India’s decision to fast-track the indigenous development of a new generation of high-thrust fighter jet engines marks one of the most significant strategic leaps in its aerospace history, comparable to its entry into the nuclear and missile domains.

Following the lessons of Operation Sindoor—which underscored the need for long-term campaign-level preparedness and indigenous depth—the government has cleared a long-pending proposal to establish a joint venture between the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) and French aerospace giant Safran.

The project aims to produce and indigenise a 120 kiloNewton (kN) class engine, subsequently scaled up to a 140 kN thrust-capable turbofan, a level of propulsion that would not only equal but surpass the power-plants currently in use by advanced fifth-generation fighters like the American F-35, Russian Su-57, and even the Rafale, India’s most advanced combat jet in service today. The uniqueness of this program lies in its guarantee of complete technology transfer—a rarity in defence-aerospace cooperation where propulsion know-how traditionally remains the most tightly guarded.

Safran’s agreement to transfer full intellectual property rights and design data includes critical technologies such as single-crystal turbine blades, superalloys for high-pressure turbines, and hot-section design methods that enable engines to withstand extreme thermal and mechanical stress while sustaining high thrust output.

For India, which has traditionally struggled to cross the technological threshold from demonstrator jet turbines to operational frontline fighter propulsion, this partnership promises to close the gaps left by the Kaveri engine program.

The Kaveri, while a vital test bed, stalled in its ability to achieve operational thrust ratings and reliability. Thus, despite DRDO’s expertise in metallurgy and turbine R&D, India remained dependent on foreign engines—most notably the General Electric GE-404 and GE-414 series used in its Tejas fighter fleet.

The approved Safran-GTRE roadmap is ambitious, but clearly structured. Officials disclosed that nine prototype engines would be built over the span of 12 years, beginning with a 120 kN class demonstrator engine.

This would be progressively scaled up through iterative refinements to a 140 kN class operational variant. Development and certification would run in parallel with the timelines of India’s fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), ensuring that by the time AMCA enters serial production, it can be powered by a domestically manufactured high-thrust engine.

For the Indian Air Force and Navy, this offers a decisive break from the constraints of foreign-supplied propulsion, securing strategic autonomy in fleet modernisation. Moreover, with private sector giants like Tata Group, Larsen & Toubro, and Adani Defence expected to enter the ecosystem, engine manufacture is poised to evolve into a broad national industrial enterprise rather than a narrowly confined laboratory program.

This development also strengthens India’s negotiating hand in its ongoing fighter procurement projects. The IAF’s Medium Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MMRCA 2.0) requirement for 114 jets is widely seen as a competition where Dassault’s Rafale is strongly positioned.

With the emergence of a 120–140 kN local engine family, India gains the ability to insist on deeper co-production, leverage offsets effectively, and integrate its propulsion program with foreign OEMs on favourable terms.

Similarly, the Indian Navy’s carrier aviation requirements, centred on the Twin-Engine Deck-Based Fighter (TEDBF), are being designed from inception with compatibility for these indigenous engines, enabling both sea and land-based combat fleets to converge around a unified propulsion source.

This reduces logistical complexity, cuts dependence on foreign suppliers, and assures continuity of support during crises, a lesson highlighted during sanctions and supply uncertainties in the post-Pokhran-II era.

Strategically, the 140 kN class engine promises performance advantages that move India to the forefront of fifth-generation combat aviation. While the F-35’s Pratt & Whitney F135 engine generates roughly 125 kN in afterburner, and the Su-57’s Saturn Izdeliye 30 targets the same bracket, a 140 kN turbofan would confer superior thrust-to-weight ratios and payload flexibility to the AMCA.

This surplus power margin is especially important given India’s plans to integrate heavy supersonic stand-off weapons, including a fighter-compatible variant of the BrahMos missile. Such load-outs demand engines capable of sustaining high thrust without penalising manoeuvrability or range.

Should integration succeed, India would field perhaps the only stealth-class multi-role fighter able to unleash a super-cruise-capable, air-launched BrahMos—a capability far beyond what the F-35 or Su-57 currently offer.

The AMCA’s IWB can carry multiple Astra missile variants including ASTRA MK-1 and ASTRA MK-2 without modifying the missile airframe. Earlier, the AMCA was planned to carry at least four ASTRA MK-1 missiles internally; now, design refinements allow at least six ASTRA MK-2 missiles in stealth mode.

The integration allows the AMCA to maintain a low observability profile by minimizing reliance on external pylons for missile carriage. The AMCA’s IWB also supports flexible payload configurations, allowing combinations of ASTRA MK-2 and potentially the larger ASTRA MK-2I missile under development.

The announcement also represents a vindication of India’s long-standing strategic bet on France as a dependable partner in sensitive defence technologies. Throughout decades when the United States, the UK, or other Western suppliers restricted India’s access to defence intellectual property, Paris consistently took a more open stance.

Even after India’s 1998 nuclear program drew international sanctions, France continued to provide Mirage-2000 spares and missile system support. Safran’s willingness to transfer propulsion know-how—arguably the most restricted and high-value domain in aerospace—highlights this continuity and cements Indo-French defence ties as a unique axis of trust.

For India, it closes the loop left open by incomplete transfers from the United States; the GE-414 program, despite supplying 99 engines, restricted transfer at 70%, leaving the Indian side without critical access to turbine hot-section design.

The larger impact is on India’s global standing as a defence power. This breakthrough positions India among the very limited club—currently the U.S., Russia, France, and the UK—that can design, manufacture, and field high-thrust combat turbofans. China, despite investing billions, continues to face shortfalls in its WS-10 and WS-15 engine programs, resorting to reverse engineering or importing Russian power plants.

In contrast, India would emerge as a propulsion power with assured sovereignty over every level of its fifth-generation fighter ecosystem: stealth design, advanced avionics, BrahMos-class missiles, and now indigenous engines.

When operational and wedded to BrahMos-class hypersonic stand-offs, the indigenous engine-powered AMCA could well surpass the F-35 in raw performance margins and the Su-57 in credible operational readiness, realising New Delhi’s long-envisioned aspiration of strategic depth in air and naval power.