India’s expansion of BrahMos missile exports is rapidly reshaping the strategic balance in Southeast Asia. Indonesia is now considering a landmark defence agreement that would make it the third regional operator of the system.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s forthcoming trip to Jakarta has drawn significant attention, with officials negotiating terms that go beyond routine defence exports. If finalised, the deal would link Indonesia with the Philippines and Vietnam, creating a connected network of BrahMos deployments across the South China Sea.

The Philippines was the first to acquire the system, using it to secure its maritime borders. Vietnam has recently joined the list of active operators, integrating BrahMos into its layered coastal defence. 

Indonesia’s entry would expand India’s strategic footprint, providing regional capitals with a powerful deterrent against hostile naval forces. For New Delhi, these agreements are not merely transactional. 

They establish enduring military relationships that encompass training, maintenance, logistics and operational support. This approach offers Southeast Asian states a strategic alternative to reliance on a US-led containment framework.

Malaysia and Thailand have also expressed active interest in acquiring the weapon. If these discussions mature into contracts, a formidable chain of coastal batteries would be positioned around Asia’s most contested waters.

The South China Sea is a vital global trade artery, facilitating trillions of dollars’ worth of goods annually. It is also a theatre of overlapping territorial claims involving China, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. Beijing has long enjoyed a military advantage, constructing artificial islands, expanding infrastructure and deploying advanced naval and coast guard forces to pressure smaller states.

For years, Southeast Asian nations lacked credible means to impose costs on Chinese operations. The challenge was not China’s ability to dominate the sea, but the inability of smaller states to threaten Chinese vessels near disputed areas.

This equation changes when coastal states acquire high-speed anti-ship missiles capable of striking deep into contested waters. By exploiting their geographic advantages, these nations can position concealed batteries along coastlines, islands and chokepoints. This distributed network allows smaller forces to effectively threaten hostile naval movements without needing massive fleets.

The BrahMos missile, travelling at velocities approaching Mach 3, compresses an adversary’s reaction window during maritime engagements. Defence analysts highlight its severe threat to large naval and coast guard platforms.

Combining extreme speed, deep penetration capability and resistance to electronic jamming, BrahMos is regarded as one of the most dangerous coastal defence weapons available.

Its growing adoption reflects shifting regional perceptions of the United States. With uncertainty surrounding Washington’s long-term Indo-Pacific focus, Southeast Asian nations are investing in their own deterrent capabilities rather than relying solely on American presence.

Deploying these advanced batteries forces stronger navies to operate more cautiously. China’s navy remains the largest in Asia, with vast resources and shipbuilding capacity. Yet a South China Sea bordered by multiple BrahMos operators becomes significantly harder to dominate. Chinese commanders navigating contested waters face a changed operational reality.

Hostile warships must remain farther from disputed areas, while adversary fleets are compelled to devote more resources to air defence systems. The distributed batteries convince opposing forces that aggressive maritime actions will extract heavy operational costs.

India’s strategy of building a “strategic missile belt” across Southeast Asia is therefore not only about exports but about shaping the regional security environment. By linking the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and potentially Malaysia and Thailand, New Delhi is constructing a deterrence arc that complicates China’s naval calculus.

This networked approach strengthens India’s Act East policy, enhances its credibility as a defence partner and signals a decisive shift in the Indo-Pacific’s balance of power.

Agencies