Asim Munir has achieved what no Pakistani general before him managed without tanks or decrees, FirstPost reported.

Through the Defence Forces Act and the amended National Command Authority Act, passed by parliament on August 20, he now holds unified command over the Army, Navy and Air Force.

He possesses the authority to hire, fire and retire officers at will, controls the nuclear command structure through a loyal appointee, and sits permanently as the Prime Minister’s chief military adviser.

This consolidation of power was not seized by force but handed over legally, with parliament signing away prerogatives that Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf had to wrest through coups.

Munir’s position is further strengthened by lifetime immunity from prosecution, secured through the 27th amendment last November. This has created a form of martial law without the formal declaration of martial law.

No unconstitutional act exists for courts, allies or the public to challenge. Unlike past military rulers, whose legitimacy eroded over time because their initial seizure of power was unlawful, Munir has removed that vulnerability. His authority is now embedded in law, making reversal far more difficult.

Pakistan’s history of coups has followed a familiar script: suspension of the constitution, rule by decree, and eventual handover under pressure. Munir’s ascent breaks that pattern. He has amassed more power than any of his predecessors held on their first day in office, but without the stigma of illegality. This inversion is what makes the current moment unprecedented and deeply consequential.

Externally, Munir has sought validation through rapid defence diplomacy in the Gulf. Within days, Pakistan signed a defence pact with Kuwait on August 27, following the Mecca agreement with Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

These agreements are less about strategic depth and more about optics. Pakistan’s military has long sold training and manpower to Gulf monarchies, but the pace of recent deals is striking.

At a time when domestic legitimacy is weakest, photographs of Munir alongside Gulf defence ministers allow Rawalpindi to project international respectability. It signals to Pakistanis that the military remains a serious actor abroad, even as unrest spreads at home.

Domestically, three provinces are simultaneously aflame. Sindh has joined Balochistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in open protest. This convergence is alarming. Sindh was the province that formally backed Pakistan’s creation in the 1940s, when Punjab’s political class was still undecided. Its current rebellion is not a minor uprising but a warning reminiscent of East Pakistan before 1971.

Balochistan’s insurgency has already forced the army into judicial concessions it resisted. In PoK, thousands of Rangers were required to suppress a single march. Islamabad is now considering constitutional changes to grant interim provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan and PoK. This move would formalise Pakistan’s hold over occupied territory precisely when its grip appears weakest.

The grievances fuelling these fires are varied—water shortages, land disputes, demands for provincial autonomy—but they converge on the same conclusion: the state’s writ is thinning. The army chief’s personal authority may be growing, but the legitimacy of the state itself is eroding faster.

Munir’s legal coup has created a paradox. He holds absolute power, yet faces provinces in revolt. The absence of tanks on the streets does not mean Pakistan is stable. Instead, it suggests the country may be sleepwalking into a fifth coup—one that requires no coup at all.

Agencies