Former Indian Air Force Chief Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria (Retd) criticised Hindustan Aeronautics Limited's decision to postpone the integration of the indigenous UTTAM AESA radar on the initial TEJAS MK-1A fleet, describing the move as a "bad decision" said Bhadauria on Episode 64 of NDTV’s Ctrl + Alt + Defence podcast, hosted by Shiv Aroor and Vishnu Som

At the centre of the dispute is HAL's choice to retain the Israeli EL/M-2052 AESA radar across the entire initial TEJAS MK-1A order rather than transition to the indigenous UTTAM radar midway through production as originally envisaged.

Bhadauria questioned that reasoning and argued that India should have prioritised induction of the indigenous system even if it resulted in a modest delay.

"I hear that HAL has gone in for more of the same radar and not taken Uttam, which is a bad decision to my mind," he said.

He further argued that concerns over an additional year or year-and-a-half of integration work were outweighed by the strategic importance of fielding an Indian-designed radar.

According to Bhadauria, flight-test data gathered by the National Flight Test Centre demonstrated that Uttam was already outperforming the radar selected for the Mk1A. He stated that the indigenous radar had "already come of age" and was ready for operational induction and aircraft integration.

The DRDO consistently maintained that Uttam had achieved production readiness and proposed a temporary arrangement under which the radar could be paired with imported electronic warfare equipment. Such a solution would have allowed the radar to enter service while certification of the fully indigenous electronic warfare package continued separately.

HAL, however, maintained that neither UTTAM nor the indigenous Swayam Raksha Kavach electronic warfare suite had completed all certification requirements for production integration. Company officials estimated that introducing the complete indigenous package could have added between 12 and 18 months to an already delayed schedule.

The disagreement highlights an important distinction between production clearance, flight-test approval and full operational certification. A radar can be approved for manufacture, cleared for testing in development aircraft and still require additional work before installation in a frontline fighter fleet.

In April 2025, the Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification reportedly advised HAL and DRDO to begin subsystem production after UTTAM completed key stages of flight testing and hardware qualification. Even so, questions remained regarding final aircraft-level clearance.

At one stage, DRDO Chief Samir V Kamat expressed confidence that UTTAM could still be integrated from the 41st aircraft onward. That possibility ultimately disappeared when HAL reversed course and sought additional Israeli radar sets instead.

The issue carries wider implications because India's fighter force remains under considerable pressure. The Indian Air Force is operating roughly 29 fighter squadrons against an authorised strength of around 42.

The retirement of the MiG-21 Bison fleet further intensified concerns over declining numbers. Senior Air Force leadership has previously indicated that India requires annual induction of between 36 and 40 combat aircraft simply to offset retirements before any meaningful force expansion can occur.

Future withdrawals of Jaguar, MiG-29 and Mirage-2000 aircraft later this decade are expected to increase that pressure.

Supporters of HAL's decision argue that maintaining a single radar configuration simplifies certification, manufacturing and fleet introduction. Using one established radar across the entire first production batch reduces integration risk and allows engineers to concentrate on getting aircraft delivered and accepted by the Air Force.

Critics counter that the expected schedule advantage has yet to be demonstrated, especially given delays to the first MK-1A handover, which was originally anticipated in early 2024.

The technical debate between UTTAM and the EL/M-2052 remains equally complex.

Both are Active Electronically Scanned Array radars, but operational performance depends on far more than headline range figures. Detection distance, target tracking stability, resistance to jamming, software maturity, weapons integration, power availability and cooling capacity all influence combat effectiveness.

Bhadauria cited flight-test results suggesting UTTAM delivered superior detection performance. Some reported trial figures indicated detection of fighter-sized targets at around 140 kilometres, while published claims for the EL/M-2052 have sometimes approached 200 kilometres under differing conditions.

However, radar comparisons are notoriously difficult because target size, altitude, aspect angle, electronic interference and mission profiles can dramatically alter results. Without identical testing conditions, direct range comparisons remain inconclusive.

Reports have suggested that UTTAM incorporates roughly 912 to 980 transmit-receive modules, while TEJAS-specific versions of the EL/M-2052 are often reported to employ around 900 modules. Yet module counts alone do not determine overall performance, as processing architecture and software play equally important roles.

Similarly, claims regarding higher target-tracking capacity for UTTAM require careful interpretation because different manufacturers often use different criteria when defining trackable or displayable targets.

The Israeli radar nevertheless enjoys the advantage of maturity, having accumulated extensive experience across multiple operational roles, including air-to-air combat, surface attack and mapping missions. This established record reduces integration uncertainty for production aircraft.

The radar decision also has long-term logistical consequences.

With the first TEJAS MK-1A batch retaining the EL/M-2052 and later aircraft expected to receive UTTAM, the Air Force could eventually operate two distinct radar configurations. That would potentially require separate spares inventories, maintenance procedures, software baselines, diagnostic equipment and technician training pipelines.

One possible mitigation could involve grouping aircraft with similar equipment at specific bases, although that would introduce its own operational constraints.

India's September 2025 contract for 97 additional TEJAS aircraft effectively shifted UTTAM's future to the second production batch.

That order, worth around US$7 billion, is expected to feature UTTAM radar systems combined with the indigenous Swayam Raksha Kavach electronic warfare suite, making it a major test of India's domestic aerospace manufacturing capabilities.

A significant milestone followed when HAL placed orders for UTTAM radar antenna assemblies and interface hardware from Astra Microwave. Those purchases moved the radar beyond the prototype stage and into genuine series-production preparation.

Industry observers note that successful mass production poses challenges very different from flight testing. Every radar must meet consistent quality standards, integrate seamlessly with aircraft systems and remain supportable throughout decades of operational service.

If successful, UTTAM could eventually provide India with greater sovereign control over radar upgrades, electronic warfare responses, software modifications and future weapons integration, reducing dependence on foreign suppliers.

Yet the wider TEJAS story illustrates that self-reliance remains a gradual process. Even with an indigenous airframe and future indigenous sensor suite, the fighter still depends on imported GE F404 engines, highlighting the complexities involved in achieving full defence industrial independence.

Ultimately, the controversy extends far beyond radar selection. The central question is whether HAL can accelerate deliveries of operationally capable TEJAS MK-1A fighters while simultaneously transitioning to indigenous mission systems quickly enough to help restore India's shrinking fighter strength.

For both policymakers and military planners, the true measure of success will not be radar specifications or procurement announcements, but whether aircraft are delivered, accepted, sustained and made combat-ready at the pace required to rebuild the Indian Air Force's frontline combat capability.

Agencies