China has significantly expanded its overseas military network, adding a new air facility in Laos to complement its existing access to a naval installation in Cambodia and its long-standing overseas base in Djibouti. The development marks a notable extension of Beijing’s military presence across Southeast Asia.

The newly operational China-Laos Joint Support and Training Centre and the China-Laos Friendship Aviation Academy were officially inaugurated at Ban Keun Airport in Laos on 29 September 2026. The opening ceremony was attended by Lao Defence Minister Khamlieng Outhakayson and followed high-level talks between Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing earlier this year, during which defence cooperation featured prominently.

Located roughly 50 kilometres north of Vientiane, the Ban Keun facility occupies a site with historical significance. During the Vietnam War, it was home to Lima Site 44, part of a network of airfields developed by the United States and the CIA. Construction of the modern facility appears to have commenced in late 2025 on land previously used for agriculture.

The base now features a 2,000-metre paved runway, taxiway, aircraft apron, air traffic control tower and five hangars. While most major infrastructure has been completed, additional development work remains under way.

China and Laos describe the installation as a jointly operated training facility intended to improve pilot training and aviation capabilities within the Lao military. Beijing has emphasised that the centre complies with domestic and international law, is based on mutual consultation and is not aimed at any third country.

Despite these assurances, regional analysts believe the base carries broader strategic significance. Vietnam is expected to view the development with particular concern given its historical tensions with China and the base’s location west of Vietnamese territory. The facility extends China’s potential operational reach deeper into mainland Southeast Asia.

Laos operates one of the region’s smallest air forces, consisting of a limited fleet of Russian- and Chinese-built aircraft and helicopters. Its inventory includes MA60 and MA600 transport aircraft, Z-9 helicopters, LE500 basic trainers and K-8W jet trainers. The country’s principal air facilities are located at Vientiane-Wattay International Airport and Xiengkhouang.

Analysts suggest the scale of the new training complex exceeds the immediate needs of the Lao Air Force. Beijing is widely expected to encourage greater reliance on Chinese military aircraft, technology and training systems, potentially replacing remaining Russian equipment and creating long-term strategic dependencies.

Chinese authorities have not disclosed the number of personnel, aircraft or support assets that will be stationed at Ban Keun. However, reports indicate that PLA Air Force JL-8 trainer aircraft could operate from the base alongside Laos’ existing K-8W fleet.

Questions also remain regarding the legal framework governing Chinese military access. Although Laos is expected to retain sovereignty over operations, observers note that Beijing’s growing economic influence could provide leverage in future negotiations concerning military usage.

Chinese military commentators have highlighted Ban Keun’s location along the China-Laos Railway corridor as a key logistical advantage. The rail connection enables efficient movement of personnel and equipment from southern China while also linking the facility closely to major regional transport routes.

The base’s proximity to Vientiane offers practical advantages for pilot training, administration and governmental oversight. Its location in relatively flat terrain is also considered more suitable for aviation operations than much of mountainous Laos.

Chinese analysts have identified three principal objectives for the installation. The first is strengthening the training and modernisation of the Lao Air Force, thereby expanding Chinese influence over future procurement and operational standards.

The second is enhancing military operations and exercises in Southeast Asia. Ban Keun could provide an additional operating location for Chinese aircraft participating in regional drills, including exercises with Thailand, while offering more realistic deployment scenarios.

The third objective relates to broader geopolitical influence. Numerous major cities across mainland Southeast Asia lie within operational range of the facility, potentially increasing China’s strategic presence throughout the Indochina Peninsula.

Some defence experts argue that the base’s greatest importance lies less in its immediate military utility and more in establishing a permanent Chinese military presence in Laos while strengthening institutional ties between the two armed forces.

The Laos installation differs from China’s overseas facility in Djibouti, which primarily supports anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden but also hosts Chinese naval infantry and armoured assets. The Djibouti base provides Beijing with a rapid-response capability across parts of Africa and the Middle East.

The Pentagon has previously assessed that Djibouti has contributed more to sustaining a permanent Chinese regional military presence than to the evacuation of citizens or protection of investments, despite those being among its publicly stated purposes.

Ban Keun is particularly significant because it represents the first overseas facility specifically focused on air force operations. The PLA is expected to maintain a continuous support presence while rotating personnel and aircraft through the base.

Some Chinese commentators suggest Beijing may have preferred Laos because Cambodia was reluctant to host a similar air facility. Phnom Penh has increasingly pursued a balancing strategy, maintaining security ties with China while also strengthening engagement with countries such as the United States and Japan.

China already enjoys extensive access to Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand. The jointly operated support and training centre there was inaugurated in April 2025 after substantial Chinese-funded expansion, including new berths and facilities.

Although Chinese warships regularly utilise Ream, Cambodia maintains that the base remains open to friendly foreign navies. That position was reinforced when the USS Cincinnati visited the facility in January 2026, marking the first United States naval visit since its redevelopment.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet has repeatedly insisted that no foreign country will be granted exclusive military rights at Ream, citing constitutional restrictions on foreign military bases.

At the same time, Cambodia has revived military exercises with the United States after a decade-long pause, reflecting its broader effort to maintain strategic flexibility between competing powers.

China and Cambodia continue to deepen military cooperation through annual Golden Dragon exercises and defence equipment transfers, including the supply of Type 056 corvettes to the Royal Cambodian Navy.

Together, the facilities at Ream and Ban Keun provide China with expanded access to both maritime and air domains in Southeast Asia. They also complement Beijing’s extensive military infrastructure across the South China Sea, including installations in the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

Chinese officials maintain that the Laos training centre will help establish a comprehensive aviation training system covering pilots, maintenance personnel and other aviation specialists. The facility is also expected to support simulators, joint exercises, technical assistance and long-term capability development.

Laotian personnel currently receive training in China, Russia and Vietnam. The new institution could reduce reliance on overseas programmes by allowing more instruction to take place domestically.

Chinese media further argue that the centre could support humanitarian operations, search-and-rescue missions, border security tasks and disaster-relief activities throughout the Mekong region.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon continues to assess that China is seeking a broader overseas logistics and basing network to support long-distance military operations. Potential locations reportedly examined by Beijing include Angola, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tanzania, the United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu.

Notably, Laos did not feature in previous publicly identified lists of potential Chinese military facilities, making the emergence of the Ban Keun base particularly unexpected.

Western defence assessments conclude that while China’s overseas military network remains modest compared with that of the United States, it is steadily expanding. The combination of naval access in Cambodia, an aviation foothold in Laos and established overseas facilities elsewhere demonstrates Beijing’s growing ability to project military influence beyond its borders and sustain a more persistent presence across strategically important regions.

ANI