IAF Backs Theatre Reform But Rejects Permanent Split of Fighter Assets Across Commands

In his most detailed remarks so far on India's proposed military theatre command restructuring, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh has made it clear that the Indian Air Force (IAF) does not support the permanent geographical division of its fighter aircraft assets, while reiterating the service's commitment to greater jointness and integration with the Army and Navy.

Speaking in an interview, the Chief of Air Staff stressed that theatre commands must be designed around India's unique security challenges rather than being modelled on structures adopted by other countries.

He argued that recent conflicts around the world have once again demonstrated the decisive influence of air power on military outcomes, making the organisation and employment of air assets a critical consideration in any future military structure.

According to Air Chief Marshal Singh, the central issue is not whether the armed forces should be integrated, but how air power can be utilised to maximum effect within an integrated framework.

He said the IAF fully supports the broader objective of jointness but does not see theatre commands as a mechanism for permanently allocating fighter assets to specific geographical areas.

"Recent conflicts around the world have once again underlined how decisively air power can shape military outcomes. That is precisely why the question of how air power is organised matters so much," he said.

Highlighting the distinctive characteristics of air power, the Air Chief Marshal noted that its speed, reach, flexibility and capacity to rapidly concentrate combat strength at a chosen point provide a significant operational advantage.

He explained that modern combat aircraft are not limited to the regions from which they operate. With capabilities such as aerial refuelling, long-range precision weapons, networked sensor systems and flexible basing arrangements, air assets can be deployed over considerable distances and shifted quickly between theatres as operational requirements change.

"The guiding principle should, therefore, be centralised control where necessary, and decentralised execution where appropriate. That way, air power can be concentrated where it is needed most, while commanders retain the agility to act swiftly on the ground," he said.

The Air Chief Marshal pointed to Operation Sindoor as an example of how such an approach can work effectively in practice. He said the operation was conducted under a joint architecture established by the Chief of Defence Staff and the three service chiefs, allowing critical resources to be allocated and reallocated centrally in response to operational requirements.

According to him, this centralised management of key assets, supported by a common tri-service air picture, enabled dynamic decision-making and played a decisive role in achieving operational objectives.

"Our own experience bears this out. During Operation Sindoor, under a joint architecture established by the Chief of Defence Staff and the three service chiefs, the centralised allocation and timely reallocation of critical resources proved decisive in the outcome," he said.

India's theatre command initiative was announced in 2019 and represents the country's most far-reaching military reform effort since Independence.

The objective is to integrate the capabilities of the Army, Navy and Air Force under unified command structures to improve operational coordination, efficiency and combat effectiveness during both war and peacetime contingencies.

Under the proposed framework, a Northern Theatre Command headquartered in Lucknow would focus on challenges along the China frontier, while a Western Theatre Command based in Jaipur would deal primarily with Pakistan-related contingencies.

A separate Maritime Theatre Command in Thiruvananthapuram would oversee maritime security and naval operations across India's areas of interest. Despite broad agreement on the need for enhanced integration among the services, progress on implementing the reform has been slower than anticipated because of differing perspectives regarding command structures, force allocation and operational control.

The IAF has consistently urged caution, arguing that any reorganisation must preserve the flexibility that is central to the effective employment of air power. Air Chief Marshal Singh also warned against assuming that future warfare can be predicted with certainty.

He observed that coming conflicts are likely to be faster-paced, increasingly autonomous, heavily dependent on networks, more transparent in some respects yet more deceptive in others, while simultaneously combining precision effects with the requirement for scale and mass.

"As we design future structures, we must also avoid the trap of trying to predict the future battlefield with excessive certainty," he said.

"What we can anticipate is that the next conflict will likely be: faster, more autonomous, yet more network-dependent, more transparent, yet more deceptive and more precise in some respects, and characterised by mass in others."

The Air Chief stressed that future force structures must be adaptable enough to absorb these shifts and remain effective in a rapidly evolving operational environment. He said any theatre command model adopted by India should be assessed solely against the country's own strategic, geographical, technological and operational realities.

"Our structures must be able to absorb that shift. They should be evaluated against India's specific security requirements, not built by replicating models from other countries, because each nation operates within its own strategic, geographical, technological and operational environment," he observed.

The Air Chief further emphasised that such a large-scale military transformation should be implemented gradually and in carefully managed phases to ensure that combat readiness is not adversely affected during the transition.

"A transformation of this scale should also be implemented in phases, so that operational readiness is never compromised," he said.

Reaffirming the IAF's support for the overall reform effort, Air Chief Marshal Singh said the service remains a committed partner in building a more integrated and capable military structure. He stated that future conflicts will inevitably be multi-domain in nature, requiring significantly closer planning and operational coordination among the three armed services than ever before.

"We will work hand in hand with our sister Services to build structures that are distinctly Indian, that preserve the inherent flexibility of air power, and that ensure India fights its future wars as one," he said.

At present, the Army, Navy and the Air Force operate through separate command structures. The proposed theatre command model seeks to bring elements of all three services under unified commanders responsible for specific geographic regions, enabling integrated planning, resource utilisation and warfighting across land, air, maritime, cyber and space domains.

The debate surrounding theatre commands has increasingly centred on balancing the benefits of integrated operations with the need to preserve the unique strengths of each service. The IAF's latest position signals support for reform while underscoring that the mobility and flexibility of air power must remain central to the final design of India's future military command architecture.

PTI

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Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh Granted One-Year Extension Until October 2027

The Union Government has approved a one-year extension in service for Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh, ensuring his continuation as the administrative head of the Department of Defence until 31 October 2027, or until further orders.

The decision, cleared by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC), extends the tenure of the 1989-batch Indian Administrative Service officer of the Kerala cadre beyond his previously scheduled retirement date of 31 October 2026.

The extension was formalised through an order issued by the Department of Personnel and Training on 24 October. It was granted through relaxation of the provisions contained in Fundamental Rule 56(d) and Rule 16(1A) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958, thereby allowing Singh to remain in office for an additional year.

Singh occupies a uniquely influential position within India's national security architecture. Alongside his responsibilities as Defence Secretary, he also serves as Secretary of the Department of Defence Research and Development and Chairman of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

Holding all three roles simultaneously places him at the centre of defence policymaking, military capability development, indigenous technology programs and long-term modernisation initiatives.

The government's decision provides continuity at a time when India is pursuing some of its most significant defence reforms in decades. These efforts encompass military modernisation, indigenous manufacturing, defence procurement reforms and the integration of advanced technologies across the armed forces.

Maintaining stable leadership at the highest bureaucratic level is expected to support the implementation of long-term projects that often require extensive coordination between multiple ministries, services and industrial partners.

As Defence Secretary, Singh oversees a broad range of policy, administrative and coordination functions within the Ministry of Defence. His continued tenure comes as the government intensifies its push towards self-reliance in defence production, promotes greater private-sector participation in military manufacturing and seeks to streamline acquisition processes while enhancing operational preparedness.

The extension also coincides with India's ongoing efforts to expand domestic defence production capabilities and reduce reliance on imported military equipment. Policymakers have increasingly focused on building a robust defence industrial ecosystem, strengthening indigenous research and development, encouraging collaboration between public and private enterprises and enhancing the competitiveness of Indian firms in global markets.

Defence exports have become a major component of India's strategic and industrial agenda in recent years. Expanding overseas sales of Indian-made systems requires close coordination between government agencies, manufacturers, diplomatic missions and partner nations. Continuity in leadership is likely to support these ongoing efforts as the country seeks to establish itself as a significant supplier in the global defence market.

A major reason for the importance of Singh's extension is the long gestation period associated with defence acquisitions. Large procurement projects typically involve complex negotiations, multiple layers of financial scrutiny, inter-ministerial consultation and extended implementation schedules. His continued presence is expected to provide consistency in decision-making and oversight during critical stages of several major acquisition programs.

His responsibilities within the defence research establishment add another important dimension to his role. Under DRDO's leadership, India continues to develop indigenous technologies across a range of strategic sectors, including missile systems, radar technologies, aerospace platforms, electronic warfare equipment, advanced materials and other critical military capabilities.

The combination of administrative authority and technological oversight allows for closer alignment between procurement requirements and research objectives.

India's defence sector is simultaneously adapting to a rapidly evolving technological environment shaped by artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, cyber capabilities, advanced manufacturing techniques and space-based military technologies.

Integrating these capabilities into operational planning and acquisition frameworks requires sustained cooperation between the armed forces, research institutions, state-owned enterprises and private industry. Singh's dual administrative and scientific oversight roles are viewed as advantageous in supporting such coordination.

The armed forces are also advancing extensive modernisation plans covering combat aircraft, submarines, naval platforms, armoured vehicles, missile systems, electronic warfare capabilities and a range of emerging technologies. The Defence Secretary's office plays a pivotal role in coordinating policy decisions and facilitating administrative processes related to these initiatives.

As a result, Singh's extended tenure will coincide with a particularly significant phase in the implementation of defence acquisition decisions and industrial policy measures. Nevertheless, the success of these programs will continue to depend upon timely approvals, effective execution, technological maturity and sustained coordination among the various institutions involved.

Beyond his official responsibilities, Singh has been actively engaged in discussions concerning the future direction of India's defence sector. He was a keynote speaker at the Bharat Defence Conclave 2026 in New Delhi on 24 September, where senior military leaders, policymakers and industry representatives examined issues ranging from indigenous manufacturing and military modernisation to emerging technologies and future capability requirements.

The government's move underscores its desire to maintain continuity in defence administration while balancing the immediate operational needs of the armed forces with the broader objective of building a technologically advanced, self-reliant and internationally competitive defence industrial base.

With responsibilities spanning defence administration, procurement oversight, research and development, and technological innovation, Singh will continue to play a central role in shaping India's defence priorities through October 2027.

Agencies

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India's Nuclear Triad: The Quiet Strategic Achievement That Places India Among the World's Most Powerful Nuclear States

A little-known but highly significant reality about India's strategic capabilities should command the attention of every citizen.

India possesses the ability to launch a nuclear weapon from land, from the air, and from beneath the sea. This capability is known as a nuclear triad, one of the most sophisticated and strategically significant military achievements any nation can attain. According to available information, only a very small group of countries have successfully established a fully operational nuclear triad, placing India among an exclusive circle of major powers.

The concept sounds straightforward in theory.

In practice, it represents decades of scientific innovation, strategic planning, technological development, and national investment. A nuclear triad consists of three separate delivery systems for nuclear weapons.

The first component is land-based missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads over considerable distances. The second component is aircraft that can deliver nuclear weapons from the air. The third and most challenging component is a sea-based platform, typically a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine capable of launching nuclear-armed missiles while remaining hidden beneath the ocean's surface. The sea-based element is widely regarded as the most difficult part of the triad to develop.

Building a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine requires mastery of advanced nuclear engineering, submarine construction, stealth technologies, underwater communications, missile integration, and long-duration undersea operations.

Only a handful of nations have managed to overcome these technological hurdles.

India joined that select group through the development of INS Arihant, the country's first indigenously designed and built nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.

INS Arihant represents far more than a military platform. It symbolises India's ability to develop some of the world's most complex strategic technologies at home. The submarine emerged from years of indigenous research and development under the Advanced Technology Vessel program, involving close cooperation between the Indian Navy, Indian scientific institutions, and the country's strategic research establishments.

The successful deployment of INS Arihant completed the sea-based leg of India's nuclear deterrent. This achievement transformed India's nuclear posture. It ensured that the nation could maintain a credible retaliatory capability even in the most extreme circumstances.

The significance of a nuclear triad is often misunderstood. Its primary purpose is not to facilitate aggression. Nor is it designed to make war more likely. On the contrary, the entire logic behind a nuclear triad is rooted in deterrence.

A country that can retaliate decisively after suffering an attack becomes extremely difficult to coerce or intimidate. The sea-based component is particularly important because of its survivability. A nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine can remain hidden underwater for extended periods.

Its location is extremely difficult for an adversary to determine.

As a result, even if an opponent were somehow able to strike land-based targets and air bases, a concealed submarine could still respond. This principle is known as second-strike capability.

Second-strike capability lies at the heart of modern nuclear deterrence.

Potential adversaries understand that a successful first strike would not eliminate a nation's ability to retaliate. Consequently, the incentive to launch such an attack is greatly reduced. The result is strategic stability. This is why nuclear-armed submarines are often considered the most survivable and credible element of a nuclear deterrent.

India's nuclear doctrine places considerable emphasis on responsible deterrence. The country's strategic framework has long been associated with maintaining a credible minimum deterrent while supporting a No First Use policy. Within such a framework, a survivable sea-based capability assumes even greater importance because it guarantees the ability to respond if attacked.

The completion of India's nuclear triad therefore marked a historic milestone.

It demonstrated that India could not only develop nuclear weapons but also establish multiple independent systems capable of delivering them under a variety of circumstances. More importantly, it demonstrated technological self-reliance in one of the most demanding areas of modern defence engineering. The original observation remains as relevant today as ever:

"India can launch a nuclear weapon from land, from the air, AND from under the sea."

That capability places India in an exceptionally exclusive strategic category. The achievement extends beyond military power.

It reflects decades of national effort in science, engineering, shipbuilding, nuclear technology, and strategic planning. Most importantly, it provides the assurance that no adversary can realistically expect to eliminate India's nuclear deterrent through a single surprise attack.

As the original statement notes, "A triad isn't about attacking. It's about guaranteeing that no one can ever wipe you out in one blow — and therefore, no one tries."

That principle remains the foundation of nuclear deterrence throughout the modern world. India did not purchase this strategic shield from another country. It developed it through indigenous capability, long-term investment, and sustained technological advancement.

The result is a strategic asset that strengthens national security, reinforces deterrence, and places India among a very small group of nations capable of maintaining a complete and operational nuclear triad.

A nuclear triad is not designed for aggression. Its purpose is to ensure that no adversary can destroy a nation’s retaliatory capability in a single strike—thereby removing any incentive to attempt one.

India did not buy that security. It built it.

Agencies

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Air-Launched AD-1 Interceptor Could Give India's Heavy Fighters A Strategic Missile Defence Role

A concept under discussion in defence circles proposes an unconventional evolution of India's ballistic missile defence architecture, with the AD-1 interceptor being adapted for carriage and launch from combat aircraft rather than relying exclusively on conventional ground-based launch platforms.

Such an approach would fundamentally alter how ballistic missile interception missions are conducted, potentially allowing interceptors to be positioned far closer to anticipated threat corridors before launch.

The idea is especially intriguing because it aligns with the unique strengths of heavy fighter aircraft such as the Indian Air Force's Su-30MKI, which already serves as one of the largest and most capable weapon-carrying platforms in Indian military service.

The Su-30MKI has previously demonstrated its ability to integrate and employ exceptionally large and heavy weapons. Its successful adaptation for the air-launched BrahMos missile highlighted the aircraft's substantial payload capacity and structural reserves.

Applying a similar philosophy to a missile defence mission could transform the aircraft into something far more significant than a conventional air superiority platform.

At the centre of this concept lies the AD-1 interceptor, one of the most important elements being developed under India's Ballistic Missile Defence Phase-II architecture. Developed by DRDO, the AD-1 is designed to engage a wide spectrum of ballistic missile threats across atmospheric and near-space environments.

The missile employs a two-stage solid-fuel propulsion system and combines advanced navigation, guidance and control technologies intended to deliver high-speed interception capability against complex threats.

Successful tests have demonstrated the interceptor's growing maturity and its potential role within India's future multi-layered missile defence shield.

The AD-1 is expected to complement the more advanced AD-2 interceptor, with both systems forming key components of a layered architecture capable of dealing with increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile threats.

A fighter-launched interceptor could theoretically provide several operational advantages.

The carrying aircraft would already be travelling at considerable speed and altitude before missile release, allowing the interceptor to conserve energy during its initial flight profile. This could increase engagement possibilities while reducing the time needed to reach an incoming target.

The concept becomes particularly relevant when considering engagements against ballistic missiles during the earliest stages of flight. Intercepting a ballistic missile before it completes powered flight has long been regarded as one of the most desirable yet technically demanding forms of missile defence.

A missile remains relatively vulnerable during this brief period because it is highly visible, follows a predictable flight path and has not yet released any payloads or penetration aids. However, the engagement window is extremely short.

Successfully conducting such an interception requires extraordinarily rapid detection, tracking, decision-making and missile launch processes. For decades, these challenges have limited the practical implementation of boost-phase interception concepts.

Advances in sensor technologies are gradually changing this equation.

Modern airborne early warning aircraft, long-range surveillance assets, networked radars and emerging space-based tracking systems are significantly improving the ability to detect and monitor missile launches in real time.

When combined into an integrated network, such systems could provide the targeting information necessary to support extremely time-sensitive interception missions. This broader trend reflects a growing emphasis on network-centric warfare, where sensors and shooters are connected across multiple domains.

Within such an environment, a fighter aircraft carrying an interceptor missile would effectively become another node in a highly integrated defensive ecosystem. The concept also raises important questions about the future force structure of the Indian Air Force. If heavy fighters are increasingly expected to carry strategic weapons rather than merely perform traditional fighter missions, their long-term value could increase substantially.

This is particularly relevant because a portion of India's future combat aircraft fleet is expected to consist of lighter and more specialised platforms that cannot match the payload capacity of the Su-30MKI.

The aircraft's large airframe, powerful engines, extensive range and ability to carry oversized payloads provide unique capabilities that remain difficult to replicate with smaller fighters. Recognising these advantages, India has already committed to extensive upgrade plans for the Su-30MKI fleet. These modernisation efforts are expected to enhance sensors, avionics, electronic warfare systems and weapons integration, ensuring the aircraft remains operationally relevant for decades.

An air-launched missile defence role would represent another potential mission area capable of extending the platform's strategic importance. The discussion also inevitably invites comparisons with other heavy fighter designs. Aircraft possessing substantial payload margins and internal volume are naturally better suited for specialised missions involving very large weapons.

Even aircraft originally optimised for stealth operations could theoretically undertake such roles when low observability is not the primary requirement. Heavy fighters offer endurance, electrical power generation capacity, payload flexibility and growth potential that are difficult for smaller platforms to match.

As India continues developing increasingly sophisticated indigenous missile systems, demand for aircraft capable of carrying and launching large weapons is likely to grow. Hypersonic missiles, long-range strike weapons, anti-ship systems, anti-satellite weapons and advanced missile defence interceptors all tend to favour platforms with significant payload reserves.

This reality strengthens the argument that heavy combat aircraft may remain strategically indispensable even as air forces worldwide pursue next-generation technologies. Although there is no indication that an operational air-launched AD-1 program currently exists, the concept highlights how future air and missile defence strategies may evolve.

Rather than viewing interceptor missiles, combat aircraft, surveillance systems and command networks as separate capabilities, future doctrines increasingly seek to integrate them into a single coordinated architecture.

Such thinking points towards a future in which heavy fighters serve not only as combat aircraft but also as airborne carriers for some of a nation's most critical strategic weapons.

If that evolution occurs, questions regarding fleet size, force availability and long-term replacement plans could become just as important as the development of the advanced weapons these aircraft are expected to carry.

Note: Though radical, this proposal is technically feasible for India. A collaborative effort between DRDO and private strategic partners could make it a success. We welcome readers’ feedback and suggestions.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)

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France’s Software Red Line Shapes India’s Pursuit of Weapons Sovereignty

The debate surrounding India’s access to Rafale fighter aircraft software has evolved into a much broader discussion about long-term military autonomy, operational flexibility and control over future weapons integration.

At the centre of the issue is not the aircraft’s physical structure or airframe design, but the software that governs some of the Rafale’s most sensitive combat functions.

These include radar processing, mission-data management, sensor fusion, weapons-control functions and electronic warfare logic, all of which collectively determine how the fighter detects, tracks, prioritises and engages threats.

The dispute has therefore become far more significant than a conventional technology-transfer negotiation. It touches directly on the question of whether India can independently evolve and adapt one of its most important combat aircraft fleets over the coming decades. France regards the software underpinning these critical systems as both protected intellectual property and a matter of national security.

Complicating the issue further is the fact that some of the most sensitive software elements are owned not by Dassault Aviation, the Rafale manufacturer, but by French electronics giant Thales.

As a result, Dassault itself does not possess unilateral authority to provide unrestricted access to every component of the combat architecture embedded within the aircraft. This distinction is important because public discussions often portray the issue as a simple decision by the aircraft manufacturer.

In reality, the software ecosystem behind Rafale involves multiple stakeholders, strict export controls and long-standing French policies designed to protect strategic technologies.

According to the available material, no export customer operating the Rafale has been granted unrestricted access to the fighter’s core source code. This means India’s request is not being treated differently from that of other international customers.

Instead, the position reflects a broader and consistent French export policy regarding access to software that controls key combat systems.

The disagreement is therefore less about India specifically and more about the limits France has historically placed on the transfer of its most sensitive military technologies. For Indian planners, however, the issue carries significant implications.

Modern combat aircraft increasingly derive their effectiveness from software rather than hardware. The ability to modify mission systems, integrate indigenous weapons and rapidly adapt operational capabilities can be as important as the aircraft’s aerodynamic performance.

To address these competing interests, discussions have focused on the potential use of Interface Control Documents, commonly known as ICDs.

An Interface Control Document defines how external systems interact with the aircraft.

It specifies communication protocols, data structures, signal pathways and integration requirements without revealing the protected code that operates the aircraft’s internal combat functions. Under such an arrangement, engineers can connect indigenous weapons or sensors through approved interfaces while the radar, mission computer and electronic warfare suite remain protected.

This approach provides a technical pathway for integration work without opening access to the underlying software architecture. Industry observers have often described this as a practical compromise between sovereignty and technology protection.

However, the ultimate value of such an arrangement depends on precisely what level of access India receives.

A second possibility involves providing application-level interfaces or software-development access. Such tools could offer Indian engineers a controlled integration environment through which indigenous systems can be connected to the aircraft.

Yet the crucial question remains unresolved.

Would this level of access allow India to independently certify and qualify future weapons, or would every significant modification still require Dassault’s approval and involvement? The answer determines whether India gains genuine operational autonomy or merely receives better integration information while remaining dependent on the original manufacturer. This distinction lies at the heart of the ongoing negotiations.

The issue has gained additional visibility because of India’s broader push towards defence self-reliance. Over the past decade, New Delhi has increasingly sought greater control over military platforms, indigenous weapons integration and domestic industrial participation. That policy direction has made software access and integration rights increasingly important in major procurement programmes.

French officials have nevertheless indicated a degree of flexibility regarding the integration of Indian-developed weapons. Recent discussions have suggested a willingness to accommodate indigenous armaments within the Rafale ecosystem rather than insisting exclusively on French-origin munitions.

Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh has publicly stated that Dassault agreed to integrate Indian weapons on the contracted Rafale Marine aircraft acquired for the Indian Navy. That commitment has been widely viewed as a positive development in the broader relationship between the two countries.

However, agreement on weapons integration does not automatically resolve the deeper question of software sovereignty. The unresolved issue concerns the extent of interface access, certification authority and future modification rights. These factors will determine whether India retains meaningful long-term control over the aircraft’s evolution.

An additional layer of sensitivity surrounds the proposed integration of the BrahMos-NG missile. Unlike many indigenous weapons, BrahMos is an Indo-Russian programme, introducing strategic considerations beyond the standard integration process.

Reports have indicated that French concerns are linked to the possibility that sensitive avionics interfaces could become accessible to engineers associated with that partnership.

Such concerns focus on technology protection rather than the missile itself.

Importantly, the available information does not establish the existence of any confirmed French prohibition on BrahMos-NG integration. Rather, it highlights concerns regarding access management and protection of sensitive systems. The distinction is significant because it suggests that negotiations remain focused on controlling exposure to critical software and interfaces rather than blocking integration outright.

A broader assessment suggests that a workable middle path may be achievable. Such a compromise would likely involve providing sufficiently detailed interfaces and integration tools to support Indian requirements while preserving French control over the most sensitive software elements.

From the French perspective, this would safeguard key intellectual property and national-security interests. From the Indian perspective, the arrangement would need to support meaningful operational independence and future weapons integration.

Whether those objectives can coexist depends on the specific rights embedded in any final agreement. The real measure of success will therefore be found not in public announcements but in the engineering authorities granted to Indian organisations.

Certification responsibilities will be equally important.

Future upgrade rights, software modification permissions and independent qualification procedures may ultimately prove more valuable than access to source code itself. Until those details become clear, the practical significance of any compromise remains difficult to assess.

The debate has also attracted commentary from foreign military figures. Retired United States Air Force Lieutenant General David Deptula has argued that limitations in software access may have contributed to slower adaptation during Operation Sindoor. However, that argument remains disputed. No independent evidence has established a direct causal relationship between restricted software access and any reported combat loss or operational outcome.

Consequently, such claims remain part of an ongoing debate rather than a confirmed conclusion. The controversy has frequently become intertwined with broader discussions concerning India-Pakistan military encounters and reported Rafale combat performance. Pakistan has advanced claims regarding Rafale shoot-downs.

India has rejected those claims.

Separate allegations involving fabricated videos and misinformation have also circulated. These issues must be considered independently from the source-code dispute. The contractual disagreement over software access does not, by itself, prove or disprove claims regarding contested combat incidents. Likewise, later support contracts or discussions concerning maintenance and upgrades cannot be used as stand-alone evidence to determine the outcome of every reported engagement.

Ultimately, the Rafale software-access debate is a reflection of a larger global trend. As modern combat aircraft become increasingly software-defined, military sovereignty is no longer determined solely by who builds the airframe. It is increasingly determined by who controls the code, certifies the upgrades, authorises the integrations and governs the evolution of the platform throughout its service life.

For India, the negotiations therefore extend beyond a fighter aircraft purchase. They represent a test of how far a major defence importer can push for technological autonomy while working within the export-control boundaries imposed by advanced military suppliers. France, meanwhile, faces the challenge of balancing a strategic partnership with India against long-established policies protecting the technologies that give the Rafale its combat edge.

The eventual outcome may help define the future framework for defence cooperation between the two countries and establish a precedent for how software sovereignty is negotiated in the next generation of military acquisition programs.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)

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IAF Deepens Private Defence Industry Partnership On Unmanned And Autonomous Systems Roadmap

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has intensified its engagement with industry stakeholders, MSMEs, Start-Ups and technology partners through an Industry Outreach Program held at Vigyan Bhawan in New Delhi, aimed at advancing India's indigenous unmanned and autonomous systems capabilities.

The event was chaired by Air Marshal Premkumar K, VM, VSM, Director General (Weapon Systems) at Air Headquarters. Around 100 representatives from drone manufacturers and associated industry partners attended, highlighting the expanding collaboration between the IAF and India's rapidly developing unmanned aviation sector.

The outreach initiative provided the IAF with a formal platform to communicate its long-term operational requirements and technological priorities. It also built upon the 'IAF Unmanned and Autonomous Systems Roadmap' unveiled during IAF Dronathon 2026 at Pokhran on 14 September 2026.

As part of the engagement, the IAF distributed its 'IAF Roadmap booklet' to participating industry partners. The document is intended to provide greater clarity on the Air Force's future operational needs and support industry efforts to align research, development and manufacturing activities with anticipated military requirements.

The roadmap outlines a vision centred on a layered and networked family of unmanned systems designed to operate alongside both existing and future manned air platforms. The focus is on developing operationally relevant, reliable and resilient indigenous technologies capable of enhancing the IAF's combat effectiveness across a broad spectrum of missions.

It was emphasised during the event that "Atmanirbharta in unmanned systems is an operational necessity, not merely an aspiration." The IAF highlighted several critical technology areas requiring focused development, including indigenous propulsion systems, autonomous software, resilient navigation solutions and standardised interfaces.

Strengthening these capabilities is considered essential for reducing dependence on overseas suppliers and reinforcing India's domestic defence industrial base.

The outreach effort reflects the increasing importance of unmanned and autonomous technologies in modern warfare, where drones, autonomous platforms, artificial intelligence-enabled systems and network-centric operations are becoming integral to air power. By sharing its future requirements early with industry, the IAF aims to accelerate innovation cycles and encourage the development of solutions tailored to operational needs.

Through sustained collaboration with industry, MSMEs, Start-Ups and academia, the IAF intends to promote joint development initiatives, speed up the transition of emerging technologies into operational service and cultivate a robust domestic ecosystem capable of supporting India's broader Atmanirbharta objectives in defence technology.

The initiative underlines the Air Force's commitment to leveraging indigenous innovation to meet future security challenges while strengthening national technological self-reliance.

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Pakistan Signals Nuclear Review As India's Missile And Submarine Capabilities Expand

Pakistan has indicated that it may reconsider aspects of its nuclear deployment posture in response to what it views as India's increasingly sophisticated nuclear and strategic capabilities.

The warning was issued by retired Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, an adviser to Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA), who stated that Islamabad would not accept any strategic imbalance in South Asia.

Speaking at the second Islamabad Non-Proliferation Conference, Kidwai said Pakistan could review its deployment options while continuing to maintain its longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity regarding certain elements of its nuclear deterrent.

His remarks come against the backdrop of lingering tensions between India and Pakistan following their military confrontation in May 2025, an episode that underscored the volatility of the regional security environment.

Islamabad's latest concerns are closely linked to India's ongoing military modernisation efforts, particularly in the nuclear domain, where New Delhi has continued to strengthen its land, sea and air-based deterrent capabilities.

Kidwai, along with retired Lieutenant General Sarfraz Sattar, both former heads of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, highlighted reports suggesting that India has begun deploying nuclear warheads aboard a ballistic missile submarine as part of deterrence patrol operations.

The Pakistani officials referred to findings and assessments associated with the SIPRI Yearbook 2026, which indicated that India may have deployed around 12 nuclear warheads aboard a submarine, a development that they argued represents a significant evolution in India's nuclear posture.

According to Kidwai, such a deployment would suggest that India has moved towards mating nuclear warheads with submarine-launched ballistic missiles, potentially increasing the readiness of its sea-based nuclear deterrent.

He further argued that this development could raise questions about the long-term credibility and interpretation of India's declared No-First-Use nuclear doctrine.

Sattar echoed similar concerns and pointed to a broader set of Indian strategic capabilities, including missile canisterisation, Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology and ballistic missile defence systems.

In Pakistan's assessment, these advances may indicate a gradual shift towards a more flexible and potentially first-use-capable nuclear posture, although such conclusions remain subject to debate among strategic analysts.

Geopolitical experts note that Pakistan's interpretation reflects its own threat perceptions and strategic calculations rather than definitive evidence of a change in Indian nuclear doctrine.

They argue that the development of more advanced delivery systems and survivable deterrent platforms does not automatically imply an intention to launch a first strike.

Many strategic analysts view India's naval nuclear capability as part of its effort to establish a credible second-strike deterrent, a cornerstone of nuclear stability that is designed to ensure retaliation capability even after absorbing an adversary's initial attack.

Pakistan's concerns have also been shaped by lessons drawn from the May 2025 conflict, which Sattar described as considerably more lethal and technologically sophisticated than the February 2019 confrontation between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.

He pointed to the employment of drones, BrahMos missiles, cyber operations and electronic warfare systems as evidence of the rapidly evolving character of military competition in South Asia.

According to Sattar, the growing integration of advanced technologies into conventional warfare increases the risk that future crises could escalate more rapidly than in the past.

He warned that the absence of a formal bilateral arms control framework between India and Pakistan further heightens the danger of misunderstanding, miscalculation and unintended escalation during periods of tension.

The Pakistani officials also expressed concern over India's Cold Start doctrine, which has long been associated with the rapid mobilisation of conventional forces for limited military operations below the nuclear threshold.

In addition, they highlighted India's pursuit of short-range missile systems, hypersonic weapons and other emerging technologies as developments requiring close attention from Islamabad.

Kidwai maintained that Pakistan reserves the right to adopt whatever measures it considers necessary to safeguard national security and preserve what it regards as a stable strategic balance in the region.

He urged Indian policymakers to take into account Pakistan's Full Spectrum Deterrence policy, which is designed to address a wide range of perceived threats across both conventional and nuclear dimensions.

Independent experts observing the debate noted that Pakistan's latest warning leaves unanswered questions regarding the precise nature of any deployment changes that Islamabad may be considering.

They also cautioned that while Pakistan presents its position as a reaction to India's expanding military capabilities, any additional nuclear deployments could intensify an already competitive strategic environment.

Such moves, analysts argue, risk accelerating the regional arms competition at a time when both countries are investing heavily in missile technology, advanced command-and-control systems, cyber capabilities and survivable nuclear forces.

The broader concern among strategic observers is that sustained military modernisation on both sides, coupled with the absence of robust confidence-building and arms control mechanisms, could make future crises more difficult to manage and potentially more dangerous than previous confrontations.

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Indian Army Set For New Land Warfare Doctrine As Military Leadership Charts Future Combat Strategy

The Indian Army is set to adopt a new Land Warfare Doctrine aimed at reshaping its operational outlook and combat preparedness in response to the rapidly evolving character of modern warfare.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh will formally release the doctrine on Friday, the concluding day of the Army Commanders' Conference, the Army’s highest-level biannual decision-making forum currently underway in New Delhi.

The three-day conference, chaired by Army Chief General Dhiraj Seth, began on Wednesday and has brought together the senior-most leadership of the Indian Army to review the security environment, assess operational preparedness and examine future capability requirements.

According to the Ministry of Defence, the new doctrine will serve as an overarching strategic and operational framework designed to prepare the force for emerging military challenges and future conflicts.

The doctrine is expected to reflect the rapidly changing nature of warfare, where technology, unmanned systems, precision weapons, artificial intelligence, electronic warfare and network-centric operations are increasingly shaping battlefield outcomes.

Its release comes against the backdrop of lessons drawn from recent conflicts and military operations, including Operation Sindoor last year, during which drones and other advanced technologies played a significant role in military operations.

The Indian Army is seeking to adapt to a battlespace that is becoming more transparent, more connected and increasingly influenced by real-time surveillance, cyber capabilities and autonomous systems.

Military planners view the doctrine as a key step in ensuring that the Army remains capable of operating effectively across conventional and emerging domains of warfare while maintaining readiness for future security contingencies.

Beyond the unveiling of the doctrine, the conference agenda includes discussions on a broad range of strategic and operational issues facing the armed forces.

Senior military leaders are deliberating on cross-domain security challenges, force modernisation priorities, operational readiness, technological adaptation and long-term transformation initiatives. A major focus of the deliberations is enhancing inter-service integration and strengthening synergy among the Army, Navy and Air Force as India moves towards a more integrated military structure.

The conference will also examine digital transformation within the defence establishment, reflecting the growing importance of secure communications, data-driven decision-making and technological innovation in military operations.

The event features addresses and panel discussions involving some of the country's leading national security figures, including senior defence officials, the Chief of the Naval Staff and representatives from the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology.

These interactions are expected to contribute to the Army’s efforts to integrate emerging technologies into operational planning and future force development.

The conference is intended to help formulate policy directions and identify priority areas that will guide the Army’s modernisation and transformation efforts in the coming years. Army leaders are working towards building a technologically enabled, agile and future-ready force capable of responding effectively to increasingly complex security challenges across multiple domains.

On the final day of the conference, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh will also unveil the annual United Nations Journal.

In addition, he will honour Indian Army personnel who have displayed exceptional professionalism, dedication and service while participating in United Nations peacekeeping missions around the world. The recognition highlights India's longstanding contribution to international peacekeeping operations and the significant role played by Indian military personnel under the UN flag.

Army Chief General Dhiraj Seth will also present special awards for Green Military Stations and Aviation Flight Safety. These awards recognise military establishments that have demonstrated excellence in environmentally responsible resource management and units that have maintained high standards of aviation safety and operational discipline.

Taken together, the release of the new Land Warfare Doctrine and the discussions at the Army Commanders' Conference underscore the Indian Army’s effort to evolve into a more adaptive, technologically advanced and future-oriented fighting force capable of meeting the demands of modern warfare and an increasingly complex global security environment.

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Indo-US Defence Technology Ties Gain Momentum Through DIU Drone Challenge And CEL Partnerships

Cooperation between India and the United States in advanced defence technology is increasingly centred on complementary initiatives that encourage co-development, manufacturing partnerships and innovation-led capability building. Two notable opportunities are the U.S. Defence Innovation Unit's Low-Cost ISR Challenge and Central Electronics Limited's expanding defence and strategic systems program.

The Defence Innovation Unit has launched the Low-Cost ISR Challenge with a combined prize and initial follow-on funding pool of up to $100 million, while as much as $250 million has been earmarked for potential future development, scaled production and operational integration. The initiative is focused on mature medium- and long-endurance unmanned aerial systems capable of conducting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions at scale.

Unlike many U.S. defence competitions, the challenge is open to both American and non-American participants. Companies may compete independently or through partnerships and joint ventures, creating opportunities for Indian firms to collaborate with international manufacturers and technology providers.

The program is particularly interested in expeditionary platforms that can operate with limited infrastructure while carrying electro-optical, infrared, synthetic aperture radar and signals intelligence payloads.

On the Indian side, Central Electronics Limited is broadening its role in defence and strategic systems by leveraging its expertise in electronics, system engineering and precision manufacturing. The company is actively pursuing strategic collaborations with industry, academia and technology partners to accelerate indigenous capability development under the Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat initiatives.

CEL's priority areas include electronic warfare systems such as Electronic Support Measures, Electronic Counter Measures and Electronic Intelligence solutions.

The organisation is also developing capabilities in secure electronics, surveillance systems and mission-critical technologies designed to strengthen India's domestic defence manufacturing base.

The company is additionally targeting small weapon systems, weapon peripherals, electro-optical devices, precision mechanical assemblies and advanced system integration. Through global technology partnerships, CEL aims to accelerate the creation of next-generation defence products while maintaining high standards of reliability, security and operational effectiveness.

Counter-drone and force-protection technologies represent another important area of focus. CEL is exploring solutions covering counter-UAS systems, drone detection and tracking, RF monitoring, sensor-fusion platforms and the protection of critical infrastructure against evolving aerial threats.

These initiatives align closely with broader Indo-US frameworks such as INDUS-X, which seek to connect Start-Ups, private industry, research institutions and innovation ecosystems in India and the United States.

By encouraging technology transfer, resilient supply chains and joint development of autonomous and AI-enabled systems, such programmes are creating new pathways for long-term bilateral defence industrial cooperation.

The convergence of the DIU's international drone competition and CEL's search for advanced technology partners highlights a growing opportunity for co-development in ISR platforms, electronic warfare, electro-optics and counter-drone solutions. Together, these efforts could strengthen indigenous manufacturing capabilities while deepening strategic defence technology links between India and the United States.

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Russia's Kilo-Class Submarine Pitch Could Open The Door To Kalibr Cruise Missiles For India

Russia is once again attempting to strengthen its long-standing naval relationship with India through an offer that goes far beyond the sale of ageing submarines.

At the centre of Moscow's latest proposal is an incentive that could significantly enhance the Indian Navy's long-range maritime strike capability: access to the submarine-launched Kalibr cruise missile (also referred to as 3M54-1 Kalibr, 3M14 Biryuza).

The proposal is notable not merely because it involves additional Kilo-class submarines, but because it reveals the conditions under which Russia is willing to transfer one of its most capable conventional sea-based strike systems. In effect, Moscow is reportedly linking the acquisition of Kalibr missiles to India's willingness to procure more refurbished Kilo-class submarines.

For India, the offer arrives at a time when the Navy faces a growing challenge beneath the waves. Several conventional submarines are reaching the end of their operational lives, while replacement programmes are proceeding gradually. This has created concerns about maintaining adequate underwater combat strength during a period when regional competitors continue expanding their own submarine forces.

Russia's proposal reportedly centres on refurbished Kilo-class submarines, a platform already familiar to the Indian Navy. Known in Indian service as the Sindhughosh-class, these diesel-electric boats have formed an important part of India's underwater fleet for decades.

The attraction of the deal, however, is not necessarily the submarines themselves.

Instead, the principal incentive is the Kalibr-PL cruise missile, a submarine-launched member of Russia's well-known Kalibr missile family. The weapon is capable of conducting long-range precision strikes against both maritime and land-based targets.

Reports indicate that the version being offered to India could possess a range exceeding 1,500 kilometres. Such reach would provide the Indian Navy with a substantially expanded ability to engage strategic targets far from the point of launch.

A missile with that level of stand-off range would allow submarines operating in relative safety to strike targets deep inland without exposing themselves to enemy anti-submarine forces. This would represent a major enhancement in conventional sea-based deterrence and power projection.

Russia has reportedly offered the Kalibr system to India for several years. However, the availability of the missile has been tied to the acquisition of additional refurbished Kilo-class submarines sourced from the Russian Navy.

According to reports, these submarines would undergo extensive refurbishment before transfer. Moscow is said to be offering significant life-extension work intended to keep the vessels operational for many years after delivery.

Russian representatives are reportedly promoting the boats as a means of rapidly rebuilding India's conventional submarine numbers while longer-term indigenous and foreign collaboration projects continue to mature.

The offer also reflects a practical reality. India already possesses extensive operational experience with the Kilo-class design. Existing infrastructure, maintenance procedures, crew training systems and logistical support arrangements are already established within the Navy.

From Moscow's perspective, this familiarity reduces integration risks and could make the acquisition process relatively straightforward compared with introducing a completely new submarine class.

Another potentially significant aspect of the proposal concerns launch capability.

Current Indian Kilo-class submarines operate the Klub-S missile family, a system with considerably shorter range than the Kalibr variants reportedly being offered. Existing missile-launch arrangements are also comparatively limited.

Russia is understood to have proposed upgrades that would enable Kalibr missiles to be fired from all six torpedo tubes of upgraded submarines. Such a modification would increase both flexibility and strike volume during operations.

The Indian Navy has long sought stronger submarine-launched land-attack capabilities. While anti-ship missions remain important, modern naval doctrine increasingly values the ability to strike strategic targets ashore from concealed underwater platforms.

Submarine-launched cruise missiles provide precisely that capability.

A diesel-electric submarine operating quietly in the Indian Ocean could potentially hold targets at risk over vast distances while remaining difficult to detect and track. This form of deterrence has become increasingly important as the maritime security environment across the Indo-Pacific continues to evolve.

China's rapid naval modernisation and growing submarine fleet have influenced strategic planning throughout the region. Pakistan has also been pursuing significant underwater capability improvements through cooperation with China.

Against this backdrop, India's requirement for enhanced submarine capabilities has become more pressing. The Kalibr offer therefore arrives at a strategically sensitive moment.

For Russia, the proposal also demonstrates how defence exports continue to play a broader geopolitical role. Arms transfers frequently reveal the extent of trust between partners, particularly when advanced technologies are involved.

The willingness to discuss transferring a long-range submarine-launched cruise missile suggests Moscow is seeking to preserve its position as a major defence supplier to India despite growing competition from Western manufacturers and increasing Indian emphasis on indigenous production.

At the same time, the reported conditions attached to the offer highlight the limits of that willingness.

Rather than providing unrestricted access to the missile system, Russia appears to be packaging the capability together with submarine acquisitions. This indicates that advanced weapon transfers remain closely connected to broader industrial and strategic objectives.

The proposal also comes as India evaluates multiple pathways for expanding its underwater strike arsenal. Domestic efforts to develop indigenous submarine-launched missiles remain under way, although such programmes often require lengthy testing and integration timelines.

Meanwhile, foreign suppliers continue presenting alternative solutions.

France, for example, has promoted submarine-launched cruise missile concepts for India's Scorpene-derived Kalvari-class fleet. Such proposals provide New Delhi with multiple options as it evaluates future strike requirements.

Consequently, the Russian pitch is unlikely to be assessed solely on the basis of missile performance.

Decision-makers will also consider the remaining service life of refurbished submarines, operational costs, maintenance requirements, industrial implications, and the broader direction of India's naval modernisation strategy.

Questions surrounding long-term support, sanctions risks, supply-chain resilience and technological dependence are also likely to form part of any comprehensive evaluation. Nevertheless, the central attraction of Russia's proposal remains clear.

The Kalibr missile would provide the Indian Navy with a capability that it presently lacks in significant numbers: a long-range submarine-launched precision strike weapon capable of reaching targets far beyond the horizon.

In military terms, such a capability would substantially expand the strategic utility of conventional submarines. More importantly, the offer provides a revealing glimpse into how Russia views its defence relationship with India. The submarine sale itself is significant, but the missile is the true prize. Moscow's message appears straightforward: additional Kilo-class submarines could unlock access to one of Russia's most potent conventional naval strike systems.

As a result, what might initially seem like a routine submarine sales pitch is, in reality, a broader strategic proposition. It offers insight into the technologies Russia is prepared to share, the conditions attached to those transfers, and the future balance of capability that could emerge within the Indian Navy if New Delhi chooses to accept the deal.

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Army's Dedicated GSAT-7B Satellite Set To Strengthen Military Communications By Mid-2028

The Indian Army is expected to receive its first dedicated communications satellite, GSAT-7B, around mid-2028, marking a major enhancement in the force's communication infrastructure and operational capabilities, Hindustan Times reported.

The satellite will be launched by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and is intended to provide secure, round-the-clock connectivity across remote border regions and difficult terrain.

GSAT-7B will support day-to-day military operations, battlefield command and control, and beyond-line-of-sight communications for deployed troops, military formations, weapon systems, airborne platforms and other mission-critical assets. Its dedicated capacity is expected to significantly strengthen network-centric warfare capabilities across the Army.

The project addresses a long-standing capability gap. Unlike the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy, the Army does not currently possess a dedicated communications satellite and relies on the Indian Air Force's GSAT-7A to meet its communication requirements. To bridge this gap, the Ministry of Defence signed a contract worth about ₹3,000 crore with NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), ISRO's commercial arm, in March 2023 for the development of GSAT-7B.

Originally targeted for launch in November 2027, the mission has slipped by approximately six months because of technical reasons. Once launched, the 5-ton geostationary satellite will become India's heaviest communications satellite and will provide resilient communications even when conventional ground-based networks are disrupted, damaged or denied during military operations.

The growing importance of protected space-based communications comes amid increasing militarisation of space. China continues to expand its space capabilities and possesses technologies capable of disrupting satellite communications, including jamming and anti-satellite systems, highlighting the need for more robust and resilient military space infrastructure.

The development follows the Ministry of Defence's recent ₹2,563-crore contract with NSIL for GSAT-7C, a dedicated communications satellite for the Indian Air Force. The indigenous satellite is designed to improve secure, resilient and seamless communications across Air Force assets and enhance operational effectiveness.

The Indian Navy has already strengthened its space-based communications network through GSAT-7R, launched last November as the successor to the Rukmini satellite. The system enables secure communications among warships, submarines, aircraft and maritime operations centres across the Indian Ocean region.

India's military space ambitions are expanding rapidly. The armed forces released the Joint Military Space Doctrine in September 2025, formally recognising space as a critical domain of warfare and national security. Work is also underway on a National Military Space Policy aimed at protecting space assets and enhancing defence preparedness.

In a broader push to strengthen surveillance and communications from space, India plans to deploy 52 dedicated military satellites under Phase-III of the Space Based Surveillance mission.

Approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security in October 2024 at a cost of ₹26,968 crore, the project will see ISRO build and launch 21 satellites while private industry develops the remaining 31, significantly expanding the country's military space architecture over the coming years.

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India Puts Security First As National Cyber Security And Intelligence Bureau Rejects Need For Starlink

The National Cyber Security and Intelligence Bureau (NCIB) has asserted that India does not require Starlink’s services, stressing that national security, data privacy and digital sovereignty must take precedence over access to foreign-operated high-speed internet networks.

According to the organisation, India already possesses a strong and expanding telecommunications ecosystem and has no reason to compromise on critical national interests merely to obtain connectivity from an overseas provider.

NCIB maintained that the country is adequately served by its existing telecom infrastructure and domestic network capabilities. It argued that any communications platform operating in India must align fully with the nation’s security requirements and regulatory framework.

The organisation emphasised that issues relating to data security, lawful oversight and sovereign control over communications networks cannot be overlooked in favour of faster internet access. It warned that technological convenience should never outweigh concerns connected to national interests.

The remarks come amid continuing debate over Starlink’s proposed expansion in India. The satellite internet service, owned by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, has sought to enter the Indian market to provide broadband connectivity through a constellation of low-Earth-orbit satellites.

Supporters of satellite broadband argue that such services can extend internet access to remote and underserved regions where traditional terrestrial infrastructure remains limited. However, concerns have been raised by policymakers, security experts and industry stakeholders regarding data governance, regulatory compliance and the strategic implications of relying on foreign-controlled communication networks.

India has simultaneously been advancing its own digital connectivity ambitions through extensive mobile and broadband expansion, with domestic telecom operators continuing to enhance coverage across urban, rural and remote areas. Policymakers have repeatedly underlined that foreign technology providers must operate within India’s security and regulatory requirements.

Reiterating its position, NCIB said India does not need to sacrifice security, privacy or sovereignty for foreign satellite internet services, insisting that the nation’s existing telecom ecosystem remains fully capable of supporting its connectivity objectives while safeguarding national interests.

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Missile Age Warfare: How Long-Range Precision Strikes Are Redefining Modern Conflict

Long-range precision strike weapons are increasingly transforming the way wars are fought, shifting the focus from traditional battlefield engagements towards stand-off attacks conducted hundreds of kilometres from the front line.

Advances in satellites, unmanned aerial systems and multi-spectrum sensors now allow military commanders to identify and track targets across vast distances. At the same time, modern missiles and guided rockets enable those targets to be struck with increasing accuracy, reducing reliance on manned aircraft operating in hostile airspace.

The growing importance of these weapons was highlighted during the recent conflict involving Iran, the United States and Israel. Tehran relied heavily on its missile arsenal to project military power and sustain military operations after its ageing air force suffered severe attrition. Despite decades of sanctions limiting its access to advanced military technology, Iran’s extensive missile inventory allowed it to retain strategic relevance and strike targets far beyond its borders.

The United States likewise demonstrated the growing role of land-based precision fires through the deployment of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), a next-generation weapon with a range of approximately 500 km. The missile forms part of Washington’s broader doctrine of using long-range stand-off capabilities to destroy critical targets before committing other forces. The PrSM is intended to replace ATACMS and provides greater launcher capacity and deeper strike options.

American forces have employed similar concepts since the First Gulf War in 1991. Long-range cruise missiles have frequently been used to open military campaigns in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Iran, allowing operations to begin without immediately exposing pilots and aircraft to sophisticated enemy air-defence systems.

China and Russia have also invested heavily in large rocket and missile forces capable of launching conventional and strategic strikes deep into an adversary’s territory, illustrating the global importance of long-range firepower.

The trend was clearly visible in South Asia during Operation Sindoor in May 2025. India employed long-range missiles to strike terrorist infrastructure in Muridke and Bahawalpur before expanding attacks against major Pakistani airbases, including Bholari, Sargodha and Nur Khan.

These strikes significantly disrupted Pakistani air operations and demonstrated the ability of precision stand-off weapons to produce strategic effects without large-scale ground offensives. Pakistan responded by launching missiles, rockets and drones against military installations across Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat. Indian air-defence networks intercepted or neutralised the overwhelming majority of these attacks.

One of the most notable incidents involved a Fatah-II missile reportedly directed towards the National Capital Region. The missile was intercepted over Sirsa in Haryana on May 10, with debris later recovered from the area.

The experience exposed a major capability gap within Pakistan’s military structure. Islamabad concluded that it lacked sufficient conventional long-range options capable of penetrating India’s increasingly dense missile-defence architecture. In response, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced the establishment of the Army Rocket Force Command on August 13, 2025.

Led by a three-star general, the new command consolidates conventional missile and rocket formations previously dispersed across different services and commands. The objective is to provide faster decision-making, centralised control and concentrated long-range firepower.

Pakistan's military planners concluded that a large operational gap existed between conventional military operations and the nuclear threshold. India successfully exploited this space during Operation Sindoor through extensive use of conventional precision missiles, particularly BrahMos, against Pakistani military infrastructure.

The Army Rocket Force Command has therefore been created to provide Islamabad with additional conventional response options while avoiding immediate nuclear escalation. The command is expected to revolve around the Fatah family of missile systems. The Fatah-I serves as a guided multiple rocket launcher capable of engaging tactical targets at ranges between 70 km and 140 km.

The Fatah-II extends engagement distances to roughly 400 km and combines inertial navigation with satellite guidance. The missile saw operational use during the 2025 conflict. Pakistan subsequently tested the Fatah-2 Extended Range missile in October 2026. Although Islamabad has described the system as hypersonic, no publicly available flight data has yet confirmed that claim.

Additional capabilities include the supersonic Fatah-III and the Fatah-IV (all reportedly Chinese sourced) ground-launched cruise missile, which reportedly possesses a range of up to 750 km. Pakistan also operates Chinese-origin A-100 multiple rocket launchers derived from Russia’s Smerch design, a system that is also fielded by India.

Reports continue to circulate regarding a possible Fatah-V missile with a range approaching 1,000 km, although its existence remains unconfirmed.

Questions also remain over whether longer-range systems such as Shaheen, Ghauri and Babur missiles will ultimately fall under the Army Rocket Force Command structure. The new formation is distinct from Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, which oversees the country’s nuclear arsenal and associated command-and-control arrangements.

While the Strategic Plans Division retains responsibility for nuclear-capable systems, the Army Rocket Force Command focuses primarily on conventional rockets and missiles intended to provide non-nuclear retaliation options.

However, the parallel existence of both organisations introduces coordination challenges. Pakistan must now maintain additional command networks, communications systems, infrastructure and specialised personnel while ensuring smooth cooperation during crises.

Another concern centres on production capacity. Pakistan’s defence-industrial base has historically prioritised low-volume strategic systems rather than the larger manufacturing output required to sustain a major rocket force.

India, meanwhile, has steadily expanded its own long-range conventional strike capabilities. The Indian Army now fields a diverse mix of systems including Pinaka, Smerch, BrahMos and Pralay.

Pralay is a solid-fuel, quasi-ballistic missile with a reported engagement range of 150 km to 500 km. Equipped with a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle and conventional warhead, the missile is designed for precision strikes against high-value targets. India approved procurement of approximately 120 Pralay missiles in 2022, while successful user trials continued during 2025.

The latest BrahMos developments are expected to extend the missile’s range towards 800 km, significantly expanding India's ability to conduct conventional deep-strike operations. At the same time, engineers are developing a long-range guided version of the Pinaka rocket system capable of reaching targets up to 120 km away.

India is also pursuing subsonic land-attack cruise missiles, including the Long-Range Land Attack Cruise Missile, which is expected to be produced in larger numbers and at lower cost than BrahMos. The strategic rationale is increasingly clear. Deep-strike missions were traditionally assigned to the Indian Air Force, but modern air-defence networks can threaten aircraft at tremendous distances.

Operation Sindoor demonstrated this reality when the S-400 reportedly engaged a Pakistani aircraft from more than 300 km away. As a result, missiles now offer an increasingly attractive method of attacking command centres, logistics hubs, airfields, ammunition depots and transportation nodes while preserving valuable combat aircraft for other missions.

Alongside offensive capabilities, India has invested heavily in a layered defensive shield. The Integrated Air Command and Control System connects sensors, radars and missile batteries into a unified network capable of responding rapidly to incoming threats.

During Operation Sindoor, this network played a critical role in protecting military infrastructure against Pakistani missiles, rockets and drones. Systems such as the S-400, MR-SAM, Akash and specialised counter-drone defences provided multiple layers of protection. India ordered five S-400 squadrons under a ₹35,000-crore agreement signed in 2018, with three squadrons operational during the conflict.

Although New Delhi has not officially disclosed which interceptor destroyed the Fatah-II missile, defence sources indicated that the S-400, Akash-NG and MR-SAM all possessed the necessary capability. The country is now seeking to build an even more ambitious air and missile-defence architecture through Mission Sudarshan Chakra, announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in August 2025.

A central pillar of this initiative is Project Kusha, an indigenous long-range air-defence system intended to bridge the capability gap between MR-SAM and the S-400. Project Kusha is planned to field interceptor variants with engagement ranges of approximately 150 km, 250 km and 350-400 km, creating an additional defensive layer within India’s integrated air-defence network.

The project is being accelerated by the Indian Air Force and DRDO following lessons learned during Operation Sindoor, while initial testing has reportedly demonstrated encouraging results. Additional programmes under development include Akash-NG, VSHORADS and the country’s two-tier ballistic missile-defence architecture.

Taken together, these developments underline a fundamental shift in modern warfare.

The competition between India and Pakistan is no longer solely determined by control of the air. Instead, it is increasingly defined by which side can strike farther, penetrate layered defences, protect critical assets and sustain precision attacks over extended periods.

Long-range missiles, rockets, cruise missiles and integrated air-defence networks are rapidly becoming the decisive instruments shaping the future battlefield.

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