Russian President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Bishkek on Monday has set the stage for a renewed Russian defence pitch to India, NDTV reported.

This comes just days before the two leaders are scheduled to meet again in New Delhi. At the heart of Moscow’s latest push are two of its most advanced weapon systems: the S‑500 Prometheus air defence and anti‑ballistic missile system, and the Su‑57 Felon stealth fighter.

The timing of this pitch is crucial. India is urgently seeking to strengthen both its air defence architecture and combat aircraft strength, while simultaneously diversifying military purchases away from its traditional dependence on Russian equipment. Moscow is positioning the S‑500 as the next step in the India‑Russia air defence partnership, building on the operational success of the S‑400 already in Indian service.

However, renowned defence journalist Shiv Aroor views that it would be a shame if either of them comes to fruition.


During Operation Sindoor last year, India’s Russian‑built S‑400 systems were extensively deployed against Pakistani aerial threats. In one extraordinary engagement, an S‑400 brought down a Pakistani airborne early warning and control aircraft at a record‑breaking range.

This sharply enhanced the system’s reputation within the Indian military and gave Russia an opportunity to capitalise on that operational experience.

Just a day before the Bishkek handshake, Putin’s government submitted a fresh bid to supply India with five additional S‑400 squadrons, potentially doubling the number already contracted.

This proposal comes even as India begins testing elements of Project Kusha, the indigenous long‑range air defence program intended to eventually provide an Indian alternative in the S‑400 class. The S‑500 proposition therefore becomes far more complex than simply buying a better version of a proven weapon.

India already has a homegrown ballistic missile defence program at an advanced stage of rollout, while Project Kusha is specifically intended to create an indigenous long‑range air defence capability. Any decision on the S‑500 will have to be weighed against these systems, into which India has invested years of development, money and technological effort.

The question is not only whether the S‑500 is formidable, but whether acquiring it fills a genuine capability gap or risks overlapping with indigenous programs approaching maturity.

The second major Russian proposition is the Sukhoi Su‑57 Felon stealth fighter. Russia has intensified its pitch of this fifth‑generation aircraft as the Indian Air Force grapples with depleted fighter squadron strength and the absence of an Indian stealth fighter for years to come. Moscow has indicated that technology transfer, localisation and production in India could form part of any future Su‑57 deal.

The Indian Air Force has officially considered the Russian offer, describing the Su‑57 as a “stopgap” before India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) arrives. This highlights the dilemma the Su‑57 is intended to solve.

One expert view is that buying a foreign stealth fighter would amount to an acknowledgement that Indian defence planning and project management failed to provide the IAF with a credible fifth‑generation capability within the required timeframe.

Meanwhile, the strategic environment has raced ahead. China is believed to operate a fleet of more than 500 J‑20 Mighty Dragon stealth fighters, while Pakistan is expected to begin receiving Chinese J‑35 stealth fighters in the coming months.

In this jet‑for‑jet dynamic, the IAF faces a genuine capability dilemma: wait for the indigenous AMCA and accept a potentially dangerous stealth gap, or import an interim fifth‑generation fighter and accept the costs and consequences that come with it. Those consequences are substantial.

A Su‑57 acquisition would add yet another fighter type to what has been described as the IAF’s “beauty pageant” of combat aircraft. Its frontline inventory already includes the Russian Su‑30MKI and MiG‑29, French Rafale and Mirage-2000, British‑French Jaguar and indigenous TEJAS. Each additional type brings its own training, maintenance, weapons, spares and logistics ecosystem.

The irony is stark. Russia’s pitch is significant given the history of the abandoned India‑Russia Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) project, which was intended to produce an Indian derivative of the aircraft that eventually became the Su‑57. Team Putin’s renewed defence offensive extends beyond these two headline systems.

Russia is also pushing the Voronezh strategic early‑warning radar, a powerful long‑range system designed to detect ballistic missile launches and other threats across enormous distances. Extensive upgrade programs for India’s large Su‑30MKI fleet in partnership with HAL, and for its Russian‑origin Kilo‑class submarines, are also part of the wider portfolio of potential cooperation.

For Moscow, there is urgency behind this sales push. India has spent two decades deliberately diversifying its defence suppliers. The most recent reminder is New Delhi’s procurement of American Javelin anti‑tank guided missiles after a process stretching back roughly 16 years.

A massive additional purchase of 114 Rafale fighters from France is also taking shape. At the same time, India is investing heavily in indigenous programs. Russia therefore faces competition not only from American, French and Israeli defence companies, but increasingly from India’s own expanding military‑industrial ecosystem.

Yet Moscow retains a structural advantage. Decades of defence cooperation mean Russian‑origin fighters, tanks, submarines, helicopters, missiles and air defence systems remain deeply embedded across the Indian military.

Maintaining, upgrading and eventually replacing those platforms creates opportunities that newer suppliers cannot easily replicate. Major individual weapons negotiations will not be conducted personally by Modi and Putin, but the political direction established by the two leaders has traditionally provided momentum to large strategic projects.

The Bishkek meeting is therefore more than another display of Modi‑Putin personal warmth. Behind the handshake lies an increasingly competitive battle over what India’s military will look like over the next two decades.

Russia’s two biggest propositions force India to confront two difficult questions: how much more foreign air defence does it need when indigenous systems are finally arriving, and how long can the IAF afford to wait for an Indian stealth fighter while both China and Pakistan move into the fifth‑generation era.

Agencies