Israel's Arrow-2 missile interceptor system

Since the end of the Kargil War in 1999, India has been grappling with the reality of a possible two-front war scenario involving Pakistan in the west and China in the north. Pakistan, with China’s assistance, rapidly expanded its ballistic missile program, significantly altering the security balance in South Asia.

For India, which had already faced surprise intrusions in Kargil and witnessed China’s military consolidation in Tibet, the need for an advanced and trusted ballistic missile defence (BMD) system became critical.

It was during this period that New Delhi turned to Israel, a reliable defence partner, for the cutting-edge Arrow-2 missile defence system. However, the deal was abruptly blocked by the United States, highlighting the geopolitical limits of India’s defence diplomacy during that era.

The Arrow-2 interceptor system, co-developed by Israel Aerospace Industries and the U.S. Missile Defence Agency, was designed to neutralise short- and medium-range ballistic missiles up to a range of 300 km. India considered this system vital to counter Pakistan’s missile threat. Israel was willing to sell the platform, but because Washington had joint ownership rights over the technology, the transfer could not proceed without explicit U.S. approval. 

The United States, under the pretext that India was not then a signatory to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), vetoed the sale. Washington further argued that such an advanced transfer to South Asia would fuel regional instability, though in practice, Pakistan continued its missile enhancement with Chinese assistance uninterrupted. This not only revealed a contradiction in American policy towards South Asia but also conveyed to India that U.S. restrictions often tilted the balance in Pakistan’s favour.

The official U.S. denial of the Arrow-2 transfer in 2002 marked a turning point in India’s defence strategy. Rather than over-relying on external suppliers, New Delhi directed the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) towards creating indigenous solutions.

This stimulus directly led to the ambitious Indian Ballistic Missile Defence Programme, which unfolded in multiple phases. In Phase 1, India developed the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) and Advanced Air Defence (AAD) interceptors, capable of hitting incoming missiles in Exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric layers, respectively.

By 2016, DRDO had achieved notable success, prompting the initiation of Phase 2, where missile interceptors such as AD-1 and AD-2 were designed for more challenging threats, including intermediate-range ballistic missiles and hypersonic projectiles. Successful trials of AD-1 in November 2022 provided India with the ability to counter threats beyond 5000 km range, reflecting world-class technological achievement.

India’s program matured into a two-layered hit-to-kill defence shield, covering critical cities and military installations, ensuring far greater resilience against missile attacks. The proposed future advancement, referred to as the Sudarshan Chakra Sky Shield, envisions an even more comprehensive national defence net, possibly rivalling existing global missile defence systems.

Despite these self-reliant strides, U.S. influence in shaping India’s defence options continues. Historically, Washington has displayed reluctance in transferring sensitive surveillance and air defence technologies to India—for example, it withheld the sale of the Falcon AWACS system citing regional stability. In response, India turned to Russia, which has been a robust and non-restrictive defence partner, supplying systems such as the S-400 missile defence system, nuclear submarines, and advanced fighters.

However, in recent years, especially under U.S. administrations focused on countering Russia globally, Washington has worked to dissuade India from procuring Russian equipment by using instruments like the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). India’s continued purchase of Russian crude oil and defence platforms at affordable rates has further irritated sections of the U.S. leadership, particularly during Donald Trump’s presidency, which emphasised transactional diplomacy and “America first” policies.

Ultimately, American attempts to restrict India’s strategic autonomy in acquiring weapons from Israel and Russia have had mixed results. On one side, such restrictions caused immediate setbacks in India’s capability acquisition, as seen with Arrow-2.

On the other, these very actions indirectly strengthened India’s commitment to indigenisation and self-sufficiency, leading to the rise of a credible domestic missile defence architecture that now competes with some of the world’s most advanced systems.

The double standards of Washington—blocking India’s legitimate defence needs while overlooking Pakistan’s clandestine missile imports from China—remain a point of contention in Indo-U.S. relations. Simultaneously, this dynamic has reinforced India’s long-held strategic principle of maintaining a diversified defence procurement network between Russia, Israel, Europe, and now indigenous DRDO systems, preventing overdependence on any single supplier.

What the United States initially viewed as a measure to prevent regional instability largely backfired by propelling India’s strategic self-reliance mission. Washington’s attempts to block weapons imports from Israel and to pressure New Delhi against Russian deals only highlighted the limitations of U.S.-India defence convergence when American geopolitical calculations diverge from India’s security imperatives. For India, the episode underscores a lasting lesson: while international partnerships are important, national security resilience ultimately lies in homegrown defence innovation.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)