India’s decision to privatise the conventional missile sector marks a structural shift in defence-industrial policy, moving away from a State-dominated model towards a competitive ecosystem where private firms can integrate complete weapon systems, Harsh V Pant analysed in The Hindustan Times.

This reform is designed to build resilience, scale, and autonomy in missile production, ensuring India can sustain wartime requirements against adversaries like China and Pakistan.

India has approved the transfer of Defence Research and Development Organisation technologies covering conventional missile systems to qualified defence companies.

This includes both public and private firms, creating a level playing field through competitive bidding rather than nomination-based contracts. Bharat Dynamics Limited’s near-monopoly in tactical missiles is being diluted, with private firms now eligible to become Development-cum-Production Partners.

The systems covered are extensive. These include surface-to-air missiles, Astra air-to-air weapons, Rudram anti-radiation missiles, anti-ship and anti-tank systems, land-attack cruise missiles, and quasi-ballistic tactical systems such as Pralay. Longer-range conventional strike systems in the 1,000–1,500 km category are also being considered for private-sector participation.

Nuclear-capable strategic systems, particularly the Agni series, remain tightly controlled under a restrictive security framework.

The rationale is twofold. On the immediate level, it supports Atmanirbhar Bharat, import substitution, and greater domestic capacity. On the strategic level, modern warfare has shown that precision weapons are central to sustained campaigns, with stockpiles rapidly depleted.

Industrial capacity, therefore, becomes a determinant of military effectiveness. For India, this has a direct China dimension, as a prolonged conflict would test not only weapon quality but also the ability to replenish them at scale.

The old model of State-led development and nominated production created structural limitations. Limited competition reduced incentives for productivity, cost reduction, and capacity expansion.

The new model separates technological ownership from manufacturing monopoly, consistent with the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2026, which seeks to establish parity between public and private manufacturers.

Expanding beyond Bharat Dynamics Limited can accelerate production, create redundancy, and strengthen wartime resilience. Private firms can move up the value chain from components to full-system integration involving propulsion, seekers, guidance, software, and testing.

This will deepen supply chains, integrate MSMEs, and raise indigenous value addition. A broader industrial base also supports India’s defence-export ambitions by enabling scale, competitive pricing, and reliable supply.

Missile production demands mastery of propulsion, guidance, control systems, electronics, software, and materials. Companies capable of subsystems must develop the capacity to integrate complete systems to armed forces’ reliability standards.

This requires defence licences, explosives approvals, quality certification, security clearances, and specialised testing infrastructure. Substantial capital and workforce development will be necessary.

The government stresses that greater private participation should not be seen as competition with DRDO, Bharat Dynamics Limited, or Bharat Electronics Limited. Instead, DRDO will focus on advanced research and next-generation technologies, while industry takes responsibility for production, integration, and lifecycle support. Legacy arrangements will not vanish overnight, so procurement structures must ensure genuine competition rather than token inclusion of private firms.

The greatest challenge is scale. Private firms will invest only if assured of predictable demand. The government cannot guarantee production runs for every company, so procurement architecture must balance confidence with competition. This applies equally to advanced systems, including hypersonic weapons, which demand higher technological maturity and industrial capability.

Technology transfer must translate into absorbed capability. Competition must deliver lower costs and faster production.

Private investment must yield actual capacity. Increased capacity must ultimately translate into military resilience. India is moving towards a model where the State acts as technology provider, regulator, and customer, while industry undertakes production.

This structural change aims to create a defence-industrial architecture capable of surviving modern warfare pressures, where technological advantage must be matched by production volumes, supply-chain resilience, cost efficiency, innovation, and rapid replacement of losses.

India’s strategic autonomy will depend on whether it can design and manufacture sophisticated missiles in sufficient numbers and sustain production under wartime conditions. Opening the conventional missile sector to private industry is a decisive step in that direction.

Agencies