Declassified NSA Doc Reveals US, Russia 'Nervous' Over Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation

Declassified documents from the US National Security Archive have exposed profound apprehensions shared by the United States and Russia over Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities.
Released this week following a Freedom of Information lawsuit, these records span verbatim transcripts of meetings and telephone conversations between former US President George W Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin from 2001 to 2008.
They reveal a consistent theme of unease, particularly regarding Pakistan's atomic stability under military ruler General Pervez Musharraf and its links to illicit networks.
The concerns centred on Pakistan's role in supplying nuclear technology to rogue states, with the notorious AQ Khan network at the forefront. Khan, the architect of Pakistan's nuclear program, orchestrated transfers of sensitive technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.
These revelations underscore how both superpowers viewed Pakistan's arsenal as a precarious risk, prone to falling into unstable or hostile hands amid the country's political volatility.
A pivotal exchange occurred during an Oval Office meeting in 2005, where Putin confronted Bush with evidence of uranium of Pakistani origin discovered in Iranian centrifuges. "As far as I understand, they found uranium of Pakistani origin in the centrifuges," Putin remarked, questioning Western tolerance given Pakistan's proliferation history.
He further noted ongoing cooperation between Iran and Pakistan, stating, "But it's not clear what the labs (Iran) have, where they are. Cooperation with Pakistan still exists."
Bush acknowledged the gravity, revealing his direct interventions with Musharraf. "I talked to Musharraf about that. I told him we're worried about transfers to Iran and North Korea. They put AQ Khan in jail, and some of his buddies under house arrest," Bush replied. He expressed frustration over incomplete disclosures, adding, "We want to know what they said. I keep reminding Musharraf of that. Either he's getting nothing, or he's not being forthcoming."
The dialogue escalated with mutual admissions of nervousness. Putin declared, "It was of Pakistani origin. That makes me nervous," prompting Bush to concur: "It makes us nervous, too."
This candid exchange highlighted a rare alignment between Washington and Moscow, both leaders grappling with the implications of Pakistan's unchecked exports violating International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Bush specifically referenced Iran's failure to declare the materials as a clear breach.
Earlier, in a 2001 summit in Slovenia, Putin had been even more forthright in his assessment of Pakistan. He described the nation bluntly as "just a junta with nuclear weapons" lacking any semblance of democracy, criticising Western silence on the matter. "I am concerned about Pakistan. It is just a junta with nuclear weapons. It is no democracy, yet the West makes no criticism of it. Should talk about it," Putin urged.
These transcripts paint a picture of shared anxieties over Pakistan's internal fragility, including its command-and-control systems for nuclear assets. Both leaders feared that political instability could enable extremists to access warheads or fissile material, a worry amplified by Musharraf's regime balancing US alliance in the War on Terror with domestic jihadist threats.
The AQ Khan network's scope remains a stark reminder of proliferation risks. Operating with apparent impunity for years, it peddled centrifuge designs, uranium enrichment know-how, and even missile components. Pakistan's official house arrest of Khan in 2004 came only after international pressure, yet doubts persisted about the full extent of disclosures and whether state elements had abetted the smuggling.
Recent developments echo these historical fears. Last month, US President Donald Trump alleged that Pakistan had conducted secret nuclear tests, prompting a sharp Indian rebuke. Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal described such activities as "clandestine and illegal," consistent with Islamabad's legacy of smuggling, export control violations, and the AQ Khan apparatus.
Jaiswal emphasised India's vigilance, stating, "Clandestine and illegal nuclear activities are in keeping with Pakistan's history, which is centred around decades of smuggling, export control violations, secret partnerships, AQ Khan network and further proliferation." He added that New Delhi has repeatedly alerted the international community to these patterns, reinforcing long-standing strategic concerns in South Asia.
These declassified insights arrive amid heightened global scrutiny of nuclear non-proliferation. For India, a nation bordering Pakistan and facing persistent cross-border terrorism, the documents validate decades of caution regarding Islamabad's atomic posture. They also highlight the delicate geopolitics of engaging Pakistan, where security imperatives often clash with proliferation containment.
The US-Russia convergence on this issue, though fleeting, signals the transnational peril of Pakistan's programme. Despite post-9/11 alliances, neither leader fully trusted Musharraf's assurances, a scepticism that lingers in contemporary assessments of Pakistan's arsenal, now estimated at over 170 warheads.
Pakistan's proliferation saga thus serves as a cautionary tale, exposing vulnerabilities in global non-proliferation regimes. The documents not only revive past alarms but also prompt reflection on current safeguards, especially as regional tensions with India persist and new actors like non-state militants loom large.
Based On ANI Report
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