India has repeatedly issued and then abruptly cancelled Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) for major missile tests in the Bay of Bengal, sparking intense speculation about strategic motives.

The most recent instance involved a vast 3,550 km danger zone notified on 12 December 2025 for activities from 17 to 20 December, stretching eastward from launch sites near Chandipur in Odisha and Visakhapatnam's Eastern Naval Command. No official explanation was provided for the cancellation, mirroring earlier withdrawals for tests planned between 1-4 December and 6-8 December.

Such expansive zones suggest preparation for long-range systems, potentially the K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a 3,500 km reach, nuclear capability, and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology.

The K-4, derived from Agni-series technology, measures 12 metres long, weighs 17 tonnes, and can launch from 20-30 metre depths on SSBNs like INS Arihant or its successors. This would validate maturity for India's sea-based nuclear triad, enhancing second-strike deterrence against regional threats including China.​

Chinese "research" vessels, often dual-use spy ships equipped with advanced sensors, radars, and sonars, have been a persistent presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Vessels such as Shi Yan-6, Xiang Yang Hong series, Lan Hai 101, Shen He Yi Hao, and Lian Hai 201 have positioned themselves near test corridors, entering via the Malacca Strait and lingering south of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These ships conduct seabed mapping, sonar profiling, submarine route planning, and missile trajectory tracking, refining China's power projection capabilities.

India's pattern of cancellations aligns with prior instances where tests were postponed upon detecting such vessels in optimal observation positions. For example, a November 2025 BrahMos test drew three Chinese ships into the central and eastern Indian Ocean, prompting rescheduling.

Observers posit that revoking NOTAMs denies Beijing valuable telemetry, radar signatures, and trajectory data, forcing vessels to reposition at high cost and exposing their response patterns.

This tactic may serve dual purposes: genuine test preparations disrupted by surveillance, or deliberate feints to study Chinese maritime agility. By issuing alerts and then scrubbing them, India compels rapid reactions from PLA-linked assets, revealing deployment timelines, sensor limits, and coordination with naval forces. Alternative explanations include weather concerns, such as the lingering threat of cyclonic storms like Ditwah in late November, though no such conditions were confirmed for mid-December.​

India's Navy Chief, Admiral Dinesh K Tripathi, dismissed postponements due to Chinese vessels as "a figment of imagination" during a December briefing, emphasising routine monitoring of foreign ships. 

He affirmed ongoing advancements, including the imminent commissioning of INS Aridhaman, the third Arihant-class SSBN equipped for longer-range missiles. Recent inductions like INS Vaghsheer and INS Udaygiri underscore naval build-up to counter threats in the Bay of Bengal and IOR.​

The episode transcends a mere delay, embodying "erosion" in Sino-Indian maritime rivalry—intelligence duels supplanting overt confrontation. NOTAMs evolve into strategic signals: domestically assuring readiness, regionally deterring adversaries like China and Pakistan, and internationally affirming India's calculated role in Indo-Pacific security. Though no missile flew, the manoeuvres conveyed resolve, preserving operational secrecy while probing adversarial intent.

Based On TOI Video Report