China has signalled that it will not participate in new nuclear disarmament talks at this stage, following the expiry of the US-Russia New START treaty.

Beijing clarified that it supports the advancement of arms control and disarmament, but emphasised that any movement in this direction must be grounded in principles that sustain global strategic stability.

The spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Lin Jian, stated at a news conference that China’s nuclear capabilities are on a different scale from those of the United States and Russia, and therefore it would not engage in disarmament negotiations at this juncture.

Analysts have warned that the expiry of New START could intensify concerns about a renewed global arms race. The treaty, initially agreed in 2010, had placed limits on deployed strategic warheads and permitted on-site inspections to verify compliance.

When the treaty neared its end, the United States indicated that any future agreement would need to include China, underscoring Beijing’s pivotal role in any comprehensive strategic arms framework. 

China, however, has historically resisted binding caps that mirror those imposed on Washington and Moscow, arguing that its own nuclear posture is defensive and that comparisons to the larger nuclear powers do not capture the nuances of China’s security environment.

Beijing’s public stance reflects a broader pattern in which China questions the structure and fairness of Western-led disarmament frameworks. Chinese officials have repeatedly asserted that arms control should promote global stability without coercive or unequal constraints, a position that complicates efforts to bring Beijing into a renewed or expanded agreement.

The United States has framed any future talks as contingent on China’s participation, while Beijing has called for a balanced approach that recognises regional dynamics and China’s strategic deterrence requirements. The argument often centres on ensuring that any limits apply equally to all major nuclear powers and that rising capabilities in non-deployed or responsive systems are adequately addressed.

Russia and the United States still possess far larger stockpiles compared with China, with estimates suggesting more than 80 percent of the world’s deployed strategic warheads are held by the two nations. 

By contrast, China’s strategic arsenal is believed to be smaller but has been expanding as Beijing modernises and diversifies its forces. The difference in scale complicates attempts to negotiate a universal framework that both constrains and reflects each country’s security calculus.

Advocates of renewed arms control worry that without formal constraints, a nexus of rapid growth and strategic modernization could heighten miscalculation or misinterpretation of intent among rival powers.

The expiry of New START also raises questions about verification and transparency. The on-site inspection regime that once allowed for direct verification of each side’s declared inventories has not been operational for several years, and the pandemic’s disruptions have prolonged that silence.

In this environment, confidence-building measures and verification mechanisms become more fragile, potentially increasing risk even as countries pursue modernisation programmes. Proponents of renewed arms control argue that even a limited framework with robust verification could help manage uncertainties and signal a commitment to preventing a destabilising arms race.

Beijing’s current stance does not categorically close the door on future negotiations. It suggests that any engagement on arms control will need to be grounded in a comprehensive understanding of global strategic stability and tailored to China’s security needs.

The Chinese side also appears to prefer a phased approach, prioritising stability and restraint before engaging in legally binding limitations that include all major powers. This position mirrors long-standing Chinese assurances that its nuclear force remains inherently defensive and that Beijing seeks to avoid entangling itself in agreements perceived as unequal or prejudicial.

For regional observers, China’s decision not to join talks at this stage maintains the status quo, but it leaves a vacuum in multi-lateral efforts to curb nuclear escalation. The absence of a broadened pact could make it harder to establish a universal cap that includes Beijing, Washington, and Moscow on an equal footing.

In the meantime, both the United States and Russia continue to operate within a post-New START environment, where transparency remains limited and strategic competition persists. The United States has emphasised the importance of Chinese participation for any comprehensive framework, while China has called for more fundamental reforms to the architecture of arms control that reflect evolving geopolitical realities.

The expiry of New START without a renewed agreement has intensified concerns about possible shifts in the global arms balance. While China asserts that its nuclear doctrine remains defensive and that its capabilities are not directly comparable with the larger arsenals of the United States and Russia, the absence of a binding, verifiable framework increases the complexity of maintaining global strategic stability.

The coming months and years will likely see continued debate over whether a broader agreement can be achieved, and if so, what form it should take to accommodate the disparate security calculations of the major nuclear powers.

Based )n AFP Report