China has methodically expanded its influence over key ports in Latin America and the Caribbean, establishing a network that poses strategic challenges to US interests. A comprehensive report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) identifies 37 Chinese-linked port projects across the region, encompassing investments, construction, equipment supply, and operational control.

These developments enable Beijing to gather intelligence, shape trade routes, and potentially disrupt US naval operations near vital chokepoints like the Panama Canal.​

The Chancay mega-port in Peru stands out as a flagship project, inaugurated in November 2024 by President Xi Jinping at a cost of $3.5 billion. Operated primarily by COSCO Shipping, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, it features 15 docks and capacity for super-large container ships unable to transit the Panama Canal.


This facility slashes shipping times from China to South America by up to 12 days while securing access to critical minerals like copper and lithium.​

In Jamaica, the port of Kingston, the seventh-largest container terminal globally, falls under Chinese operational control, positioned along shipping lanes linking the Panama Canal to the US East Coast. Its proximity to the US Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, just 200 miles away, heightens concerns over surveillance and logistical leverage.​

Mexico's Manzanillo on the Pacific and Veracruz on the Gulf of Mexico represent further high-risk sites, with terminals managed by CK Hutchison, a Hong Kong firm increasingly aligned with Beijing's influence. These ports handle vast cargo volumes and integrate Chinese technologies from firms like Huawei, ZTE, Nuctech for scanning, and ZPMC for cranes, embedding data collection capabilities deep into regional infrastructure.​

Chinese firms also dominate ports flanking the Panama Canal, including Colón and Balboa, through billions in investments. While overt naval bases remain unlikely due to US retaliation risks, these assets facilitate dual-use potential for military logistics and economic dominance, reshaping trade flows away from US-centric routes.​

Australian think tanks have critiqued India as the 'weak link' in the Quad framework, pointing to perceived gaps in military interoperability and strategic alignment among the US, Japan, Australia, and India. This narrative gained traction amid India's continued engagement with Russia and its cautious approach to confronting China directly in the Indo-Pacific. Such views, often voiced by outlets like the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, underscore asymmetries in capabilities that complicate collective action against Beijing's assertiveness.​

Meanwhile, China maintains a firm foothold in Australian ports, most notably through the 99-year lease of Darwin Port to Landbridge Group, a Chinese firm, secured in 2015 for AUD 506 million. This deal, once criticised by former US President Barack Obama, has resurfaced as a security flashpoint, with Australia's Defence Department flagging it for review in 2024 amid evolving geopolitical tensions. The port's proximity to US Marine training exercises heightens concerns over potential dual-use risks.​

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's government has moved to reclaim control, announcing plans during the 2025 election campaign to compel the sale back to domestic ownership in the national interest. China's ambassador in Canberra sharply criticised this intent, arguing that Landbridge should face no repercussions for its operations. Diplomatic sources note that Albanese's July 2025 visit to Beijing strategically sidestepped the Darwin issue to prioritise economic deals on trade and iron ore, reflecting a pragmatic balancing act.​

The irony sharpens when juxtaposed with Quad dynamics: while Australia pushes to sever Chinese port ties at home, it questions India's resolve abroad. India's emphasis on sovereignty and non-traditional threats, like China's encirclement via projects in Pakistan and Bangladesh, actually bolsters the Quad's broader agenda on supply chains and critical minerals. Yet, without unified action, Beijing exploits these fissures, advancing geo-economic coercion across the region.

This port network underscores China's Belt and Road Initiative in the Western Hemisphere, prioritising resource security, geopolitical sway, and reduced reliance on traditional chokepoints. Host nations face trade-offs between infrastructure gains and sovereignty erosion, as Beijing positions itself as the region's premier port financier and operator.​

IDN (With Agency Inputs)