India’s expanding defence exports are becoming a tool of statecraft rather than merely a source of revenue.
Recent BrahMos missile agreements highlight how New Delhi is using military exports to strengthen long-term strategic relationships and extend its influence across key regions.
The BrahMos Aerospace agreement signed with Indonesia during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s July 2026 visit marked the third export success for the supersonic cruise missile after earlier sales to the Philippines and Vietnam. All three nations border or operate in the wider South China Sea region and face maritime disputes with China.
A BrahMos deployment in the Philippines, Vietnam or Indonesia gives these countries a credible deterrent capability while creating enduring links with India through training, maintenance, logistics and operational planning. The missile’s combat use during the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025 has further enhanced its attractiveness in international markets.
The significance of these deals extends beyond a single weapons platform. India is steadily building a broader portfolio of defence exports that reflects a wider strategic vision and growing geopolitical ambition.
India’s defence exports reached ₹38,424 crore in 2025-26, representing growth of nearly 63 per cent in a single year. The figure stood below ₹700 crore in 2013-14. Indian defence equipment is now supplied to more than 80 countries, while the government has set a target of ₹50,000 crore in annual exports by 2028-29.
The nature of exports is also changing. Armenia has emerged as a major customer, acquiring Akash surface-to-air missile systems, Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, Swathi weapon-locating radars and ATAGS artillery guns. Media estimates place these purchases at nearly ₹16,600 crore, although no official figure has been confirmed.
India is also preparing to export the Astra air-to-air missile, potentially marking the first overseas sale of that system. Alongside this, Dornier aircraft, patrol vessels and Advanced Light Helicopters have been supplied to several Indian Ocean nations.
These exports indicate a transition from selling individual items and spare parts to exporting integrated military systems. Such systems create long-term dependence through maintenance requirements, upgrades, training and operational integration.
In Southeast Asia, BrahMos exports represent India’s response to China’s expanding regional presence. Rather than establishing military bases, India is helping regional states strengthen their own deterrence capabilities, placing Indian-origin military capacity along China’s maritime periphery.
In the Caucasus, defence sales to Armenia provide India with strategic influence in a region where Turkey and Pakistan support Azerbaijan. These agreements also strengthen India’s position along routes linked to Iran and the International North-South Transport Corridor.
Across the Indian Ocean, defence cooperation with countries including Mauritius, Seychelles and the Maldives reinforces India’s role as the principal security partner for many smaller regional states, consistent with the SAGAR vision announced in 2015.
Exports also strengthen India’s domestic defence industry. Larger production runs reduce costs for India’s armed forces, support indigenous manufacturing and lessen vulnerability to external pressure from foreign suppliers.
Challenges remain. BrahMos is a joint India-Russia venture, requiring Russian approval for exports, which can affect delivery timelines and strategic flexibility. The Indonesian agreement itself required Russian clearance before proceeding.
Many customers are small or middle-income nations that often require favourable financing arrangements, phased payments or technology-transfer provisions. At the same time, Indian manufacturers face growing competition from suppliers in South Korea, Turkey and Europe, while maintaining delivery schedules and reliability will be critical.
Although India’s annual defence exports remain modest compared with those of the United States, Russia, France and China, the broader trajectory is clear.
The selection of customers reflects New Delhi’s strategic priorities: strengthening the capabilities of China’s neighbours, countering rival partnerships involving Turkey and Pakistan, and consolidating influence across the Indian Ocean.
Rather than relying on formal alliances or overseas military bases, India is increasingly using defence exports to build durable partnerships, enhance interoperability and deepen regional influence.
In this model, strategic autonomy is expressed not only through diplomacy but through supply chains, industrial capacity and long-term security relationships.
A rising power signals its arrival not merely through what it acquires, but through the partners it chooses to equip, and India is increasingly making those choices with clear strategic intent.
Agencies
