External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has reaffirmed India’s decision to maintain trade and diplomatic relations with friendly countries, including Russia, as New Delhi faces heightened pressure from the United States over its continued imports of Russian crude oil.

The issue has assumed greater significance following the enactment of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 by the United States.

Signed into law by US President Donald Trump on September 18, the legislation expands Washington’s sanctions framework against Russia and Iran. It also authorises tariffs on countries that purchase Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas, or assist in evading sanctions imposed on Moscow.

The law allows the US President to impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on imports from certain countries that continue to purchase significant quantities of Russian oil or gas. It also provides for tariffs of up to 500 per cent on imports from Russia itself.

India, China, Azerbaijan, Slovakia and Hungary have been identified in current assessments as countries potentially affected by provisions targeting major purchasers of Russian energy. The legislation also seeks to restrict Russia’s energy revenues, impose measures against its defence and energy sectors, and target vessels associated with the so-called shadow fleet used to circumvent sanctions and transport Russian oil.

The law extends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 until 2031 and expands restrictions connected with Iran’s energy sector and weapons-related activities. The enactment of the legislation has created an additional complication in India-US relations, even as both countries seek to deepen cooperation in defence, technology, trade and strategic affairs.

India’s position on its energy purchases from Russia, however, has remained consistent.

New Delhi has repeatedly argued that its procurement decisions are guided by national interest, energy security, market conditions and the need to protect Indian consumers from excessive price volatility. India has also maintained that its purchases of Russian oil have helped stabilise global energy markets by ensuring that crude remains available to buyers despite disruptions caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

EAM Jaishankar had earlier defended India’s policy during a panel discussion at the Munich Security Conference, where he was questioned about New Delhi’s balancing act between its expanding relationship with the United States and its continuing economic engagement with Russia.

Responding to the criticism, Jaishankar said India’s decision to retain multiple economic and diplomatic options was a smart one and should be appreciated rather than criticised.

“Is that a problem, why should that be a problem? If I am smart enough to have multiple options, you should be admiring me,” he was quoted as saying.

The minister also said that unidimensional relationships were unrealistic in an interconnected world order. His remarks underlined India’s long-standing approach of maintaining strategic autonomy while engaging with different powers on the basis of specific national interests.

India and Russia have maintained close political, defence and economic relations for decades. Russia remains one of India’s principal sources of military equipment, spare parts, ammunition, nuclear-energy cooperation and space-related assistance.

Although India has expanded defence and strategic cooperation with the United States, France, Israel and other partners, Moscow continues to have an important role in India’s defence ecosystem.

The relationship has also been affected by changing global circumstances, including Russia’s military operation in Ukraine, Western sanctions, disruptions to defence supply chains and Moscow’s growing economic dependence on Asian markets.

Following the imposition of Western sanctions on Russia, Indian refiners increased their purchases of Russian crude, which was offered at discounted prices. The arrangement enabled Indian refiners to secure supplies at competitive rates while allowing Russia to continue selling energy in international markets. India has consistently stated that it does not accept unilateral sanctions imposed by individual countries unless they are mandated by the United Nations Security Council.

New Delhi has also insisted that countries should not politicise energy trade or use access to fuel as an instrument of coercion. Indian officials have argued that developed countries themselves continued to purchase Russian energy or other commodities after the conflict began, either directly or through complex international supply chains.

India has therefore rejected suggestions that its crude imports alone should be treated as support for Russia’s military campaign. At the same time, New Delhi has sought to avoid an open confrontation with Washington. India and the United States have developed a broad strategic partnership covering defence technology, maritime security, the Indo-Pacific, critical and emerging technologies, space cooperation, supply-chain resilience and counter-terrorism.

The two countries also share concerns about China’s military expansion and increasing influence across the Indo-Pacific.

Any extensive use of tariffs or secondary sanctions against India could therefore have consequences beyond energy trade. It could affect bilateral commerce, investment, technology cooperation, defence procurement and the wider effort to build resilient supply chains outside China. The possibility of punitive US measures has already become a subject of discussion between senior officials from both countries.

Jaishankar met US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly and raised India’s interests and concerns regarding the newly enacted sanctions law. The discussions reflected the sensitivity of the issue at a time when Washington is seeking greater international pressure on Moscow, while New Delhi is attempting to protect its economic and strategic room for manoeuvre.

The new US law does not automatically impose a tariff on every country purchasing Russian oil.

Instead, it gives the US President significant authority to determine which countries should face additional duties and under what circumstances. The legislation also includes presidential implementation powers and waiver provisions, leaving room for diplomatic negotiations and case-by-case decisions.

The coming months will show whether the new American law is used primarily as a negotiating instrument or as the basis for punitive action against major buyers of Russian energy.

For India, the outcome will have consequences not only for crude imports, but also for its wider foreign-policy choices and its ability to maintain multiple strategic partnerships in an increasingly divided international system.

Agencies