Army Unveils New Land Warfare Doctrine After Eight Years As Focus Shifts to Drones, AI And Two-Front Conflict

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has handed over the Indian Army’s new Land Warfare Doctrine, marking the force’s first major doctrinal update since December 2018.
The document was released in New Delhi on the final day of the Army Commanders’ Conference, where Chief of Army Staff General Dhiraj Seth met senior commanders to assess the evolving security environment and future military challenges.
While the Ministry of Defence has disclosed only limited details, officials have indicated that the doctrine is shaped by the growing importance of drones, artificial intelligence, precision strike capabilities, electronic warfare and multi-domain operations. The doctrine is also intended to serve as a long-term framework for preparing the Army for emerging forms of conflict over the next two to three decades, while ensuring readiness for immediate threats.
For much of the past quarter-century, Indian Army doctrine was largely centred on Pakistan and the western front stretching across Punjab and the Rajasthan desert. Following Operation Parakram in 2001-02, when mobilisation took nearly a month, the 2004 doctrine emphasised rapidly deployable strike formations capable of crossing the border within days. That concept later became associated with the Cold Start strategy.
The 2018 doctrine retained its primary focus on the western theatre and advocated Integrated Battle Groups, brigade-sized formations designed for swift deployment during crises. Although these formations were extensively tested in exercises, they were never fully established across the force.
The strategic landscape, however, changed significantly after the 2020 Galwan crisis. The Army was compelled to redirect attention towards the Line of Actual Control, where warfare is shaped by extreme altitude, harsh weather and limited infrastructure rather than desert manoeuvres. Units originally trained for conventional operations in the western sector spent successive winters deployed at elevations of around 15,000 feet in eastern Ladakh.
Operation Sindoor in 2025 further transformed military thinking. India conducted deep strikes inside Pakistan, targeted key airbases and successfully defended against large-scale drone and missile attacks without relying on traditional armoured thrusts. The experience highlighted how rapidly warfare is evolving and exposed limitations in assumptions underpinning earlier doctrinal thinking.
One of the doctrine’s most pressing concerns is likely to be long-range warfare. Pakistan has established an Army Rocket Force Command equipped with Chinese-origin missile systems intended to strike Indian military infrastructure from deep within its territory. Simultaneously, China’s Western Theatre Command has significantly expanded missile deployments, airfields, logistics hubs and transportation networks across Tibet and Xinjiang since 2020.
As a result, both adversaries increasingly possess the ability to target rear areas from the opening stages of any conflict. India’s response is taking shape through systems such as the Pralay missile and proposals for an Integrated Rocket Force. The new doctrine is expected to outline how the Army intends to operate when bases, logistics nodes and command centres are vulnerable from the outset.
The document is also likely to confront the increasingly complex two-front challenge. Pakistan’s growing reliance on Chinese military hardware, including J-10 fighters and Chinese air-defence systems, combined with the strategic significance of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor through Gilgit-Baltistan, has strengthened military links between the two countries. In a future crisis, pressures from the northern and western fronts could become increasingly interconnected.
This reality raises difficult operational questions about force allocation and mobility. The Army must determine how to shift formations between Himalayan and desert theatres despite the limited road and mountain pass networks available for rapid movement.
Another major theme is the institutionalisation of drone warfare. Over the past two years, the Army has raised specialised formations including Bhairav battalions, Shaktibaan artillery regiments, Baaz long-range drone units, Ashni platoons within infantry formations and drone squadrons attached to armoured regiments. The doctrine is expected to move these concepts beyond the experimental stage and establish them as integral elements of future combat operations.
Recent reporting has also suggested an emphasis on manned-unmanned teaming, resilient communication networks, autonomous systems, cyber security, advanced data analytics and the integration of drones into routine military operations. The doctrine reportedly aligns with Defence Forces Vision 2047 and stresses closer joint operations across the armed forces.
Grey-zone conflict is another area expected to receive significant attention. Along the Line of Control, this includes persistent infiltration attempts, while on the Line of Actual Control it encompasses incremental Chinese advances through infrastructure development, border villages and forward patrol positions. These activities frequently remain below the threshold of conventional war but demand continuous military attention and resources.
The significance of the doctrine extends far beyond battlefield tactics. Military doctrine shapes procurement priorities, force structure, training requirements and professional military education for many years. It effectively determines how the Army prepares itself for future conflicts and which capabilities receive sustained investment.
Its release is particularly important because it coincides with progress towards integrated theatre commands, which are approaching Cabinet approval. Under the new structure, Army formations will operate under joint commanders for the first time, including the possibility of an Air Force officer overseeing the western theatre.
Unlike the doctrines of 2004 and 2018, which were written for an Army planning and fighting largely on its own, the new document is designed for a force expected to operate as part of an integrated joint military structure while confronting simultaneous challenges across multiple fronts.
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