The trajectory of Indo-American relations has been dramatically altered within just 18 months of Donald Trump’s second term.

What once appeared to be a steady course correction since the early 2000s, bringing the world’s two largest democracies closer together, now risks sliding back to the frostiness of the 1990s, or even the hostility of the 1970s.

The passage of the Russia Sanctions Bill has become the defining moment in this reversal. The legislation empowers the US president to impose sanctions on Russia and levy tariffs of up to 100 per cent on countries continuing to buy Russian oil and gas.

For Delhi, this measure undermines the notion of a shared rules-based order, particularly when Washington’s rhetoric of partnership is contradicted by coercive economic instruments.

The bipartisan support for the Bill is striking. The Senate passed it on 7 August 2026 by 86 votes to 11, with overwhelming backing from both Republicans and Democrats. Only Rand Paul among Republicans opposed it, while Bernie Sanders stood as the sole Independent against it.

The House vote on 16 September 2026 was less one-sided but still decisive, with 262 members supporting and 159 opposing. The numbers reveal a growing consensus in Washington that Bharat should be treated not as a strategic partner but as a potential target of punitive measures.

This consensus strips away the diplomatic cover that once softened tensions. Even if a new president in 2029 adopts a more cautious tone, the structural frictions surrounding Bharat’s rise are unlikely to disappear. Delhi must therefore prepare for a prolonged period of strained relations with Washington.

The Bill’s structure raises questions about its true target. While ostensibly aimed at Moscow, its provisions disproportionately affect Bharat. China, Turkey and the European Union remain the largest buyers of Russian coal, crude oil, oil products, LNG and pipeline gas.

Yet exemptions in the legislation allow EU nations to escape sanctions by treating them as individual countries under a 15 per cent threshold. The US itself retains limited imports of Russian uranium for civilian nuclear cooperation. Bharat, however, faces the full brunt of punitive tariffs despite its energy needs for 1.4 billion people.

This asymmetry is difficult to ignore. Washington’s approach effectively asks Delhi to subordinate its energy requirements to American strategic priorities. The timing, coming soon after the Brics summit in Delhi, suggests an attempt to constrain Bharat’s independent foreign policy and push it towards American energy supplies.

The Modi government has so far adopted a cautious stance, avoiding outright confrontation. Yet caution risks being misread as weakness. The Trump administration appears to interpret Delhi’s restraint as acquiescence. Analysts argue that reciprocal measures, such as a tariff-for-tariff model inspired by Mark Carney’s approach, could signal that Bharat will not accept coercion without response.

Standing up to America would be challenging, given the Indian economy’s dependence on US markets and technology. However, long-term growth and sovereignty may require short-term pain. Diversification of energy supplies, trade relationships, defence partnerships and critical technologies is essential to reduce vulnerability to any single power.

The Indo-American romance, once celebrated as a partnership of democracies, now faces a harsh reality. What emerges may not be outright hostility but a colder, more transactional relationship based on interests and reciprocity.

The Russia Sanctions Bill may be framed as targeting Moscow, but Delhi must recognise that it is equally in the line of fire. The time has come for Bharat to convey clearly that business as usual is no longer acceptable.

This piece is loosely based on an article published by FirstPost, with due credit and courtesy to the original source