HAL's Controversial Decision: A Setback For India's Indigenous Defence Ambitions

In a blow to indigenisation, HAL has opted for foreign technology, jettisoning DRDO's radar and Electronic Warfare equipment for the TEJAS MK-1A jets, reported Pradip R Sagar of India Today.
The recent decision by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to abandon its commitment to using indigenous radar and electronic warfare systems in its TEJAS MK-1A jets represents a significant blow to India's defence indigenisation goals.
This has sparked considerable controversy within the defence establishment, particularly in light of the recent success of Operation Sindoor, which had showcased India's growing indigenous military capabilities.
The Indigenous Promise Broken
In February 2021, when the Indian Air Force (IAF) signed the landmark ₹48,000 crore contract for 83 TEJAS MK-1A multi-role fighter jets with HAL, there was a clear understanding that the final 43 aircraft would feature indigenous radar and electronic warfare systems.
Specifically, HAL had committed to integrating the Defence Research and Development Organisation's (DRDO) Uttam Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar and the Swayam Raksha Kavach (SRK) Electronic Warfare suite starting from the 41st aircraft.
However, in a dramatic reversal in March 2025, HAL decided to install Israeli ELTA systems across all 83 aircraft, effectively abandoning its commitment to indigenous technology.
The timing of this decision is particularly jarring given the successful demonstration of indigenous capabilities during Operation Sindoor in May 2025. This military operation, launched in response to the Pahalgam terror attack, showcased the effectiveness of Indian-made defence systems including the Akash surface-to-air missile system, various radar technologies, and electronic warfare capabilities.
The operation successfully demonstrated India's capacity for high-precision, coordinated military action using predominantly indigenous systems, making HAL's subsequent decision to favour foreign technology all the more controversial.
Technical Excellence of Indigenous Systems
The DRDO's Uttam radar represents a significant technological achievement in India's defence capabilities. Developed by the Electronics and Radar Development Establishment (LRDE) since 2008 and formally sanctioned in 2012, the Uttam AESA radar features 912 Transmit/Receive Modules (TRMs) and has demonstrated the ability to track up to 50 airborne targets at ranges beyond 100 kilometres while engaging four targets simultaneously. The radar has completed over 230 hours of airborne testing and 125 test sorties on TEJAS MK-1 prototypes, with performance reportedly on par with proven designs like the Israeli EL/M-2052.
The Swayam Raksha Kavach Electronic Warfare suite, designed to work in conjunction with the Uttam radar, represents another milestone in indigenous defence technology. Developed by DRDO's Combat Aircraft Systems Development & Integration Centre in Bengaluru and Defence Electronics Research Laboratory in Hyderabad, the suite comprises a state-of-the-art Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) with four wideband receiver channels and an Advanced Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) pod utilising Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) technology. The system offers 360-degree radar warning coverage and can handle over a million pulses per second, providing comprehensive protection against electronic threats.
Certification Controversy And Conflicting Claims
HAL's justification for abandoning indigenous systems centres on certification delays by the Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC). According to HAL officials, the indigenous radar and EW suite were not completely certified for production by CEMILAC, forcing them to rely on proven Israeli technology to meet delivery commitments. However, this explanation has been challenged by DRDO officials who claim that CEMILAC had certified the Uttam radar for production in 2023, and that the organisation had requested more time for complete certification of the EW suite.
The controversy deepened when it was revealed that in April 2025, CEMILAC had issued an internal communication stating that the Uttam radar had completed four phases of flight trials and that the radar hardware had undergone qualification tests according to TEJAS MK-1A requirements. CEMILAC had even recommended commencing production of radar subsystems with HAL's avionics division in Hyderabad serving as the lead system integrator. This timeline suggests that certification issues may not have been as insurmountable as HAL claimed.
Adding to the confusion was HAL's own tender issued in November 2024 for 43 Uttam radars for the TEJAS MK-1A, which made the subsequent decision to abandon indigenous systems even more unexpected. DRDO officials had proposed a viable alternative of integrating the Uttam radar with imported EW systems until the SRK suite received complete certification, but this compromise was apparently not pursued.
Delivery Delays And Production Pressures
The controversy over indigenous systems must be viewed against the backdrop of significant delays in TEJAS MK-1A production. Despite the original commitment to begin deliveries in February 2024, not a single aircraft had been delivered by June 2025. The primary cause of these delays was the late supply of F404-IN20 engines from GE Aerospace, with the first engines arriving only in March 2025, nearly two years behind schedule.
HAL Chairman DK Sunil acknowledged that at least six aircraft were ready and waiting for engine installation by June 2025, with expectations that 12 engines would be supplied in the current fiscal year. The engine bottleneck had created significant pressure on HAL to accelerate production once engines became available, potentially influencing the decision to stick with proven foreign radar systems rather than risk further delays with indigenous alternatives.
Strategic Implications And Missed Opportunities
HAL's decision represents a significant setback for India's broader indigenisation goals under the Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) initiative. The government has made substantial investments in developing indigenous defence capabilities, with the defence ministry releasing several Positive Indigenisation Lists covering over 5,000 items currently imported by defence forces. The Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 explicitly prioritises procurement from domestic sources and mandates 50 percent indigenous content in procurement contracts.
The abandonment of indigenous radar systems is particularly problematic given the strategic importance of electronic warfare capabilities. As former DRDO scientist Ravi Gupta noted, having complete control over the supply chain and source code of indigenous radar systems is essential for national security, particularly during wartime when imported systems may be compromised. The decision effectively perpetuates India's dependence on foreign technology in critical areas despite having developed viable indigenous alternatives.
The situation becomes even more concerning when viewed alongside similar decisions in other programs. In the Rafale Marine fighter jet deal, the Uttam radar was reportedly removed from the final configuration at the insistence of manufacturer Dassault Aviation, despite being part of the original plan. This pattern suggests systemic challenges in promoting indigenous systems even when they meet technical requirements.
Industry Response
The controversy has highlighted tensions between HAL's immediate production pressures and India's long-term strategic goals of defence self-reliance. While HAL faces legitimate concerns about meeting delivery commitments and maintaining quality standards, DRDO officials argue that the company should demonstrate more patience and confidence in indigenous systems. Senior DRDO officials suggest that HAL's hesitation stems from a lack of confidence in indigenous technology and pressure to deliver jets quickly.
The decision has broader implications for India's defence industrial ecosystem. HAL has been actively outsourcing work worth approximately ₹25,000 crore to private sector firms as part of its production strategy, following the model used in the TEJAS program where major components like fuselage and wings were distributed among private companies. However, the preference for foreign critical systems undermines the development of indigenous supply chains and reduces opportunities for Indian companies to develop advanced capabilities.
Looking ahead, the Indian Air Force is planning a follow-on order for 97 more MK-1A fighters at an estimated ₹67,000 crore, bringing the total to 180 aircraft. The second batch of TEJAS MK-1A aircraft, expected to enter production in early 2028, is planned to feature enhanced indigenous content and upgrades, potentially providing another opportunity to integrate indigenous radar systems. The TEJAS MK-2 program, scheduled for prototype rollout in late 2025, is expected to feature an advanced Gallium Nitride (GaN)-based Uttam AESA radar with enhanced capabilities.
Conclusion
HAL's decision to abandon indigenous radar and electronic warfare systems for the TEJAS MK-1A represents a troubling contradiction to India's indigenisation goals and the spirit of self-reliance demonstrated during Operation Sindoor.
While legitimate concerns about certification timelines and production pressures may have influenced this decision, the controversy highlights systemic challenges in translating India's indigenous defence capabilities into production programs. The situation underscores the need for better coordination between development agencies, certification authorities, and production organisations to ensure that India's substantial investments in indigenous defence technology translate into real operational capabilities rather than remaining confined to laboratories and test facilities.
The ultimate resolution of this controversy will significantly influence India's credibility in promoting indigenous defence systems and may determine whether the country can achieve genuine self-reliance in critical military technologies or remain dependent on foreign suppliers despite possessing viable indigenous alternatives.
Based On India Today Report
- Next Post DRDO's Light Tank ‘Zorawar’ Completes High-Altitude Trials, Extended Range Up To 150 km Sunday, June 29, 2025 by Indian Defence News
- Previous Post 'Will You Sell It To Pakistan?': When A Pak Army General Asked BrahMos Creator In Abu Dhabi, His Response 'A Hit Below The Belt' Moment Sunday, June 29, 2025 by Indian Defence News