Chinese online commentary surrounding Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Central Asia and participation in the SCO summit in Bishkek was dominated by discussions about his flight route, India Today reported. 

Much of the chatter focused on the fact that Modi had to fly an additional 3,000 kilometres, spend five extra hours in the air, and take a significant detour through China to reach his destination.

This became a focal point for debates on India’s transit constraints, regional frictions, and the broader thaw in China-India relations.

Observers noted that the five Central Asian countries hold oil, gas, rare earths, and critical minerals, resources that India urgently requires to upgrade its manufacturing sector. Both Central Asia and New Delhi aspire to establish themselves as trade hubs linking South Asia and Central Asia.

However, India lacks a direct land border with these countries, meaning any passage must rely on third-party states. This structural limitation was highlighted in Chinese commentary as a major obstacle for New Delhi.

The shortest route for India to reach Central Asia would be through Pakistan’s airspace, taking only three hours to reach Tashkent. Yet, following the Pahalgam terror attack, India-Pakistan ties deteriorated sharply, and Pakistani airspace has remained closed to Indian flights for over a year. This closure has forced India to seek alternatives.

India had long sought to bypass Pakistan by cooperating with Iran and developing the Chabahar Port. 

The plan was to establish a sea-land intermodal transport corridor to Central Asia. India and Iran signed a 10-year contract in May 2024, and India fulfilled its commitment of ₹1,000 crores to the port. 

However, the US-Iran war disrupted this plan. In July 2026, US airstrikes reportedly destroyed a tower at Chabahar Port. The Indian budget for 2026–27 made no new allocation for Chabahar, and frequent clashes in the Persian Gulf rendered Iranian airspace unsafe for transit.

Another potential route was through Russia, circling north. Yet, with Russia facing war zones within its territory, the security of this option was deemed highly questionable. Consequently, the only reliable route for India to reach Central Asia at present is through China.

Chinese commentators described this situation as a strategic embarrassment for India. For a country that prides itself on being a rising major power with nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers, and a population of 1.4 billion, being trapped in the subcontinent and dependent on China for access to Central Asia was portrayed as a foreign policy failure.

The fact that India needed China’s consent to reach the Eurasian heartland was seen as symptomatic of deeper strategic shortcomings.

They argued that India’s predicament stems from its hardline policies in its neighbourhood, its fence-sitting on the US-Iran conflict, and its complex balancing act between China and the US. India’s simultaneous participation in BRICS, SCO, and the QUAD was cited as evidence of its difficult calculations, which have left it vulnerable in terms of connectivity.

Chinese commentary suggested that this situation may represent a new normal in India’s Central Asia strategy. With animosity between India and Pakistan unlikely to ease, and Iran-India cooperation unstable, India may eventually have to negotiate an air corridor through China. Such negotiations would raise questions about what bargaining chips India could offer, and what compromises it might have to make.

The issue of India seeking an air corridor through China has been discussed in Beijing since the Tianjin summit in August 2025, when Modi visited China for the first time in over seven years.

That summit led to major decisions, including the resumption of direct flights, visa facilitation, consensus on border management, and reopening of the pilgrimage route to Mount Kailash. The resumption of the Guangzhou-Delhi direct flight in October 2025 further fuelled debate.

A Reuters report in October 2025 revealed that Air India had urged the government to negotiate with China for permission to fly over Xinjiang airspace and establish emergency landing points in Urumqi, Kashgar, and Hotan.

This sparked intense discussion on Chinese social media platforms such as Weibo. Critics accused India of exploiting the thaw in relations to make demands that touched China’s core interests.

Xinjiang’s airspace and airports fall under the PLA’s Western Theatre Command, which is strategically vital for China’s defence posture along the India-China border. From both national security and alliance commitments to Pakistan, China remains reluctant to open this airspace, even temporarily.

Nevertheless, China also does not wish to jeopardise the positive momentum in bilateral ties. This may explain why Modi’s flight took a long detour rather than a direct passage through Xinjiang. Yet, questions remain unanswered.

Has India formally raised Air India’s request with China? Has China officially rejected it? What was the scope of the transit permission granted to Modi’s flight? Neither side has issued public statements, leaving the matter shrouded in secrecy and speculation.

The ongoing debate in China suggests that air transit could become a critical issue in future India-China discussions. For now, Modi’s detour has highlighted India’s strategic vulnerabilities and the complex interplay of regional politics, connectivity challenges, and great power competition.

Agencies