US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has confirmed Pakistan's offer to contribute troops to the proposed International Stabilisation Force (ISF) in Gaza, a key component of President Donald Trump's 20-point peace plan.

Speaking in Washington DC on Friday, Rubio expressed gratitude for Pakistan's willingness, noting that it has at least offered to consider participation. He emphasised that further clarifications are needed before firm commitments can be sought from any nation.

Rubio's remarks came in response to queries about formal consent from Pakistan. "We're very grateful to Pakistan for their offer to be a part of it, or at least their offer to consider being a part of it," he stated. 

"I think we owe them a few more answers before we can ask anybody to firmly commit." This indicates ongoing diplomatic discussions amid uncertainties surrounding the mission.

The US Secretary of State voiced optimism about broader international support. He highlighted confidence in securing contributions from "a number of nation-states acceptable to all sides in this conflict who are willing to step forward." Such assurances suggest that the Trump administration is actively courting multiple partners to ensure the ISF's viability.

Pakistan's position, however, remains cautious. According to a report by Dawn, the Pakistani Foreign Office has clarified that no final decision has been taken on troop contributions.

Foreign Office spokesperson Tahir Hussain Andrabi addressed the matter during a weekly press briefing on Thursday, stating: "Regarding Pakistan's participation in the ISF, no decision has been taken to join the force as of now."

This statement from Islamabad counters growing speculation of pressure from the incoming Trump administration. Reports indicate that Washington may be urging Pakistan to commit forces, leveraging longstanding bilateral ties. Yet, Pakistan's ambivalence reflects domestic sensitivities and strategic calculations in a volatile regional landscape.

The ISF forms a cornerstone of Trump's 20-point framework, which brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in October. The plan outlines comprehensive measures for peacebuilding, including security enhancements, demilitarisation, and reconstruction in Gaza. Deployment of a multinational stabilisation force is envisioned as a temporary mechanism to oversee these objectives.

On 17 November, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution endorsing the plan and authorising the ISF's formation. The vote saw support from key Western powers, with Russia and China abstaining. Notably, Pakistan voted in favour, signalling alignment with the initiative at the multilateral level despite reservations on operational involvement.

Pakistan's supportive UN stance contrasts with its current indecision on troops, potentially influenced by geopolitical rivalries. As a Muslim-majority nation with historical ties to Palestinian causes, Islamabad must balance domestic public opinion against US strategic overtures. Relations with Israel remain frosty, complicating any direct role in Gaza.

The Trump administration's push aligns with its broader Middle East policy reset. Reviving the ISF underscores efforts to stabilise post-ceasefire Gaza, preventing resurgence of hostilities. Rubio's comments imply that Pakistan's involvement could enhance the force's legitimacy among Arab and Muslim states.

Speculation of US pressure on Pakistan draws from patterns in past engagements, such as contributions to UN missions in Somalia and Bosnia. Pakistan has deployed over 200,000 troops to 41 UN peacekeeping operations historically, boasting the largest cumulative troop contribution globally. This track record positions it as a prime candidate for the ISF.

Yet, risks abound for Pakistan. Deploying to Gaza could expose troops to asymmetric threats from militant remnants, straining military resources already committed to border tensions with India and Afghanistan. Economic incentives, such as IMF bailouts or military aid, might sway Islamabad, given its fiscal woes.

India's perspective merits attention amid South Asian dynamics. New Delhi has deepened defence ties with Israel, including arms procurement worth billions. Any Pakistani troop presence in Gaza could indirectly bolster narratives of Pakistan's adventurism, prompting Indian scrutiny in forums like the UN.

Regionally, the ISF's composition will be pivotal. Rubio's reference to "acceptable" nations hints at excluding Iran-aligned actors, favouring Sunni-majority contributors like Pakistan, Jordan, or Egypt. Saudi Arabia's potential role remains unclear, pending normalisation with Israel.

China and Russia's abstentions at the UN signal reservations. Beijing's economic stakes in the Middle East, via Belt and Road projects, may favour neutrality. Moscow, a Hamas backer, likely views the ISF as advancing US interests.

As of 20 December 2025, the ISF's timeline remains fluid. UN authorisation provides a mandate, but logistical hurdles—force size, rules of engagement, and funding—persist. Pakistan's offer, if realised, could accelerate deployment, targeting early 2026 operations.

This development underscores shifting alliances under Trump 2.0. Pakistan's overture reflects pragmatic hedging between US patronage and regional solidarity. Final commitments hinge on resolved ambiguities, with Rubio's diplomacy central to galvanising support.

The Gaza stabilisation effort thus enters a delicate phase, where Pakistan's role could prove decisive—or divisive—in Trump's ambitious peace architecture.

Based On ANI Report