Capt Soiba Maningba Rangnamei of 16 Bihar Regiment confronting PLA during Galwan conflict

The 32-page report offers a survey of the history of India-China border dispute, the 2020 standoff, documents China’s systematic violations of past agreements

Washington: The US must elevate India’s territorial dispute with China on par with China’s assertiveness against other allies and partners; speak up against China’s “efforts at land-grabbing” in all multilateral platforms including the United Nations; offer India sophisticated military technology and initiate co-production and co-development of equipment; assist India in strengthening its military and naval capacity; and be prepared to fully support India in case of another border crisis, two former American officials in a major report on India-China ties have suggested.

Published by the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS) on Thursday, the report, titled ‘India-China Border Tensions and US Strategy in the Indo-Pacific’, argues that the 2020 crisis has left China in an advantageous position to project power, while India remains on the defensive. Lisa Curtis, who served as the senior director for South Asia in the National Security Council under Donald Trump, and in that capacity directly dealt with India during the 2020 crisis, and Derek Grossman, a senior analyst at Rand Corporation who has worked in the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, have authored the report.

Its other policy recommendations to the US government include conducting joint intelligence reviews with India to assess Chinese plans and intentions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and enhance contingency planning in case of another conflict; establishing or supporting an unofficial organisation that collates unclassified commercial satellite imagery on PLA positions at the LAC and disseminates it; and signalling to Pakistan — directly and through other partners of Islamabad — about the need to stay neutral during any India-China conflict.

The 32-page report offers a survey of the history of India-China border dispute, the 2020 standoff, documents China’s systematic violations of past agreements, and the military balance of power on the ground. It also examines the possible role of Pakistan in either opening a second front or taking actions short of a war when India and China are in a standoff, and carefully examines what India may want from the US and what Washington can offer in terms of support.

Delivering the keynote speech to mark the release of the report, Senator Jeff Merkley — who co-sponsored a resolution condemning Chinese aggression at the border and commending India’s response in the Senate last month — said that China was regularly probing and testing how far they could push along the LAC. He referred to the clash in December in 2022 in Arunachal Pradesh and said that India pushed back, based on “actionable intelligence” provided by the US — confirming a US media report published last week that had first disclosed bilateral intelligence cooperation in the run-up to the clash. While saying that he would like India to speak up more vocally against Russian aggression in Ukraine and join the international sanctions against Moscow, Merkley reiterated his support for India in the standoff with China.

From The Chinese Prism

The report acknowledges that while there are various theories, there are no substantive evidence-based explanations for why China did what it did in 2020. But it fundamentally attributes growing Chinese belligerence in the past decade-and-a-half vis a vis India to its rising economic and military strength.

Irrespective of motivation, the report says that Chinese actions — and subsequent Indian responses — have left the existing border agreements irrelevant and out of date.

The report documents China’s military activities along the LAC — the establishment of Western Theatre Command as responsible for the border with India, its increased troop presence along the LAC, the bolstering of integrated air and missile defence systems, a major expansion in infrastructure including roads in sensitive areas and the widening of air steps, and construction of large structures.

While the authors also examine India’s measures at the LAC, they conclude that China is in advantageous position. “Beijing has achieved a form of territorial expansion by enhancing its military capacity within the Aksai Chin…Small Chinese outposts along the border in 2020 were joined by temporary tent camps and eventually evolved into permanent bases with cold-weather shelters. In the Depsang Plains, before 2020, China maintained primarily an observational presence, whereas this area now contains infantry shelters and ammunition storage facilities, in addition to tanks and artillery systems.”

The report says that even in areas where disengagement of forces has occurred, such as the Galwan and Hot Springs, China has established “large military bases attached to modern roads” for easy resupply close to the border. China has also expanded its air poser facilities and logistic nodes not just along the Aksai Chin border but across the Tibetan plateau.

“China effectively has bolstered its power projection along its disputed border with India, while India is now on the defensive to reassert its territorial claims and prevent further erosion of its position in the Ladakh region, even as it faces territorial threats from China in the eastern sector of their disputed borders in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.”

From The Indian Prism

Terming the 2020 crisis as an “inflection point” that has led New Delhi to be more receptive to cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally through Quad, the report says that India’s interest in engaging in “dual-track relations” with China — “building stronger economic and diplomatic ties while downplaying military tensions at the border” — now stands diminished.

The LAC developments have also led to an increased convergence between India’s view of the China challenge and that of the US, even if “their strategies for dealing with the challenge differ in several respects”, for instance on bringing in defence-related components in Quad or criticising China on Taiwan or Xinjiang.

But the report offers a nuanced picture of what India may want from the US in the eventuality of another crisis. It says that while Delhi would expect intelligence support and winter gear, it may also request “joint exercises, emergency senior-level military and defence consultations, and inclusion in Quad statements of the need to defend Indian border claims—all to enhance its deterrence vis-à-vis Beijing”.

At the same time, India wants to convey to its citizens that it can handle military operations competently and successfully, even in a wartime scenario. India may also believe that joint statements with US that frame the border crisis through the lens of US-China competition could be seen as unhelpful. “As their country becomes an increasingly confident emerging power, Indian officials would prefer to avoid the perception of being dependent on Washington to manage the border dispute with China.”

All of this suggests that US policymakers are in a tough spot — “to do something, but not too much” to assist New Delhi. “Yet it is undeniable that US policy on this issue matters, and if handled effectively, can help deter future Chinese incremental land grabs—or “salami slicing”— of India’s borders,” the report says.

From The American Prism

The report says that until recently, American officials handling South Asia had concentrated largely on planning for a potential India-Pakistan conflict but they needed to pay more attention to a potential India-China military crisis for its implications in the Indo-Pacific and given that both countries are nuclear powers.

Curtis and Grossman suggest that the hardening Indian position on China can help open the doors for an American strategy of “deterrence by denial” — the provision of more security support in order to deny China the prospect of success by raising the costs for it. A second way to help India is through “deterrence by detection” — by ensuring India has sophisticated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

The report points out that US support to India at a time of Chinese assertiveness will also help send a signal to other Asian countries that strengthening security ties with Washington rather than placating Beijing is a more effective way to secure sovereignty.

“The United States should support New Delhi diplomatically and militarily, yet not trumpet this assistance. Washington should find creative ways to bolster India’s position without seeking to mediate the conflict. Given the implications for its broader Indo-Pacific strategy, Washington cannot afford to stay completely on the sidelines of this conflict nor neglect it until conflict breaks out.”

Future Outlook

The report is pessimistic about the future. It argues that with both China and India “enhancing infrastructure, changing their rules of engagement since 2020, and introducing new and advanced weapons systems on their sides of the disputed border”, the possibility of continued standoffs erupting into full-blown conflict remain high.

At the same time, the prospects for negotiating a political settlement of disputed borders remains low, especially since China has been “uninterested in clarifying the LAC through an exchange of maps, as India has suggested”. “China is resisting the map exchange process likely because territorial ambiguity favours exaggerated claims and supports maintaining military advantages.”

It is in this backdrop that the report lauds India for its patience and calm and efforts to find diplomatic solutions, while squarely placing the responsibility on China for “upping the ante” by its infrastructure development, military deployments and encroachment into territory India considers its own.