India, UK Hold Consultations On Disarmament And Non-Proliferation

The India-UK Consultations on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation were held in Delhi on February 4, where the two sides discussed conventional weapons including AI in the military domain and multilateral export control regimes.

The two sides discussed developments in the field of disarmament, as per a statement by the Ministry of External Affairs.

"The two sides discussed developments in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation relating to nuclear, chemical and biological domains, as well as regional non-proliferation issues, outer space security-related matters, conventional weapons including AI in the military domain and multilateral export control regimes," the statement said.

"The Indian delegation was led by Muanpuii Saiawi, Joint Secretary (Disarmament and International Security Affairs), Ministry of External Affairs, while the UK delegation was led by Stephen Lillie, Director for Defence and International Security at the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office," the statement added.

The UK works within the NPT to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, promote cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and advance nuclear disarmament, a statement by the UK government says.

Since the end of the Cold War, the UK dismantled their tactical and air-delivered nuclear weapons, becoming the only Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) with a single weapon system. They also reduced the role of nuclear weapons in security strategy, and significantly reduced our total stockpile of nuclear warheads.

The UK champions the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) international safeguards system including by encouraging all States to ratify and fully implement safeguards agreements, as per UK Government.

The NPT is an international treaty which aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and pursue negotiations in good faith on disarmament measures, as per the UK Government.

This treaty is important because it contains commitments made by China, France, Russia, the UK and the US. The NPT refers to these countries as the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). It came into force in 1970.

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China Secretly Building Massive Nuclear Fusion Research Centre, Satellite Images Reveal

China is currently constructing a significant nuclear fusion research facility in Mianyang, which has raised alarms regarding its implications for regional security, particularly for India. Satellite images reveal a sprawling complex designed to enhance both nuclear weapons capabilities and clean energy research. The facility features four external arms housing laser bays and a central chamber where hydrogen isotopes will be subjected to high-energy laser beams to initiate fusion reactions.

1. Nuclear Weapons Development: Experts express concerns that the Mianyang facility could be utilized for nuclear weapons development. The technology employed in laser-ignited fusion can enable China to refine its existing nuclear arsenal without conducting traditional tests, which are restricted under international treaties. This capability allows for the enhancement of nuclear weapon designs while adhering to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Satellite imagery has unveiled a sprawling complex, featuring four external arms, each housing laser bays, and a central experimental chamber designed to contain hydrogen isotopes. These isotopes, such as deuterium and tritium, will be subjected to intense laser beams, facilitating fusion reactions that generate energy.

2. Growing Nuclear Arsenal: China's nuclear capabilities have been expanding rapidly, with estimates suggesting an increase from 410 nuclear warheads in January 2023 to approximately 500 by January 2024. Projections indicate that if this trend continues, China could match or exceed the nuclear missile capabilities of the United States and Russia by the end of the decade. In contrast, India's nuclear stockpile is significantly smaller, estimated at around 172 warheads.

3. Energy Production Implications: While the facility has potential applications in clean energy generation, its dual-use nature—capable of both power generation and weapons development—poses a strategic dilemma for India. Should China succeed in harnessing fusion energy effectively, it could alter global energy dynamics and position itself as a leader in clean energy technologies.

The development of this facility reflects China's broader strategy to enhance its nuclear deterrent capabilities and technological prowess. The design of the Mianyang facility is reportedly similar to that of the U.S. National Ignition Facility (NIF), which has achieved significant milestones in fusion energy research. However, experts caution that such advancements could provide China with substantial advantages in both military and energy sectors, thereby increasing tensions in the region.

China's secretive construction of a massive nuclear fusion research centre raises significant concerns for India regarding both national security and regional stability. The potential for enhanced nuclear capabilities coupled with advancements in clean energy technology underscores the need for India to reassess its strategic posture amid these developments.

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Global Nuclear Disarmament in Disarray: Pak Media

As we venture deeper into the 21st century, the once-idealistic notion of global nuclear disarmament has become outdated in the face of escalating global volatility. Recent events have only served to exacerbate tensions and intensify the looming threat of nuclear annihilation. Notably, in February 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the suspension of his nation’s participation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START); the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement. This has prompted a strong response from the United States, which has ceased exchanging data on nuclear forces. Such developments highlight the increasing fragility of the future of nuclear disarmament and raise doubts about the effectiveness of arms limitation treaties such as the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Outer Space Treaty (OST), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the New START doctrine.

Rose Gottemoeller, the chief negotiator for New START, has warned that the failure of the treaty between the world’s two nuclear superpowers highlights that the world is on the cusp of another nuclear arms race. As of early 2023, approximately 12,500 warheads were still in the possession of nine countries, leaving the possibility of nuclear disarmament in the future questionable.

The path towards disarmament appears to be strewn with numerous obstacles. In 2019 the United States walked away from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and later in 2020, it also withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty, which dealt a heavy blow to the progress made in eliminating an entire class of nuclear missiles. Likewise, recent developments in Russia’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus have raised the spectre of nuclear conflict, leading the United Nations to issue a warning that the risk of nuclear weapons being used is higher now than it has ever been since the Cold War.

Failure of the treaty between the world’s two nuclear superpowers highlights that the world is on the cusp of another nuclear arms race.

The situation is further compounded by the growing nuclear arsenals of countries like Israel, which is expanding its nuclear facilities, coupled with intentions to equip its submarines with nuclear weapons. This has raised concerns about the potential for a nuclear conflict in the Middle East. Similarly, North Korea’s progress in acquiring a nuclear weapon and willingness to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively is worrying. Such actions by both Israel and North Korea hinder disarmament efforts.

Furthermore, China’s complaint at the UN regarding the AUKUS deal highlights the loophole of NPT as under this treaty it is not allowed to transfer fissile material and nuclear technology from a nuclear-armed state to a non-nuclear state. This has brought to the forefront a host of concerns surrounding nuclear proliferation.

A similar trend is evident in South Asia, where Pakistan is particularly concerned about India’s growing nuclear arsenal. India has signed agreements such as the Indo-US 123 agreement, which involves the procurement of uranium enrichment and trade of nuclear components with the US. This agreement marks a departure from the NPT policy.

Furthermore, India has been steadily enhancing its nuclear capabilities. In 2021, it conducted tests of the Agni-Prime (Agni-P) missile, followed by the testing of Agni-V in 2022, which is a land-based nuclear-capable Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). India’s nuclear triad, which allows for launching nuclear weapons from land, air, and sea, is firmly in flow. Moreover, India has acquired advanced weapon systems such as the S400 defence system and long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles, indicating a trend of vertical proliferation which raises questions about the effectiveness of nuclear non-proliferation regimes.

In contrast, Pakistan has been proactive in its efforts to contain nuclear proliferation in South Asia. In the past, Pakistan proposed the Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR), which includes three crucial elements: missile and nuclear restraint, maintaining conventional balance, and reinforcing elements of conflict resolution. Pakistan’s permanent representative to the UN has time and again reiterated that Pakistan’s offer for SRR remains on the table, aiming to promote peace and stability in the region. Given the growing threat of India, SRR would effectively curb arms build-up. Certainly, Pakistan should continue to project its commitment and constructive role towards nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia.

Overall, the current global strategic environment is ripe for an arms race, creating prospects for vertical as well as horizontal proliferation. Mearsheimer astutely pointed out that structural changes in the global order are compelling states to adopt offensive measures to safeguard their interests. The shadow of uncertainty hangs over the world due to ongoing events, escalations, and provocations that are spurring a renewed arms race. At this critical juncture, diplomatic engagement, cooperative initiatives, and confidence-building measures must take centre stage to prevent further escalation. The challenges at hand are formidable, but they must not deter the world from seeking viable solutions.

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US Fusion Breakthrough Reinforces The Case Against Live Nuclear Tests, And India Should Take Note: Chinese Media

The success of virtual nuclear testing has set the stage for ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty, but India still wants to conduct nuclear tests. A breach of norms against testing should invite universal condemnation and punitive action, and not be enabled by a waiver of sanctions

by Riaz Khokhar

Last month’s fusion ignition breakthrough by scientists in the US reinforced the multilateral norm against live nuclear tests and advanced the earlier work of confining nuclear explosions to within simulation labs. However, it could be bad news for India, which has in the past argued for a resumption of testing to validate its nuclear weapon designs.

The nuclear fusion breakthrough came on December 5, when physicists at the US Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s National Ignition Facility were able to produce more energy from fusion than had been used to power the experiment.

The fusion ignition lasted less than a second, but a sustainable chain reaction would allow scientists to test modern nuclear devices on computers, with no need to detonate nuclear bombs in the real world.

With America not conducting any live tests since its unilateral moratorium in 1992, US nuclear scientists switched to supercomputers, lasers and other experimental capabilities to maintain the reliability and performance of the country’s nuclear deterrent.

In 2020, US scientists and other experts opposed any resumption of nuclear testing, following reports that the Trump administration had discussed the idea as a potential warning to Russia and China. Scientists have acquired more knowledge about the physics of nuclear explosions via computer simulations than they did through the live tests prior to 1992.

The success of virtual nuclear testing and the system of compliance verification have set the stage for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was concluded in 1996 and signed by 186 countries but has yet to come into force.

Indeed, India’s hawks have talked of the need to conduct nuclear tests when the prospects of ratification rise. This first happened after US president Barack Obama’s speech in Prague in April 2009, in which he said he would immediately pursue US ratification of the treaty.

K. Santhanam, a disgruntled senior scientist at the Defence Research and Development Organisation – which controls the military aspect of India’s nuclear program – alleged his government’s long-standing position and publicly disclosed that India’s 1998 nuclear test had underperformed. He insisted on another test to revalidate the nation’s nuclear capability before signing the treaty. (This claim is baseless as former NSA MK Narayanan clarified that Santhanam's allegations was "horrific". He said India has verified its thermonuclear capabilities and the data of the test was shared across the security establishment).

After the Trump administration’s test discussions came to light, Indian experts thought it was “good news” for India to verify its nuclear weapon designs through renewed testing. Following Joe Biden’s election as US president in 2021, he was expected to build on the Obama-era legacy of recommitting to ratifying the treaty.

Against these prospects, a 2022 report by an India expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace highlighted possible ways for the US to augment India’s nuclear capability, including by helping New Delhi secure weapons designs. If this proved legally questionable, Washington could consider a sanctions waiver if India chose to conduct live testing at some point in the future.

The first proposal would appear to put the US in violation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, under which nuclear weapons states cannot share critical technology with non-nuclear-weapons states.

Besides, India might already have effective nuclear weapons designs as it has been working on them since the 1980s. And it would come as no surprise if Russia – India’s long-standing strategic partner – had assisted New Delhi in mastering weapon designs or had covertly supplied proven designs.

Clearly, any nuclear tests carried out by India – or a waiving of sanctions for doing so – would undermine decades of work, potentially rendering irrelevant the huge investment in computer-based nuclear experiments and verification compliance technologies. And it could spark rounds of testing by other existing and potential nuclear weapons states.

Finally, other countries in the region would be quick to condemn the testing, given the potential to provoke strategic instability, nuclear weapons proliferation and a nuclear arms race.

To strengthen the multilateral norms against nuclear testing, the US should encourage actions that go beyond unilateral moratoriums. Until the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty comes into force, one near-term strategy could be to facilitate joint statements from nuclear rivals that legally bind states. In any case, a breach of norms against testing should always invite universal condemnation and punitive action.

Riaz Khokhar is a retired Pak diplomat and a research associate at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) and a former Asia Studies visiting fellow at the East-West Centre in Washington

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Agni-V Makeover - Pak Media

Given the Indian missile testing spree throughout 2022, it seems to have abandoned restraint in nuclear capable missile development and testing. The recent test of Agni-V (15 Dec 22) at an extended range of 5400 km poses regional as well as global concerns. It is also being reported that the missile can even go beyond 7000 km as its overall weight has been reduced by 20%. Being a member of Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), India stands in violation of its political commitments to curb missile proliferation and exercise maximum possible restraint in development, testing and deployment of missiles. Interestingly, the country is nowhere close on these three counts.

India not only has the fastest growing nuclear program but also fastest missile testing record in the region. India and North Korea have tested maximum number of missiles in the outgoing year. Although the motivation for missile testing is different for both countries; however, it reflects a similar threatening and armament-oriented mindset. North Korea’s missile testing is a clear political and strategic signal to the U.S. administration vis-à-vis its calls for denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. While Indian missile testing could be seen as signalling towards China – backed by the West for its own vested interests, the increasing ranges of Indian missiles should be equally concerning for the U.S. like the threats from North Korean missile program.

The maximum range of Agni-V always remained contested. Some assessments indicate that it may be capable of hitting targets up to 8,000 km. Even though Agni-V can cover entire China, the Indian DRDO is working on developing even a longer-range missile Agni-VI capable of carrying warhead beyond 10,000 km. It is believed that India is unlikely to pursue capabilities beyond China and that the requirement for ranges should be calculated from farthest point in the operating country till the farthest point in adversary’s landmass. However, the same criterion is not applied when analysts assess the rationale for development of Pakistan’s Shaheen-3 missile that barely reaches farthest points in India. Anything exceeding the stated objective of deterrence vis-à-vis China would indicate either a technological competition driven by status or catering for a deterrent capability to address potential threats from across the globe. At the doctrinal level, missiles with ranges up to 10,000 km clearly go beyond what may be required for maintaining a credible minimum deterrent vis-à-vis China and Pakistan.

Indian scientific leadership has been long indicating their intent of integrating Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) capability in the Agni-V and a future Agni-VI missile. The recent test of Agni-V is also reported to be that of Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV). The fact that the weight of missile is reduced by 20% coincides with one of the main subsystem requirements of HGV to have a light-weight airframe. HGVs, a category of hypersonic weapons, are usually launched on top of ballistic missiles which then glide back through the atmosphere to their target at hypersonic speeds (5 Mach and above). HGVs are capable of carrying multiple warheads and are highly maneuverable, designed to not just reduce the flight time but also to avoid existing missile defense systems. Testing and integration of HGV capability in the, currently, longest-range Indian missile could be an indication of an upcoming demonstration of MIRV capability. MIRV capable missiles are generally seen as a countermeasure for BMD systems but would be an overkill given the absence of an operational BMD system in China and Pakistan.

Introduction of newer technologies like HGV and MIRV capable missile systems will make resumption of nuclear testing a necessity for India. ICBMs like Agni-V and Agni-VI with respective ranges of 7,000 and 12,000 km are not suitably complimented by the currently claimed maximum yield of 25 KT. There are also significant domestic pressures on India regarding the disputed success of its claimed thermonuclear tests. Hence, Indian position not to sign CTBT is consequential. During the recently held 77th session of the First Committee, India voted against Operative Paragraph (OP) 19 of the resolution on nuclear disarmament, which calls for early entry into force, universalization and strict observance of the CTBT.

In its eagerness to enter the elite club, India appears to be dismissive of regional realities in the form of fragile deterrence stability, existing disputes and a perpetually dysfunctional state of relationship with its nuclear armed neighbours. Although India has made a commitment in its nuclear doctrine to work towards global nuclear disarmament and maintains this stance at international forums; its actions point towards arms race which runs counter to the objective of disarmament.

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CTBT Does Not Address Concerns Raised By India: Foreign Secretary Shringla At UNSC

New York: While speaking at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting on Monday, Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla said that Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) does not address a number of core concerns raised by India.

Shringla cited this as a major reason behind India's non-participation in the treaty. His remarks came while addressing the United Nations Security Council meeting on 'Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty' (CTBT).

"India had participated in the negotiations of the draft CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament. But, India could not join the Treaty as the Treaty did not address a number of core concerns raised by India," Foreign Secretary said at the UN Security Council meeting.

During the address, Shringla also said India is committed to the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world and urged the international community for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the world.

"We believe that this goal can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework, as outlined in India's Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2006," Shringla said.

During the address, Foreign Secretary also added that "India maintains a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosive testing."

India was the first country to call for a ban on nuclear testing in 1954 and a non-discriminatory treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as distinct from non-dissemination, in 1965.

With the objective of strengthening non-proliferation architecture, India has also joined various export control regimes namely, Australia Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime and has harmonized its controls with the Nuclear Suppliers Group lists.

Meanwhile, Foreign Secretary also urged that the international community should continue to work towards realizing the collective aspiration for a nuclear weapon-free world.

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India Committed To Nuclear Weapons-Free World: Foreign Secretary Shringla At UNSC

New York: India is committed to the goal of a nuclear weapons free world and complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the world, Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla on Monday said at the United Nations Security Council meeting.

"We believe that this goal can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework, as outlined in India's Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2006," Shringla added.

Shringla's remarks came while addressing the United Nations Security Council meeting on 'Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)'.

During the address, Foreign Secretary also added that "India maintains a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosive testing."

India was the first country to call for a ban on nuclear testing in 1954 and a non-discriminatory treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as distinct from non-dissemination, in 1965.

India is a key partner in the global non-proliferation efforts. One of the important steps undertaken by India in this context is the piloting of an annual UN General Assembly Resolution on 'Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction' since 2002, which is adopted by consensus.

"There is a need for the international community to pay closer attention to the illicit proliferation of networks of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems, components and relevant technologies," Foreign Secretary added.

Shringla, during his address, also informed that India would continue to work in the framework of the Disarmament Triad comprising the Conference on Disarmament, the UN Disarmament Commission and the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, to strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.

"As the world's sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament is well placed to advance the global disarmament agenda and negotiate legally binding instruments on items on its core agenda," Shringla said.

With the objective of strengthening non-proliferation architecture, India has also joined various export control regimes namely, Australia Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime and has harmonized its controls with the Nuclear Suppliers Group lists.

Meanwhile, Foreign Secretary also urged that the international community should continue to work towards realizing the collective aspiration for a nuclear weapon-free world.

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If The Donald Trump Resumes U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing, India Will Follow: Pak Media

And that would be bad news. Here's why

by Hasan Ehtisham

On May 15, according to media reports, the Trump administration conducted serious discussions on whether or not to break the informal ban to carry out a nuclear test explosion. Washington's intent to resume nuclear testing threatens to elevate already grown strategic tensions with China, Russia, and others. Some analysts comprehended that this is a proper course to influence Russia and China to support Washington's plan for trilateral talks related to nuclear arms controls and disarmament issues.

Throughout the Cold War, hundreds of nuclear tests were carried out by the United States and the Soviet Union. But when the Soviet Union in 1991 announced a unilateral moratorium, the United States under H.W. Bush administration reciprocated with a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. The suspension of nuclear tests provided the diplomatic room for the world to begin negotiations regarding the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to impose a blanket ban on test explosions of nuclear weapons. Russia and all NATO members except the United States have already ratified the CTBT. This latest move by the U.S. to resume nuclear testing can also contribute to the wider attempt to sabotage the agenda of CTBT.

The head of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), Lassina Zerbo, has presaged that any attempt by the United States to recommence nuclear testing would have serious ramifications for global peace and security. While mentioning CTBTO’s close relationship with the U.S. National Laboratories, Zerbo categorically precluded the notion of any requirement for nuclear testing. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian has also shown “grave concerns about the report.” He urged the Trump administration to meet its “due obligations and honour its commitment by upholding the purpose and objective of the CTBT.” During the contemporary strategic competition of major powers, an uncertain situation has emerged about any sort of political gains for Washington against Moscow or Shanghai with a nuclear test. The most plausible consequence of a nuclear explosion by the United States at this point will facilitate other countries to resume nuclear testing. Washington will be criticized by other nuclear weapons states for violating the nuclear test moratorium practiced since 1998 by all countries, except North Korea.

Robert Rosner, a professor of physics at the University of Chicago, has evaluated that after the United States others will also resume nuclear testing and “the crucial question is: Who are the others?” In the South Asian strategic scenario, India will be that other country. India, one of the world's fastest developing nuclear weapons states, has long been waiting for such a mistake, particularly from the United States, so that it could revoke the pledge of nuclear non-testing. It has been unable to do so just because it aspires to become part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and other global regimes. Once the United States resumes nuclear testing, India will find it easier to further demonstrate its nuclear weapon capability.

This latest paradigm shift by the United States allows India to conduct more nuclear testing to assess the design of its thermonuclear weapon which it claimed to have detonated on May 11, 1998, in the Operation Shakti-1. Numerous international experts believe that the results of the thermonuclear test were highly inflated and doubt that the device successfully ignited the second fusion stage of the explosion. The scientist community who coordinated the Operation Shakti-1 in 1998 has concluded that the test was a failure, as the yield of the fusion device never produced the desired results.

Nuclear pundits in India have already materialized a comprehensive and robust nuclear facility to meet any kind of eventuality that could provide India with an opportunity to carry out further nuclear tests. For instance, in 2012, India’s secret nuclear city at Challakere, Karnataka was revealed by independent researchers. Experts have shown apprehensions that the facility will be a major complex of nuclear centrifuges under military control, along with atomic research laboratories, weapons and aircraft testing sites. Once it starts functioning, the facility would enable India to modernize its existing nuclear warheads and the nuclear fuel from domestic reserves will be used for a thermonuclear weapon. India is also working on a uranium enrichment plant from which it will be able to produce about twice as much weapons-grade uranium as New Delhi will need for its operational nuclear weapon programme. That significant excess of the enriched uranium would be used for the development of thermonuclear weapons.

India has already done the necessary homework to manipulate any step the United States may take in the near future. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has signalled the capacity to conduct more nuke tests at short notice. If India alters the status of its moratorium on nuclear testing, then it would not only upset the deterrence balance but most significantly it would start a fresh nuclear arms race in South Asia. Under the pretext of growing Indo-US strategic relations in the region, the U.S. is offering a free ride to India to enhance the nuclear capability by resuming nuclear testing. It is strategically prudent for the U.S. national interest to uphold its commitments regarding the unilateral pledge of nuclear non-testing while ratifying the CTBT. The United States should also press India to continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing which was the primary prerequisite for the U.S.-India nuclear deal of 2008. It will reinforce the global standards against nuclear testing and encourage regional stability.

Hasan Ehtisham is the M. Phil Scholar of Defence and Strategic Studies at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan

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United States Discussed Holding First Nuclear Test In Decades: Report

President Donald Trump's administration has discussed holding the first US nuclear test since 1992 as a potential warning to Russia and China, the Washington Post reported Friday

Such a test would be a significant departure from US defence policy and dramatically up the ante for other nuclear-armed nations. One analyst told the newspaper that if it were to go ahead it would be seen as the "starting gun to an unprecedented nuclear arms race".

The report, citing one senior administration official and two former officials, all who spoke anonymously, said the discussion had taken place at a meeting on May 15.

It came after some US officials reportedly claimed that Russia and China were conducting their own low-yield tests. Moscow and Beijing have denied the claims, and the US has not offered evidence for them.

The senior administration official said that demonstrating Washington's ability to "rapid test" would be a useful negotiating tactic as the US seeks a trilateral agreement with Russia and China over nuclear weapons.

The meeting did not conclude with any agreement, and the sources were divided over whether discussions were still ongoing.

Nuclear non-proliferation activists were quick to condemn the idea.

"It would be the starting gun to an unprecedented nuclear arms race," Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, told the Post.

He added that it would also likely "disrupt" negotiations with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, "who may no longer feel compelled to honour his moratorium on nuclear testing."

The Trump administration has repeatedly shaken up US defence policy.

The Washington Post report came one day after Trump announced that he plans to withdraw from the Open Skies treaty with Russia, which was designed to improve military transparency and confidence between the superpowers.

It is the third arms control pact Trump has abrogated since coming to office.

Russia has insisted it will abide by the 18-year-old agreement, which seeks to lower the risk of war by permitting each signatory country's military to conduct a certain number of surveillance flights over another member country each year on short notice.

European nations have also urged Trump to reconsider.

Facing re-election in November, Trump has also significantly hardened his rhetoric against China in recent weeks, repeatedly criticising Beijing's handling of the Coronavirus pandemic which first emerged there.

He has made repeated but vague threats of retaliation against the chief US economic rival, which has denied all his accusations.

Earlier this month Trump called for involving China in new arms control talks with Russia, telling his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin they need to avoid a "costly arms race".

It is not the first time Trump's defence policy has raised concerns the administration is elevating the risk of nuclear war.

In February the Pentagon announced it had deployed a submarine carrying a new long-range missile with a relatively small nuclear warhead, saying it was in response to Russian tests of similar weapons.

Critics worry that small nukes would be more likely to be used because they cause less damage, thereby lowering the threshold for nuclear conflict.

But the Pentagon says it is crucial to deterring rivals like Moscow who might assume that, with only large, massively destructive nuclear weapons in its arsenal, the US would not respond to another country's first use of a small, "tactical" nuclear bomb.

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Time Running Out On The Last US-Russia Nuclear Arms Treaty

If President Trump doesn't extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty — only remaining US-Russia arms control pact — or succeed in negotiating a replacement treaty, it will expire on February 5. That's just 16 days after Trump begins a second term or his successor is sworn into office. Russia has offered to extend New START for up to five years, but Trump is holding out. The US and Russia have about 91 per cent of the world's nuclear warheads, according to the Federation of American Scientists

WASHINGTON: Time is running out on an arms control treaty that, if it's allowed to expire, will leave the world with no legal restrictions on US and Russian nuclear weapons for the first time in nearly half a century.

If President Donald Trump doesn't extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty — only remaining US-Russia arms control pact — or succeed in negotiating a replacement treaty, it will expire on February 5. That's just 16 days after Trump begins a second term or his successor is sworn into office.

Russia has offered to extend New START for up to five years, but Trump is holding out. He thinks China, which is expected to double its stockpile of nuclear weapons in the next decade, should have to sign on to a nuclear arms control accord, too.

The future of New START was further called into question with Trump's announcement Thursday that the US intends to withdraw from another treaty that permits observation flights over the US, Russia and more than 30 other nations.

Trump voiced his desire for a three-way arms control agreement months ago, but that effort is still in the starting blocks. Marshall Billingslea, who was appointed last month as the president's special envoy for arms control, said Thursday that he had his first secure phone call with his counterpart in Moscow, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. Billingslea said they agreed to meet, talk about their objectives and find a way to begin negotiations. “Suffice to say, this won't be easy.

It is new,” Billingslea said, adding that the US fully expects Russia to help bring China to the table.

Russian officials and many arms control experts agree that China, as a rising power, should be part of a nuclear arms accord, but they are eyeing the calendar.

“It's really hard to see how, in the midst of a pandemic that would make actual in-person negotiations quite difficult, you're going to get something done and ratified and in force before the New START treaty expires on February 5, 2021,” said Alexandra Bell at the Centre for Arms Control and Non-proliferation.

They note how Trump's reelection campaign, the Coronavirus pandemic and the economic problems it has created are consuming a lot of time. Negotiating complex nuclear accords can take years, and even the president, who has blamed Beijing for not stopping the spread of the virus, has said he's doesn't want to talk to President Xi Jinping right now.

A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Geng Shuang, said in January that China has “no intention to participate" in trilateral arms control negotiations. Billingslea, however, is optimistic that Beijing will want to joint in and be seen as a world power.

New START imposes limits on the number of US and Russian long-range nuclear warheads and launchers. If it were to collapse, it would be the first time in 50 years that the US does not have the ability to inspect Russian nuclear forces, said Rose Gottemoeller, a former undersecretary of state for arms control and international security.

“Every time they (the Russians) take a missile out of a silo and take it to a maintenance facility, they have to notify us that that missile's going to move. ... The intelligence community is simply going to have a much harder time knowing what's going on," she said.

But Trump has accused Russia of not living up to agreements. He cited Russian violations in his announcement Thursday that the U.S. would withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty. While the US has officially given its required six-month notice of withdrawal, Trump hinted that he may reconsider and stay in the pact.

Trump also blamed Russian violations for his decision last year to pull out of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that banned production, testing and deployment of intermediate-range land-based cruise and ballistic missiles.

Russia's Foreign Ministry on Friday accused the US of aiming to dismantle security pacts. Withdrawing from the Opens Skies Treaty "fully fits into (the US) line on the destruction of the entire complex of agreements in the field of arms control and confidence-building in the military field,” the ministry said.

Senior US administration officials say Trump's willingness to withdraw from treaties shows he is serious about compliance and is evidence of how prominently arms control verification and compliance will feature in New START talks.

“We are not in the business of negotiating new agreements, or extending old ones, if we cannot be assured that the other parties will hold up their end of the bargain," Billingslea said. "When it comes to Russia, we have little reason to be confident. Russia's track record is, to be frank, abysmal.”

The US and Russia have about 91 per cent of the world's nuclear warheads, according to the Federation of American Scientists. The US has 3,800 in its stockpile and Russia has 4,310. China has 320 nuclear warheads, although the Defence Intelligence Agency predicted last year that China was likely to at least double the size of its stockpile during the next 10 years.

With the US presidential election just five months away, the question is whether Trump has enough time to negotiate a grand, three-way deal, especially given China's reticence to participate. Timothy Morrison, an arms control expert and former adviser to Trump on Russia and Europe at the National Security Council, said at a nuclear weapons forum in January that as the months go by, Trump may be “left with a binary question of extend or not extend” New START.

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Exclusive: India, Pakistan Nuclear Procurement Networks Larger Than Thought, Study Shows

NEW DELHI - Hundreds of foreign companies are actively procuring components for India and Pakistan’s nuclear programs, taking advantage of gaps in the global regulation of the industry, according to a report by a U.S.-based research group.

Using open-source data, the non-profit Centre For Advance Defence Studies (C4ADS) report provides one of the most comprehensive overviews of networks supplying the rivals, in a region regarded as one of the world’s most dangerous nuclear flashpoints.

“India and Pakistan are taking advantage of gaps in global non-proliferation regimes and export controls to get what they need,” said Jack Margolin, a C4ADS analyst and co-author of the report.

It is seldom possible to determine whether individual transactions are illegal by using publicly available data, Margolin said, and the report does not suggest that companies mentioned broke national or international laws or regulations.

But past reports by the think tank, whose financial backers include the Carnegie Corporation and the Wyss Foundation, have often led to action by law enforcement agencies.

Spokesmen from the offices of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan did not respond to requests for comment. Pakistan’s military, which plays a major role in decision-making for the nuclear weapons programme, also declined to comment.

To identify companies involved, C4ADS analysed more than 125 million records of public trade and tender data and documents, and then checked them against already-identified entities listed by export control authorities in the United States and Japan.

Pakistan, which is subject to strict international export controls on its programme, has 113 suspected foreign suppliers listed by the United States and Japan. But the C4ADS report found an additional 46, many in shipment hubs like Hong Kong, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates.

“In Pakistan’s case, they have a lot more stringent controls, and they get around these by using transnational networks… and exploiting opaque jurisdictions,” Margolin said.

The father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, AQ Khan, admitted in 2004 to selling nuclear technology to North Korea, Iran and Libya. He was pardoned a day later by Pakistani authorities, which have refused requests from international investigators to question him.

India has a waiver that allows it to buy nuclear technology from international markets. The Indian government allows inspections of some nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but not all of them.

Neither India or Pakistan have signed the international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, adhered to by most nuclear powers. Consequently, they are not obliged to submit to IAEA oversight over all of their facilities.

C4ADS identified 222 companies that did business with the nuclear facilities in India that had no IAEA oversight. Of these, 86 companies did business with more than one such nuclear facility in India.

“It’s evidence that more needs to be done, and that there needs to be a more sophisticated approach taken to India,” Margolin said. “Just because the product is not explicitly bound for a military facility, that doesn’t mean that the due diligence process ends there.”

India and Pakistan have gone to war three times - twice over the disputed Kashmir region - since they won independence from British colonial rule in 1947.

Having for years secretly developed nuclear weapons capability, the two declared themselves nuclear powers following tit-for-tat atomic tests in 1998.

A few years later, in 2002, the two foes almost went to war for a fourth time, following an attack by Pakistan-based militants on the parliament in New Delhi. And a year ago, a suicide attack by a Pakistan-based militant group in a part of Kashmir controlled by India sparked another flare up in tensions.

Both countries are estimated to have around 150 useable nuclear warheads apiece, according to the Federation of American Scientists, a non-profit group tracking stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

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At The Edge of A New Nuclear Arms Race

The U.S.’s moves to resume nuclear testing, also signalling the demise of the ill-fated CTBT, could be the first signs

by Rakesh Sood 

In mid-April, a report issued by the United States State Department on “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Compliance Report)” raised concerns that China might be conducting nuclear tests with low yields at its Lop Nur test site, in violation of its Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) undertakings.

The U.S. report also claims that Russia has conducted nuclear weapons experiments that produced a nuclear yield and were inconsistent with ‘zero yield’ understanding underlying the CTBT, though it was uncertain about how many such experiments had been conducted.

Russia and China have rejected the U.S.’s claims, but with growing rivalry among major powers the report is a likely harbinger of a new nuclear arms race which would also mark the demise of the CTBT that came into being in 1996 but has failed to enter into force even after a quarter century.

What Does CTBT Ban Mean?

For decades, a ban on nuclear testing was seen as the necessary first step towards curbing the nuclear arms race but Cold War politics made it impossible. A Partial Test Ban Treaty was concluded in 1963 banning underwater and atmospheric tests but this only drove testing underground. By the time the CTBT negotiations began in Geneva in 1994, global politics had changed. The Cold War had ended and the nuclear arms race was over. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or the USSR, had broken up and its principal testing site, Semipalatinsk, was in Kazakhstan (Russia still had access to Novaya Zemlya near the Arctic circle). In 1991, Russia declared a unilateral moratorium on testing, followed by the U.S. in 1992. By this time, the U.S. had conducted 1,054 tests and Russia, 715.

Negotiations were often contentious. France and China continued testing, claiming that they had conducted far fewer tests and needed to validate new designs since the CTBT did not imply an end to nuclear deterrence. France and the U.S. even toyed with the idea of a CTBT that would permit testing at a low threshold, below 500 tonnes of TNT equivalent. This was one-thirtieth of the “Little Boy”, the bomb the U.S. dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 — its explosive yield was estimated to be the equivalent of 15,000 tonnes of TNT. Civil society and the non-nuclear weapon states reacted negatively to such an idea and it was dropped. Some countries proposed that the best way to verify a comprehensive test ban would be to permanently shut down all test sites, an idea that was unwelcome to the nuclear weapon states.

Eventually, the U.S. came up with the idea of defining the “comprehensive test ban” as a “zero yield” test ban that would prohibit supercritical hydro-nuclear tests but not sub-critical hydrodynamic nuclear tests. Once the United Kingdom and France came on board, the U.S. was able to prevail upon Russia and China to accept this understanding. After all, this was the moment of the U.S.’s unipolar supremacy. At home, the Clinton administration in the U.S. satisfied the hawks by announcing a science-based nuclear Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, a generously funded project to keep the nuclear laboratories in business and the Pentagon happy. Accordingly, the CTBT prohibits all parties from carrying out “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion”; these terms are neither defined nor elaborated.

Why It Lacks Authority

Another controversy arose regarding the entry-into-force provisions (Article 14) of the treaty. After India’s proposals for anchoring the CTBT in a disarmament framework did not find acceptance, in June 1996, India announced its decision to withdraw from the negotiations. Unhappy at this turn, the U.K., China and Pakistan took the lead in revising the entry-into-force provisions. The new provisions listed 44 countries by name whose ratification was necessary for the treaty to enter into force and included India. India protested that this attempt at arm-twisting violated a country’s sovereign right to decide if it wanted to join a treaty but was ignored. The CTBT was adopted by a majority vote and opened for signature.

Of the 44 listed countries, to date only 36 have ratified the treaty. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the U.S. have signed but not ratified. China maintains that it will only ratify it after the U.S. does so but the Republican dominated Senate had rejected it in 1999. In addition, North Korea, India and Pakistan are the three who have not signed. All three have also undertaken tests after 1996; India and Pakistan in May 1998 and North Korea six times between 2006 and 2017. The CTBT has therefore not entered into force and lacks legal authority.

Nevertheless, an international organisation to verify the CTBT was established in Vienna with a staff of about 230 persons and an annual budget of $130 million. Ironically, the U.S. is the largest contributor with a share of $17 million. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) runs an elaborate verification system built around a network of over 325 seismic, radionuclide, infrasound and hydroacoustic (underwater) monitoring stations. The CTBTO has refrained from backing the U.S.’s allegations.

Competition Is Back

The key change from the 1990s is that the U.S.’s unipolar moment is over and strategic competition among major powers is back. The U.S. now identifies Russia and China as ‘rivals’. Its Nuclear Posture Review asserts that the U.S. faces new nuclear threats because both Russia and China are increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons. The U.S., therefore, has to expand the role of its nuclear weapons and have a more usable and diversified nuclear arsenal. The Trump administration has embarked on a 30-year modernisation plan with a price tag of $1.2 trillion, which could go up over the years. Readiness levels at the Nevada test site that has been silent since 1992 are being enhanced to permit resumption of testing at six months notice.

Russia and China have been concerned about the U.S.’s growing technological lead particularly in missile defence and conventional global precision-strike capabilities. Russia has responded by exploring hypersonic delivery systems and theatre systems while China has embarked on a modernisation programme to enhance the survivability of its arsenal which is considerably smaller. In addition, both countries are also investing heavily in offensive cyber capabilities.

The new U.S. report stops short of accusing China for a violation but refers to “a high level of activity at the Lop Nur test site throughout 2019” and concludes that together with its lack of transparency, China provokes concerns about its intent to observe the zero-yield moratorium on testing.

The U.S. claims that Russian experiments have generated nuclear yield but is unable to indicate how many such experiments were conducted in 2019. It suggests that Russia could be testing in a manner that releases nuclear energy from an explosive canister, generating suspicions about its compliance.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) limits U.S. and Russian arsenals but will expire in 2021 and U.S. President Donald Trump has already indicated that he does not plan to extend it. Instead, the Trump administration would like to bring China into some kind of nuclear arms control talks, something China has avoided by pointing to the fact that the U.S. and Russia still account for over 90% of global nuclear arsenals.

Current Context

Both China and Russia have dismissed the U.S.’s allegations, pointing to the Trump administration’s backtracking from other negotiated agreements such as the Iran nuclear deal or the U.S.-Russia Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Tensions with China are already high with trade and technology disputes, militarisation in the South China Sea and most recently, with the novel coronavirus pandemic. The U.S. could also be preparing the ground for resuming testing at Nevada.

The Cold War rivalry was already visible when the nuclear arms race began in the 1950s. New rivalries have already emerged. Resumption of nuclear testing may signal the demise of the ill-fated CTBT, marking the beginnings of a new nuclear arms race.

Rakesh Sood is a former diplomat and presently Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation

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'Irresponsible': China Refutes US Remarks On Beijing Secretly Resuming Underground Nuclear Tests

The US State Department in a report said that China may have secretly set off low-level underground nuclear test explosions

China on Thursday said it was "committed" to a moratorium on nuclear tests as it strongly refuted as "irresponsible" and "ill-intentioned" the US remarks of the possibility of Beijing secretly resuming underground atomic experiments.

The US State Department in a report on Wednesday said that China may have secretly set off low-level underground nuclear test explosions despite claiming to observe an international pact banning such blasts.

US concerns about Beijing's possible breaches of a "zero yield" standard for test blasts have been prompted by activities at China's Lop Nur nuclear test site throughout 2019, Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post quoted the US report as saying.

Zero yield refers to a nuclear test in which there is no explosive chain reaction of the type ignited by the detonation of a nuclear warhead.

Reacting to US charge, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian told a media briefing here that China is among the first group of countries to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and always been supportive of its goals and purposes.

The CTBT is a multilateral treaty, which bans all nuclear explosions, for both civilian and military purposes, in all environments.

China is "committed" to the nuclear testing moratorium, Zhao said.

The monitoring stations placed within China's border are fully recognised by the CTBT secretariat, he said.

"The US neglects all the facts and make wanton accusations against China. This is irresponsible and ill-intentioned," he said.

Zhao pointed out that the US in its nuclear posture review has said that it will resume underground testing if necessary.

"The international community should stay on high alert on this. We urge the US to change its course," he said.

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