China's military space program has undergone explosive growth, surging from just 36 satellites in 2010 to nearly 1,000 military and dual-use satellites by 2025, including around 350 dedicated to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).

This expansion reflects Beijing's strategic pivot to space as a warfighting domain, blending civilian and military assets under its civil-military fusion doctrine. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) now leverages this constellation for persistent monitoring of adversaries, enabling real-time tracking of naval assets like US carrier strike groups across the Indo-Pacific.

In 2010, China's orbital presence was modest, with approximately 36 satellites supporting nascent navigation and reconnaissance efforts, primarily through early BeiDou prototypes and Yaogan ISR platforms.

By contrast, 2025 saw China's total operational satellites exceed 1,060, second only to the United States globally. This leap stems from record launch cadences—92 missions in 2025 alone, deploying over 300 payloads—and investments in proliferated low-Earth orbit (pLEO) architectures.

A core driver is the Yaogan series, the PLA's flagship ISR fleet, which by mid-2025 comprised over 510 satellites equipped with optical, radar, and electronic intelligence sensors. Platforms like Yaogan-41 in geostationary orbit provide high-resolution persistent imaging, while Yaogan-43 handles multi-role tasks. These assets have demonstrated on-orbit interception simulations, hinting at nascent anti-satellite capabilities.

Dual-use constellations amplify this menace, with the Gaofen Earth-observation network—officially civilian—delivering sub-metre imagery for strategic reconnaissance under the China High-resolution Earth Observation System (CHEOS).

By July 2024, Gaofen included at least 32 satellites, expandable for military targeting. Similarly, commercial ventures like Jilin-1 (over 300 planned by 2025) and G60 (72 satellites by mid-2025, targeting 648 by year-end) offer high-capacity connectivity and broadband rivalling Starlink, readily re-purposable for battlefield command.

BeiDou-3, China's global navigation system with about 50 active satellites, ensures precision positioning and time synchronisation for PLA strikes, independent of GPS. Fengyun meteorological satellites (nine operational) bolster environmental surveillance, while Shijian experimental platforms—six launched in 2025—test satellite refuelling, towing, and sub-satellite deployment, aligning with doctrines for space dominance. Thousand Sails (Guowang), with 90 satellites toward a 14,000 goal, mirrors this hybrid approach.

This proliferation fuels alarms, as US Space Force assessments warn of China's 510+ ISR satellites enabling "informatized warfare" with unprecedented revisit rates. In 2024, 26% of 260 deployed payloads were ISR-focused, doubling in 2025 amid 68 launches. Ground-based lasers, jammers, and projected space-directed energy weapons by the late 2020s complete the arsenal, threatening adversary constellations.

For India, this poses acute risks in South Asia, where enhanced ISR tracks border movements and naval patrols in the Indian Ocean. Beijing's bilateral space pacts with 26 nations since 2022, including dual-use tech sharing, extend its influence. The 2025 DoD report underscores PLA exercises jamming EHF communications, directly challenging regional powers.

Projections indicate China's fleet tripling by decade's end, with G60 expanding to 13,000-15,000 satellites by 2030 for global coverage. This "quantity over quality" strategy, backed by Long March rockets from four launch sites, erodes US advantages and complicates orbital management. Civil-military fusion obscures intent, allowing seamless wartime pivots.

Countering this demands accelerated indigenous capabilities, such as India's planned 52 military satellites by 2029, alongside ASAT tests and pLEO development. Alliances like QUAD space dialogues and resilient architectures will prove vital against Beijing's orbital supremacy bid. The era of uncontested space access has ended, ushering in a new domain of strategic rivalry.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)