Pakistan’s acquisition of Chinese Hangor-class submarines, expected to enter service in 2026, marks a significant shift in the naval balance of power in the northern Arabian Sea and the wider Indian Ocean Region, reported SCMP a Chinese based news web portal.

This development indicates not only enhanced undersea capabilities for the Pakistan Navy but also represents a milestone in China’s naval export strategy, which has overcome technical obstacles that delayed the delivery of these vessels.

The Hangor-class submarines, jointly built by China and Pakistan and based on the Type-039A design, are conventionally powered attack submarines featuring advanced systems such as air-independent propulsion (AIP).

This technology allows the submarines to remain submerged for up to three weeks without surfacing for oxygen, significantly improving stealth and endurance. This capability strengthens Pakistan's anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) posture, especially in the strategically critical Arabian Sea, where it could challenge India’s dominant naval presence.

Strategically, the arrival of Chinese submarines in Pakistan’s fleet complicates India’s maritime operational environment. These submarines enhance Pakistan’s ability to threaten Indian naval assets, including aircraft carriers and surface vessels.

Their presence forces India to allocate greater resources and expense towards anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities to protect vital sea lanes from the Strait of Hormuz to India’s western coast. This increases the operational complexity and cost for the Indian Navy in maintaining maritime dominance.

From a geopolitical perspective, this development tightens the China-Pakistan defence nexus, underscoring Beijing’s expanding influence in the Indian Ocean. The submarines will complement China's wider strategic interests, such as protecting the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and securing maritime routes linking China to Middle Eastern energy supplies through Pakistan's Gwadar port.

China’s growing naval footprint in Djibouti, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar further supports this regional maritime strategy, positioning Beijing as a key player in the Indo-Pacific security architecture.

The technology transfer embedded in the submarine program is particularly notable. It signifies progress in Pakistan’s indigenous defence production capabilities, a step towards self-reliance. The partnership also reflects China’s ambition to export sophisticated underwater warfare technology, which until recently had been constrained by Western embargoes on critical components like submarine engines.

A major technical hurdle that had slowed the program related to engines. The German-made MTU396 diesel engines required for the Type 039A submarines were subject to EU embargoes, which blocked exports to China due to concerns arising from Tiananmen Square sanctions. This embargo forced China to develop a domestic alternative, the CHD620 engine, which is reportedly a reverse-engineered version of the German engine.

While the CHD620 enables these submarines to avoid reliance on Western technology, it has yet to prove itself fully against Western standards, particularly in acoustic stealth and operational endurance. 

Chinese claims suggest reasonable performance, but concerns remain about noise levels and integration with other submarine systems, which are crucial in high-intensity combat scenarios. If these issues persist, they could limit the submarines’ tactical effectiveness in ASW environments dominated by technologically advanced adversaries.

India, for its part, has already taken significant strides with its indigenously developed nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), such as INS Arihant and INS Arighaat. Nuclear propulsion provides Indian submarines with advantages in range, speed, and endurance over conventional submarines.

However, Pakistan’s augmented conventional submarine fleet still adds considerable complexity to India’s naval calculus, particularly in terms of tracking and countering increased undersea threats.

The enhanced submarine capabilities combined with missile systems like the YJ-82 anti-ship and Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missiles bolster Pakistan’s second-strike nuclear deterrence at sea. This raises the stakes by complicating India’s maritime deterrent strategy and signalling China’s expanding capacity to support its ally’s strategic posture.

The interplay of these capabilities reshapes regional deterrence dynamics and requires India to maintain a heightened focus on submarine detection and localized maritime security.

The introduction of Chinese-built Hangor-class submarines into the Pakistan Navy is a formidable development. It signifies both expanded undersea strength for Pakistan and China’s overcoming of past technological embargoes, allowing it to enhance its naval exports.

For India, this shifts the Indian Ocean’s security environment, requiring renewed emphasis on anti-submarine warfare, maritime domain awareness, and strategic planning to counterbalance the evolving China-Pakistan maritime partnership. The region faces a more complex and contested maritime domain as a result.

Based On SCMP Report