The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, convening in Tianjin, China, comes at a decisive moment for global geopolitics, as the United States’ escalating trade war and tense India-China relations overshadow the traditionally symbolic gathering.

More than 20 world leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Chinese President Xi Jinping, have arrived for the high-profile meeting of the Beijing-led bloc, which has grown into the world’s largest regional grouping by population.

Founded in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the SCO has evolved from a regional security initiative into a diplomatic platform aimed at offering alternatives to the US-led global order.

Analysts point out that for Beijing, the SCO embodies a “parallel governance architecture,” giving China and its allies a rare avenue to forge consensus outside Western-dominated institutions.

This year’s summit, scheduled for August 31 and September 1, gains added significance due to US President Donald Trump’s expansive tariff strategy, which has unsettled not only traditional American adversaries but also long-standing allies.

India, for instance, was recently hit with a punishing 50 percent tariff over its continued purchase of discounted Russian oil, a move Washington argues undermines Western sanctions on Moscow.

Ironically, this clash with the United States has opened new space for dialogue between India and China, whose relations have remained cool since deadly Himalayan border skirmishes in 2020. Although both countries reached a frontier settlement in 2024, mistrust persists.

Analysts warn, however, that Trump’s tariff offensive could create a wedge between India and its Western partners, potentially nudging New Delhi closer to Beijing’s orbit, especially at multilateral forums like the SCO.

The summit also arrives amid volatile dynamics between China and Russia. While both powers continue to champion their “no limits partnership,” declared just before Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, international scrutiny has highlighted the uneven costs borne by each in supporting Russia’s war effort.

China, though heavily engaged in shoring up Russia’s economy, has thus far escaped the harsh sanctions directed at other nations, creating frustration in India and elsewhere.

Putin’s recent meeting with Trump in Alaska added further intrigue, raising questions about potential shifts in Moscow’s diplomatic posture when compared to Beijing’s hardline stance. Observers will be closely parsing the language used in summit statements by both Xi and Putin to measure whether their alignment has softened or strengthened.

A significant factor shaping the summit is the growing diversity of its membership and partners. Once dominated by Central Asian powers, the SCO has expanded to include India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus as full members, with Afghanistan and Mongolia as observers, and 14 dialogue partners including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and Sri Lanka.

The presence of Southeast Asian leaders, among them Malaysia’s Anwar Ibrahim and Indonesia’s Prabowo Subianto, underlines the region’s new status as “swing states” in the intensifying US-China rivalry.

The expanding guest list reflects Beijing’s ambition to present the SCO as a broad-based forum for the Global South, showcasing China’s appeal as an alternative partner in global governance.

Despite the dramatic backdrop of trade disputes, war, and shifting alliances, expectations for the SCO’s concrete output remain modest.

Analysts anticipate that the primary outcome will be a joint statement, carefully worded to emphasize shared opposition to “unilateralism”—a veiled criticism of Washington—while avoiding divisive rhetoric. Likely topics will include reaffirmations of multilateralism, calls for greater regional stability, and commitments to economic cooperation.

In this context, the symbolism of unity among such a diverse coalition of powers is viewed as more significant than the substance of the declarations themselves.

The Tianjin summit is also strategically timed in relation to China’s broader international image-building efforts. Following the SCO meetings, leaders will remain in China ahead of the September 3 military parade in Beijing commemorating the 80th anniversary of World War II’s end in Asia.

This major spectacle, expected to draw leaders from North Korea, Serbia, and Slovakia in addition to SCO participants, serves as an opportunity for Beijing to project its diplomatic clout and military confidence.

While Modi is not expected to attend the parade, his foreign minister may represent India, signalling New Delhi’s intent to strike a balance between its friction with Washington and its wariness of over-dependence on Beijing.

Ultimately, the SCO summit in Tianjin is less about binding resolutions than about political signalling. With China demonstrating its global “friend circle” and exploiting opportunities emerging from Trump’s confrontational trade policies, the summit underscores how multilateral forums are increasingly becoming arenas for great-power competition.

For India and China, the delicate question remains whether economic and strategic pragmatism in the face of US pressure can override their deep-seated border and trust issues.

For Russia, the summit offers diplomatic cover amid its ongoing war, while for Beijing, it marks another opportunity to expand its influence across the Global South. As one analyst put it, the “family photo” at Tianjin will mask layers of rivalry, suspicion, and shifting alliances—all under the shadow of Washington’s trade offensive.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)