India's accelerating effort to build a multi-layered air defence shield is emerging as a major source of concern within Pakistan's military establishment. While New Delhi portrays the system as a purely defensive measure designed to safeguard cities, leadership and strategic infrastructure, Islamabad fears that it could undermine deterrence stability and intensify the regional arms competition.

The concern has grown following India's recent tests of the AD-1 and AD-2 interceptor missiles, part of the second phase of its Ballistic Missile Defence program. These systems are designed to intercept ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 5,000 kilometres and build upon existing capabilities provided by the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD), Advanced Air Defence (AAD) and Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) interceptors.

From Pakistan's perspective, the issue is not whether India can create an impenetrable shield. Most analysts agree that no existing missile defence architecture can guarantee complete protection against large-scale missile attacks, particularly those involving hypersonic weapons, MIRV-equipped missiles, cruise missiles or coordinated drone swarms. The real concern is that even a partially effective shield could reshape strategic calculations during a crisis.

This reflects the classic offence-defence paradox. A system viewed as defensive by one state may be interpreted as offensive by an adversary. Pakistan fears that a stronger Indian air defence network could give Indian policymakers greater confidence in their ability to absorb retaliation, potentially lowering the perceived risks associated with coercive military action.

These concerns were further underscored by the May 2025 India–Pakistan military crisis. India launched a devastating counter-offensive, whereas Pakistan was unable to mount a single effective strike, with all its drone and missile attempts intercepted by India’s air defence system.

Any future confrontation could unfold under conditions where one side increasingly believes it possesses enhanced protection against missile strikes, while the other is compelled to expand offensive capabilities to restore deterrence credibility.

As a result, India's missile defence advances may inadvertently encourage Pakistan to accelerate the development of countermeasures. These could include additional MIRV-equipped ballistic missiles, low-flying cruise missiles, precision-guided conventional strike systems, armed drones and, eventually, hypersonic weapons capable of bypassing or overwhelming defensive networks.

A fundamental challenge for missile defence systems is that offence generally remains cheaper and easier to expand than defence. Building and maintaining sophisticated radar networks, interceptor missiles and command-and-control systems requires enormous investment, whereas an adversary can often develop relatively cost-effective measures to saturate or circumvent those defences.

Even assuming interception rates of 75 to 80 per cent, the remaining missiles that penetrate the shield could still inflict unacceptable damage. In a nuclear scenario, even a small number of successful strikes would have catastrophic consequences. This reality limits the strategic value of missile defence while simultaneously encouraging rivals to develop larger and more sophisticated offensive arsenals.

Pakistan's military planners therefore view India's growing air defence shield less as a stabilising security measure and more as a catalyst for an expanding regional security dilemma. The more India invests in defensive capabilities, the stronger the incentive for Pakistan to invest in offensive systems designed to defeat them.

China also influences the equation. Beijing has developed both missile defence technologies and advanced countermeasures against such systems, while continuing to modernise its own missile arsenal. This broader regional trend reinforces Pakistani concerns that missile defence is becoming an integral part of a wider strategic competition across Asia.

The competition may eventually extend into space. Future missile defence architectures are expected to rely increasingly on space-based sensors and tracking systems, particularly for detecting and intercepting hypersonic weapons.

However, such developments could accelerate the militarisation of space and create new vulnerabilities, given the growing availability of anti-satellite weapons.

Despite these risks, there is currently no meaningful arms-control framework governing missile defence deployments. Long-standing geopolitical tensions, major-power rivalry, ongoing conflicts and persistent mistrust between India and Pakistan make any agreement on missile defence limitations highly unlikely.

Consequently, Pakistan's military establishment is likely to continue viewing India's expanding air defence shield with deep apprehension. Rather than reducing insecurity, the deployment of increasingly advanced interceptor systems may reinforce fears that South Asia is entering a new phase of strategic competition, characterised by a simultaneous race in both defensive and offensive missile technologies.

Agencies