Pakistan’s long-range missile program has entered a new and contentious phase, drawing sharp scrutiny from Washington and raising questions about Islamabad’s strategic intentions, according to an article  published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), by Paul K. Kerr.

In December 2024, the U.S. State Department imposed sanctions on Pakistan’s National Development Complex (NDC) and several associated entities, citing their role in acquiring items for the country’s ballistic missile development.

American officials warned that Pakistan’s advances in rocket motor testing and missile technology could eventually yield intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of striking the United States. This assessment was echoed in the 2026 U.S. Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment, which concluded that Pakistan’s trajectory points towards capabilities far beyond South Asia.

Islamabad has consistently rejected these claims, insisting that its nuclear and missile programmes are defensive in nature and aimed solely at deterring India. The Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared in late 2024 that its “modest” missile program could not threaten a superpower, while retired officials such as Zamir Akram and Khalid Kidwai have repeatedly stressed that Pakistan’s arsenal is designed to ensure deterrence against India’s conventional and nuclear superiority. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, they argue, is narrowly focused on survival and deterrence, not global power projection.

Despite these assurances, U.S. officials remain sceptical. Former Biden Administration advisers Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi wrote in 2025 that intelligence agencies believe Pakistan is developing an ICBM that could reach the continental United States.

They suggested that Islamabad might seek such a capability to deter Washington from intervening in a future India–Pakistan conflict or from attempting a preventive strike against Pakistan’s arsenal. This interpretation contrasts sharply with Pakistan’s public narrative, which frames its missile development as a response to India’s expanding capabilities, including the Agni V missile with a range exceeding 5,000 kilometres and potential MIRV technology.

Pakistan’s missile programme has long benefited from external assistance, notably from China and North Korea. U.S. sanctions in 2024 targeted Chinese entities accused of supplying equipment for testing large rocket motors, underscoring the persistence of foreign involvement.

The Shaheen-III, with a range of 2,750 kilometres, and the Ababeel, capable of delivering multiple warheads over 2,200 kilometres, already provide Pakistan with significant reach across the Indian subcontinent. Yet the pursuit of larger rocket engines and specialised launch equipment suggests ambitions that extend beyond India-focused deterrence.

The rationale for such expansion remains contested. Pakistani officials like Akram have argued that longer-range systems may be necessary to target Indian assets stationed in the Indian Ocean, beyond the reach of current missiles. He also pointed to potential applications in space launch vehicles and anti-satellite weapons, areas where ballistic missile technology plays a dual-use role. At the same time, Akram rejected any notion of external limits on Pakistan’s missile programme, signalling Islamabad’s determination to retain strategic autonomy.

Congress has taken a keen interest in these developments, with options ranging from hearings to mandating intelligence reports on South Asian nuclear and missile programmes. Historically, Congress required annual reports on nuclear proliferation in the region, though this obligation was repealed in 2014. Renewed legislative oversight could compel the executive branch to provide updated assessments, including unclassified versions of National Intelligence Estimates, to inform public debate and policy responses.

The sanctions imposed under Executive Order 13382 aim to isolate Pakistan’s missile development infrastructure from the global financial system, denying access to critical technologies and funding. 

Whether these measures will slow Islamabad’s progress remains uncertain, particularly given the resilience of its strategic programmes and the likelihood of continued external support. The broader question is whether Pakistan’s pursuit of longer-range capabilities reflects a genuine shift in doctrine or a hedging strategy against perceived vulnerabilities.

Ultimately, Pakistan’s missile advances highlight the enduring volatility of South Asia’s nuclear rivalry. With India and Pakistan maintaining roughly equivalent arsenals—172 and 170 warheads respectively—the risk of escalation remains ever-present.

The prospect of Pakistan developing an ICBM introduces a new dimension, potentially altering its relationship with the United States and complicating regional stability. For Washington, the challenge lies in balancing deterrence, diplomacy, and sanctions while avoiding steps that might accelerate Islamabad’s pursuit of capabilities it insists are defensive but which others view as a looming global threat.