Pakistan’s public endorsement of China’s claim of a mediating role in the May 2025 India–Pakistan conflict marks a subtle but significant shift in the diplomatic narrative around that four‑day crisis.

Until now, Islamabad had largely highlighted US President Donald Trump’s role in facilitating the pause in hostilities that followed Operation Sindoor.

By explicitly validating Beijing’s characterisation of its engagement as “mediation”, Pakistan is both recalibrating credit for crisis management and signalling its alignment with China’s strategic messaging in South Asia.

At the weekly press briefing, Foreign Office spokesperson Tahir Andrabi stated that Chinese leaders were in “close contact” with Pakistan’s leadership between 6 and 10 May 2025, and that they also reached out to India.

According to him, these interactions helped “calm the situation and reduce tensions in the region”. The choice of language – “very positive diplomatic exchanges” that “did constitute in bringing down temperatures” – is intended to portray China not merely as a bystander or concerned party, but as an active diplomatic crisis manager whose role Pakistan now formally acknowledges.

This is the first time Islamabad has openly endorsed Beijing’s description of its role as mediation in that episode. The timing is noteworthy. For months, Pakistan’s public line was that it was President Trump’s intervention and Washington’s pressure that created the conditions for a pause in hostilities.

By adding China to the list, and in effect elevating Beijing’s claim to parity with the US narrative, Pakistan is diversifying the external actors it credits, in line with its broader strategic dependence on China and its desire to showcase Beijing as an indispensable stakeholder in regional security.

Andrabi’s remarks implicitly back Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s earlier assertion that Beijing had played a constructive role during the crisis. India had firmly rejected that claim at the time, making it clear that it did not accept any notion of third‑party mediation between New Delhi and Islamabad.

For India, the official position remains that the de‑escalation was a direct outcome of communication initiated by Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations to his Indian counterpart, leading to a mutually agreed pause in offensive actions. New Delhi has repeatedly underlined that any issues with Pakistan are to be handled bilaterally, without external mediation.

Pakistan’s new formulation sits uneasily with this Indian position. By describing Chinese engagement as “mediation” and calling it “diplomacy for peace, for prosperity, for security”, Andrabi is aligning Pakistan explicitly with China’s preferred narrative of being a responsible great power and conflict manager in its periphery.

He also framed the May crisis management as part of a broader pattern, referencing “several international efforts during those three‑four fateful days”. This phrasing allows Islamabad to fold US, Chinese and potentially other diplomatic contacts into a composite picture of multilateral crisis diplomacy, while still foregrounding China.

The move serves several Pakistani objectives. First, it reinforces the depth of the Sino–Pakistani strategic partnership at a time when Islamabad increasingly relies on Beijing for diplomatic, economic and security backing.

Publicly endorsing China’s mediation claim is a low‑cost way of repaying political support, particularly on issues such as Kashmir, Financial Action Task Force grey‑listing in the past, and multilateral cover in forums like the UN Security Council. Secondly, it helps Pakistan signal to domestic audiences that it was not isolated during the crisis and that major powers, including China, actively engaged on its behalf.

For China, Pakistan’s endorsement is diplomatically valuable. It allows Beijing to rest its narrative of crisis‑manager and peace‑broker on more than its own self‑description. A direct Pakistani acknowledgement gives China a cited partner to point to in future discussions, both in the region and in global fora.

This is especially important as Beijing seeks to counter perceptions that it is a revisionist actor destabilising the Indo‑Pacific. By highlighting its claimed role in de‑escalating tensions between two nuclear‑armed neighbours, China attempts to project itself as a stabilising presence and an alternative to US leadership in regional security affairs.

India, however, is unlikely to alter its stance in response to Pakistan’s remarks. New Delhi has historically resisted any attempt by third countries, whether the US, China or others, to portray themselves as mediators on India–Pakistan issues.

From India’s perspective, even acknowledging “good offices” risks creating a precedent that external actors can claim a seat at the table in future crises. Hence, it has consistently pushed back against Trump’s repeated public suggestions that the US played a central role, and equally dismissed China’s earlier claims.

New Delhi’s focus has been to highlight operational and diplomatic channels directly between the two militaries and foreign offices, rather than conceding space to external narratives.

The interplay of American and Chinese claims of crisis‑management reveals a broader strategic competition overlaying the India–Pakistan dyad. Washington has repeatedly emphasised that President Trump’s intervention was crucial to preventing escalation, thereby reinforcing the US role as the principal security stakeholder in South Asia.

Beijing, for its part, seeks to demonstrate that it too can influence outcomes in high‑risk situations involving nuclear powers in its vicinity. Pakistan, which sits at the intersection of these rival claims, is attempting to leverage both sets of relationships while moving closer into China’s strategic orbit.

Pakistan’s shift towards endorsing China’s mediation claim can also be read in light of its evolving relationship with the US. As Washington has deepened strategic ties with India, notably in defence, technology and Indo‑Pacific security, Islamabad’s incentive to publicly elevate US diplomatic contributions has diminished.

Simultaneously, its economic dependence on Chinese financing, including through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, and its alignment with Beijing on issues like Afghanistan and regional connectivity, have grown. In this context, recognising China’s crisis‑management role costs Pakistan little but yields political goodwill in Beijing.

From a crisis‑stability perspective, the May 2025 conflict and its termination now appear, in public narratives, as the product of overlapping bilateral and external mechanisms. On one level, military‑to‑military communication between the Directors General of Military Operations of India and Pakistan provided the formal trigger for the pause in hostilities.

On another level, parallel diplomatic activity from the US and China – each claiming or being credited with a decisive role – formed a backdrop of international pressure and inducements. The competing narratives about who “ended” the crisis reflect not only genuine diplomatic activity but also each actor’s strategic messaging priorities.

For India, the danger of conceding any external mediation is twofold. It risks internationalising the bilateral dispute with Pakistan and potentially creating pressures in future crises for formalised third‑party involvement.

It also opens space for external powers to shape the narrative about Indian decision‑making, including the conditions under which New Delhi will escalate or de‑escalate. By insisting that the pause following Operation Sindoor stemmed from a Pakistani request and a sovereign Indian decision, New Delhi protects its doctrinal autonomy and reinforces its long‑standing policy that the Simla Agreement and subsequent bilateral understandings govern India–Pakistan crisis management.

Pakistan’s endorsement of China’s position also feeds into the broader contest over narrative control in South Asia. Islamabad wants to show that, even in moments of military pressure and domestic vulnerability, it enjoys strong backing from major powers.

Beijing seeks to demonstrate that neighbouring states view it as a trusted interlocutor and protector of regional stability. Washington, in turn, uses its crisis‑management claims to underline that despite India’s new partnerships and Pakistan’s tilt towards China, the US remains central to preventing conflict between the two nuclear‑armed rivals. India’s refusal to validate any of these third‑party narratives leaves all three external actors competing to shape global perceptions without formal Indian endorsement.

In conclusion, Pakistan’s public backing of China’s claim of mediation in the May 2025 conflict is less about revisiting the factual sequence of de‑escalation and more about signalling alignments and projecting influence.

It marks a consolidation of Sino–Pakistani diplomatic coordination, offers Beijing additional legitimacy as a claimed crisis‑manager, and reflects Pakistan’s adjustment to a shifting balance in its relations with the US and China.

For India, the development reinforces the importance of maintaining a clear, consistent line against third‑party mediation and preserving the primacy of bilateral channels in managing future crises with Pakistan, even as external actors continue to vie for narrative and strategic influence around the subcontinent’s flashpoints.

Based On Agency Reports