Seventeen months after Operation Sindoor exposed significant vulnerabilities in Pakistan's military posture, Islamabad has intensified efforts to reinforce its strategic position through new defence partnerships, missile development programs and increasingly assertive nuclear signalling.

While these moves are intended to project strength, they also reflect the challenges Pakistan faces in addressing shortcomings revealed during the conflict. For India, these developments warrant careful monitoring despite their limitations.

Operation Sindoor demonstrated the reach and effectiveness of Indian military capabilities, with Indian missiles reportedly striking airbases deep inside Pakistan. The conflict also highlighted shortcomings in several systems on which Pakistan had placed considerable confidence.

Chinese-supplied air defence assets were unable to prevent key strikes, while Turkish-origin drones reportedly suffered substantial losses against Indian air defences.

Against this backdrop, Pakistan has pursued a series of new strategic arrangements. In August, it entered into the Mecca Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, under which an attack on one signatory would be regarded as an attack on all.

This was followed on 21 October by the Badr Memorandum of Understanding signed in Doha with Turkey, Qatar and Indonesia. The agreement focuses on joint defence production, military training and research cooperation, with manufacturing facilities reportedly expected to be established in Turkey.

Despite the ambitious presentation of these arrangements, their practical military value appears uneven. Saudi Arabia maintains extensive economic and strategic ties with India, making direct military involvement on Pakistan's behalf highly unlikely. Indonesia, which signed BrahMos and Astra agreements with India in July, remains more closely aligned with its own defence modernisation priorities.

Former BrahMos chief Sudhir Kumar Mishra has noted that export customers receive operational access rather than underlying missile technologies. Qatar's primary contribution is likely to be financial rather than military. As a result, Turkey stands out as the only participant capable of delivering substantial defence-industrial support.

Pakistan's growing interest in partners beyond China is particularly noteworthy. One possible interpretation is that confidence in certain Chinese military systems declined after the events of May 2025. Air defence systems, fighter aircraft and long-range missiles fielded by Pakistan did not prevent Indian strikes against key military installations, including Nur Khan Air Base.

Another possibility is that Beijing is limiting access to some of its most advanced capabilities. Speculation surrounding the transfer of J-35 stealth fighters has persisted for several years, yet available aircraft continue to be prioritised for Chinese military requirements. Whatever the reason, Islamabad increasingly appears to be diversifying its strategic dependencies.

Turkey is positioned to contribute drones, electronic warfare capabilities and naval platforms. Pakistan already operates Turkish-built Babur-class corvettes and Turkish unmanned systems. Over time, these acquisitions could strengthen Pakistan's ability to conduct drone operations and enhance its naval presence in the Arabian Sea.

However, such cooperation is unlikely to erase the broader military imbalance. Defence-industrial collaboration requires years to mature, Turkish drones faced difficulties against Indian air defence systems during previous confrontations, and India's advantages in missile technology and naval power continue to expand.

Pakistan has also sought to demonstrate progress in missile development through the Fateh-2 ER. However, intelligence assessments indicate that the system lags well behind India's Agni-P in range, speed, accuracy and survivability against missile defences.

Designed primarily as a guided rocket for engaging airbases and command facilities, the Fateh series has already faced operational setbacks, with one missile reportedly intercepted over Sirsa during the previous conflict. India's Pralay missile system not only offers greater range but is also progressing towards operational induction.

Alongside conventional military developments, Pakistan has renewed emphasis on nuclear deterrence. Retired Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, adviser to Pakistan's National Command Authority, has suggested that Pakistan may reconsider aspects of its nuclear deployment posture and would not accept what he described as a "strategic imbalance". Another prominent Pakistani strategic commentator, Sarfraz Sattar, has questioned the implications of India's sea-based nuclear deterrent and raised doubts about India's No First Use doctrine.

The broader purpose of these statements appears clear. India's actions during Operation Sindoor demonstrated a willingness to conduct conventional military operations despite Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi subsequently declared that India would not submit to nuclear blackmail. In that context, Pakistan's recent rhetoric can be viewed as an effort to restore the credibility of a deterrent many observers believe was weakened by the events of 2025.

Yet the most persistent challenge for India may not come from missiles or formal defence pacts. According to security analysts, Pakistan-based networks continue to employ low-cost hexacopter drones to infiltrate Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir under cover of darkness.

These drones are used to deliver narcotics and, at times, weapons to local operatives who rarely have direct contact with organisers. Investigations by Indian authorities have linked proceeds from narcotics trafficking to Lashkar-related activities, highlighting the continued use of asymmetric methods that impose steady security pressures at relatively low cost.

For India, the emergence of new defence agreements and renewed nuclear rhetoric should be viewed as indicators of a Pakistan seeking external support to compensate for recognised weaknesses. New Delhi's response is already visible through the deployment of systems such as BrahMos and Pralay, continued investment in layered air defence networks that proved effective during the conflict, and the accelerated procurement of counter-drone capabilities.

The most important developments to monitor in the coming years will be the transfer of additional Turkish drones and warships to Pakistan, any movement towards deploying battlefield nuclear weapons closer to the border, and the continuing stream of cross-border drone activity over Punjab.

Together, these areas are likely to provide the clearest indication of how Pakistan intends to adapt following the military and strategic lessons of Operation Sindoor.

Agencies