korea's security and maritime sovereignty. Trump has expressed openness to sharing technology with South Korea to modernise its diesel-powered fleet, a move set to involve construction in Philadelphia.

No verified reports confirm Trump being "shocked" by the unveiling, though sensational headlines have amplified concerns in Washington. The U.S. has long viewed North Korean nuclear advancements as a threat to its homeland and allies, prompting sustained deterrence measures. Pyongyang's state media timed the reveal amid U.S.-South Korea exercises like Freedom Shield, followed by North Korean missile tests into the sea.

The submarine could provide North Korea with a survivable second-strike capability, allowing launches from stealthy underwater positions toward the U.S. mainland or allies. This escalates risks in the Indo-Pacific, where submarine-launched ballistic missiles challenge existing defences like THAAD. Questions persist over Pyongyang's ability to source nuclear propulsion technology under sanctions, with speculation of Russian assistance amid growing ties.

Experts warn that operational deployment would represent an "epoch-making" shift in North Korea's navy, enhancing its deterrence against perceived threats from the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. The vessel's potential for hypersonic glide vehicles further complicates missile defence strategies. Tensions remain high, with stalled denuclearisation talks since Trump's 2019 summit with Kim.

Agencies

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'I'm Going To Kill That Son Of A B**Ch': Ex-CIA Officer Reveals Musharraf's Angry Response To AQ Khan Selling Stolen Pak's Nuclear Tech

Former Pakistani Dictator Pervez Musharraf’s reaction to the exposure of Abdul Qadeer Khan’s nuclear secrets leak was one of intense anger and decisiveness. When confronted by then-CIA Director George Tenet with irrefutable evidence that Khan was betraying Pakistan by selling nuclear technology to countries such as Libya, Musharraf reportedly responded with the vehement remark, “I’m going to kill that son of a bitch.” This moment marked a turning point in efforts to contain one of the world’s most dangerous nuclear proliferation networks.​

Abdul Qadeer Khan, a nuclear physicist and metallurgical engineer considered the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, had for decades sourced nuclear technology for Pakistan. However, his activities expanded into illicit trafficking of nuclear knowledge and materials to states like Libya, Iran, and North Korea, earning him the nickname “Merchant of Death” among US intelligence circles.

The CIA’s investigations revealed that Khan’s network supplied multiple foreign nuclear and missile programs, often assisted by Pakistani generals and officials on his payroll—but importantly, without direct state knowledge.​

Musharraf’s response involved placing Khan under years-long house arrest—a decisive step signalling Islamabad’s attempt to regain control and contain damage. Khan was forced to publicly confess and apologise, though many experts doubted his claim that he acted alone without institutional backing. 

Musharraf distanced his government from Khan’s actions, asserting that proliferations were carried out by individuals for personal gain rather than official policy.​

The CIA's covert counter-proliferation operation, led by James Lawler, combined intelligence infiltration with sting tactics that involved front companies posing as nuclear technology suppliers to sabotage Khan’s network.

This initiative bore fruit notably after 9/11, when intercepted shipments of nuclear components destined for Libya prompted its nuclear disarmament, an event celebrated within US intelligence as preventing future nuclear conflict. The CIA continued to closely monitor Pakistan’s nuclear assets to ensure Khan’s network did not supply terrorists.​

The wider implications were profound. Khan’s network had helped proliferate Iranian nuclear centrifuge technology and ballistic missile designs, raising fears of a cascading nuclear arms race in the Middle East. US tolerance of Pakistan’s nuclear development contrasted with its hard stance on Iran, attributed partly to Pakistan’s strategic role in Afghanistan, although with awareness of long-term risks.​

Musharraf’s furious reaction was a critical moment in exposing and curtailing Abdul Qadeer Khan’s clandestine export of nuclear secrets. Despite government denials, Khan’s intricate and far-reaching proliferation network posed a major global threat, countered by persistent and covert US intelligence operations that reshaped non-proliferation strategies in the early 21st century.​

This account integrates intelligence revelations, Musharraf's political manoeuvrings, and the persistent dangers posed by the clandestine nuclear trade orchestrated by AQ Khan. The episode illustrates the complexity and high stakes of nuclear counter-proliferation in South Asia and beyond.

Based On ANI Report

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Pakistan’s Reported ICBM Ambition Raises Strategic Alarms Across Regions

Illustrative      

US intelligence agencies have reportedly identified indicators of an imminent Pakistani intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test, with an estimated range exceeding 5,500 kilometres. Such a development, if confirmed, would mark a major evolution in Pakistan’s strategic deterrent architecture, placing it alongside a select group of nations with global-range missile reach.

Preliminary assessments suggest Pakistan’s current missile infrastructure, centred on the Shaheen and Ababeel series, may have undergone extensive upgrading to support longer-range propulsion stages and improved payload configurations.

Satellite imagery and telemetry analysis reportedly point to test preparations at missile complexes in Balochistan or the Sindh interior, both possessing reinforced launch infrastructure suitable for heavy-lift ballistic stages.

A range capability surpassing 5,500 km would extend Pakistan’s reach beyond South Asia to encompass West Asia, parts of Europe, and East African corridors. This expanded envelope indicates a doctrinal shift from purely regional deterrence against India to a broader strategic posture possibly influenced by emerging power alignments and technology partnerships.

Analysts note similarities in stage design concepts reportedly reminiscent of North Korean Hwasong architecture, though direct transfer linkages remain unverified.

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) reports earlier in 2025 had already highlighted Pakistan’s experimentation with extended re-entry vehicle (RV) materials and multi-stage liquid-solid propulsion hybridisation, suggesting the pursuit of intercontinental delivery potential. Such initiatives likely stem from a combination of national prestige ambitions and deterrence enhancement in light of India’s Agni-V and Agni-P deployments.

The reported U.S. intelligence assessment underscores rising concern in Washington over the South Asian nuclear balance and Islamabad’s potential collaboration networks. Sources indicate intensified monitoring by both the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office and allied European assets to establish any foreign technology inflow, particularly from China or North Korea.

This has also compelled renewed consultations within the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) framework, despite Pakistan’s non-membership, to ensure export compliance vigilance among partner nations.

If the test proceeds, it would fundamentally reshape regional deterrence geometry, compelling India to recalibrate its missile readiness thresholds and prompting diplomatic reassessments by Gulf and Central Asian states. The strategic reverberations could also trigger wider U.S.–China competitive posturing, as Washington interprets Islamabad’s move as an indirect extension of Beijing’s influence in South Asian missile development.

Experts warn that the debut of a Pakistani ICBM would not only escalate security anxieties but might also accelerate multilateral debates about missile proliferation beyond conventional threat theatres. The implications for crisis stability in South Asia, already strained by sub-conventional tensions and arms modernisation cycles, are likely to be profound.

Based On OSINT Report

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Trump Discloses Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing, Justifies US Resumption After Three-Decade Lull

US President Donald Trump has revealed that Pakistan is among the countries currently conducting nuclear weapons testing, listing it alongside Russia, China, and North Korea. Speaking during an interview with CBS News’s 60 Minutes, President Trump argued that the United States could not remain the only major nuclear power refraining from such trials.

He explained that other nations had been routinely experimenting with nuclear capabilities without acknowledging it publicly, while the US, being an open society, maintained transparency on strategic developments. “Russia’s testing and China’s testing,” he noted, adding that unlike those nations, the US must engage openly with its media and citizens on matters of national defence.

The President clarified that his decision to resume nuclear tests followed Russia’s recent trials of advanced nuclear-capable systems, including the Poseidon underwater drone.

He stated that renewed testing was necessary to ensure the reliability and deterrence strength of America’s arsenal amid escalating global proliferation activities.

Trump further pointed to continual nuclear trials in North Korea and alleged similar activity in Pakistan, arguing that Washington could no longer afford a self-imposed moratorium while adversaries advanced their systems clandestinely. “We’re going to test because they test,” he said.

Reinforcing his stance, Trump emphasised that the US still possessed a superior nuclear stockpile. “We have more nuclear weapons than any other country,” he declared, claiming America’s warheads could destroy the world multiple times over.

He mentioned that denuclearisation remained an objective topic in discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

On Thursday, Trump formally announced the immediate resumption of US nuclear weapons testing, ending more than three decades of restraint. While acknowledging that global denuclearisation “would be a tremendous thing,” he said renewed trials were “appropriate” under current conditions, citing national security imperatives.

Preparations for the testing phase were reportedly complete, though the President did not reveal details about specific sites or timelines.

When questioned whether renewed nuclear tests could destabilise the global security environment, Trump replied that his administration had the situation “pretty well locked up,” signalling confidence in Washington’s deterrence architecture.

The move coincides with rising tensions between Washington and Moscow, following President Putin’s decision to annul the 2000 plutonium disposal treaty with the US—a pact originally aimed at capping weapons-grade plutonium stockpiles from dismantled warheads.

The termination of this agreement now casts further uncertainty over arms control efforts between the two leading nuclear powers.

Based On ANI Report

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South Korea Unveils Hyunmoo‑5: The 'Monster Missile' For Strategic Deterrence Against North Korea

South Korea has revealed its most powerful conventional missile to date, the Hyunmoo‑5, nicknamed the “monster missile.” The weapon represents a major leap in Seoul’s strategic deterrence framework, built to counter North Korea’s expanding nuclear and missile capabilities through devastating conventional force.

Weighing roughly 36 tonnes and measuring about 16 metres in length, the Hyunmoo‑5 is a road‑mobile, ground‑to‑ground ballistic missile optimised for deep‑penetration and bunker‑busting missions. Its reported payload capacity of up to eight tonnes allows it to deliver massive kinetic energy capable of destroying hardened underground command centres and missile silos across the Korean Peninsula.

Depending on the warhead weight, the missile offers flexible engagement ranges — approximately 600 kilometres with the heaviest payload, and extended reach when equipped with lighter warheads. This range‐adjustable architecture provides Seoul with scalable conventional options for pre‑emptive or retaliatory precision strikes.

Defence Minister Ahn Gyu‑back confirmed that mass production of the Hyunmoo‑5 has begun, with operational deployment expected before the year ends. He described the missile as central to achieving a “balance of terror” through powerful non‑nuclear means, signalling South Korea’s intention to offset North Korea’s nuclear coercion with overwhelming conventional capability.

The Hyunmoo‑5 embodies a turning point in South Korea’s missile development strategy following the 2017 lifting of US‑imposed payload restrictions. It underscores Seoul’s pursuit of greater self‑reliance in strategic armaments and contributes to the broader Kill Chain and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) doctrines that define its counter‑strike posture against Pyongyang’s threat spectrum.

Agencies

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Marco Rubio, Wang Yi Hold Call On Bilateral, Global Issues

The latest phone call between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi highlighted the pressing need for open channels of dialogue amid a new chapter of heightened friction in US–China relations.

According to the US State Department, the two leaders discussed a wide spectrum of bilateral, regional, and global issues, continuing from their earlier exchanges in Kuala Lumpur.

Washington emphasised constructive engagement, even as the broader context of the call was marked by sharp public rhetoric and a complex geopolitical environment increasingly defined by alignments, accusations, and displays of power.

The timing of the conversation underscored Washington’s attempt to balance intensified domestic posturing with the need for stabilizing dialogue with Beijing.

The outreach came just days after US President Donald Trump levelled pointed accusations at Chinese President Xi Jinping, claiming that Beijing, in concert with Moscow and Pyongyang, was “conspiring against the United States.” This charge coincided with China’s grand military display on September 3, held to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II.

The parade, unprecedented in scale, was attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, signalling a symbolic consolidation against Washington’s strategic orbit. Trump’s social media remark, sarcastically offering warm regards to Xi, Putin, and Kim, exemplified the sharp shifts between confrontation and personal diplomacy that continue to characterize his foreign policy style.

Despite the rhetoric of conspiracy, Trump simultaneously evolved his public tone, offering compliments on the parade, describing it as “very impressive” and “beautiful.” His statement implied both recognition of China’s ceremonial strength and his belief that its scale was partly intended to capture his personal attention.

He underlined that his relationships with global leaders, including Xi Jinping, remained “very good,” leaving room for manoeuvre and suggesting an intent to use his personal rapport as a diplomatic lever. Yet, his comments also carried undertones of transactional calculation, hinting at an impending period of testing in the bilateral relationship.

Another strand of tension emerged in Trump’s remarks about India and Russia. In a striking post on his Truth Social platform, Trump suggested that the United States had “lost Russia and India to deepest, darkest China,” implying a geopolitical shift in alignment that could weaken Washington’s strategic influence.

However, this provocative statement was quickly recalibrated. Speaking at the White House the same day, following a question posed by ANI, Trump denied that the US had truly “lost India.” He clarified that his dissatisfaction stemmed from New Delhi’s continued purchase of discounted Russian oil, which in his view undermined Washington’s broader Russia containment strategy.

He also invoked trade frictions, citing the US decision to impose a 50 per cent tariff on Indian goods – a policy presented both as punishment and leverage. Despite these grievances, Trump sought to reinforce the idea of his personal rapport with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, recalling Modi’s recent visit to Washington and their joint press appearance in the Rose Garden.

Taken together, these multiple dynamics illustrate the layered complexity of contemporary US diplomacy: on one hand, the Rubio–Wang Yi dialogue represents an institutional effort to sustain diplomatic engagement with Beijing, while on the other, Trump’s high-profile social media commentary injects volatility, often undercutting or re-framing these institutional efforts.

The juxtaposition of outright accusations of conspiracy with recognition of “very good” personal ties underscores the uneven rhythms of Washington’s approach to Beijing. Moreover, by publicly framing India and Russia as drifting towards China, Trump revealed a deep anxiety over shifting balances in the Global South, particularly as Beijing consolidates its partnerships with Moscow while attempting to position itself as a leader of multipolar engagement.

The week’s developments make clear that US foreign policy in Asia remains marked by contradiction: an institutional apparatus emphasizing sustained dialogue through figures like Rubio contrasts with Trump’s unpredictable, often sharply worded interventions.

China’s decision to stage a massive parade with Russia and North Korea’s leaders present was read in Washington as both a military show of force and a symbolic rebuke to American dominance.

Trump’s reactive mixture of accusation, praise, and strategic ambiguity reflects his attempt to maintain leverage through both rhetoric and personal ties. Simultaneously, his remarks about India reveal a growing unease in Washington about Delhi’s balancing strategies, caught between Western partnerships and enduring energy and strategic cooperation with Moscow.

Against this backdrop, the Rubio–Wang Yi call can be seen as a stabilizer, designed to keep communication channels alive just as public rhetoric escalates.

However, with mounting trade frictions, posturing on global alliances, and Trump’s volatile communications feeding into perceptions abroad, the trajectory of US–China relations continues to move within a narrow corridor: one where dialogue is kept alive, but trust remains limited, and the risks of miscalculation are amplified by intensifying symbolic gestures and personal politics.

Based On ANI Report

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China Displays Its Missiles, Fighter Jets And Other Military Hardware In A Tightly Controlled Parade

On Wednesday, September 3, 2025, China staged a massive and highly choreographed military parade in Beijing to commemorate the 80th anniversary of Japan’s World War-II surrender. The event, held in the heart of the Chinese capital, showcased an array of advanced military hardware, much of it publicly displayed for the very first time, and served as both a celebration of China’s historical resilience and a potent demonstration of its modern military might.

Chinese President Xi Jinping, in his dual roles as leader of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, presided over the proceedings, watching as thousands of uniformed troops marched in perfect lockstep before him. The meticulously arranged formations, flyovers, and displays underscored the image of discipline, strength, and national unity that the Chinese leadership sought to project on this significant anniversary.

The military parade unveiled an impressive spectrum of advanced weaponry, reflecting the rapid modernization of the People’s Liberation Army. According to officials, many of the systems on display were strategic assets never before seen in public. These included land, sea, and air-based long-range weapons, next-generation precision strike systems, and advanced drones designed for surveillance and combat.

The aerial portion of the event was particularly striking, featuring sleek formations of fighter jets, helicopters, and bombers over the capital’s central business district. The dramatic display of weaponry not only highlighted China’s evolving capabilities across multiple domains of warfare but also sought to reassure the domestic audience of the military’s readiness to defend the country against external threats.

The significance of the parade went beyond commemorating the end of World War II, a conflict that was especially devastating for China. It marked the most prominent military celebration since the 2019 parade that honoured the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

Analysts note that such events are deliberately orchestrated to instil confidence and pride among the Chinese populace, reinforcing the narrative that China has risen from its historical hardships to become a powerful and independent global player.

At the same time, the overwhelming display of force is raising concern among China’s regional neighbours and the United States, which view Beijing’s growing arsenal with increasing unease, particularly in the context of strategic competition and ongoing territorial disputes.

The guest list for this symbolic event reflected China’s geopolitical alignments at a time of heightened tensions with the West. While leaders from the U.S., Western Europe, Japan, India, and South Korea chose to remain absent, the parade drew participation from Beijing’s close partners and allies. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un made a rare foreign visit to attend, underlining the enduring ties between Pyongyang and Beijing.

Russian President Vladimir Putin was also in attendance, further demonstrating the deepening China-Russia partnership amid their shared opposition to Western influence. Iran’s president joined as well, alongside numerous leaders from Southeast Asia, Africa, and South Asia.

In total, about two dozen foreign dignitaries participated, signalling Beijing’s determination to showcase international goodwill among nations seeking closer relations with China. Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, though delayed by domestic unrest in his country, managed to arrive in time, underscoring the importance of the event for China’s diplomatic outlay.

True to China’s reputation for control and discipline, the parade was not a public spectacle in the traditional sense but a heavily restricted and security-intensive affair. Authorities erected barriers to keep the general public at least one block away from the route while clearing and temporarily closing commercial buildings along the parade site.

The entire event was designed for a select audience of invited guests, diplomats, and foreign leaders, with ordinary citizens limited to watching the proceedings via television or livestream. This managed approach reinforced the government’s preference for a carefully scripted presentation of national power, free from unpredictable crowds and spontaneous reactions.

In conclusion, the 80th anniversary military parade in Beijing was more than a ceremonial remembrance of World War II—it was a deliberate statement of China’s political confidence, military progress, and diplomatic orientation.

Through the controlled but grandiose display of advanced weapons, tightly disciplined troops, and selective foreign attendance, Beijing signalled both its growing strength and its commitment to shaping global perceptions of its resurgence. While designed to instil domestic pride and reassure the Chinese people of their country’s ability to defend itself, the parade also inevitably heightened concerns abroad, particularly in Washington, Tokyo, and other capitals.

Ultimately, the event underscored how China continues to use such high-profile military displays not only as commemorations of victory but as strategic tools for reinforcing its image as a rising global power in an increasingly contested international landscape.

Based On AP Report

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China's Xi, Flanked By Putin And Kim, Hosts Military Parade In Defiance of West

China staged its largest-ever military parade in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, underscoring both its expanding military capabilities and President Xi Jinping’s broader aspirations to recast China as a central pillar of a new post-U.S. world order.

The event, which commemorated the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II, was marked by extensive symbolism, global political signalling, and highly choreographed displays of power.

Xi Jinping, dressed in a Mao-style suit to invoke continuity with the legacy of the Chinese Communist Party’s revolutionary past, received a red-carpet welcome alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The optics of Xi positioned between two of Washington’s biggest adversaries were a deliberate message of unity against Western dominance.

The parade attracted over 50,000 spectators, who witnessed a 70-minute showcase of meticulously coordinated military hardware, including hypersonic missile systems, advanced armed drones, and next-generation tanks—clear indicators of China’s rapid modernisation of its People’s Liberation Army.

The spectacle followed weeks of intensive security preparations, midnight rehearsals, and sweeping citywide closures, highlighting Beijing’s determination to present flawless strength and discipline on the global stage. Xi’s keynote address, delivered from atop the iconic Gate of Heavenly Peace under the gaze of Mao Zedong’s portrait, emphasised both the historical significance of World War II and China’s role in defeating fascism alongside Soviet Russia. He tied these legacies to his vision of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” framing China as the rightful custodian of stability in the evolving international order.

A striking element was Xi’s subtle but pointed criticism of Western powers, particularly the United States. His earlier remarks at a regional security summit, calling for solidarity against “hegemonism and power politics,” reappeared in the narrative of the parade, suggesting a push toward rallying non-Western nations behind China’s alternative global framework.

This positioning comes at a time of heightened trade tensions and strategic rivalry with Washington, especially under President Donald Trump’s "America First" policies and tariff wars. Interestingly, Trump publicly downplayed the parade’s challenge to the U.S., claiming to enjoy a strong personal relationship with Xi while reiterating America’s economic advantage.

The parade also served multiple diplomatic and political purposes for Beijing. Putin leveraged the occasion to cement deeper energy deals with China, further binding the two powers amid mutual confrontations with the West.

For North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, the event was particularly historic as he became the first North Korean leader in 66 years to attend a Chinese military parade. His presence, alongside the debut of his daughter Ju Ae on the international stage, signalled both a consolidation of his regime’s international ties and the projection of dynastic continuity in Pyongyang’s leadership. Kim’s attendance can also be seen as a diplomatic coup, potentially securing implicit Chinese and Russian acknowledgment of his nuclear ambitions, still globally condemned but central to his domestic legitimacy.

Domestically, the parade was a demonstration of Xi’s grip on power as he seeks to consolidate his political authority ahead of key Party milestones. Tens of thousands of Communist Party members and volunteers were mobilised nationwide to prevent unrest, emphasising the state’s fixation on internal security during such high-profile events.

Analysts view the event as a carefully orchestrated reaffirmation of the military’s loyalty to Xi, a critical element as he continues to centralise authority in his leadership and strengthen his narrative of China’s “rejuvenation.” The visual spectacle of advanced weaponry, parading troops, and the presence of strategic global partners served as a reassurance to domestic audiences and a warning to foreign adversaries of China’s rising capabilities.

At its core, the Victory Day parade was more than a commemoration of the past—it was a geopolitical performance designed to project China’s growing influence, demonstrate its military modernisation, and challenge the American-led global order.

Flanked by Putin and Kim, Xi used historical memory, military symbolism, and diplomatic theatre to portray Beijing as the central hub of an emerging non-Western alliance, one rooted in resistance to U.S. dominance. While framed as a celebration of victory against fascism, the event unmistakably served Xi’s long-term ambition of positioning China as the leader of an alternative world order—militarily strong, ideologically unified, and geopolitically assertive.

Based On Reuters Report

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