India’s contemplation of a unified rocket and missile force stems from the lessons of recent conflicts, where salvoes of missiles, swarms of drones and precision-guided munitions have defined the frontline of modern warfare, India Today reported.

Operation Sindoor in May 2025 highlighted this reality, as India employed BrahMos, Pralay, SCALP cruise missiles, long-range artillery and kamikaze drones to strike terrorist infrastructure and military targets across Pakistan.

The operation raised a fundamental question for planners: should India establish a dedicated rocket and missile force to marshal its growing arsenal more effectively, or can existing structures suffice?

An integrated missile force would provide a single framework for India’s expanding inventory of conventional precision-strike weapons, including drones. Military planners argue that such a force would streamline resource management, shorten decision cycles and enable faster responses during crises.

It would also reinforce the emerging ‘Sindoor Doctrine’ of swift, calibrated conventional strikes below the nuclear threshold. Analysts note that in an era of uncertain wartime supply chains, better management of missile power is not a luxury but a necessity.

At present, India’s rocket and missile systems are dispersed across the services. The Army operates surface-to-surface missiles such as Pralay, Prahaar and Shaurya, longer-range cruise missiles like BrahMos and Nirbhay, and battlefield rockets through Pinaka and Smerch launchers.

The Air Force controls air-launched missiles including Astra, BrahMos-A and SCALP, while both the Army and Air Force manage surface-to-air systems like Akash, Barak-8 and S-400.

The Navy operates ship- and submarine-launched BrahMos variants, anti-ship and land-attack missiles, and ship-based air defence systems like Dhanush. Nuclear-capable ballistic missiles such as Agni and submarine-launched K-series systems remain under the Strategic Forces Command.


The strategic environment strengthens the case for integration. China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) and Pakistan’s Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC) are dedicated structures that recognise long-range precision weapons as central instruments of deterrence.

India’s dispersed arrangements compare unfavourably, according to experts. Outgoing Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi emphasised the urgency, noting that both China and Pakistan have established rocket forces and India must follow suit. He suggested the force might initially be placed under the Army’s artillery branch, though its final organisational placement remains undecided.

Defence Secretary R.K. Singh confirmed that India is working to develop a conventional missile force spanning short-, medium- and long-range systems. He cited evolving global conflicts and Pakistan’s growing conventional missile capabilities as drivers of this strategic shift. Senior officials indicate that the proposal enjoys strong backing from the National Security Council, though final approval is pending.


Analysts such as Christopher Clary observe that there is no universal model for missile force organisation—Russia and China maintain dedicated forces, while others integrate assets within nuclear commands or distribute them among services.

Pakistan’s ARFC, announced by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in August 2025, focuses on conventional deterrence with systems like Abdali, Ghaznavi, Fatah and Babur cruise missiles. Its nuclear-capable arsenal remains under the Army Strategic Forces Command.

Experts argue that Operation Sindoor exposed gaps in Pakistan’s deterrence, prompting the creation of ARFC. China’s PLARF, by contrast, is among the world’s largest missile forces, responsible for both nuclear and conventional long-range strike operations, including advanced hypersonic weapons, giving Beijing the ability to conduct precision strikes across the Indo-Pacific.

Yet opposition exists within India’s defence establishment. Lt Gen. P Ravi Shankar contends that India already possesses the nucleus of a deep-strike force in its three artillery divisions, which integrate artillery, rockets, BrahMos and other missiles under established command networks.

He advocates expanding these divisions with newer long-range missiles, UAVs and joint-service staffing rather than duplicating structures. His proposal envisions nine artillery divisions deployed across theatres facing China, Pakistan, the Andaman and Nicobar Command and the mainland, forming an integrated DRAM—Drones, Rockets, Artillery and Missiles—ecosystem networked through ISR and joint theatre commands.

Lt Gen. Anil K. Ahuja similarly argues that a missile force would require heavy logistical investments better directed towards expanding missile inventories. He calls for clearer coordination between the Army and Air Force on long-range strike roles, stressing that the debate should focus on maximising strike capability at minimal organisational cost.

Clary also believes an integrated force is unnecessary unless joint processes fail or services neglect long-range strike priorities. Most militaries, he notes, distribute strike capabilities across services and rely on joint targeting mechanisms.

The government appears inclined towards establishing a missile force, but experts remain divided. All agree, however, that India’s rocket and missile capabilities must expand continuously through newer indigenous systems.

The debate reflects a broader tension between organisational reform and capability enhancement, with India weighing whether a unified missile force is the best path to deep-strike dominance or whether existing structures can be strengthened to meet future challenges.

Agencies