India is modernising its submarine fleet but the endeavour is challenging

by Abhijit Singh

On 20 December 2022, the Indian Navy (IN) took delivery of the INS Vagir, the fifth submarine under the Project-75, Kalvari class submarines. Constructed at Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) Mumbai, in collaboration with the Naval Group, the Vagir is a state-of-the-art submarine featuring advanced stealth features, including acoustic absorption. It is designed for multifarious missions such as anti-surface, anti-submarine, intelligence gathering, surveillance, and mine-laying. The submarine was launched in November 2020 and has undergone outfitting, machinery, and weapons trials in just over two years, well on track for commissioning in early 2023. The tempo of its testing and evaluation suggests that the navy is expediting efforts to modernise the submarine fleet.

India’s security planners are also acutely aware that the Indian navy’s main operational deficit over the last decade has been a lack of attack submarines.

India’s urgency in modernising the submarine arm is indeed palpable. At a time when China has been attempting to expand its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, Indian observers are concerned about its adverse implications for India’s maritime security and strategic influence. Indian analysts are particularly worried that Chinese undersea drones, recently seen in Indonesia’s near-seas, could be deployed in the waters around India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Eastern Indian Ocean. Consequently, India’s naval leadership is focusing on diesel-electric submarines that have the capability to patrol the littoral.

India’s security planners are also acutely aware that the Indian navy’s main operational deficit over the last decade has been a lack of attack submarines. The navy’s submarine arm is under considerable strain with only 15 conventional submarines. Not only are current force levels at least nine short of the ideal figure of 24, but the submarine fleet’s workhorses, the Kilo-class (Sindhughosh) subs, are nearing the end of their service life. The decommissioning of the INS Sindhudhvaj in July 2022 starts a process that would end with the retirement of all boats in the class by the end of the decade.

Worryingly for New Delhi, Project-75, the Kilo-class replacement program is making slow progress. Six Scorpene class submarines ought to have been delivered between 2012 and 2016. But INS Kalveri, the first vessel, was not launched until 2017, five years later than anticipated. Two more submarines, the INS Khanderi and INS Karanj were put into service by 2020, but none of them possessed a complete stock of their main weapon, the torpedo. A 100 Black Shark Torpedoes could not be delivered, because the defence ministry blacklisted Finmeccanica (a result of the Augusta Westland VVIP chopper scandal) preventing subsidiary company WASS from delivering the armament.

The project is slated to become the largest under ‘Make in India’, and could potentially create the foundation of an industrial ecosystem for submarine construction in the country.

The reduction in submarine force levels is now driving a late response to accelerate the delivery of the Kalveri class. Vagir’s delivery (and possible commissioning early next year) would be a good augury. With the Vagsheer—the sixth and final sub in the Scorpene program—due for induction in early 2024, naval managers hope to carry forward the momentum to the Project-75(I) project. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has already approved a deal for the construction of six conventional submarines under the P-75I at an estimated cost of INR 43,000 crores. The project is slated to become the largest under ‘Make in India’, and could potentially create the foundation of an industrial ecosystem for submarine construction in the country. Already, the MoD has chosen MDL and private shipbuilder Larsen & Toubro (L&T) to collaborate on the construction of six new stealth submarines.

The IN is also working on a plan to construct nuclear attack submarine (SSN). The IN approached the government in May 2021 for permission to make changes to the 30-year submarine building plan approved in 1999. In light of the changing strategic scenario in the Indo-Pacific, the navy plans to replace six conventional attack vessels with nuclear-powered platforms. In the face of growing Chinese deployments in the Indian Ocean and efforts by other Indo-Pacific powers to build submarine capability, senior officers, both serving and retired, agree that an Indian SSN construction program—however long and complex it may be—is both necessary and unavoidable. India’s naval managers are acutely aware that the return of the Akula class SSN, Chakra, to Russia, has eroded the country’s conventional underwater fighting capability While India has already signed a lease agreement for another such submarine, which is expected to be delivered in 2025, the IN must be ready for any contingency in the interregnum.

In light of the changing strategic scenario in the Indo-Pacific, the navy plans to replace six conventional attack vessels with nuclear-powered platforms.

The navy plans to enlist at least six P-75 (I) class submarines and six SSNs over the coming 10 years. To build a powerful deterrence against China, the navy is looking to commission soon the INS Arighat, the second ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) after the INS Arihant. Plans are also in the works to construct the S4, an advanced boat in the class. The DRDO, meanwhile, is developing the K5 (5,000 kms) and K6 (6,000 kms) submarine-launched ballistic missiles for the new class of SSBNs. The K-8 is a bigger, 8,000-kilometer-range missile, too, and has been a subject of research and development.

Even so, the Kalveri class submarines and Project -75(I) are currently the main focus of India’s naval planners. It is still to be seen how quickly and effectively plans will come to fruition.

It has been reported that the vendor response deadline to the P-75 (I) tender or request for proposal (RfP) has had to be deferred to late 2023. Apparently, design ‘overreach’ in the Navy’s Staff Qualitative Requirements (NSQRs) for the submarines, unrealistic delivery schedules, unworkable liability clauses and other strict technology transfer requirements have led to several of the world’s top submarine builders declining to participate in P-75 (I). Needless to say, the success of India’s submarine modernisation program will depend on the Indian propensity to keep up with set timelines.