When Prime Minister Modi meets all police chiefs and intelligence heads at the Border Security Force Academy at Tekanpur near Gwalior on January 6, he should drill into them the need to make commanders more accountable and insist on the use of technology to protect security installations

Actionable intelligence is the key to the success of any counter-terrorist operation. A combination of strong intelligence with command and control improve the chances of neutralising a terror strike with minimum collateral damage. If any of these elements is lacking, though, such strikes could succeed. When aimed at security forces, such strikes, if successful, could result in significant casualties, even lower the morale of the unit attacked and national security planners. The attack by Pakistani terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) on the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) camp at Lethpora on December 31, in which five security personnel lost their lives, indicates weak command and control despite specific actionable intelligence. This isn't new.

Over the past two years, there have been several such instances in Jammu and Kashmir where Indian security forces have been lethargic or slow to respond to real-time intelligence provided by hard-pressed state police and security agencies. This has not only forced the Narendra Modi government to militarily react, like it did with the surgical strikes after the September 18, 2016, Uri attacks but also close the option of any future diplomatic initiative with the civilian government in Pakistan. This is exactly what Pakistan based jihadist groups want.

Consider the January 2-5, 2016, Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorist attack on the Pathankot air base, during which seven Indian security personnel lost their lives. By 3 pm on the day before, January 1, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval had briefed the three military chiefs as well as the National Security Guard chief that the Pathankot air base could witness an attack. His warning was on the basis of communication intercepts. Counter-terrorist commandos were flown in to engage the suicide attackers. Doval also firmly suggested to his Pakistani counterpart Naseer Janjua the same night that Islamabad should force Bhawalpur based Jaish-e-Mohammed emir Masood Azhar to stop the attack. The alternative was an escalation of hostilities, he warned. Yet, Jaish-e-Mohammed attackers managed to enter the premises by merely cutting concertina wires. The same happened at Uri. And, most recently Lethpora.