India's development of the Great Nicobar International Airport marks a pivotal enhancement to its strategic posture in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, particularly owing to its proximity to the Six Degree Channel.

This dual-use facility, combining civil aviation with military capabilities, positions the Indian Navy and Air Force to deploy larger aircraft directly into one of the world's most vital maritime chokepoints. For New Delhi's adversaries—chiefly China, with its expanding Indian Ocean ambitions—this development spells heightened vulnerability in their sea lines of communication.

The Six Degree Channel, separating Great Nicobar from the Indonesian island of Sumatra, derives its name from its approximate latitude of six degrees north. Spanning roughly 180 kilometres at its narrowest, it serves as the principal passageway for merchant shipping transiting from the Middle East and Europe towards East Asia.

Annually, over 100,000 vessels navigate these waters, carrying a significant portion of global oil supplies—estimated at 20-25 per cent of the world's traded crude—en route to the Strait of Malacca.

This choke point's criticality cannot be overstated; any disruption here could cascade through global energy markets and trade networks. Ships from the Persian Gulf or Suez Canal must thread this narrow corridor before accessing the Malacca Strait, making it a linchpin in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain. India's oversight of the channel has historically relied on distant bases like Port Blair, some 540 kilometres north, limiting rapid response times for surveillance and interdiction.

The Great Nicobar airfield changes this dynamic profoundly. Designed with expandable runways and taxiways, it will initially accommodate medium-category aircraft such as the Navy's P-8I Poseidon maritime patrol planes and the Air Force's C-17 Globemaster-III transports. Future upgrades could enable operations for heavier platforms like Su-30MKI fighters or even strategic bombers, drastically compressing reaction times to threats in the channel.

For the Indian Navy, entrusted with air traffic and airside operations, this means persistent airborne surveillance using long-endurance drones or patrol aircraft. The Andaman and Nicobar Command, India's sole tri-service theatre command, gains a forward perch to monitor submarine movements, illicit trafficking, or hostile naval deployments—capabilities previously hampered by fuel and transit constraints from mainland bases.

New Delhi's enemies, particularly the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), view this with alarm. China's "String of Pearls" strategy—encircling India via ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar—seeks dominance over Indian Ocean sea lanes.

The PLAN's growing fleet of submarines and surface combatants frequently traverses the Six Degree Channel, shadowed by Indian assets. A robust airfield here amplifies India's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) envelope, enabling quicker deployment of BrahMos cruise missiles, anti-ship munitions, or electronic warfare platforms.

Consider the implications for a PLAN task force attempting to project power towards the South China Sea. Indian P-8Is, loitering from Great Nicobar, could provide real-time targeting data to naval strike groups or shore-based missiles on nearby islands. Response times plummet from hours to minutes, deterring aggressive manoeuvres and forcing adversaries to reroute through less efficient paths, such as around Australia.

Pakistan, another regional rival, faces indirect repercussions. Its naval outreach into the Indian Ocean relies on fuel-thirsty transits past Indian waters; enhanced monitoring via Great Nicobar could expose covert operations or collaborations with China, such as joint submarine patrols. This airfield thus bolsters India's deterrence against two-front contingencies.

The project's dual-use nature smartly integrates civilian benefits, with the Airports Authority of India managing passenger terminals and commerce. This not only fosters tourism and trade—connecting remote Nicobar to mainland India—but also provides plausible deniability against accusations of militarisation, mirroring joint-use stations like INS Rajali.

Geopolitically, the timing aligns with India's "Act East" policy and Quad partnerships. Allies like the US, Japan, and Australia benefit from shared intelligence on channel traffic, countering China's Belt and Road maritime extensions. Exercises like Malabar could incorporate Great Nicobar, simulating choke point defence and interoperability.

Yet challenges persist. Environmental concerns over the ecologically sensitive Nicobar rainforest have sparked debates, though the government emphasises sustainable design. Logistical hurdles, including consultant tenders and operational agreements between naval and civil authorities, must be navigated to meet timelines.

This airfield transforms Great Nicobar from a peripheral outpost into a strategic fulcrum. By enabling larger aircraft deployments, it shrinks adversaries' operational freedom in the Six Degree Channel, safeguarding India's economic lifelines while projecting resolve. For Beijing and Islamabad, the message is clear: India's gaze now pierces deeper into the Indian Ocean's beating heart.

Based On The Week Report