Israel is once again considering the possibility of building its own fighter jet after nearly four decades. Reports from Bloomberg and The Jerusalem Post in late July 2026 revealed that a senior Israeli official outlined a ten-year plan to develop a domestic stealth fighter and an unmanned combat aerial vehicle that would draw upon F-35 technology.

This marks Israel’s first major attempt at a new fighter design since the IAI Lavi program was cancelled in 1987 due to prohibitive costs and American political pressure. The new vision aligns with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s broader strategy to reduce reliance on the $3.8 billion in annual military aid from the United States, which is set to expire in 2028, by shifting towards domestic funding, local manufacturing, and international joint ventures.

Since the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel has depended entirely on American aircraft for its frontline fighter fleet. The announcement of a homegrown stealth jet signals a dramatic shift towards strategic independence.

Defence analysts have noted that Israel’s ambitions could align closely with India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) program, which is itself a fifth-generation stealth fighter initiative.

However, Israel’s project remains at a very early stage. The official clarified that the ten-year timeline is only for producing a flight demonstrator, with no contractors selected, no schedules finalised, and no formal program launched by the Ministry of Defence.

Israel’s defence industry leaders have admitted that building a complete aircraft from scratch is beyond their current capabilities, given the absence of manufacturing infrastructure, dedicated engineering teams, and a funded aerospace program.

Israel does, however, possess advanced expertise in Active Electronically Scanned Array radars, electronic warfare systems, and avionics, honed through decades of modifying American aircraft, particularly the customised F-35I Adir.

Yet it lacks facilities to mass-produce stealth airframes, test radar-evading designs, or develop high-thrust turbofan engines. Establishing these capabilities will take immense time and resources, explaining why Israel’s demonstrator phase is projected to take at least a decade. This reality is crucial for India to consider when evaluating potential collaboration.

India and Israel already share a strong defence relationship. Bharat Electronics Limited and Rafael Advanced Defence Systems jointly manufacture precision-guided munitions, while the Barak-8 missile system stands as a successful co-development project.

This history of cooperation has fostered mutual trust and smooth technology transfer. Israel’s aerospace limitations align with India’s strengths. Israel needs a partner with large-scale manufacturing capacity, while India offers Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s infrastructure and the Indian Air Force’s demand for future aircraft.

In return, Israel’s advanced radar, electronic warfare, and sensor fusion technologies could help India overcome technical challenges in the AMCA’s internal systems. Such collaboration would also diversify India’s technological dependencies, reducing reliance on France, particularly as India awaits final approval for the Safran-GTRE joint venture to build a 120-kilonewton engine for the AMCA.

Despite these complementarities, making Israel a structural partner in the AMCA airframe design is highly impractical. India has deliberately ensured complete domestic ownership of the stealth airframe and intellectual property to avoid export restrictions and bureaucratic hurdles, such as those experienced with the TEJAS fighter’s reliance on American engines.

Current workshare agreements are centred on the Safran-GTRE engine partnership, and introducing Israel as a new structural partner would require renegotiations that could derail the project.

Moreover, much of Israel’s cutting-edge electronic warfare and sensor technology is tied to American intellectual property, meaning Washington retains veto power over its export. Integrating such systems into the AMCA could undermine India’s goal of building a sovereign fighter free from US restrictions.

Development timelines also pose a challenge. India’s Aeronautical Development Agency aims for the AMCA MK-1 prototype’s first flight by 2028 or 2029, with mass production by 2035. Israel, however, is at least a decade away from producing a basic demonstrator. Israel lacks mature airframe technology that India could incorporate without risking delays to its established schedule.

Therefore, the most practical path forward is a focused collaboration at the subsystem level. India could invite Israeli firms to supply electronic warfare suites, radar components, and sensor fusion software, areas where Israel excels. This would strengthen the AMCA without disturbing its structural design or engine partnership.

Such a component-level partnership would also avoid geopolitical complications. Making Israel a primary co-creator of India’s flagship stealth fighter could strain New Delhi’s delicate diplomatic balance in West Asia, where it maintains ties with Gulf nations and Iran.

By limiting collaboration to subsystems, India gains technological benefits while avoiding diplomatic risks. This approach would allow both nations to leverage their strengths—India’s manufacturing scale and Israel’s advanced electronics—without jeopardising timelines, sovereignty, or strategic independence.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)