Russia is tightening its grip on the global uranium supply chain, with projections suggesting it could control nearly 36% of mined uranium by 2040 and already dominating enrichment capacity at around 44%, FirstPost reported.

This poses a serious challenge for Western nations, as nuclear power demand rises alongside AI-driven electricity needs, while alternative capacity will take years to develop.

Russia’s strategy in uranium is emerging as a new energy weapon. Moscow has steadily expanded its influence across mining, conversion, and enrichment. ROSATOM, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, controls about 44% of global enrichment capacity and nearly 46% of conversion services, creating a structural chokepoint for Western utilities.

This dominance means that 20% of US reactor fuel and 25% of EU demand currently depend on Russian supplies.

The mining side is equally strategic. Russia directly produces uranium from domestic mines in regions such as Zabaykalsky Krai, Buryatia, and Kurgan, while also leveraging joint ventures in Kazakhstan and Tanzania.

By 2024, Uranium One, ROSATOM’s foreign arm, produced nearly 5,829 tons of uranium, supplementing Russia’s domestic output of 2,738 tons. With resources exceeding 497,000 tons, Russia is positioned to expand further, supported by federal funding of over ₹5,000 crores for exploration in recent years.

Western nations face a supply crunch. The US ban on Russian enriched uranium in 2024 removed about a quarter of its reactor fuel supply, driving enrichment prices up by 56% to $252 per SWU (roughly ₹2.1 lakhs per SWU) by 2026.

Utilities are now locked into long-term contracts at unprecedented costs, while new Western enrichment capacity from Urenco, Orano, and Centrus will only meet about 30% of demand by 2030. This leaves a structural deficit, particularly for advanced reactors requiring High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU), where ROSATOM remains the only large-scale supplier.

Europe is especially vulnerable. Many EU reactors, particularly those using VVER designs, rely exclusively on Russian fuel fabrication.

Alternatives exist for Western PWRs, but the transition for VVER fleets is far more complex. With nuclear power expected to play a central role in Europe’s decarbonisation and AI-driven electricity demand, the dependency on Russia is a strategic liability.

The geopolitical implications are stark. Russia’s uranium power play mirrors its earlier use of natural gas as leverage. By controlling enrichment and mining, Moscow can exert pressure on Western energy security, complicating sanctions regimes and forcing costly reconfigurations of supply chains.

The West’s options—expanding domestic enrichment, diversifying mining partnerships in Canada and Australia, and accelerating SMR deployment—are constrained by long lead times and high capital costs.

Agencies