Russia is intensifying efforts to sell its advanced Su-57 Felon stealth fighter to India, this time tailoring the offer to align closely with New Delhi's "Make in India" initiative.

The proposal centres on a customised Su-57E variant, incorporating extensive participation from Indian industry and indigenous subsystems. This marks a significant shift from previous restrictive export terms, where the jet was offered largely "as is.", reported Reuben F Johnson of 19FortyFive.

Nearly a decade ago, India rejected a substantial Russian proposal for co-production of the Su-57, citing the challenges of implementing numerous required modifications. Despite this, recent lobbying has revived the discussions, elevating the idea to a key topic in planning for the Indian Air Force's (IAF) future.

In early December 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin personally promoted the aircraft to Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a visit, even involving the head of Russia's United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) to advance the deal.

UAC CEO Vadim Badekha recently emphasised that the Su-57E for India would maximise the use of local industry and Indian-made systems. This approach accommodates India's insistence on localisation for foreign weapon systems. Previously, Russia had marketed the Su-57 with tight export controls, akin to a one-size-fits-all model like the F-35, leaving little room for customisation.

Negotiations have progressed to advanced technical dialogues, with major Indian state-owned defence firms leading design and configuration efforts. Sources in New Delhi indicate the Su-57 could replace Su-30MKI squadrons in high-priority missions. Confirmation of license-production talks underscores the momentum.

Three procurement pathways are under consideration. The first involves a small "off-the-shelf" purchase from Russian production lines, similar to India's 2016 acquisition of 36 Rafale jets from Dassault in Bordeaux. That deal, however, proved costly at around US$9 billion, highlighting the expense of limited foreign-built buys.

The second option entails license production in India with minimal alterations to the base design. These could include adaptations for Indian weapons integration or tweaks to the aircraft's source code for new mission profiles, enhancing compatibility without overhauling the platform.

The third, most ambitious route is a joint development program. It would incorporate dozens of IAF-requested design changes, assigning distinct roles to Russian and Indian teams. Indian industry would handle substantial integration of locally designed subsystems, potentially creating a highly customised, data-sovereign aircraft.

Under this scenario, the initial two to three squadrons might adopt the standard Russian configuration while an Indian production line is established. Subsequent units would feature extensive tailoring, rendering them distinctly different from the original—much like how the Indian Su-30MKI diverges significantly from Russia's Su-30SM.

An assessment of an "Indian-friendly" Su-57E highlights integrations such as indigenous mission computers, software-defined radios, secure data links, and identification-friend-or-foe systems. These would ensure interoperability with the IAF's network-centric warfare doctrine, safeguard data sovereignty, and shield operations from external scrutiny.

Such customisation comes at a premium. Data shows the Su-30MKI costs nearly twice as much as the Russian Su-30SM due to localisation and modifications. A similarly priced Su-57E could prompt the IAF to scale back ambitions for large-scale procurement of these specialised variants.

Russia views India as a prime export customer for the Su-57, once seen as a long shot. The evolving proposal reflects Moscow's adaptability to India's strategic priorities, balancing technological transfer with industrial growth. Yet, the higher costs and complexities may temper the scale of any deal.

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