India’s potential domestic production of the Russian Su-57 stealth fighter has re-emerged as a significant defence and industrial topic, with far-reaching implications for both Indian air-power and the long-term strategic orientation of its defence procurement policy.

The possibility of locally manufacturing the Su-57 under a joint-production agreement between Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) represents not only a military modernisation initiative, but also a calculated geopolitical gamble tied to India’s “Make in India” and Atmanirbhar Bharat policies.

For years, India has sought a fifth-generation fighter capability to close the gap with rivals China and Pakistan, but its previous participation in the Russia-led Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) program collapsed over disagreements on cost, stealth standards, and full-scale technology transfers.

However, ongoing discussions suggest that Moscow may now be offering unusually generous transfer-of-technology terms, which, despite perceived limitations of the Su-57 compared to the American F-35, could prove decisive for India’s defence-industrial roadmap.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has publicly acknowledged its requirement for at least two to three squadrons — around 40 to 60 units — of fifth-generation fighters to complement its shrinking combat fleet, currently reliant on Su-30MKI heavy fighters, Rafales, upgraded Jaguars, and the indigenously produced TEJAS.

The urgency has grown acute in light of China’s expanding fleet of J-20 stealth fighters and reports, albeit walked back, of the Pakistan Air Force exploring acquisition of up to 40 Chinese J-35 stealth jets by the mid-to-late 2020s.

In any future high-intensity scenarios along the northern or western fronts, the lack of fifth-generation survivability could place India at a disadvantage. The U.S.-made F-35 Lightning II remains the most advanced option available globally, offering unmatched stealth, sensor fusion, and avionics. Aviation experts often cite its radar cross section (as small as 0.0015 square meters) as making it nearly undetectable.

However, structural political barriers remain. Washington has consistently refused India’s demands for technology transfers and local assembly, while deteriorating U.S.-India trade relations — including punitive tariffs imposed over Russian oil purchases — further strain the possibility of a Lightning-II deal.

Against this backdrop, while the F-35 is technologically superior, New Delhi views Moscow’s Su-57 offer as geopolitically and industrially more aligned with its long-term strategic requirements for self-sufficiency.

The question of feasibility rests on several interlocking factors. ROSTEC is actively studying HAL’s existing Su-30MKI assembly lines to assess whether they can be retrofitted for Su-57 production, thereby minimising the upfront industrial investment needed.

Russia is said to be conducting internal audits of the costs and customisation options India would require, including the possible integration of indigenous avionics, sensors, and weapons.

Domestically manufacturing Su-57s would represent a continuation — on a much more advanced technological plane — of the same model that India successfully employed with the Su-30MKI, which remains the backbone of the IAF fleet.

Moreover, Russia’s wartime economic strains and its growing isolation from Western defence markets could incentivise Moscow to bend further on technology-sharing demands, potentially giving India access to stealth design principles, propulsion technology, and composites expertise that could accelerate the development of its own Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) project.

For New Delhi, this is arguably more valuable over the long term than buying an off-the-shelf but closed foreign system like the F-35.

Still, there are pressing reservations. Independent assessments of the Su-57 have highlighted deficiencies in its stealth profile — particularly from side and rear aspects — as well as lingering doubts about the maturity of its engines and avionics.

Operational testing in Syria and Ukraine has demonstrated capability but not at the scale, quantity, or combat survivability levels expected of mature fifth-generation platforms. Indian negotiators know well that the Su-57 lags behind both the F-35 and China’s J-20 in stealth refinement, networked operations, and production scale.

If India commits to co-producing the Su-57, there is also the risk of triggering secondary sanctions under U.S. legislation such as CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act), though New Delhi has previously maneuvered around such risks when acquiring the Russian S-400 air defence systems.

Moreover, given the slow pace of defence decision-making in New Delhi, a drawn-out negotiation process could undermine India’s ability to respond quickly to Pakistan and China’s stealth acquisitions.

From a strategic viewpoint, however, the possible Make in India Su-57 program aligns closely with two of India’s overriding goals: restoring the credibility of its Air Force with a fifth-generation capability by 2030 and cultivating an indigenous aerospace ecosystem resilient against supply chain disruptions.

Even if the Su-57 is not the world’s most advanced stealth fighter, locally manufacturing it would secure access to composite fuselage techniques, advanced radar absorbent materials, and stealth shaping expertise — knowledge that could directly feed into the AMCA and future sixth-generation designs.

Thus, the crux for India is not whether the Su-57 outperforms the F-35 — it does not — but whether it can serve as a stepping stone for broader industrial independence at a politically acceptable cost.

If India moves forward with such a program, it would represent both a tactical hedge against regional threats and a strategic bet on building sovereign aerospace capabilities, marking a fundamental continuation of India’s long game in defence industrialisation.

Based Republic World Video Report